GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

- Taiwan
- Anti-Americanism
### Corporate Members

- Air New Zealand Limited
- ANZCO Foods Limited
- Asia:NZ Foundation
- Australian High Commission
- Beef + Lamb New Zealand Ltd
- Business New Zealand
- Catalyst IT Ltd
- Centre for Defence & Strategic Studies, Massey University
- Department of Conservation
- Department of Labour
- Dept of the Prime Minister & Cabinet
- Fonterra Co-operative Group
- Gallagher Group Ltd
- HQ New Zealand Defence Force
- Landcorp Farming Ltd
- Law Commission
- Ministry for the Environment
- Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry
- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Economic Development
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Science & Innovation
- Ministry of Social Development
- Ministry of Transport
- New Zealand Customs Service
- New Zealand Police
- New Zealand Trade & Enterprise
- New Zealand United States Council
- Reserve Bank of New Zealand
- Saunders Unsworth
- Science New Zealand Inc
- State Services Commission
- Statistics New Zealand
- The Treasury
- Victoria University of Wellington
- Wellington Employers Chamber of Commerce

### Institutional Members

- AGMARDT
- Apostolic Nunciature
- British High Commission
- Canadian High Commission
- Centre for Strategic Studies
- Council for International Development
- Cullen - The Employment Law Firm
- Deloitte
- Embassy of Cuba
- Embassy of France
- Embassy of Israel
- Embassy of Italy
- Embassy of Japan
- Embassy of Mexico
- Embassy of Spain
- Embassy of Switzerland
- Embassy of the Argentine Republic
- Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Embassy of the Federative Republic of Brazil
- Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
- Embassy of the People’s Republic of China
- Embassy of the Philippines
- Embassy of the Republic of Chile
- Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia
- Embassy of the Republic of Korea
- Embassy of the Republic of Poland
- Embassy of the Republic of Turkey
- Embassy of the Russian Federation
- Embassy of the United States of America
- High Commission for Malaysia
- High Commission for Pakistan
- High Commission of India
- High Commission of Papua New Guinea
- Independent Police Conduct Authority
- New Zealand Red Cross
- NZ China Friendship Society - Wellington Branch
- NZ Horticulture Export Authority
- Pacific Cooperation Foundation
- Political Studies Department, University of Auckland
- Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Royal Thai Embassy
- School of Linguistics & Applied Language Studies, VUW
- Singapore High Commission
- Soka Gakkai International of NZ
- South African High Commission
- Standards New Zealand
- Taipei Economic & Cultural Office
- Tertiary Education Commission
- The Innovative Travel Co.Ltd
- United Nations Association of NZ
- Volunteer Service Abroad (Inc)
- World Vision New Zealand
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Governance and multilateralism in the 21st century

Tim Groser focuses on international economic issues with strong emphasis on trade and climate change.

It is a statement of the obvious that political ‘governance’ exists on sub-national, the nation-state and supra-national levels. It became fashionable in policy circles some ten to fifteen years ago to talk of the ‘porous’ nature of modern sovereignty.

For a variety of reasons it became more noticeable that power was being ‘drained’ from the nation state in two opposing directions. First, it was becoming more and more practical to deal with problems below the level of central government – technology being a key enabler. Second, there was a growing realisation that the nation state was increasingly incapable of dealing alone with a wider variety of ‘cross-border’ issues than the traditional suite of policies in trade, international financial and security affairs – trans-national pollution being a classic example. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations, which are trying to align climate change policies, are the ultimate expression of this trend. No wonder this is fraught with difficulties.

This growing realisation around the nature of power and responsibility socialised a political concept long discussed in European policy circles — the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, another political word that sounds decidedly odd when translated literally from French to English (like ‘modalities’ in trade negotiations). However, the core idea is anything but odd. I understand it as follows: we should seek to devolve power to the lowest level of political responsibility (or governance) consistent with the scale of the problem. Or to put it more crudely — small problems should be dealt with locally, problems too big for the nation state should be dealt with through multilateral, bilateral or plurilateral arrangements (whether legally binding or not).

This still leaves the vast bulk of responsibility for governance with the nation state. Any thought that this trend spelled the slow decline of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states would be absurd. For as long as we can forecast, the sovereign nation state will remain the dominant political actor internationally. States will accept limitations on their sovereignty but only in return for reciprocal limitations on the sovereign power of other states to engage in actions damaging to their own country’s interests.

Hon Tim Groser MP is the minister of trade. This article is the edited text of an address he gave to the NZIIA at Victoria University of Wellington on 16 August 2012.

The global governance system is undergoing substantial change. In particular, the nation state is under unprecedented challenge from two directions — the sub-national and supra-national. Technology is helping to facilitate the former, while emerging trans-national problems are driving the latter. Even so, for the foreseeable future the sovereign nation state will remain the dominant political actor internationally. States will accept limitations on their sovereignty but only in return for reciprocal limitations on the sovereign power of other states. This lies at the heart of negotiations in many areas, not least international trade. But the state-based system’s modus vivendi must be adjusted to reflect shifts in relative power.
Same principle

Exactly the same principle lies at the heart of all trade negotiations. The whole point of the TPP and the WTO is to put some reasonable limitations on that sovereignty around principles and policies that we know work and are mutually beneficial. For the most part, the limitations will be moderate, sensible and largely about binding in existing policy settings. We — and no doubt all of our negotiating partners — will make our decisions at the end of these negotiations when we can see the balance of the deal in terms of our overall national interest.

So, how well are we doing at the beginning of the 21st century? What metrics should we use to see how well the system has worked since the end of the Second World War, which established the key mechanisms of global governance?

In my view, the answer is clear: the institutions of global governance have underwritten enormous social, economic and political progress. Obviously, far more is driving this than just the institutions of global governance — technology and the spread of ideas is a massive contributor. The key word is ‘underwritten’.

A simple real-world example should be enough to make the point. In 1950 South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. There was an infamous Australian Senate inquiry into the state of Korea at the end of the Korean War, which basically wrote the country off in provocative terms. They could not have known where Korea stands today: on a purchasing power parity basis Korea is around US$35,000, and New Zealand is on $29,000 per capita.

Key reason

You do not need to be an expert on Korean economic history to know that the export-led development strategy would have been literally impossible without the Koreans being able to access the relatively open trading system underwritten by the GATT. They started, as most developing countries do, with simple, labour-intensive textiles, garments and shoes. Their success led to an explosion of real wages and structural adjustment out of these early stage development options. When I was ambassador to Indonesia over fifteen years ago, the entire Korean footwear industry, or so it seemed, had migrated to Tangerang — an industrial and manufacturing hub of Java, some 25 kilometres from Jakarta.

Today, we know South Korea as the most ‘wired’ country in the world and a source of extraordinary innovation with brands like Samsung, Hyundai, and LG becoming household names. This success story would not have happened without effective global governance that opened the door to spectacular Korean development. However, Korea still needed to do the business itself. Years of training as a diplomat prevent me from naming a group of other countries that sat alongside Korea in 1950 as the poorest of the poor. Some of them are still languishing.

They have had the same opportunities the global governance system offered South Korea. For different reasons, they have not yet been able to seize those opportunities and solve the most basic developmental problems facing their peoples. A conventional way of summing up the issue is to say that an effective global governance regime is a necessary but not sufficient condition for countries to move ahead.

Tentative conclusions

If we look at this matter on a global basis, some tentative conclusions seem warranted. We are discussing ‘governance’, but this is a high level abstraction far above the daily concerns of people around the world. What matters to people around the world, at least in material terms, is:

- personal security and the relative absence of war and violent conflict, without which no economic or social progress is possible;
- progress on the developmental issues facing the vast masses of poor people in the world: grinding poverty, malnutrition, low life expectancy, illiteracy, disease, and lack of opportunity for half of humanity who happen to be women.

By almost every metric, the last 60 years have seen progress unparalleled in the history of mankind. We must be doing something right.

In terms of personal security, my father and I were the first generation of European ethnic males who were spared what my two grandfathers were not — periodic slaughter of young men on the battlefields, usually for reasons of great power rivalry when there were no fundamental ideological differences amongst them (First World War) and sometimes, and more respectfully, to determine fundamental doctrine about global governance and values (Second World War). No doubt my son and grandson (when the latter is old enough to contemplate the issue) would regard this as ancient history. It is not.

We know the exceptions — people in Aleppo, Syria’s second city, are dying now; parts of Africa are still in a war zone; there are still major challenges ahead of us in Afghanistan; there are still huge risks from terrorism. However, by the standards of any other epoch, we are seeing more and more people living in conditions of comparative tranquility. It could change tomorrow with some ghastly strategic mistake, but that is where we are today.

Falling rate

Deaths resulting from war-related violence have fallen 45 per cent since the 1990s and 70 per cent since the Cold War, according to figures compiled by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. In spite of spectacular publicity in certain localities — often of drug-related crime — crime-related fatalities have declined roughly three-quarters across all countries in the last decade. In Europe, murder was ten times as common before the industrial revolution per head of population as it is today.

You would have been either a sublime optimist or a fool (or Winston Churchill, who clearly was neither) to have bet on ‘democracy’, however defined, in 1940 being the predominant form of government 60–70 years hence. In 1940 most of the world was gripped in various forms of authoritarian government, fascist,
Dramatic progress
If we pass from the political/security to the economic, the progress is even more dramatic. This is more familiar territory — most informed people know the usual metrics about the rise of life expectancy, rise in caloric consumption amongst people in developing countries, the extraordinary decline of absolute poverty, particularly in China and Indonesia.

Let me instead quote some deliberately provocative statistics: the average Botswanian earns more in real terms than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The Chinese are ten times as rich and live 28 years longer than they did 50 years ago.

Just remember these metrics the next time you hear a ‘doom and gloom’ lecture on the state of world governance. So my conclusion is this: whatever deficiencies there may be, the existing system of global governance has worked pretty well. I do not see any facts-based case for radical changes, with one obvious exception: the system of global governance that we have brought into the first quarter of the 21st century seems to have proven its worth.

Massive shift
I think the situation is challenging but far less dramatic. The main point is clear. There is a massive shift of relative political and economic power — a subject we’ve all heard about. The IMF, World Bank and major regional financial institutions such as the ECB seem too under-equipped, under-resourced and fractured politically to deal with the greatest international economic crisis since the 1930s with all eyes focused on the Eurozone.

In climate change, the drive towards a single ratifiable, legally binding agreement stalled at Copenhagen in 2009 in spite of the presence of President Obama, Premier Wen and the generally good and the great — most of whom were uselessly stuck in the coffee bar of the improvised conference centre, relying on coffee and gossip while we tried to find out what on earth was going on. Meantime, in the absence of a climate change treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol we are heading remorselessly towards levels of CO2e concentration levels that are dangerous to human beings with little hope of a binding multilateral framework to discipline domestic policies.

The rise of China and the emerging economies — all of which have little or no ownership of the existing multilateral institutions — pose a transcendental challenge to the primacy of the Western liberal order, systemised in multilateralism over the last 60 years.

Head for the hills! Say the last rites! Prepare for the Apocalypse. And while you are at it prophesising all this doom and gloom, ask for your speakers’ after dinner fee, since catastrophist theory sells well.
their views.

This is a deliberate exaggeration. In terms of my experience, large and powerful countries will usually try to accommodate small countries’ legitimate interests provided this does not compromise their own essential interests. I have many practical examples in my head behind this observation.

**Attenuated democracy**

If, in terms of analysing international governance, we use the term ‘democracy’ to describe the concept of equality of nations, we need to recognise that ‘power’ always attenuates ‘democracy’. Certainly, the IMF and several other multilateral institutions have near universal membership, but they also have weighted voting systems. The UN General Assembly is a one country, one vote institution — pure democracy on the surface. But sitting above the General Assembly is the Security Council with its five permanent members, reflecting the balance of power in 1945 and their permanent veto.

Other institutions of global governance balance power with democracy in informal and subtle ways — the WTO is the most obvious example. There is a voting system inherited from the GATT, but for all practical purposes it is a dead letter. I have not done the research, but I recall only one time in the 30 years I have been associated with multilateral trade diplomacy when it was used.

To say that ‘power always attenuates democracy’ in global institutions is not necessarily a negative statement. To make multilateral systems work, two or three ingredients are always required:

- The most powerful countries need to drive the decision-making process; otherwise the institutions of global governance become just vacuous debating chambers issuing meaningless communiqués, ‘action plans’ and declarations of no consequence.
- Skilled facilitators are needed to help powerful countries, which have a huge capacity to talk past each other.
- Some self-restraint, and respect for the interests of smaller countries not involved deeply in the engine room of an international negotiation, is required on the part of the most powerful countries. They must start the process of developing convergence on key outstanding issues, but they must leave space for others. This is both a matter of substance — smaller countries have distinct interests and are perfectly capable of blocking a consensus if those interests are ignored — and a matter of form. Alexander Hamilton famously observed that ‘men will often oppose a thing simply because they have had no hand in its making’.

**Historical example**

That nothing changes fundamentally when human beings are involved is indicated by my favourite historical example: the process of negotiating the Treaty of Vienna. This famous conference developed many of the techniques and modalities used in multilateral diplomacy today — the term ‘final act’ being one example.

My rough recollection of the history is as follows. Europe hardly be more acute. We owe a great debt of gratitude, in my account. They found ways to involve Talleyrand, the great French foreign minister.

There were over 30 German principalities — this was, of course, before the unification of Germany under Chancellor Bismarck. The Pope and the sultan of the Ottoman Empire (or their senior diplomats) were there too. Trying to get an international consensus was like herding cats. What has changed, it might well be said? So the inner power grouping of the major countries basically established what we call ‘convergence’ and then took political responsibility for selling those ideas to the outer concentric rings of smaller countries or principalities. It worked — only the Pope and the Ottoman sultan refused to sign the final act. One assumes that the secular nature of the deal was probably the root cause.

**No change**

Nothing has changed internationally because human beings have not changed. This is how diplomacy works today. It only works when the great powers understand they have responsibility for making the system work, can find ways to work together even if they have bitter histories and conflicting interests and, finally, stop short of imposing a deal on the smaller countries so the final deal has something for everyone in it. It is all about balance and requires commitment and creativity.

In short, global governance needs informal and highly effective leadership from the most powerful countries. Without that, there is no effective global governance, just drift. And here is the nub of the problem facing us in the early 21st century: how do you adjust for shifts in relative political power?

In the immediate post-war era in the trade arena, we had close to a single global hegemonic power — the United States. That country imposed a liberal order allowing defeated Axis powers remarkable room to recover their power, their status and well-being. American power and leadership, underwritten by rapid economic growth, drove the post-war global governance agenda.

Obviously, this was consistent with US national interests and some important design faults were made — in the area of international monetary co-ordination, the asymmetrical adjustment process putting all pressure on deficit countries and not surplus countries in a system of fixed exchange rates was perhaps the most obvious. However, this is a counsel of perfection. The contrast with the previous global conflagration of the First World War and the punitive peace of the Treaty of Versailles that followed it could hardly be more acute. We owe a great debt of gratitude, in my view, to that generation of American political leadership.

**Growing cracks**

Cracks were beginning to appear in the system by the early 1970s. As the deficit costs of the Vietnam War rose, causing capital flight from the United States, Nixon closed the gold window in 1971,
ending unilaterally the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates. Some ten years later, the US trade representative, Bill Brock, made his famous speech which invoked the term ‘the level playing field’ and foreshadowed for the first time the willingness of the United States to engage in free trade agreement bilateral trade liberalisation, starting with the US–Israel free trade agreement.

In effect, these events were watermarks not of American power in an absolute sense, but of American relative power. America was not a weaker place; other countries had simply become relatively stronger as they recovered from the disasters of the Second World War.

It was a signal of intent from the United States — we will play a huge role in international governance but do not expect us to do all the heavy lifting. If we fast-forward another decade into the 1990s, the US Senate rejected the Kyoto Protocol 95–0. The key driver was the same issue: the failure of the Kyoto Protocol to impose comparable obligations on the increasingly powerful developing country emitter countries. The unipolar world has given way to a multi-polar world and it will only strengthen in this direction.

**Transition question**

The G-20 has effectively replaced the G-8 (formerly G-7) as the centre-piece of global governance in the economic sphere. It is a profoundly positive shift. Given the vast and accelerating shift of power to China and the emerging economies, the idea that the developed world (plus Russia) could seriously manage governance in the 21st century is risible.

Unfortunately, it is equally clear that whatever institutional machinery lies beneath the G-20 (and I have attended one as a ‘special observer’ on trade), it is completely undercooked. Declarations from the highest level of political power are made and there appears no drive shaft to turn the wheels.

I was literally astonished that when the G-20 met in Washington on 15 November 2008 (days after the National Party won the New Zealand general election and I was appointed trade minister), they issued a clarion call to their trade ministers to go to Geneva to complete the WTO Doha Round. Not only did their trade ministers ‘fail’ to do what their heads of government had called for, none of them even bothered turning up in Geneva to try. Actually, even if there were good reasons for totally ignoring what their leaders had said, it is a sign of the disconnect at the highest level of international governance.

The good news is that it is abundantly clear that the emerging economies to where the power is flowing value and wish to improve, not replace, the existing machinery of global governance. They are queuing up to join the key institutions of global governance, not to leave them — Russia being the latest to join the ‘international rule set’ implied by WTO membership. Absorbing the underlying culture of these liberal institutions is another matter and will take time. But it is impossible to read (say) BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) communiqués and draw the conclusion that they reject root and branch the existing institutional machinery.

**Fundamental difference**

In this sense, the ‘challengers’ to American pre-eminence (China, India and the major emerging economies) are fundamentally different to the competition of the 1950s and 1960s — the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union indeed had a fundamentally different agenda, driven by an incompatible ideology and consciously created competing and parallel institutional governance machinery to the Western machinery.

We are, post-1989 and ‘fall of the Wall’, in a completely different space with those who are jostling for influence today. Indeed, some leading emerging economies seem to be reinforcing the prudence of the existing system. It was instructive that President Calderon of Mexico issued well-judged appeals to the developed world to get their debt under control. He was right to do so. But anyone who remembers recurrent Mexican debt crises of 20–30 years ago could hardly fail to notice the irony of the student turned instructor.

At the same time, these huge and increasingly powerful emerging economies still face formidable development challenges. There are hundreds of millions of very poor people in China. In climate change, the imperatives of development will continue to trump politically the need to get on top of their rapidly rising emissions. A ‘Second Commitment Period’ made pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol deals only with 15 per cent of global emissions.

**Remarkable immaturity**

We are moving towards a multi-hegemonic system of power but the global governance system that would match that is remarkably immature. My central view is that it is not a fundamentally different system that needs to be designed, but rather the informal modus operandi of the system needs to change to reflect the shift in relative power.

The issue here is about leadership: no system of global governance can work without it. When China joined the WTO, I heard some deeply experienced people speculate on how the WTO would work with the ‘800 pound gorilla’ in the ring. The concern is entirely the wrong way round. The greater danger is the opposite — that these great emerging economies may not use their huge weight and influence to provide leadership but behave too passively.

There can be no definitive conclusion to this. I think we are in a process of transition and the trick here will be to ensure that something gets done on both trade and climate change during that transition.
Taiwan update: domestic reform and soft power diplomacy

Stephen Hoadley comments on the state of economic and political affairs in the small but prosperous Republic of China.

In a neighbourhood dominated by major powers, measured demographically and economically as well as geo-politically, Taiwan is barely visible. Nevertheless its government has achieved much in enhancement of prosperity, democracy and human rights, and these achievements have contributed to the success of Taiwan's soft power diplomacy.

Relatively small in population (23 million), Taiwan ranks ahead of Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia and Mongolia, but behind the rest of its Asian neighbours. Its islands are not rich in minerals, timber, fish, or hydrocarbon energy resources. Nevertheless, the people of Taiwan enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of New Zealanders, particularly when measured by the purchasing power parity (PPP) index, and six times higher than that of their mainland Chinese counterparts.1

Economic transformation

Taiwan is one of the four 'Asian tigers', exemplars of rapid economic development following the Second World War, following the model of Japan and foreshadowing in some respects that of China. The 'Asian tiger model' identifies government-led investment and innovation in manufacturing for export as the key strategy.2 The Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan fits the model inasmuch as it was semi-authoritarian until the 1980s. The mainland military and civil elites of the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party that retreated to Taiwan upon the victory of the People's Republic of China in 1949 were strongly motivated to modernise economically and militarily to defend their island haven.

Military and development aid from the United States, building on infrastructure bequeathed by the Japanese colonial administration 1895–1945, gave the Taiwan economy a boost and allowed the ROC government to channel domestic savings to favoured entrepreneurs for further development. Furthermore, the openness of the US market provided a lucrative outlet for Taiwan's exports, initially processed foods and light manufactured goods, and later its high-tech electronics and information technology products. With the advent of Deng Xiaoping's 'open policy' in 1978, Taiwan's manufacturers moved much labour-intensive work to the China mainland, with consequent cost savings.

Investment in education at all levels, and dispatch of students to higher study in the United States, sustained the drive to innovate and export and, as well, broadened social opportunity. Policies to provide health care and public amenities, clean up the environment and encourage energy-saving practices followed. Despite exclusion from participation in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Taiwan in 2007–08 reduced its carbon emissions by 4 per cent at a time when most industrial countries' emissions were rising inexorably, as were New Zealand's.3 Consequently, enjoying a secure, comfortable, and sustainable lifestyle at home, few Taiwanese feel the need to emigrate, minimising the brain drain.

Despite diplomatic isolation, Taiwan as an economic entity has joined the international trend to trade liberalisation. It entered the WTO in 2001, has completed free trade agreements with four of its Central American partners, and is currently negotiating free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore. It aspires to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in due course.

Democratic transformation

The ROC government presided over economic growth 1949–87 as a one-party state exercising martial law. However, starting in 1987 the administration led by President Chiang Ching-kuo initiated a series of domestic civil liberties reforms that brought liberal multi-party democracy to the country in little over a decade.4

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The Republic of China on Taiwan has transformed itself from an authoritarian one-party state into a liberal democracy in less than a quarter-century. It has developed its economic base from small-holder agriculture to high-tech manufacturing and exporting, and reformed its society and environment to distribute Taiwan's new wealth. To offset its diplomatic ostracism, the ROC government has devised innovative unofficial diplomacy stressing rapprochement with neighbouring China, achievement of international trade, human rights and environmental standards, deployment of soft power such as aid, and projection of a non-confrontational approach to regional problems. An economic co-operation agreement with New Zealand is imminent.
These reforms included the lifting of martial law, the ending of media censorship and public assembly constraints, the abolition of distinctions between mainlanders and Taiwanese, and the institution of direct elections for the legislature and the presidency. In 2000 the heretofore opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected peacefully to power, and in 2008 the Kuomintang was returned, thus establishing a pattern of two-party alternation in power.

Beijing, backed by the threat of retaliation.

Soft power

Consequently ROC leaders turned to non-governmental organisation channels to facilitate international contact, and this led them to adopt ‘soft power’, or power of example, as a means to win respect and gain voice in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. ROC leaders set about adopting Western democracy and human rights standards (and economic, social, and environmental standards as well) in order to make Taiwan into a model polity, thereby gaining influence by attraction.

Throughout this transition period the ROC attempted to rejoin international organisations. It was eventually successful in joining APEC, the WTO, the International Olympic Committee, and the World Health Assembly, although not as a sovereign state but as a hybrid entity labelled Chinese Taipei or other title devised to mollify Beijing.

The ROC government’s initiatives to enhance human rights protections and ratify international human rights treaties were part of this effort to ease Taiwan’s diplomatic ostracism, for it promised to link the ROC to treaty bodies such as the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee, and to the UN Secretariat, where treaty ratifications are deposited. It was hoped this would enhance the ROC’s engagement with international institutions and raise the ROC’s profile as a constructive actor. The linkage was made explicit by President Chen in his assertion at his inaugural speech in 2000:

The ROC cannot and will not remain outside global human rights trends.... We will bring the ROC back into the international human rights system.

Continuing reforms

But the ROC faced unique obstacles to completion of the ratification process. Because the ROC had no official status in the United Nations, it asked Nauru to submit the instrument of ratification of the CEDAW, but in March 2009 Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon refused to accept it. Similarly, the ROC’s instruments of ratification of the ICCPR and ICESCR, submitted on

Diplomatic adaptation

In 1971 the ROC withdrew from the United Nations General Assembly and most international organisations, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took its place in accordance with the One China Policy. As most governments of the world, including New Zealand’s, switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC, the ROC was reduced to three dozen small diplomatic partners, mostly Pacific and Central American mini-states. The ROC was obliged to conduct its relations with the rest of the world through trade and cultural offices, often labelled Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO) as in Wellington and Auckland, and informal or unofficial contacts by officials, within the limits set by

Taipei
its behalf by Nauru, Belize, The Gambia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines, were also rejected. Undeterred by these brush-offs, Taiwan in 2012 published its first report on compliance with ICCPR standards, fulfilling its obligation as if it were a treaty member, outperforming those treaty parties chronically delinquent in submitting reports. Reports on compliance with the CEDAW, which entered ROC law on 1 January 2012, are to be issued every four years as prescribed.

Other initiatives to raise the ROC’s international profile continued in parallel. In 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the NGO Affairs Committee, which served, among other functions, as a channel through which ROC officials in an unofficial capacity could participate in international conferences, including those on human rights. In 2003 the Chen administration established the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), modelled after the US National Endowment for Democracy. In 2004 its chairperson noted how the TFD helped the ROC to ‘keep in step with international democratic processes to spread Taiwan’s democratic experience’. The following year the TFD established the Taiwan Youth for Democracy in Asia, which in turn supported the World Forum for Democratization in Asia. President Ma’s administration set up a Presidential Human Rights Advisory Committee in 2009 as a step towards establishing a human rights commission, and in June 2012, with the TFD and Taiwan National University, sponsored an international symposium on compliance with the ICCPR and IESCR.

Aid power
One of the persistent images of China and Taiwan in the South Pacific is their ‘cheque book diplomacy’ rivalry as each vied for diplomatic recognition in the 1990s and 2000s. President Ma, along with new initiatives to co-operate pragmatically with China, in 2009 declared an end to this diplomatic rivalry and a reform of Taiwan’s aid programmes. The current emphasis of Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund is no longer on budgetary and infrastructure grants but on carefully targeted and monitored project aid, much of it for agricultural, medical and educational improvements in the islands. One notable project aims to make Tuvalu the first country in the world entirely independent of imported diesel fuel by 2013 by installing solar panels for power and lighting. Pacific aid is concentrated on the ROC’s five islands diplomatic partners — Solomon Islands, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Palau — but projects are also directed to Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Kiribati even though they are diplomatic partners of Beijing. Worldwide, the ROC gives aid to 39 countries plus several international agencies.

Tension reduction
When the confrontation in 2012 between China and Japan over the disputed islands of the East China Sea made world headlines, Taiwan’s role was largely ignored. It should be noted that the ROC’s claims to the disputed islands are identical to those of the PRC. But its methods were strikingly different.

NOTES
1. The International Monetary Fund’s 2011 per capita GDP PPP figures place Taiwan 19th with $37,720, New Zealand 32nd with $27,668, and China 92nd with $8382. (See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capi-
ta).
3. Environmental Protection Agency, Executive Yuan, Second National Communication of the Republic of China (Taiwan) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Executive Summary (Taipei, August 2011), p.6 (access at www.epa.gov.tw).

4. The following passages are drawn from a working paper entitled ‘Democracy, International Human Rights, and Diplomacy in Taiwan’ prepared by the author for the New Zealand Centre for Human Rights Law, Policy, and Practice.


13. Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (Taipei, nd), promotional brochure (received during an interview at the TFD on 10 April 2012, Taipei, Taiwan). I am indebted to my graduate student Andrei Zhavoronko for sharing this brochure and his interview notes with me.

Facing modern warfare’s legal challenges

Amichai Cohen reviews the efforts of the Israeli Supreme Court to apply the international laws of armed conflict in asymmetrical conflicts.

Recent armed conflicts are increasingly ‘asymmetrical’, an adjective used principally with reference to the fact that the protagonists are — on the one side — a state, with all its might and force, and — on the other — an organisation with few heavy arms and a limited number of fighters. But such conflicts are also asymmetrical in a more complicated sense: states possess sound reasons for following the laws of armed conflicts or international humanitarian law,3 and a high incentive and organisational obligation to do so. But non-state organisations almost never follow these rules and have very little incentive to do so.

States involved in these conflicts mostly attempt to follow, or are expected by the international community to follow, the laws of armed conflicts as detailed in customary international law, in the Geneva Conventions, and in other sources of applicable international law.3 However, it has become increasingly difficult to abide by these laws, mainly because of the novel nature of the problems that constantly arise during the course of combat.

Consideration of these and similar issues has motivated some scholars and politicians to call for the redefinition or reinterpretation of the rules of armed conflicts. The Geneva Conventions and their protocols, runs their argument, were framed in an era of more ‘classic’ military engagements, when wars were fought between nations and by armies that observed the rules of armed conflict. The norms that may have been suitable in such situations are not suited to modern armed conflicts.

Changes to the laws of armed conflicts may indeed be required, although it will prove very difficult to actually convince states to adopt them. However, before tabling dramatic changes, it might be useful to evaluate the current state of laws of armed conflicts, and ask whether some of the problems to which reference has been made above cannot be solved within the existing framework, without a need for reconstruction.

I shall present the attempts of the Israeli Supreme Court to provide contemporary interpretations to the laws of armed conflicts, which fulfil two functions. First, they would be workable and sensible from the viewpoint of a state engaged in asymmetrical conflict. Second, these interpretations would also be loyal to the principles and norms embedded in the laws of armed conflicts, as they currently stand.

Long history

The Supreme Court’s application of the international laws of armed conflicts has a long history, dating back to the Six Day War of 1967. After that war, when Israel came to control the ‘territories’,4 the Supreme Court, with the explicit agreement of the organs of the state, applied to the territories a set of international norms that form a body of law called ‘the international law of belligerent occupation’. Since Israel was almost the only state applying this body of law, and the Supreme Court was certainly the only court applying it, there were very few precedents for the court to rely on.

Over the years, the Supreme Court has created a detailed and wide-ranging jurisprudence of this body of law, dealing with issues such as the rights of private property, the rights of detainees, the scope of judicial review, and the legality of all kinds of security measures. The procedure which was most frequently used to develop this legal regime was when the Supreme Court sat as the ‘High Court of Justice’ — basically an administrative procedure, allowing the court to review the actions of the other branches of government, and issue writs and judicial orders to those branches which forbid them to take a specific action, or command them to take an action.

New uprising

In September 2000, after the failure of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian Authority’s President Yasser Ara-
fat to end the conflict at the Camp David meeting, the second intifada broke out. The Supreme Court was quick to recognise that this intifada involved far more than sporadic security breaches in occupied territories. The situation on the ground, with wide-ranging terrorism, suicide bombing and, above all, an organised Palestinian action from areas at least partially controlled by Palestinians, fulfilled all the requirements of the international definition of an armed conflict. The legal consequence was that the international laws of armed conflict were recognised to be the relevant legal regime controlling the events.

While deciding which legal regime controlled the situation was relatively simple, what is unique in the Israeli situation is that a national court was willing to entertain petitions and decide cases based on the international laws of armed conflict. Prior to 2001 almost no national court had ever applied the laws of armed conflict in administrative proceedings. Even today, the number of decisions in these matters in courts around the world is very limited. The fact that the Israeli Supreme Court was willing to deal with these issues is perhaps best attributed to its long history of jurisprudence regarding the international law of occupation. The Supreme Court rejected, prior to 2000, any suggestion that the court should limit its interference in matters involving the territories for institutional or political reasons. Hence, when the second intifada began, there was no jurisprudential reason for the court to limit its own role.

**Intifada jurisprudence**

As Professor David Kretzmer has noted, the intifada jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme Court can be divided into two parts. The earlier cases posited the Supreme Court as a mediator, accepted by both sides: the Israel Defence Force, on the one hand, and the Palestinians and international organisations, on the other. In other cases, mostly the later ones, the Supreme Court used international law, and interpreted it in ways that posited it as the main barrier between Israel and international criticism.

Let us briefly look at these two roles, beginning with the court as facilitator. The clearest example of the role of the Supreme Court as a facilitator is the 2004 Rafah decision (*Physicians for Human Rights v Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza*). The background is a military operation in the Gaza Strip, before the disengagement programme. A petition to the Supreme Court was submitted during a military operation. The petitioners, a group of non-governmental organisations, raised many questions relating to the conduct of the operations, most of them concerned with allowing the transfer of food and drugs for civilian use. Their claims were based on the duties of Israel according to the international laws of armed conflicts, and the law of belligerent occupation. Basically, they claimed that even in the midst of battle Israel had the duty to transfer food and medical supplies to civilians trapped between the warring sides.

Whether or not this is a correct interpretation of international law is debatable. What is not debatable is that never in the history of Western legal tradition has a court heard a similar claim — in the midst of a battle regarding the rights of the enemy’s civilians.

The decision reads like a protocol of a discussion, in which the court attempts to facilitate an agreement between the petitioners and the Israel Defence Force. The parties are described as willing to negotiate on the basis of international law, and arrive at quite reasonable results. At the end, the court was left with just one contentious issue, on which it issued a decision.

Here we can see one strategy adopted by the Israeli Supreme Court to solve the problems associated with asymmetrical applications of laws of armed conflicts. The solution is institutional rather than substantive — if the sides could be brought to the table, then solutions could be found. Of course, ‘the sides’ is the problematic point. This strategy worked because non-governmental organisations were willing to represent the Palestinians and the IDF was willing to deal with their claims.

These claims are usually associated with the personality of the previous president of the Israeli Supreme Court — Aharon Barak. A legal giant, a strong and respected personality, and one who was accepted by all parties as a fair and impartial judge, he was able to conduct these ‘negotiations’ and arrive at specific results which protect both the security interests of Israel and the human rights of civilians who find themselves in the midst of battles. It is easy, then, to discard the relevance of these decisions to all other situations, including that the decisions were possible only in the Israeli context. But I caution against this view. Perhaps the specific judicial decision could have been handed down only by the Supreme Court, but its lessons are universal — modern asymmetrical wars require constant negotiations, recognition of non-governmental organisations and their special role and, above all, the willingness and flexibility to consider different methods in order to consider the rights of civilians in times of war.

Of course, facilitating a discussion works only if there are two sides that are willing to engage in a discussion, and when the other side comprises terrorists no discussion is possible — Barak or no Barak. Here the Supreme Court moved to consider the legality of specific actions of the IDF according to the international laws of armed conflicts.

**Many decisions**

There are many, perhaps dozens, of Supreme Court decisions that reference the international laws of armed conflict. Not all of them can be dealt with here. I shall try, therefore, to analyse one decision — the targeted killing case — and explain the principle that guides the jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme Court.

The December 2006 judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice, in *Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v The Government of Israel (the targeted killings case) constitutes one of the most interesting and comprehensive recent judicial pronouncements on the rules of international humanitarian law governing military operations against non-state military groups during armed conflicts. Although the court did not rule out the possibility that some targeted killing operations undertaken by the IDF against Palestinian militants would meet the demands of international legality, it emphasised that such operations are always subject to legal restrictions. In the words of Justice Aaron Barak, the departing president of the Supreme Court:

we cannot determine that a preventative strike is always legal, just as we cannot determine that it is always illegal. All depends upon the question whether the standards of customary international law regarding international armed conflict allow that preventative strike or not. The court made two separate observations. The first was that targeted killing is not completely forbidden according to international laws of armed conflicts, and might be permitted in specific cases where the object takes ‘direct part in the hostilities’. The second part of the decision was an application of the principle of proportionality to the case of targeted killing.

**Proportionality principle**

The principle of proportionality in the immediate context of the targeted killing decisions means something very specific: if too many innocent civilians would be killed as a result of the attack, then it may not take place. However, Barak’s use of proportionality here is based on a general conception, and it is this conception that is my interest in this article.

It seems as if Barak has taken in the targeted killings case, as well as in other decisions he issued on related topics, a broader view on proportionality, treating it as a general principle of the laws of armed conflicts (as well as a general principle of international law) that can serve as a direct source for introducing limitations on the conduct of hostilities. Hence, proportionality serves in Barak’s jurisprudence as an important legal standard for safeguarding fundamental human rights and interests.

According to Barak, a reviewed military measure must conform to three proportionality requirements:

- **rational link** — the means selected should rationally lead to the desired military objective;
- **least injurious alternative** — the means selected ought to cause the least possible harm;
- **proportionality stricto sensu** — the harm caused by the measure should stand in reasonable proportion to the anticipated military benefits thereof.

The court believed that the decision should not rest on issuing general declarations about the balance of human rights and the need for security. Rather, the judicial ruling must impart guidance and direction in the specific case before the court.

**Universal lessons**

I submit that the jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme Court teaches us two universal lessons about the application of the laws of armed conflicts in modern asymmetrical conflicts.

The first principle is that of flexibility — armies and states should negotiate and take into account changing circumstances when fighting these kinds of enemies. The second principle is the principle of proportionality — armies fighting these wars should not lose sight of their moral character, and consider the injuries to civilians, even if the enemy is not doing so.

I would add two points: first, perhaps there are other principles that should be considered regarding the application of the laws of armed conflicts to asymmetrical conflicts. However, any attempt to create ‘new norms’ to fighting asymmetrical conflicts that would be specific and exact would be self-defeating. An enemy that does not respect the laws of armed conflicts will only try to evade and bypass any new rules we create. The most we can ask of our soldiers, and indeed the minimum we can ask of them as well, is to be flexible in their attention to the needs of civilians, and to act morally in conducting their attacks. Second, the IDF, during the course of its recent operations and after them, has made an immense effort to operationalise these principles: by creating ‘humanitarian officers’; by taking ‘humanitarian breaks’ in fighting; and by meticulously considering the effects of each and every attack.

**NOTES**

2. Some, especially in the United States, use these two terms (laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law) as synonyms. Traditionally, the laws of war were called the laws of armed conflict. This signifies their general goal — to regulate armed conflicts according to pre-agreed forms. During
the second half of the 20th century, the terms were changed and
the name of this area of law became international human-
itarian law. Clearly, this change also shifted the focus of
the area of law from agreement between armies to protection of
civilians. For a general description see: A.-M. Slaughter and
L. Helfer, ‘Why States Create International Tribunals: A Re-
sponse to Professors Posner and Yoo’, 95 California Law Re-
view, 899 (2005).
3. For detailed descriptions of IHL see Yoram Dinstein, The Con-
duct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Con-
flict (Cambridge, 2004); Jean-Marie Henkaerts and Louise
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law
(Cambridge, 2005).
4. Once again, there are many terms that address the same tract
of land. Other names are: Occupied Palestinian Territories,
Judea and Samaria, or the West Bank.
5. According to the Supreme Court, the targeted killing opera-
tions examined in the case were undertaken during an interna-
tional armed conflict between Israel and Palestinian militant
groups. HCJ 769/02 — The Public Committee Against Torture
in Israel v Gov’t of Israel, judgment of 14 Dec 2006, para 21
(elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.
a34.pdf). We will not discuss here the accuracy of this conclu-
sion.
6. Ibid., para 60. Incidentally, the judgment was rendered on
Aharon Barak’s last day on the court.
7. The most problematic part of the decision is its expansive
interpretation of the term ‘direct part’, which amounted, in the
eyes of some, to the claim that everyone who takes some active
part in the terrorist act is actually a legitimate object of attack.
8. See Public Committee, at para 41.
9. See eg, HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v Gov’t of Isra-
el, 58(4) PD 807 (elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/
a28/04020560.a28.pdf); HCJ 7957/04, Mar’abe v Prime
Minister of Israel, judgment of 15 Sep 2005 (elyon1.court.gov.
il/files_eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf) (In both
cases the court struck down segments of the separation bar-
tier that caused disproportional harm to affected Palestinians.) See
also HCJ 3799/02, Adalah — The Legal Center for Arab Mi-
nority Rights in Israel v G.O.C. Central Command, judgment
of 23 Jun 2005 (elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/990/037/
a32/02037990.a32.pdf) (the ‘early warning’ procedure or
‘human shields’ case); HCJ 4764/04, Physicians for Human
Rights v Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip,
58(5) PD 385 (elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/640/047/
a03/04047640.a03.pdf) (the ‘Rafah’ case); HCJ 7015/02,
Ajuri v IDF Commander in West Bank, 56(6) PD 352 (ely-
on1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/150/070/a15/02070150.a15.
pdf).
10. Beit Sourik case, para 41. For a criticism of the application of
the third test of proportionality in the separation barrier cases,
see M. Cohen-Eliya, ‘The Formal and Substantive Meanings of
Proportionality in the Supreme Court’s Decision regarding the
11. HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v The Government of
Israel (2005), PD 58(5), 845.
Why is the Islamic world anti-American?

Ashok Sharma examines the challenges ahead for the United States in the Middle East.

As a security analyst, I think the United States is a better alternative than any other power or combination of powers in the management of global affairs. However, the United States is not performing up to its potential in the Middle East. Once again, the United States is clashing with the governments and people of the Middle East and the larger Islamic world. The violent protests in cities across the Islamic world recently targeted the symbols of US influence, such as consulates, schools and restaurants, in reaction to a crude film named ‘Innocence of Islam’ made in the United States by a right-wing Christian group that ridicules Islam. These violent protests have resulted in the killing of four US officials of the diplomatic mission in the Libyan city of Benghazi, and more than two dozen protesters died in associated confrontations with authorities. In much of the region, police from broadly pro-Western regimes attempted to contain the protests, but in Iran crowds had official sanction to chant ‘Death to America’ and ‘Death to Israel’ in central Tehran. In Pakistan the government declared an official holiday for the love of the Prophet and in the Sudanese capital Khartoum parts of the British and the German missions were pillaged.

The United States’ immediate response was the resolve by the President Obama to stand by the fragile fledgling democracies of the Middle East, while deploying platoons of Marines to vulnerable embassies and launching a manhunt by the US military and intelligence agencies in Libya for the militants who staged the assault on the Benghazi consulate.

These events suggest that despite Obama’s arrival in the White House and all the efforts that his administration has deployed, anti-Americanism in the Islamic world has not abated. The resurgence of anti-American protest has become an important issue in the on-going Global War on Terrorism and US policy in the Middle East, emerging again in US presidential debates in October 2012, in which Republican candidate Mitt Romney accused the Obama administration of having a weak and muddled stance.

Longstanding sentiment

But anti-Americanism is not new in the Islamic world. The genesis of anti-Americanism and anger against the United States and the West among the larger Islamic community can be traced to the US–West European political hegemony in the Middle East seeking to exploit the lucrative oilfields, their support for Israel in the 1978 Israel–Lebanon War and in Israel–Palestine conflicts, and their overall foreign policy in the Middle East. More recently, anger was generated by the United States’ continued support of Israel, the post-9/11 US response to the attack on America, the ‘Clash of Civilisation’ arguments regarding Christianity and Islam, and the lack of modern liberal democratic secular values, education and systems in the Islamic world.

It is a paradox that the United States has given more aid to the Middle East than any other country, yet Americans are the least prepared to cope with the world they have inherited and shaped in the post-Second World War period. Since its emergence on the global stage, without intending to, America has entered into the lives of most of the people on Earth by sharing the American dream, sprinkling the stardust of hope into billions of eyes and liberating hundreds of millions, accumulating huge reservoirs of goodwill during in the last century. But in the post-Cold War period America displayed indifference to the plight of others and unwittingly alienated huge populations and especially a majority of the 1.2 billion Muslims. Reservoirs of goodwill have been replaced with reservoirs of anger and resentment. Suddenly a country that used to have substantial political influence in the Middle East has found itself in a situation in which it not only is finding it difficult to maintain its political influence but also cannot stem the increasing anger directed at itself and its Western allies.

But when it comes to dealing with Islamic radicalism and terrorism, the problem becomes even more complex. It is not about dealing with one state but with the different religious beliefs and value systems and non-state actors that are using asymmetric means — particularly terrorism — to achieve their objectives. Contemporary Islamic terrorism is carried out to further the political and religious ambitions of a segment of the Muslim community in the name of Jihad. It is rooted in the history of Islam and its response to Westernisation and modernisation. As Western power grew and the division of the Islamic world deepened,

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The recent rise of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world can be attributed to muscular US counter-terrorism strategies and actions in the Middle East in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001. Washington faces daunting challenges in dealing with the Islamic world. The United States should continue not only to frustrate the Islamic militant and jihadist actors but also to promote democratic values and institutions in these countries. Alongside prudent defence against terrorism, Washington must place greater reliance on soft power and sensitive diplomacy based on intelligent statecraft oriented to long-term reform.
moderate progressive movements in the Middle East, such as socialism or even nationalism, did not prevail. Modern values like secularism, modern scientific education and modern political systems based on democratic principles have not been able to flourish in the Islamic world. The increased globalisation is often feared by the Muslim community, which concludes that Western values will destroy their traditional Islamic way of thought and life.2

Facilitating factor
The facilitating factor that enables modern trans-national terrorism is the development of and accessibility to the means of communication since the late 1960s. Trans-national terrorism began to proliferate then as a result of the expansion of commercial air travel, the ubiquity of televised news coverage and broad political and ideological interests among extremists that coalesced around a common cause.3 In recent decades these factors have sustained anti-Americanism and anti-West propaganda among the larger Muslim community through modern means of communication, especially the internet. Terrorists have used these means of communication to spread their extremist ideology, to co-ordinate attacks to pursue their political objectives and also to vent their anger against the West. Examples of media-rich attacks were the Black September 1972 Munich Olympics hostage-taking and murders, the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, and suicide bombings in Lebanon in 1983 and hijackings of TWA Flight 847 in 1985.

Another factor in this growing rift between the Islamic world and the West has a cultural explanation. The preservation of culture and identity by Muslims against the cultural penetration of Western products and materialism has created what might be called a cultural-structural anti-Americanism and anti-West feeling. The social changes associated with globalisation and the spread of free market capitalism appear to overwhelm the identity or values of Islamic believers, who perceive themselves as the losers in the new international system. At the local level, this cultural friction may translate into conflicts along religious or ethnic lines.

Increased terrorism
Moreover, the end of the Cold War created conditions for increased terrorism. Disgruntled groups blamed the newly predominant United States for their failure and perceived marginalisation. Unable to give vent to their opposition to US foreign policy through legitimate means, these forces began to adopt terrorism or attacks on US embassies and missions to show their opposition to US foreign policy and hatred of the United States. Anti-Americanism solidified after the US attack on Afghanistan, then Iraq. The alleged torture in US prisons such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib gave further fuel to the radical forces and helped them to indoctrinate the larger Muslim community worldwide with anti-Americanism.

The US strategy to deal with Islamic terrorism has been successful at home, but it has not been so internationally. Since the 9/11 attacks the two presidents have adopted different strategies. George W. Bush responded to 9/11 with the Global War on Terror with a confrontational and military style. But Barack Obama took a different approach: he focused on winding down the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while attacking al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, and removing the organisation as a threat to the United States and the world at large. He had some success, and can rightly claim that he has ended the Iraq War, persevered in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and essentially decapitated al-Qaeda.

Negative perception
Despite Obama’s less confrontational and military approach than his predecessor’s in dealing with Islamic world and the Global War on Terrorism, the overall perception of America in the Islamic world, as revealed by the Pew Global Attitude Project released on 13 June 2012, continues to be negative.3 Europeans and Japanese
remain largely confident in Obama, albeit somewhat less so than in 2009, while Muslim public opinion remains largely critical. In the European Union and Japan, views are still positive, but the United States is still unpopular in nations such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan. There remains a widespread perception that the United States acts unilaterally and does not consider the interests of other countries. And American anti-terrorism efforts are still widely unpopular. In nearly all countries, there is considerable opposition to a major component of the Obama administration’s anti-terrorism policy: drone strikes. In seventeen of 20 countries, more than half disapprove of US drone attacks targeting extremist leaders and groups in nations like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.

The poll findings show that, notwithstanding dissatisfaction with Obama’s policies, there was still significant support for his re-election in many countries, especially in Europe, Brazil and Japan. But in the Middle East this trend was negative and there was little support for a second-term presidential bid — majorities in Egypt (76 per cent), Jordan (73 per cent) and Lebanon (62 per cent) did not support Obama’s re-election. However there was no other candidate who got more support than Obama. Moreover, in the Muslim nations Obama’s ratings — while not especially high — were still more affirmative than those of Bush. Even in many nations where overall ratings for the United States remain low, certain aspects of American ‘soft power’ are often well-regarded. For instance, the American way of doing business is especially popular in the Arab world — more than half in Lebanon (63 per cent), Tunisia (59 per cent), Jordan (59 per cent) and Egypt (52 per cent) say they like this element of America’s image.

Daunting challenge
The challenge for Washington in dealing with the Islamic world is daunting when the traditional power of the United States appears to be waning, and the world is witnessing the emergence of other powers. If the United States is to maintain its pre-eminence, tactful diplomacy is needed. This will require the readjustment and reformulation of foreign policy institutions and practices.

The United States must continue to frustrate the Islamic jihadi radical groups while at the same time promoting democratic values and institutions in these countries in accordance with the democratic peace doctrine. True, US and NATO forces have been able to topple dictators like Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi and introduce democratic governments. But terminating dictatorial regimes is not a sustainable policy. Establishing a puppet government, however democratic it may be, is not a solution because citizens will always regard with suspicion any government set up by a foreign power. In the long run, the people of these countries will sustain democratic progress only when it is consistent with their social norms and values.

The United States must learn to deal more tolerantly with continued Muslim disillusionment and anti-American violence and more sensitively with Muslim leaders whose policies are convergent with those of the United States. The best US strategy is thus to enable the people of these countries to conduct their own politics and decide their own fate themselves while co-operating with compatible leaders. The building of democratic institutions, ensuring real participation of the people and introducing a modern education system based on liberal democratic secular values will be the policies most likely to succeed in the long run, though most difficult to accomplish in the short run. For the United States this means that alongside prudent defence against terrorism Washington must place greater reliance on soft power and intelligent statecraft based on smart diplomacy. And it must devise and patiently implement policies promising long-term improvements rather than superficial remedies.

NOTES
Making a difference

Phil Goff discusses New Zealand’s role in the world.

I want to look first at the things that define our place in the world. On that basis I want to consider how we have responded in the past to events internationally and the role that we can play as a small nation to pursue our values and interests.

New Zealand’s first and obvious defining characteristic is our size. With 4.3 million people, we are roughly a third the size of cities like Delhi, Moscow and Sao Paulo, and one-eighth the population of China’s Chongqing municipality. We are neither a big power nor a middle-level power, such as Australia would define itself. But our smallness is something we share in common with over half the member states of the United Nations.

Half of the world’s countries have a shared interest in working to ensure that global decision-making occurs within a framework that takes account of their interests and needs and not simply those of large and powerful countries. That leads us to focus on and promote multilateralism and entrenching an international rules-based system.

New Zealand’s second defining characteristic is our relative geographic isolation. We are, as David Lange once quipped, ‘a strategic dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica’!

Isolation has at times been helpful. It has protected us against invasion. It has kept us free from territorial disputes with our closest neighbours. Australia and Pacific Islands countries are three or more hours away by air, Peru and Chile eleven hours distant and South Africa fifteen hours. It has helped protect us against bio-security threats, people smuggling and international crime, though globalisation and modern transport and communications today diminish that protection. The major disadvantage of distance is that we are a long way from our markets, which explains our enthusiasm for free trade agreements to secure access for our exports.

Major conflicts

Notwithstanding our isolation, New Zealand has never been isolationist in its outlook or its policies. The downside of that is that we have been drawn into the major international conflicts of the 20th century. On 12 October we commemorated the 95th anniversary of the Battle of Passchendaele. In the first four hours of the attack on 12 October 1917 846 young New Zealanders were killed and by the end there were 2700 New Zealanders killed or wounded.

The commemoration was held in Auckland War Memorial Museum’s Hall of Memories. The names of over 18,000 killed in the First World War are inscribed on the walls. For a country of then barely one million people, this is a huge casualty rate. We sent 100,000 soldiers to fight in a war that served no good purpose. Far from being a war to end all wars, it succeeded only in planting the seeds of a second world war just 21 years later. The speeches given at the Passchendaele commemoration, by two retired colonels, paid tribute to the courage and self-sacrifice of those who gave their lives but did not glorify war. They talked of its horror. While monuments are often dedicated to ‘The Glorious Dead’, there was no glory in the manner of their deaths.

From those experiences, it is natural that we should today be strongly committed to a stable, secure and peaceful world. In 1945 Peter Fraser, our wartime Labour prime minister, took that commitment to San Francisco, where victor nations met to devise a post-war architecture to avoid a repeat of the world wars that had twice ravaged the world. There is irony in Peter Fraser being jailed for opposing conscription in the First World War and conscripting men to fight in the Second. But the circumstances were quite different and post-1945 we set out to avoid the mistakes made in 1919. We can be proud of the role Fraser and New Zealand played as a founding member of the United Nations and in devising its Charter.

New Zealand shares with half the world’s countries an interest in working to ensure that global decision-making takes account of their interests and needs and not simply those of large and powerful countries. Multilateralism provides a suitable framework for such an approach. We want to see entrenched an international rules-based system. Although one of the world’s most isolated states, New Zealand has never been isolationist in either outlook or policies. Our sometimes painful experiences have left us strongly committed to a stable, secure and peaceful world. New Zealand leaders have played active roles in promoting multilateralism, not least in the creation of the United Nations in 1945.
**Veto fight**

Fraser fought hard against the principle of the five permanent big country members on the United Nations Security Council having a veto over collective action by the council, a stance we have maintained ever since. That power has been used on various occasions by countries acting in their self-interest rather than the interest of the wider international community. Most recently Russia and China blocked a collective response to the conflict in Syria, where over a thousand people a month, mainly civilians, are being killed. Lack of united international commitment made Kofi Annan’s mission impossible and will be a huge obstacle to Lakhdar Brahimi’s efforts to end the conflict.

Syria highlights the shortcomings of multilateralism and the need for reform of the United Nations. New Zealand supports reform to ensure that a multilateralist and rules-based international system can achieve a peaceful, socially just and environmentally sustainable world. Structures and working methods can undoubtedly be improved. However, the fundamental weaknesses in the UN system lie in the lack of will and commitment among member states to reach agreement on solutions and to implement them. New Zealand can best support multilateralism through promoting a values and evidence-based approach to the problems the world confronts.

Without the size, the resources and the military and economic clout of larger nations, New Zealand’s path to exercise influence must be through the strength and logic of our arguments, and the values and principles behind them. A critical prerequisite of that is being seen to be fair and independent in the positions we take and not being seen to simply echo the views of any other country.

For the first 100 years of our existence as a country, we followed Britain, epitomised by Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage’s speech shortly after New Zealand declared war on Germany in 1939: ‘Where Britain goes, we go. Where she stands, we stand’.

Notwithstanding this, New Zealand had in fact already begun to mark out more independence in its thinking, being one of a small minority of countries in the League of Nations that opposed Italian aggression against Abyssinia.

**American alliance**

When Britain was unable to provide protection against the Japanese invasion of South-east Asia and the Pacific, New Zealand transferred its reliance to the United States. We pressed hard for the formation of the ANZUS alliance in 1951. Alliances create obligations and ANZUS subsequently led us into the Vietnam conflict. It was, in Labour’s judgment, an ill-conceived and unnecessary war. Our effective participation in ANZUS ended in 1985 when our commitment to New Zealand being nuclear free in practice as well as in principle clashed with the desire of the United States not to confirm or deny whether its naval ships visiting this country were nuclear armed.

Labour’s policy is that New Zealand should not seek to reactivate its involvement with ANZUS or any other alliance which might prescribe New Zealand’s future position and action on international issues. Nor would Labour invite the troops of any other country to be permanently stationed on New Zealand soil, for the same reason.

Labour supports training and exercising alongside other countries. Where the United Nations supports collective action we would be prepared to commit peacekeeping or combat troops in situations where New Zealand judges this to be necessary. We will make our own decisions on the merits of each case, and according to our values and principles.

We made the decision to deploy in East Timor and the Solomons, alongside Australia, in a way that we believed was appropriate. We made the decision to deploy to Afghanistan in the face of al-Qaeda’s using that country as a base to launch international terrorist attacks. Likewise, when the commitment of the SAS and the provincial reconstruction team should be ended is a judgment for New Zealand to make. When a deployment ceases to be able to realise achievable objectives, as is the case in Afghanistan today, we would end it.

**Iraq resistance**

Labour decided against becoming involved in the 2003 invasion

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*NZIER* 19 (2015) Peter Fraser

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![Battle-weary US troops take rest in the open at Pukekohe during the Second World War](image1)

![Student protest in America against the continuing Vietnam War](image2)
of Iraq, because we believed that it was not justified and would not achieve what was claimed. We were right. A National government would have taken a different position.

We welcome the removal of restrictions by the United States on bilateral co-operation at all levels. It is natural that we should have a warm relationship with a country with which we have a shared history and shared commitment to democracy and freedoms. But that does not require us to surrender our decision-making to its judgments.

That applies also to Australia. We do a lot and have a lot in common with Australia. We will continue to place priority on co-operating with it in our region and in our bilateral relationship on the development of a single economic market. But decisions on New Zealand’s positions internationally will reflect judgments made in Wellington, not Canberra.

I should add that a single Australasian economic and labour market means that a national from either side of the Tasman working in the other country and paying taxes should have the same rights as other permanent residents in that country. That includes a social safety net and the right to representation. Australians living permanently in New Zealand have these rights, but since 2001 New Zealanders living permanently in Australia do not. A position where people pay taxes for years but are denied the safety net of income support when needed, for example in the case of serious illness or redundancy, is unfair and unsustainable. They have paid for that support through their taxes.

Deepening relationship

Our relationship with China has grown comprehensively and deepened over recent decades. However, China continues to have a system of governance which does not reflect the democratic and human rights that are fundamental to our values. We need to be honest about our differences. As foreign minister I raised issues such as human rights on a regular basis in talks with my counterparts. We should continue to do so. We should also continue to seek closer engagement with China on the raft of issues where we have mutual interests and concerns. As with other countries, we will reserve our right to make our judgments on international issues independent of influence or pressure from China.

China and the United States are both powers with enormous economic influence in our Asia-Pacific region. It is in the region’s interest and in our interests that the two countries co-operate to the maximum extent to ensure peace and stability, and growing prosperity, which depends on that. It is vital that resolution of issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the relationship between China and Taiwan be resolved peacefully rather than by conflict.

What specific roles can New Zealand play to influence and make a difference in the world? The first is in our continuing contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation. In respect to weapons of mass destruction, the two are, of course, inter-related. Nuclear-armed nations have no moral high ground in calling for non-proliferation, unless they are willing themselves to commit to relinquishing their nuclear weapons and act on that commitment. New Zealand has a strong track record on opposing nuclear testing, proliferation and possession of nuclear weapons.

While the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has stagnated, the most recent Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Process made better progress. As disarmament minister, I pressed at the United Nations for nuclear weapons to be taken off high alert. That is now achieving wide support. I also worked actively to ensure progress on a convention against cluster munitions, which resulted in the Oslo Convention outlawing possession and use of these weapons. A majority of countries have now signed this convention and more have committed to it. The Syrian government is reported to be currently using cluster munitions, in defiance of the wider consensus. Questions should be asked of countries supplying it with these weapons.

Next step

I believe the next step by New Zealand should be the promotion of a nuclear weapons convention, banning nuclear weapons entirely. I do not under-estimate the challenges involved, but we should tackle those challenges. We cannot be complacent about the fact that humans for the first time in history have the ability to destroy our planet. We cannot ignore the risks of nuclear weapons being used either by political misjudgment or miscalculation, by accident or by terrorists, who are seeking to acquire and may gain access to such weapons.

While the National-led government is currently reluctant actively to support a nuclear weapons convention, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee recently endorsed a proactive stance by New Zealand in pursuing a convention, working alongside other small and like-minded countries to achieve this. Labour promoted that position. Labour also endorses New Zealand actively supporting the conclusion of the Arms Trade Treaty. The international community must stop the supply of weapons to groups and states where they are likely to be misused in exacerbating conflict.

Secondly, Labour will be looking to expand New Zealand’s role in conflict prevention and resolution. While war between states has declined dramatically since the Second World War, millions of lives have been lost in intra-state conflicts. The international community has sent peacekeepers into post-conflict situations, but much more effort could be applied in preventing the outbreak of violence by helping resolve conflict at an earlier stage.

Active role

As a small and non-threatening country, with a reputation for integrity, New Zealand could be playing a more active role. Our potential to make a real difference can be seen in our record in Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomon Islands. Our Police Force and Defence Force have demonstrated their ability to win confidence through their professionalism and willingness to respect the local people they work with.

Individual New Zealanders such as David Harland, who is...
working for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, Andrew Ladley at Victoria University, who distinguished himself in East Timor, and David Shearer, who did great work for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, reflect our capacity to handle such roles, together with very talented people in both our non-governmental organisations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

As we end our commitments over the next six months in Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, we should look at putting our effort, skills and resources into playing a greater role in mediation and conciliation aimed at preventing conflict and resolving differences. Our initial focus should be in the South Pacific.

**Election bid**

Thirdly, Labour will be actively supporting New Zealand’s bid for election to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2014. New Zealand has not been on the council for 20 years. I believe in our last term on it we played a constructive and useful role. That won us respect and gave us valuable experience and contacts in the multilateral arena. Our strengths are the ability to provide competent and professional analysis of issues, an independent and impartial perspective, and our own experience as a multicultural society drawing from our Maori, European, Pasifika and Asian heritage. New Zealand has played an active role in the United Nations. It has been, in Kofi Annan’s words to me when I was foreign minister, ‘an exemplary international citizen and contributor’.

Fourthly, Labour is committed to rebuilding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, after the government’s unfortunate experiment in trying to corporatise the ministry. This has resulted in a plunging of morale and professional commitment and a loss of competent and expert personnel. The savings the government will make are small compared to both the short- and long-term costs incurred. We have also given the wrong impression to our European friends that in building up our presence in Asia we were downgrading the importance placed on our long-term relationships with Europe, with whom we have co-operated close-ly. When you have neither vast resources nor military strength, the professionalism and skills of our people in MFAT are critical to the influence we can exert.

**Climate change**

Finally, New Zealand needs to build on the leadership and influence it can exercise through its active involvement in areas such as climate change, securing a long overdue outcome through the World Trade Organisation Doha Round and through the quality of its international development assistance. New Zealand’s relinquishing of a leadership role in combating climate warming is disappointing, as is the international community’s failure to achieve consensus around remedial action. Labour would recommit to the objective of being at the forefront of actions to address climate change.

Likewise, while New Zealand has been successful in negotiating bilateral trading agreements such as the China Free Trade Agreement that I signed in 2008, which has seen a trebling of our exports to that country, there is no substitute for a comprehensive multilateral agreement. The Doha Round was focused on the needs of developing countries. It is also the only way to deal with subsidies that distort world trade and undermine environmental sustainability, and to ensure a coherent international trading system. Neither bilateral agreements nor the Trans-Pacific Partnership can compensate for the lack of a comprehensive and coherent agreement through the WTO which takes the interests of all countries into account.

On development assistance, Labour would restore the over-arching goal of poverty elimination, which includes good governance, equity and sustainable development. We would also commit to reversing the decline in the level of our assistance as a proportion of GDP.

Our future as a nation is closely bound to the global community of which we are a part — in respect to peace, security, stability and economic, social and environmental well-being. Building on past achievements, we can ensure that we are in a position to help shape that world.
A glance at Iran’s foreign policy after the revolution

Seyed Majid Tafreshi Khameneh outlines Iran’s approach to foreign policy.

In February 1979, we witnessed one of last century’s most important events — the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, following a spontaneous, grassroots revolution that had been absolutely unforeseen by the Western and Eastern powers.

Winston Churchill asserted that in our world nothing happens by itself; there must be a plan or programme for it. In light of the effect of Iran’s revolution on surrounding regions and its earnest resistance against the hegemonic powers of the world, we may conclude, however, that the origins of the revolution lay in the strong will of the Iran nation and the leadership of Imam Khomeini, and not in the plans of others.

In February 1979 we were in fact witnessing the downfall of 2500 years of monarchy in Iran. The last monarchical dynasty in Iran belonged to the Pahlavis, a regime that was overthrown in 1953 by Dr Mohammad Mossadegh’s grassroots movement with the assistance and support of the clergy. However, after an Anglo-American coup (Operation Ajax), the king (shah) returned and, against the will of the nation, ruled for a further 25 years.

US Justice William O. Douglas said in 1953 that even if it seemed that the United States had achieved its goals in overthrowing the Mossadegh government, by interfering in Iran internal affairs it had in fact breached international law and norms. For Iranians and the people of other regional countries, this step was the beginning of uncertainty about the United States and its foreign policy. This was a hugely mistaken US foreign policy approach, which unfortunately has been continuing ever since.

In assessing the foreign policies followed and practiced by the monarchies in Iran, in particular the last two dynasties — the Ghajars and the Pahlavis — it seems sufficient to point out that Iran lost the majority of its territories during their rule, in many cases even without war. Aran, Shirvan, Arministan, Gorjestan, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Chechenia, Ingushetia, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, parts of the Caucasus and Kyrgyzstan, Kurdistan and even recently Bahrain — more than 3.5 million square kilometres in all — have been separated from Iran within the last two centuries. Studies show that this vast dismemberment of a country is unprecedented. The separation of Bahrain from Iran happened as recently as Reza Pahlavi’s reign, when Iran was the strategic ally of the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel. No such disastrous events have occurred since the revolution in Iran, in spite of eight years of imposed war and the occupation of some crucial parts of Iran by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with the support of 35 countries, including many Western countries and in particular the United States, the United Kingdom and even a few Arab states.

I believe that a government that splits from its people and loses their trust will never have full authority, even though they might enjoy the support of outside powers. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Bahrain are current examples of countries in which revolutions are rooted in the very depths of the people and nation, against which no power can stand.

Important definition
To define foreign policy, I advance the following criterion: foreign policy is a government’s series of thoughts, methods, position-makings and measures to deal with foreign issues and situations, all taking place within the framework of the general goals and policies of that system. Defence against threats and invasions by other countries, removal of pressures, decrease of dependency, strengthening of the country’s dignity, authority and national identity, and the overall increase of the country’s influence and role within the international network definitely have special significance.

Iran’s foreign policy since the revolution — aimed at reaching the above-mentioned goals — has employed different interactions...
and dialogues based on different place and time conditions and circumstances, including:

- realistic or compromising-oriented interaction and dialogues
- idealistic or value-oriented dialogue
- interest-oriented dialogue
- culture-oriented dialogue
- value-oriented and self-esteem dialogue.

Imam Khomeini, the mastermind/architect of the Islamic Republic of Iran, believed that foreign policy should be based on:

- The principle of exporting the revolution. (This does not mean conquering other countries but rather exporting the values, beliefs and logic of Islam in inviting form. In this regard, many countries around the world have been colonised and suffered from hegemonic policies; they are interested in our thoughts and principles in the framework of foreign policy. In other words, I do not know of any oppressed country — I mean nation, not government — around the world that rejects and stands against us and the above-mentioned values.)
- The principle of neither practising hegemonic policies nor submitting to hegemonic ones, the best example of which is our resistance to unreasonable conditions in relation to the nuclear issue.
- The principle of defending Islamic doctrines and Muslims around the world.
- The principle of mutual respect and avoiding interference in other countries’ affairs and issues. (We have not invaded any country during the past 200 years and have not followed any war-causing policies.)
- The principle of resistance against oppression and tyranny (cruelty) and acceptance of the rights of the oppressed.
- The slogan ‘neither the West nor the East’ and simple reliance on our national and religious capacities, capabilities and achievements. (We have not signed any strategic treaty with the hegemonic countries and have remained an independent nation.)

Articles 152, 153 and 154 of Iran’s Constitution also cover the above-mentioned principles and goals.

**Unsuccessful efforts**

During previous governments, our foreign policy was for many years based on avoiding tension and trying to eliminate any ambi-

**Firmer framework**

The ninth government in Iran, using the lessons and experiences of the previous governments, came to this conclusion: that its foreign policy should follow a firmer framework, the result of which was the discouragement of some Western countries from developing their relations with Iran. But, of course, previous relationships...
Iranian literacy has increased from 50 to 90 per cent of population. This has happened while the population of the country has been doubling. The developments and growth in higher technology, different sports, scientific research, medical science, engineering, dam and road construction, car and aircraft manufacturing, satellite launching, and many other areas of science — all truly demonstrate the outstanding progress made by Iran. Having withstood sanctions and pressures, as well as being declared the world’s seventeenth largest economy in 2011, Iran has hardly pursued a failed foreign policy. Nevertheless, the hostility it has faced, and in particular the tyrannical sanctions imposed on it, has increased our costs and expenses, but the government, as the people’s representative, is pursuing the rightful demands of its completely free people.

Iran’s foreign policy calendar is marked by:

- the start of open hostility towards Iran’s nation during the formative years of the revolution in 1978 and 1979;
- the one-sided repeal of the contract for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant;
- the lack of co-operation with Iran’s new government over the question of returning both the king and billions of dollars to Iran;
- the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars to overthrow and destroy Iran’s revolution, mainly by the US Congress;
- the eight years of war imposed and managed by the super-powers in light of the UN Security Council’s deadly silence;
- the assassination of many authorities and officials in Iran, including the president, prime minister, the head of judiciary, many MPs and thousands of innocent people;
- the bombing of mosques and other holy places;
- the financial and logistic support of terrorist groups like Malke Rigi and MKO and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists by Israelis;
- the US attack on an Iranian passenger plane that caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent people;
- the US attacks on Iran’s oil sites;
- the United States’ evident violation of international law and it huge pressure on other countries to end or limit their relations with Iran;
- the endeavours to destroy Iran’s relations with its neighbouring Arab states by asserting ridiculous scenarios like the assassination of the Saudi Arabia ambassador to Washington;
- the training and deployment of espionage teams;
the blocking of Iran’s capital and accounts;
the pressuring of banks around the world to delimit and re-
peal their economic activities with Iranian companies and or-
ganisations;
the attempts to restrain and trouble Iran’s oil market;
the managing of the human rights scenario against Iran that
has been practiced before in relation to other countries, such
as China, and so many other hegemonic endeavours that they
could be a PhD topic.

These are the facts that constitute Iran’s calendar of foreign pol-
icy tribulations. And this is all because of its proclaiming a new
justice-oriented philosophy and doctrine, a philosophy that uses
the power of logic rather than the logic of power, and by jus-
tice-oriented means firmly standing up against some hegemonic
and imperial states, not nations.

The foreign policy of a country has two different faces: either
it is strong and successful or it is incapable and deteriorating. If
Iran’s foreign policy is incapable, helpless and deteriorating, why is
it that all these enormous energies and resources are continuously
working to devastate it? Is it possible to consider some mere con-
jectures and suspicions as threats to international security? Even if
we accept the big lie about Iran’s nuclear programme, can we say
power is power, both positive and negative? How can we accuse
Iran, a nation with an ancient history and civilization and a tra-
dition of peacefulness, of being a threat to the world’s peace and
international security? How can we deprive this important coun-
try of its share and effective place in protecting and strengthening
international peace and security? Perhaps the answer is that the
defenders of democracy do not truly attempt to establish peace
and security in the world and their benefit and interests in fact
demand the continuation of insecurity and war.

Today, the continuance of hegemonic and imperialistic pol-
icies, the misuse of Security Council resolutions, and the tragic
invasions of Iraq, Afghanistan and Bahrain have reduced the cred-
ibility of the United Nations and complicated more and more the
means of threatening the international peace and security.

Unfortunately, today’s terrorists can act more powerfully and
deadlier than previously and geographical borders are no longer
a barrier to them. Today, more than any other time, the world
needs solidarity, unity, and respect for all countries’ sovereignty
and religion, culture and lifestyles.

New logic
To sum up, the Islamic Republic of Iran is the first
country in the world to try to design and manage its
development mechanism outside the standard frame-
works of the West. The lessons of the past led us to
the conclusion that development and growth are not
easily available. Our nation has come to this certain-
ty: that the starters and architects of the First and Sec-
ond World Wars or the attackers of our neighbours
and intimidators of our peacefulness and security are
definitely not good role models for our foreign policy.
This new logic, although it has changed traditional
patterns and approaches, should not be treated as a
threat and must instead be respected.

I believe that the international community in
today’s problematic atmosphere, more than at any
time, needs wisdom and justice-oriented policies.
Today is no longer the time of the slogan ‘peace is
prior to justice’. The world is desperate for the motto

‘justice is the mother of peace.’

Everyone is responsible but those with more power have more
responsibilities as well. Those who started the First and Second
World Wars and killed millions of innocent people should con-
tribute more and show more flexibility. They are not our mod-
els. Today the lack of movement towards a world free of nuclear
weapons is a melancholic and costly approach. We should accept
that the time has passed for disrespecting nations and countries
and that progress and development is the right of every nation.

I am hoping that politicians will come to understand the truth
that we are doomed to live together and to tolerate each other in
this world. They must manage their policies to achieve and fulfil
the wishes and ideals of the real men of art, not somebody like
Adolf Hitler (provisional painter), with the aim of expanding and
increasing the welfare, peace, friendliness and general humanity
for all human beings.
Xu Jianguo argues the case for Chinese ownership of the disputed Diaoyu Dao Islands.

Since 10 September 2012, when the Japanese government announced its ‘purchase’ of the Diaoyu Dao Islands in a bid to ‘nationalise’ them, the dispute between China and Japan on Diaoyu Dao has been escalating. China’s firm opposition to Japan’s violation of China’s sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao and the Chinese people’s cohesively strong indignation have combined to deal a serious blow to the arrogance of the Japanese side. However, the disguise of ‘restraint’ and ‘constructive gesture’ could not cover up Japan’s true intent and restlessness. The Japanese government claimed that ‘Japan should make an all-out effort to strengthen its guard over the waters around the Senkaku Islands’. Japanese right-wing forces also clamoured for the building of facilities on Diaoyu Dao to strengthen Japan’s capability to confront China. The tension still persists in the area. Many New Zealand friends are concerned about the origin and evolution of the issue. As the Chinese ambassador to New Zealand, I feel fully entitled and obligated to unfold the truthful history of this issue and clarify Chinese government’s position on this issue.

Diaoyu Dao is an inseparable part of the Chinese inherent territory. They were first discovered, named and administered by China. The earliest historical record of the names of Diaoyu Dao can be found in the book *Voyage with a Tail Wind* published in 1403. Diaoyu Dao was under China’s jurisdiction from the early years of the Ming and Qing dynasty (the middle 14th century till the early 19th century). The ‘Roadmap to Ryukyu’ in the *Shi Liu Qiu Lu* written by imperial title-conferring envoy Xiao Chongye in 1579, the *Record of the Interpreters of August Ming* written by Mao Ruizheng in 1629, the ‘Great Universal Geographic Map’ created in 1767, and the *Atlas of the Great Qing Dynasty* published in 1863 — all marked Diaoyu Dao as China’s territory. Maps such as ‘A New Map of China from the Latest Authorities’ published in Britain in 1811, Colton’s ‘China’ published in the United States in 1859, and ‘A Map of China’s East Coast: Hongkong to Gulf of Liao-Tung’ compiled by the British Navy in 1877 also marked Diaoyu Dao as part of China’s territory.

In 1895, Japan illegally grabbed Diaoyu Dao after the Sino-Japanese War. In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration stated in explicit terms that ‘all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.’ In July 1945, the Potsdam Proclamation stated in Article 8: ‘The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.’ In accordance with the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, all the territory that was grabbed by Japan should be returned to China, which of course includes Diaoyu Dao.

On 8 September 1951, Japan, the United States and a number of other countries signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan (commonly known as the Treaty of San Francisco) with China being excluded from it. The United States arbitrarily included Diaoyu Dao under its trusteeship and ‘returned’ the ‘power of administration’ over Diaoyu Dao to Japan in the 1970s. China has, through diplomatic channels, strongly protested against and condemned the backroom deals between the United States and Japan over Diaoyu Dao. These backroom deals are illegal and invalid. They have not and cannot change the fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China.

Regardless of the large quantities of irrefutable evidence, Japan still exhausts itself in seeking to find a legal basis for its sovereignty claim over Diaoyu Dao. Why was Japan put in such an awkward position? Is it still the mania to wage a war of aggression? Is it still the colonialist mindset of enslaving Asian people? Or is it a daydream of whitewashing its historical crimes and denying the post-war international order?

On 7 December 1970, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt travelled to Poland and dropped to his knees before the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943. Many in the world were deeply moved by this famous gesture of repentance and apology. The extraordinary courage and sincerity of Germany won it trust and respect. After the Second World War, German and Japanese attitudes form a stark contrast. Unlike Germany, Japan has never seriously reflected on its military fascist past and made a serious apology. Instead, it tried to reverse the history. Such a remorseless attitude has made it difficult for Japan to earn the trust of its neighbours and the forgiveness of people around the world.

To forget history means betrayal. We must not forget the untold sufferings incurred during the Second World War. China and New Zealand are both victims of fascism. We have shared memories and pains. Chinese and New Zealand troops fought side by side on the battleground against Japanese military fascism. It is the common responsibility of China and New Zealand and the entire international community to reaffirm the outcomes of the war against fascism and maintain the post-war international order.
In the 19th century ‘Asia’ was in crisis. Societies that had stood largely unchanged for centuries seemed powerless to resist the aggressive thrust of Western nations into their widespread and populous territories. The aggression was not without a response, but often resistance came from only a limited number of writers struggling against the humiliations of subjugation.

An important question was how to construct an effective response to what Asians saw as the overwhelming use of modern technology and power. What should they accept from the imperial powers? What could they adapt and what reject? To some extent these questions remain unresolved even in the resurgent ‘Asia’ of today.

In his wide-ranging, perceptive and challenging book From the Ruins of Empire, Pankaj Mishra identifies three main strands of resistance. First, the traditionalists (in fact reactionaries) who believed that the area’s religious and cultural traditions would ultimately prevail. Secondly, the moderates who wanted to take the best of what the West had to offer leaving their societies essentially in place. Thirdly the revolutionaries such as Mao Zedong and Kemal Ataturk who thought that if their societies were to emerge into what might be called the modern world they would need radical, secular reform under the aegis of a new ideology.

Mishra begins with what was seen in Asia at the time as a hugely important event — the sinking in 1905 of the Russian fleet in Tsushima Strait by Japan, the rising star of Asia. Russia might have been surprised to find itself classified as ‘Western’, but, as Sun Yat-sen said, ‘the Japanese victory over this Western power infused Asia with new hope’.

Mishra’s constant theme is the deep humiliation suffered by formerly great empires at the hands of what they saw as crass, outward thrusting Europeans. Mishra identifies several distinctive traits that underlay the European successes — advanced technology and organisation (particularly in Western institutions), superior information gathering and imposed trade terms. He also discerns an underlying strength in financial innovation and, importantly, the development in the West of ‘rich public cultures of enquiry and debate’.

One might have expected Mishra to explore this theme through such household names in the West as Gandhi, Mao and Ataturk. But not so. He chooses instead three public intellectuals whose writings would inspire later generations. The first, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, travelled extensively as a journalist, teacher and agitator working in cafes, mosques and homes while being expelled in turn from Afghanistan, India and Turkey between 1860 and 1900. He had a marked ability to adapt to circumstances. Although a Persian-born Shia, he acted when necessary as a Sunni from Afghanistan. In his early days Mishra characterises him as a liberal. Mishra provides extensive background on conditions in many of the countries al-Afghani travelled through — his own experience of these defined his worldview. And, as Mishra says, ‘a history of his ideas cannot depend, as in the case of many Western thinkers, on published texts setting out clear concepts and well referenced biographies’. For Mishra, there was scarcely a social or political tendency in Muslim lands — modernism, nationalism and pan-Islamism — that al-Afghani’s eclectic sensibility did not cover. Nor was there an area of political action — anti-imperialist conspiracy, educational reform, journalism or constitutional reform — on which he did not leave the imprint of his ideas.
In drawing attention to al-Afghani’s current relevance, Mishra describes a visit in October 2002 (almost a year after the Taliban were driven from power) by the then American ambassador to Afghanistan to the tomb of al-Afghani at Kabul University. The ambassador not only pledged a donation of $25,000 to help restore the edifice but also in a speech referred to al-Afghani as a man ‘steeped in the learning of the Qu’ran, calling for freedom, reason and scientific enquiry... criticising the West for its materialism but not shying away from criticising the Muslim rulers of the day’.

**Foremost intellectual**

Mishra sees his second major figure, Liang Qichao, as ‘perhaps China’s foremost modern intellectual’. Liang observed many events that led to the destruction of his country’s old imperial certainties. As with al-Afghani, Liang wrote on virtually every issue that involved the role of the state. He stressed political reform and established ‘study societies’ to promote discussion. He then published his views through his own newspaper. He talked about teaching moral culture in schools and saw the urgency of developing education widely in the community. Confucianism presented a special problem. The social and ethical norms of this pervasive system seemed essential to the ruler and ruled if order was to be maintained in the community. But in the 1850s the idea was emerging that the too conservative interpretation of Confucius at the time would not assist China in adapting to the modern age.

Liang’s mentor Kang Youwei went further, stating that Confucianism had to be reinvented in order to save it. He wanted to make political reform and mass mobilisation a central concern of Confucianism to sanction the reformist aspirations of scientific and social progress. Kang focused on institutional reform. Although Liang saw material life as merely a means to the maintenance of spiritual life, he also saw the need for a strong state with a degree of consent from the ruled.

On democracy, however, Liang was deeply cautious. In practical terms it should not be imposed through revolution but cultivated over a long period. He saw even in America that the liberal political terms it should not be imposed through revolution but cultivated over a long period. He saw even in America that the liberal democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion. The extreme inequality he saw in New York coupled with the insidious democratic state had been achieved with much coercion.

On return to China only after the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty.

**Anti-Western rhetoric**

For Mishra the real significance of al Afghani is that he established the vocabulary of 20th century anti-Western rhetoric. In the case of Liang, Mishra sees a clear line from him to Mao Zedong, as Liang, while seeking a break with Confucianism, concluded that for now China must accept authoritarian law. Only in the fullness of time might the people possibly be given something like Rosseau’s ideas of a ‘what if’ question.1 Others, including Sun Yat-sen (China), Ali Shariati (Iran), Ataturk (Turkey) and Sayyid Qutb (Egypt), also walk across Mishra’s colourful stage.

In support of his decision to concentrate on the three protagonists, Mishra says Gandhi is now a ‘forgotten figure’ in the India of today. Marxism-Leninism has been discredited, while China’s own legacy of ethical politics and socio-economic theory ‘remains largely unexplored’. And even if it is exportable to other Muslim countries, Turkish style Islamic modernity does not point to an alternative socio-economic order.

**Human heart**

Liang invited the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore, Mishra’s third major Asian figure, to Shanghai in 1924 to give a series of lectures. Tagore hoped that the East might temper the machine-like nature of modern civilisation, substituting the human heart for cold expediency. But for China, India was something of a cautionary tale, being seen as a country of humiliated British slaves. Tagore, the apparently unworldly romantic, was nevertheless influential in transforming the awareness of his region through essays, poems and songs, two of which are now the national anthems of India and Bangladesh.

These early modern Asians, Mishra says, ‘stand at the beginning of the process whereby ordinary resentment against the West and Western dominance, along with anxiety about internal weakness and decay, was transformed into mass nationalist and liberation movements and ambitious state building programmes across Asia’. But major figures also appear. Nguyen Ai Quoc, better known as Ho Chi Minh, an indigent worker in Paris in 1919, rented a morning suit in the expectation of meeting Woodrow Wilson at the Peace Conference. He got nowhere near the United States president, prompting perhaps speculation on a theme of a ‘what if’ question.2 Others, including Sun Yat-sen (China), Ali Shariati (Iran), Ataturk (Turkey) and Sayyid Qutb (Egypt), also walk across Mishra’s colourful stage.

**Rabindranath Tagore**

There is a larger context. Reviewing Niall Ferguson’s *Civilisation* in The London Review of Books last year, Mishra demonstrated his ability to engage as a tough-minded polemicist. In a biting critical analysis of the historian’s account of the West’s rise, he focused particularly on Ferguson’s six ‘killer apps’ that enabled European domination — property rights, competition, science, medicine, consumer society and the work ethic.3 Mishra’s succinct reply saw these qualities as underplaying the role of slavery, colo-
nialism and indentured labour in the West’s rise. Deeply affronted by the tone of the essay, Ferguson talked about suing Mishra.

The debate goes on. For me, Mishra, a well respected writer, will reward those readers who want a wider perspective on the emergent Asia. His message is far from comforting. In his concluding chapters he is particularly pointed. As he says:

- Asia wanted to beat the West at its own game.
- There remains a widespread wish to humiliate the West.
- Asians are aware of Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, the ‘Western [sic] Financial Crisis’ and ‘the brutal but inept military incursions in Afghanistan and Pakistan’. These activities ‘sustain a powerful sense of Western hypocrisy, failure and entitlememt’.
- The West’s sense of supremacy remains entrenched in media commentary et cetera. But for others Western moral authority has been squandered. While the West’s power may still be feared, much of this was leached away in the Cold War’s many hot wars.
- The West’s reputation has been blighted by the ‘calamitous war on terror’ and ‘profoundly discredited’ by the collapse of the ‘Washington Consensus, the West’s vaunted model of unregulated financial capitalism’. Globalisation in Mishra’s view remains the subject of deep questioning. (I would add that this view gained some prominence in Asia after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 where inappropriate IMF initiated programmes were instituted. Post-recovery, Seoul and other Asian capitals rethought their economic policies to reflect their own interests and values.)

**Preliminary comments**

A Western-generated global financial crisis (or Great Recession) may not provide the most favourable setting to revisit (albeit superficially) the factors Mishra outlines concerning the foundation of European dominance of Asia. However, as we experience a decidedly resurgent Asia some preliminary comments may be made.

On political organisation and military technology, the West still dominates. Military power and the ability to project this power on a global basis is, no doubt, the biggest single factor in the United States’ continued presence in Asia. Asians have long memories, and some may be happy, though perhaps reluctantly, quietly to have the United States represented in their area to moderate the influence of China.

The closely linked factor of innovative scientific research still favours the West, but with many European companies transferring their production facilities Asia is in swift catch up mode. Given the sheer numbers involved, China could soon become a centre of scientific innovation in its own right, as Japan already has. But for Beijing significant technological advance depends to a large extent, but not solely, on a complex mix of factors involving political direction and stability, and freedom of education, thought and public expression.

**Huge consumption**

China’s huge consumption of raw materials is currently decisive in maintaining some buoyancy in a number of Western economies (New Zealand’s for instance). But how long this situation will continue and, equally, how long China will stay a relatively passive voice in setting the rules in international trade organisations also remain to be seen. As its productive capacity is hollowed out, the West’s continued capacity to dominate multilateral trade organisations must become increasingly doubtful. The question of financial innovation (capital raising, joint stock companies) underwriting the early Western thrust into Asia is currently a lost cause. Remarkably, a financial concept based on the efficient market hypothesis and the Washington consensus still holds sway among many Western policy-makers and academic economists.

Mishra’s reference to ‘rich public cultures of enquiry and debate [in the West]’ feeding on each other and across disciplines is one of the most challenging comments in the book. Currently, public debate in the West seems to have fallen prey to the imperatives of the mass media. In the United Kingdom the Murdoch parliamentary enquiry has revealed apparent criminal activity in relation to intrusive coverage given to the vulnerable, while owners seem consumed by politically driven ideological imperatives revolving around profits, scandal and celebrity. Newspapers and periodicals in the United States are currently under formidable pressure to survive in the face of invasive and highly informal social media. Informed discussion is at a premium.

Indeed, as the gap between rich and poor widens in the United States, huge corporate sums are directed at the presentation of the corporate agenda, while also becoming a decisive factor in elections, the results of which maintain the continuing dominance and privileges of the rich 1 per cent of the population. The public must increasingly exist on sound bites too often crafted by well paid publicity agents. It is some time since we have seen a detailed analysis of sustained economic reform that takes as its starting point the well-being of the community. This latter point potentially emphasises another growing gap in the community: a much needed discussion on the shifting ethical foundation of the communities we now live in — that is, when a knowledge of ethics in the community exists at all.

Mishra’s thoughtful and provocative book comes with a strong recommendation but a minor caveat about the rather too thin index. Why, in the computer age, good indexes should be a casualty in book publication eludes me.

**NOTES**

1. Given Woodrow Wilson’s overall performance at the Peace Conference, we can pretty much say that absolutely nothing would have emerged from the meeting. Wilson might have been making uplifting speeches about a world safe for democracy, but in his History of the American People he famously acknowledged America’s need for foreign markets, which, if need be, must be opened up by American power.


In 1995 Benjamin Barber wrote a book entitled *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (although in a post-9/11 world this volume seems to have been re-packaged under a new subtitle, *Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy*). That book examined the seeming paradox of global commerce, travel and cultural exchange at one level, but the persistence of tribalism and local identity at another, with Barber concluding that globalism was in fact causing rather than erasing localised counter-reactions. Probably many are more familiar with its famous cover, that of a supposedly incongruous image of a woman covered in a *niqāb* (veil or mask) and *abaya* (cloak) drinking a ‘*Pepsi*’. The image was perhaps designed to convey some sort of globalisation versus local paradox, although many were quick to note that the woman’s attire was emblematic of (probably) some deep cultural and religious significance, while the mere consumption of a soft drink was an example of a thin veneer or ‘surface culture’ that cannot count as having any impact on worldviews. (The consumption of ‘*Coke*’ and ‘*Pepsi*’ is fairly ubiquitous throughout the Middle East, as it is in many developing countries too.)

Malcolm McKinnon’s book *Asian Cities* takes another look at these kinds of globalisation discussions by examining the development of cities in three Asian countries, China, India and Indonesia. McKinnon then chooses a couplet of cities in each case, one a mega-city and the other of around 1–2 million people; respectively they are, Shanghai and Yangzhou, Bangalore and Mysore, and Jakarta and Semarang. Urbanisation is, of course, of great significance in modern Asia. McKinnon notes that cities of between a quarter of a million to five million people number around 200 in China and 50 in Indonesia. Most of these cities are totally unknown to the wider world.

Noting urbanisation as a phenomenon, McKinnon challenges attempts to equate the growth of cities with globalisation, which count in some circles, according to the author, as academic ‘fashion’. He further distinguishes between urbanisation (the ‘hardware’ of a city’s growth and expansion) and urbanism (the ‘software’ of giving people greater scope for expression). In seeking to examine the interplay of globalisation, urbanisation and nation-building, McKinnon’s research has depended on personal observations of the chosen cities and a range of ‘professional informants’. This volume finds that urbanisation in the selected Asian cities does not equate to globalisation, and may often strengthen local identities and assist with nation-building. One of the most interesting observations here centres around Bangalore, often thought of as a ‘synonym’ for globalisation, as evidenced by Thomas Friedman’s commentary in *The World is Flat*. Bangalore’s presence as an IT colossus in an internet-linked world should not obscure the fact that globalisation may play a slight role in the lives of the great majority of that city’s residents.

One could think of further lines of enquiry that emerge from this volume. Near the end of the book McKinnon notes forms of ‘South–South’ globalisation that are not visible to the West, giving the example of what occurs with the world of Islam. McKinnon identifies an important exchange, but one little discussed, in relation to Indonesia, whereby local forms of Islam are seen as resisting the (Western) influences of secularism or new forms of spirituality. Indonesia has received external influences from the wider Islamic world for hundreds of years, and in an age of travel and instant communications even Java’s indigenous Islamic movements can enjoy ready access to cognates in the Middle East. We also navigate a common dichotomy of a West with old and established nations and an Asia engaged in nation-building. Of course, Western countries have continuing nation-building challenges too; a few Western countries themselves are relatively recent unification projects, while China can claim the oldest set of government records in existence.

Overall, however, this is a fascinating and thought-provoking look at the development of Asian cities, and how this fits into globalisation, on one hand, and nation-building, on the other.

**ANTHONY SMITH**

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**EAT, DRINK AND BE WARY: A New Zealand Diplomat Looks Back**

**Author:** Jim Weir  
**Published by:** Dunmore, Auckland, 2011, 220 pp, $34.99.

Jim Weir is a retired diplomat who, in the course of a 35-year career, served as New Zealand’s head of mission in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Moscow and Rome. *Eat, Drink and be Wary* is his memoir of the people, places and events that featured in his long and distinguished career, excluding his stint as ambassador in the Soviet Un-
It started for Weir back in 1947. His ‘orientation programme’ consisted of being told to learn the United Nations Charter ‘preferably by heart’. The charter was a personal priority of the minister (and also prime minister), Peter Fraser, who had played a significant part in its drafting at the founding conference of the UN in 1945. Pay packets were collected every Wednesday morning. Sixpence was deducted to send food parcels to the locally engaged (British) staff at the New Zealand High Commission in London.

The Department of External Affairs (as it was then called) ‘divided the world in three, like Caesar’s Gaul’: Europe, Asia, and Antarctica/Oceania. There were only five diplomatic missions: London, Canberra, Washington, Moscow and New York. The department operated as economically as possible, and the staff determined that it would be as egalitarian as possible — no airs, graces or titles. New Zealand’s diplomatic service would not be an antipodean imitation of the Foreign Office. Weir and his colleagues were even instructed not to describe themselves as diplomats (‘civil servant’ was the approved designation). One head of mission described himself as ‘licensed drainlayer’.

Weir’s first overseas assignment was to New York in 1949 as a third secretary (‘the lowest form of diplomatic life’). New Zealand’s consulate was located on the 60th floor of the Empire State Building. Weir recalled his wonderment at seeing so many well known world leaders and officials during his first UN General Assembly, only to be rebuked by his more senior colleague, Charles Craw: ‘when you’ve been in the diplomatic game long enough, you’ll realize that everybody else is mad’. The ambassador (and head of ‘NZ inc’ in the United States, to use more recent terminology) was the indomitable Carl Berendsen. Weir recalled that immediately following the outbreak of the Korean War, Berendsen went straight to the State Department, asking ‘what can we do to help?’ Other ambassadors in Washington waited until they had conferred with their home governments.

People often asked Weir in his retirement what had been his favourite posting. ‘We could answer without a moment’s hesitation — Canberra’. Australia’s capital was a familiar and hospitable environment for his young family. It was also a welcoming environment professionally: ‘New Zealand diplomats stationed in Canberra were the only ones allowed — indeed, they were expected — to go around the Department of External Affairs knocking on doors without an appointment.’ New Zealand’s high commissioner was a political appointee, Lisle Alderton, who developed a close friendship with Australia’s prime minister, Bob Menzies. The Menzies and the Aldertons regularly socialised together. Alderton was once asked why he never reported anything of what Menzies said on these or any other occasions. Alderton retorted, ‘but he speaks to me in confidence and he wouldn’t if I passed on these confidences to other people’.

An interesting aspect of Weir’s posting to Canberra was his visits to both Papua New Guinea (then a trust territory administered by Australia) and West New Guinea (then administered by the Dutch but claimed by Indonesia). He was thus uniquely placed to compare and contrast the respective colonial administrations. Interestingly, he found that the Dutch related far better to the indigenious peoples, perhaps reflecting the strong Eurasian presence in the Dutch administration — ‘in this respect the Dutch seemed to be on the side of the angels’. But in terms of development, ‘the Australians left the Dutch far behind’. For example, even though the two territories were roughly similar in size and topography, the Dutch by 1960 had managed 250 miles of roads in their territory, as against 5918 road miles in Papua New Guinea. Within fifteen years of Weir’s first visit, Papua New Guinea would be independent, while West New Guinea would be part of Indonesia, and renamed Irian Jaya.

Weir’s first posting as head of mission was to Singapore in 1966, shortly after it had been expelled from Malaysia to become an independent state. During the following five years of his assignment, the British made the momentous decision to withdraw east of Suez, and thus abandon their large bases in Singapore (which covered a sixth of the city state, and earned approximately a fifth of its revenue). In his book, Weir provides some wonderful anecdotes of his dealings with Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew. At the start of one meeting, Weir, trying to set a friendly tone (as diplomats tend to do), innocently remarked ‘welcome back’ to Lee, only to be told abruptly ‘no time for pleasantries’. During another meeting a visiting New Zealand businessman, after praising Singapore’s government efficaciously, suggested that the two countries should swap governments for a while. ‘That may be all very well for you,’ replied Lee, ‘but what about us?’

During his posting in Singapore, Weir visited Burma for the first time, to attend a Colombo Plan conference in Rangoon in 1967. A few years later he returned, to present credentials as New Zealand’s first ambassador to that country (accredited from Kuala Lumpur). Even then Burma was becoming, to quote Weir, a ‘hermit state’, cutting itself off from the rest of the world. The large business community based in Rangoon had disappeared (the New Zealand Insurance company had once had an office in the city). Weir’s narrative includes many examples of what he described as ‘the ugliness of an introspective and autocratic society’. But he also remained optimistic about the future, believing that ‘a people with so many good qualities must eventually profit by their mistakes and make a going concern of a country so well endowed’. "Eat, Drink and be Wary" is a delightful little book of Weir’s experiences over a long and distinguished diplomatic career (1947–83). He is unashamedly positive about that career, though also acknowledging the difficulties of working in the foreign service (for example, citing the strain it can place on family relationships). It would have been interesting if Weir had provided more commentary on how the art and practice of diplomacy had developed and changed over his long career. But overall he seems to have chosen wisely the topics of his memoirs, focusing on those countries and periods of time that would be of most interest to the contemporary reader. It is also a book wonderfully laced with the author’s lively sense of humour.

JOHN SUBRITZKY
FIGHTING TO THE FINISH
The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1968–1975

Author: Ashley Ekins with Ian McNeill
Published by: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, NSW, 1139pp, $130.

As we engage in another Asian campaign that appears unlikely to provide a satisfactory outcome, New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam War is frequently brought to mind. That conflict ended with Russian-made tanks bursting into the presidential palace grounds in then Saigon in April 1975, some years after the pullout of the coalition forces, including Australian and New Zealand, that had helped sustain the ill-fated Republic of Vietnam. The withdrawal process had been neither simple, nor short; it was, suggests Ashley Ekins, ‘almost as protracted as the original military commitment in 1962’.

_Fighting to the Finish_ is the long awaited final volume of the ‘Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asia Conflicts 1948–1975’, a series produced under the general editorship of Peter Edwards (though his impact on this last volume appears to have been relatively limited). In particular, the size of this volume, which at twice the page length dwarfs the other eight volumes, indicates perhaps a lack of editorial oversight.

The third in a series that examines the role of the Australian Army in Vietnam, _Fighting to the Finish_ focuses on the final years of the Australian participation from mid-1968 to the end of 1971. Because New Zealand’s force in Vietnam operated within an Australian military context, as part of 1st Australian Task Force, New Zealand readers will find this and the other army volumes of the wider series of considerable interest.

The army volumes were originally assigned to Ian McNeill, a Vietnam veteran. Following his untimely death Ashley Ekins took over the reins and he has now brought the project to completion. He has clearly been much more on his own in producing this final volume, though he acknowledges that McNeill did some of the work for it before his death.

Not least of the merits of this book is the material it contains on the communist effort during the war. The authors visited Vietnam and spoke with Viet Cong veterans in the province in which the task force operated — Phuoc Tuy. Ekins, and McNeill before him, have done an excellent job in integrating this material into the account of the campaign. In providing a very detailed coverage of the various operations that were undertaken, the book is marked by its balanced and judicious assessment of the overall effort. Although the task force won every encounter, where the Viet Cong chose to stand and fight, it was never able to pin down and destroy its main provincial adversary, the D445 Battalion, or, perhaps more importantly, to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure in the towns and villages, which was actively operating throughout the Australian presence. In light of this, Ekins rightly dismissed the myth that the Australians (and New Zealanders) won even as much as a tactical victory in Phuoc Tuy province.

Ekins makes the interesting comparison between Australia’s campaigns in Gallipoli and Vietnam. In both they fought an enemy on their own soil and withdrew without securing victory, and in both Australia’s political and military leaders made decisions to commit forces on the basis of inadequate strategic planning, inadequate intelligence about their enemy, an absence of a clearly defined objective, and with limited reserve power over the operational deployment of the forces they committed.

The period covered by this volume was ‘marked by intense activity and momentous changes’. In the little more than three years the Australian Army lost 250 men killed, more than half the campaign total. Ekins’s detailed coverage of the operations in which these casualties were suffered indicates the intensity of the operations that left the troops in close proximity with the enemy for longer periods than in most previous wars. The tension was enhanced by the threat from a particularly dangerous anti-personnel mine that the Australians themselves had laid in a large barrier minefield in a misguided attempt to seal off the main population centres from the Viet Cong mobile forces, only to have the Viet Cong lift and deploy them against the task force. Ekins traces the prolonged and difficult efforts to clear the remnants of this minefield.

Given its size and price, this book will never be a best seller. But as a comprehensive reference work it will have lasting value. Its 150 pages of appendices include a summary of each operation undertaken by the task force during the period composed by Colonel D.A. Chinn, important documents and lists of casualties and decorations. There are, in addition, more than 200 pages of reference notes. Finally, the book is profusely illustrated, with excellent maps and many evocative coloured photographs.

IAN McGIBBON

NOTE FOR CONTRIBUTORS
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INSTITUTE NOTES

National Office and branch activities.


A panel discussion on ‘The Indonesian Diaspora, Stay or Return? The Dilemma Facing Overseas Students’ was held on 23 August under the chairmanship of Wellington branch chair Peter Nichols.

On 11 September Sir Michael Leigh, senior advisor to the German Marshall Fund, addressed a meeting at Victoria University on the provocative subject ‘The United Kingdom and the EU: The Slippery Slope to Withdrawal’.

On 1 October Christian Schmidt, the German parliamentary state secretary of defence, addressed a meeting on ‘German Security Policy and Transformation of the Bundeswehr [German Defence Force]’.

The final event in the Improving Global Governance series, run by the Institute of Governance and Public Policy and the NZIIA, was held on 16 October. The speakers included Dr Frank Rijsberman, CEO of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Consortium and a specialist in global water issues; Dr Christine Padoch, an anthropologist and currently the director of the Forests and Livelihoods Programme, CIFOR, Indonesia; and Professor Chris Moran of the Sustainable Minerals Institute, Australia (global mineral issues).

On 25 October the Swiss ambassador, Marion Weichelt Krupski, addressed a meeting on ‘Governance Swiss Style’.

At a meeting at Victoria University of Wellington jointly hosted by the NZIIA and the European Union Centres Network on 8 November, Helga Schmid, deputy-secretary-general for political affairs in the European Union’s European External Action Service, gave the 2012 Europa Lecture. She spoke on ‘The EU’s Response to Security Challenges in its Wider Neighbourhood and in Asia’.

A new NZIIA branch was established in Tauranga on 25 October 2012.

Auckland
The following meetings were held:
19 Sep Tony Browne (chair of both the New Zealand Contemporary China Centre Advisory Board and the VUW’s Confucius Institute, member of the New Zealand China Council Executive Board and former New Zealand ambassador to China), ‘New Zealand’s Relations with the People’s Republic of China’.

Christchurch
On 31 October Ernesto Henriod, acting consul of Peru in Christchurch, addressed the branch on ‘South America: A Brief look at its Geography, History and Culture’.

Nelson
In May Hugo Judd spoke on the subject ‘Should New Zealand Retain the British Monarch as our Head of State?’ Paul Steere, a vice president of the New Zealand Red Cross, followed in July with an address about the international role of the Red Cross. In August Hon Philip Burdon, the chairman of the Asia New Zealand Foundation, outlined recent developments in China and the opportunities there for New Zealand. United States Ambassador David Huebner spoke to the branch in September on the intriguing subject of ‘Diplomacy and Innovation’. The October meeting featured an address on international co-operation in the Antarctic by Gillian Wratt, former CEO of Antarctic New Zealand.

Wairarapa
The branch AGM was held on 15 October with 40 present. The following officers were elected:
Chair — Derek Milne
Vice Chair — John Schellenberg
Secretary/Treasurer — Aileen Weston
Committee — Janet Avery, Rex Fowler, Ian Grant, Ross Ireland, Margaret Smith, Ray Stewart, Scott Thomson.

Following the meeting former ambassador to China Chris Elder addressed the branch on ‘China versus All Blacks: World Cup Final 2031 (with the benefit of foresight: China and New Zealand in the decades ahead)’.

WELLINGTON
The following meetings were held:
28 Sep Dr David Harland (executive director of the Swiss foundation Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and son of former NZIIA director Bryce Harland), ‘Low Profile Talks in Conflict Situations’.
9 Oct Clare Fearnley (MFAT), ‘APEC in the Regional Architecture’.
16 Oct Hon Phil Goff MP (Labour Party spokesperson on foreign affairs and trade), ‘Making a Difference, New Zealand’s Role in the World’. 
AN INVITATION

If you are interested in international affairs and you are not already a subscriber to the New Zealand International Review, consider the advantage of receiving this magazine on a regular basis. New Zealand International Review completed its thirty-seventh consecutive year of publication in 2012. It continues to be the only national magazine exclusively devoted to national issues as they affect New Zealand. Issued bimonthly it is circulated throughout New Zealand and internationally. The Review is non-partisan, independent of government and pressure groups and has lively articles from local and international authors, with special emphasis on New Zealand’s international relations. It contains

- stimulating and up-to-date articles on topical issues,
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