KOREAN ARMISTICE AT 60

■ Mali intervention
■ Foreign policy
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Business New Zealand
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Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Economic Development
Ministry of Education
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Ministry of Transport
New Zealand Customs Service
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Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia
Embassy of the Republic of Korea
Embassy of the Republic of Poland
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey
Embassy of the Russian Federation
Embassy of the United States of America
High Commission for Malaysia
High Commission for Pakistan
High Commission of India
Independent Police Conduct Authority
New Zealand Red Cross Inc
NZ China Friendship Society
NZ Horticulture Export Authority
Pacific Cooperation Foundation
Papua New Guinea High Commission
Political Studies Department, University of Auckland
Royal Netherlands Embassy
School of Linguistics & Applied Language Studies, VUW
Singapore High Commission
Soka Gakkai International of NZ
South African High Commission
Standards New Zealand
Taipei Economic & Cultural Office
The Innovative Travel Co. Ltd
United Nations Association of NZ
Volunteer Service Abroad (Inc)
Wood Processors Association of NZ
World Vision New Zealand
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Understanding Korean choices

As the Korean Armistice turns 60, Ian McGibbon urges more understanding of the historical context of the current crisis on the peninsula and of possible choices that might confront this country.

On 27 July it will be 60 years since the Korean truce brought to an end fighting that had ravaged the Korean peninsula for more than three years. The armistice agreement established a framework for security that has endured because of the failure to achieve a peace settlement. It remains a point of contention, however, with Korean leader Kim Jong Un declaring, in March this year, that his country no longer recognised it — even though the security framework remains firmly in place.

As tension on the peninsula has risen in recent months, with a series of belligerent threats by Kim, New Zealand’s likely response to a new conflict on the Korean peninsula has been brought under the spotlight. Prime Minister John Key caused a flurry when on 4 April he suggested, in China, that New Zealand might be involved in support of South Korea. ‘Taken to the extreme and without interventions and without some resolutions of the issues, that is of course possible….’, Key stated.1 ‘Obviously we’ve got a long and proud history of coming to the support of South Korea so we’d always assess that on its merits.’ It was, of course, ironic that he made this statement standing alongside the leader of the country whose troops New Zealanders had fought in Korea.

Back in New Zealand Key’s comments agitated the opposition parties. They vigorously challenged his stance, even as he backtracked. The Greens’ Dr Russel Norman insisted that New Zealand should always look to be involved in any such hostilities as part of a multilateral effort. ‘It seems to me’, opined Norman, ‘international law and working within the UN charter should be the framework for the New Zealand Government’s response, not as John Key says where the US and Australia goes, New Zealand goes.’2 Labour foreign affairs spokesperson Phil Goff described Key’s statement as ‘amateurish and ill-timed’ and maintained that ‘New Zealand does not blindly follow any other country with respect to decisions about engaging in wars’.3

**Historical context**

These opposition comments demonstrate an abysmal lack of knowledge of the historical context of the current crisis — the Korean War of 1950–53. This conflict began on 25 June 1950 as an attempt by Kim Jong Un’s grandfather Kim Il Sung, leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and founder of the Kim dynasty, forcibly to reunite the country, divided since the end of Japanese rule in 1945. He did so with the blessing of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong.

Significantly, this sudden onslaught came as a shock because no one in the West expected Kim Il Sung to launch actual hostilities, as opposed to a war of words. Such action did not seem to fit perceptions of the strategic framework, in which Stalin was believed to control action throughout the communist bloc, not least that of a Korean puppet ruler. This is a point worth remembering as we hear confident predictions that Kim Jong Un will not take the seemingly irrational course of actually going to war.

Kim Il Sung’s attempt came to grief when the United States responded vigorously, mobilising a coalition through the United Nations. Taking advantage of Soviet absence from the Security Council, Washington secured a resolution calling on North Korea to withdraw and, when this was ignored, another asking members to come to the assistance of South Korea. New Zealand was one of the first of sixteen to do so.

New Zealand sent two frigates immediately and later a 1500-man ground force, mainly comprising a field artillery regiment. This was a bipartisan policy with Labour Party leader Peter Fraser declaring his ‘whole-hearted support’ for the involvement and, as his last political act, sending a farewell message to the departing

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Between 1950 and 1953 New Zealand took part in the Korean War, a conflict that erupted suddenly when North Korea invaded its southern neighbour. More than 6000 New Zealanders served in Korea, in all, whether on two frigates or in a ground force. The North Korean attempt forcibly to reunite Korea failed in the face of vigorous US-led action by the United Nations. But when Chinese People’s Volunteers entered Korea the struggle became an indirect contest between the United States and China. The stalemate eventually opened the way for armistice negotiations, which after long delay culminated in an armistice on 27 July 1953. Following the armistice New Zealand pledged to return to the fray should South Korea again be subjected to aggression — a pledge that has continuing relevance.
New Zealand International Review

HMNZS Pukaki was, along with HMNZS Tutira, New Zealand’s initial contribution to the UN Command.

The building in which the armistice agreement was signed.

The DMZ at Observation Post Typhoon, looking towards North Korea.

with the aim of driving the UN Command into the sea. With the failure of his so-called Fifth Phase Offensive in May, the communist authorities indicated their willingness to discuss a ceasefire. Armistice talks began at Kaesong on 8 July 1951, but were broken off in late August. They reconvened at Panmunjom on 25 October.

**Dramatic turn-around**

Commanded by American General Douglas MacArthur, the UN forces in September 1950 turned the tables on the invading North Koreans by landing at Inchon, well behind their front. The North Korean Army, far to the south, soon collapsed. Most were captured, while remnants fled north of the pre-war border, the 38th Parallel.

The war might have ended then. The UN purpose had been achieved. South Korea was preserved. But, with North Korea’s forces shattered, Washington succumbed to the temptation to go forward and reunite Korea. The North Korean Army, far to the south, soon collapsed. Most were captured, while remnants fled north of the pre-war border, the 38th Parallel.

Over-confident in his ability to counter any Chinese intervention, MacArthur launched his ‘home by Christmas’ offensive on 24 November 1950. Next day the Chinese struck with shattering effect. The UN forces fell back, the ‘bug out’ not halting till they were well south of the 38th Parallel. Seoul changed hands for the third time in six months.

The war now became an indirect contest between two great powers, the United States and China, fought on Korean soil. In the first six months of 1951, Peng launched a series of offensives

**Protracted negotiations**

It took two years to secure an armistice. Why the long delay? Basically, it was because an early agreement was not in the communist bloc’s interest. Armistice talks ensured that there would be no further UN offensive aimed at driving the communist forces northwards. Under no military pressure, the communists had no incentive to make concessions. In the meantime they could use the talks for propaganda purposes.

The armistice negotiators settled the question of where the demarcation line would lie relatively quickly. After initially insisting on a return to the pre-war 38th Parallel, the communists eventually agreed to the existing line of contact. Unlike the 38th Parallel, this provided a defensible line. In the west the communists occupied the Ongjin peninsula and Kaesong, which had been South

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Korean before the war. This was compensated for by the fact that the front line in the east lay well to the north of the pre-war border. So the armistice did not restore the status quo ante, but the two Koreas came out of the war with roughly the same amount of territory as they had had before it began.

These territorial issues were not the main sticking point during the talks at Panmunjom. This was the question of prisoners of war. Many prisoners captured by the UN Command were South Koreans impressed by the North Korean Army during its heady sweep south towards Pusan at the outset of the war. Others were Nationalist Chinese soldiers who had been forced into the PLA following the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War (and who wanted to go to Taiwan). The communists insisted that all prisoners should be returned to their respective side; the UN Command wanted prisoners to have a choice. Not till after Stalin’s death in 1953 was there movement on this point. In the end, the armistice agreement contained complex arrangements, never fully implemented, for processing prisoners who opted not to return to their side.

At 10 a.m. on 27 July 1953 representatives of the two sides, without ceremony, signed the agreement at Panmunjom. Nine copies were delivered to the UN Command’s commander-in-chief, General Mark Clark, for his signature and nine to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai for their signatures. The copies were then exchanged for counter-signatures. There were six copies each in English, Chinese and Korean.

**Demilitarised zone**

The armistice came into effect at 10 p.m. that same day. In accordance with its provisions both sides were required, within 72 hours, to pull back two kilometres to create a four-kilometre demilitarised zone, which remains today the de facto boundary between the two Koreas.

The position at sea has been less stable. The agreement specified that all North Korean islands north of the 38th Parallel on both coasts were to be returned to communist control. On the west coast south of the parallel communist forces occupied a number of close-in, indefensible islands south of the Onjin peninsula. The agreement specified that with the exception of five large groups, all islands lying north of a line to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae and Kyonni islands would remain in communist hands.

The five large groups in question — Taechong, Paengyong, Yonpyong, Sochong, U — had been part of pre-war South Korea and had never been captured by communist forces. The agreement referred to them specifically as remaining under UN Command control (and hence South Korea) merely because they lay within the area in which the communists were to retain possession of former South Korean islands.

This provision has become a matter of contention, with Pyongyang claiming, incorrectly, that a sea boundary had been created by the armistice agreement and that access to these South Korean island groups should be limited because they lie in ‘North Korean waters’. The North Koreans reject the de facto sea boundary (the Northern Limit Line) unilaterally drawn by the UN Command between the South Korean island groups and the Ongjin peninsula after the war, mainly to control the activities of fishing boats in the area. In 2010 they bombarded Yonpyong island, killing a number of South Koreans.

**Diplomatic stalemate**

Although hostilities ceased in July 1953, the war did not end. Battlefield stalemate was replicated at the diplomatic negotiating table. A political conference in 1954 aimed at achieving a peace settlement quickly deadlocked. No progress in this direction has been made subsequently.

In the absence of a settlement, the UN resolutions of June and July 1950 remain the basis of the UN Command’s continuing presence in Korea. In suggesting that New Zealand should only be involved in Korea as part of a multilateral effort, Dr Norman appears to be unaware of this framework. We are still part of the command, given that New Zealand has officers accredited to the command.

Following the armistice, New Zealand joined the other fifteen powers in the so-called Joint Policy Declaration, which was issued on 7 August 1953 as part of a special report submitted by the UN.
Command to the UN Secretary-General. This declaration included the statement: ‘We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist.’

Recognition of this declaration may have been behind the prime minister’s comment in China last April. The South Korean government is unlikely to ignore this statement should their country again come under attack from the north. We can expect New Zealand to face considerable moral pressure to fulfill its pledge, even if we accept that the United Nations is unlikely, because of the veto, to pass any further resolutions. Phil Goff is evidently unaware of this fact.

**Dangerous possibilities**

Such a crisis — another attack by North Korea on its southern neighbour — would confront New Zealand with a quandary, depending on the position adopted by China. Although all Chinese troops were withdrawn from North Korea by 1958, China has 600,000 reasons for not wanting to see the demise of the North Korean buffer state — the lives it lost in preventing such an outcome in 1950–53. Its interest in maintaining the buffer should not be under-estimated. Any outbreak of hostilities is likely rapidly to bring China and the United States into confrontation — a point probably not lost on the North Korean leadership.

In these circumstances New Zealand obviously has a huge interest in avoiding open hostilities on the Korean peninsula. It would force choices that would be extremely difficult. But in determining our response in any crisis it is important fully to understand the historical context. Our politicians need to be better informed about the origins of the stand-off that exists on the Korean peninsula, and of New Zealand’s involvement in the on-going war that erupted there in 1950 and led to the seemingly endless armistice 60 years ago.

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**Notes**

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p.88.
6. Ibid., p.337.

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**THE JOINT POLICY DECLARATION OF 7 AUGUST 1953**

We, the United Nations Members whose military forces are participating in the Korean action, support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

The task ahead is not an easy one. We will support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea based on the principles which have long been established by the United Nations, and which call for a united, independent, and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.
Tensions on the Korean peninsula have repeatedly thrust the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK or North Korea) onto the centre stage of international relations. These tensions, often attributed primarily to Pyongyang, have caused global concern. Such concern has been shared by New Zealand, which did not establish diplomatic relations with the North until 2001.1

New Zealand–North Korean relations were tense after the Korean War and throughout the Cold War, but the 1970s started with an unplanned August 1971 meeting between the North Korean consul-general in Singapore and New Zealand’s high commissioner, Tim Francis. The consul-general asked whether North Korean journalists could visit New Zealand. He was told this was ‘highly unlikely’, Francis emphasising New Zealand’s relationship with the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Indeed, he said ‘I fear I may have overdone things a little by my glowing tributes to the democratic nature of the Republic of Korea but it had the desired effect of persuading Mr Sok [Consul-General O. Man Sok] that there was little point in carrying the discussion further’.

This meeting took place because the North Koreans said they represented the ‘Republic of Korea’ when contacting the high commission, thus being mistaken for South Koreans. Francis labelled this a ‘ruse’ to ‘confuse simple-minded heads of mission such as myself’. He apologised to the government for his ‘diplomatic indiscretion’, and any embarrassment caused by meeting the ‘wrong’ Korean representative. The ministry remarked that ‘sooner or later we may have to let some North Koreans pay us a visit, but for the moment it does not seem to us to be a particularly appropriate time’.

North Korea’s ambassador in China met Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs Joe Walding during the latter’s visit to China in March 1973. According to mission member Chris Elder, after their arrival the Chinese asked if Walding would meet the ambassador. ‘This was a bit embarrassing as we did not have diplomatic relations, but we did not want to disoblige our hosts’, so the ambassador unofficially visited Walding’s guest house. A ‘highlight’ for New Zealand officials involved Walding, after being ‘deluged with references to Our Great Leader Kim Il-Sung, gravely saying that he would refer what he had heard to his Great Leader, Norman Kirk’.

In December 1973 Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials felt that arguments in favour of moving towards recognising North Korea were ‘conclusive’. These included the desire to help unite Asia, acceptance that two Koreas existed, and the inconsistency with the recognition of North Vietnam. Canberra thought Wellington was interested in recognising Pyongyang and might establish diplomatic relations at the same time as Australia. But when Australia did so, briefly, in 1974, New Zealand considered it preferable tactically to delay such action so as not to ‘identify New Zealand’s policy with Australia’. South Korea made a ‘strong plea for Wellington to try to dissuade Canberra from recognising Pyongyang. Indeed, it was reported that Seoul had threatened to break-off diplomatic relations with Australia, a course that New Zealand opposed.

Continuing reluctance
Wellington’s reluctance to increase interaction with North Korea continued into the following decade. In 1980 the government refused visas for North Koreans seeking to visit New Zealand, but

Paul Bellamy, who recently spoke on New Zealand–North Korean relations at an international conference, has visited Korea a number of times, most recently as a distinguished guest of the Korea Foundation, and with the South Korean embassy has composed a history of New Zealand–South Korean diplomatic relations. His third book (a co-authored study of post-Second World War civil wars) will be published shortly by Congressional Quarterly Press. He is most grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (especially Neil Robertson), Department of Labour Archives New Zealand, Security Intelligence Service, ROK embassy, Professor Bill Willmott, Rev Don Borrie and interviewees for their kind help. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the author’s employer or those who assisted.

In recent years the Korean peninsula has witnessed significant tension, including clashes between both Koreas and nuclear tests. Moreover, a new president has been elected in South Korea and a transition initiated in North Korea, now ruled by a young, untested leader, a leader who currently shows little inclination towards making fundamental policy changes facilitating reconciliation and stability. Indeed, tensions have increased. Against this background, Wellington and Pyongyang have established, relatively lately, a tenuous diplomatic relationship. This was a challenging assignment. The relationship remains difficult, with New Zealand’s concern over recent North Korean actions warranted. A cautious approach is advisable.
Member of Parliament Warren Freer went to North Korea that July. The New Zealand–DPRK Society’s first large-scale study tour took place in 1982 — with another following two years later. Its leader noted that North Korea ‘apparently had a very happy, healthy society’, but he wondered if there were dissenters and what happened to them.

Relations between Pyongyang and the New Zealand–DPRK Society were sometimes challenging. Poor communication was a serious concern for both. Indeed, in declining an invitation from the society to be its patron, Freer noted Pyongyang’s lack of response to his trade promotion efforts. The society conceded to Freer that it felt ‘rather betrayed’ by the North Korean inaction, and told Pyongyang its failure to respond to correspondence placed the group in an ‘embarrassing position’ as it was encouraging contact. A leading society member in 1985 told Australian counterparts ‘We are growing alarmed at the way Pyongyang completely ignores our communications, to say nothing of our letters. I truly despair of ever communicating effectively with them’.

Although Pyongyang sought stronger ties with the fourth Labour government, contact remained limited, chiefly because of Wellington’s reluctance within the context of the on-going Cold War. Negative perceptions of North Korea’s foreign policy and diplomacy, along with positions and experiences of other countries, further reinforced this approach. However, some MPs questioned the government’s position. Jim Anderton in 1985 remarked that it was in New Zealand’s interests to have friendly relations with all Pacific Rim nations, including North Korea. A year later Helen Clark asked Prime Minister David Lange: ‘Is there any reason why New Zealand policy now appears to be much more restrictive on this matter [relations with the North] than it was over a decade ago?’ In 1987 she exclaimed ‘I cannot myself see what the problem is in permitting DPRK people to begin to visit on cultural or trade delegations’, and referred to the foreign ministry’s ‘clearly formulated and highly inflexible approach’. Similarly, she said ‘Heaven knows why we are so timid when other Western countries seem able to establish relations with Pyongyang’. As the decade progressed New Zealand’s position became somewhat more relaxed.

As interaction increased so did diplomatic contact. The foreign ministers of both countries met during 1992. Christopher Butler (ambassador in Seoul 1990–93) had no direct contact with North Korea. However, he visited the Demilitarised Zone more than once and had interaction with both UN Command Military Armistice Commission representatives and the neutral nations’ missions from Sweden and Switzerland that did have contact. Relations between a 1992 delegation and the friendship society were sometimes tense, while a 1996 North Korean exhibition arrived with little prior notification and did not follow advice regarding its itinerary. The society was ‘most concerned’ that an academic could not visit in 1998. Society co-founder Reverend Don Borrie told Pyongyang that items brought by exhibition groups were unsuitable, and noted the poor financial performance of exhibitions. North Korea itself insisted that the society establish an Auckland branch, and expressed concern over the level of society activities.

Greater dialogue
The post-Cold War environment and increased Seoul–Pyongyang interaction facilitated greater dialogue. This was further encouraged by other countries re-evaluating their relations with Pyongyang, recognition that dialogue was vital in resolving peninsula issues, and interest in exploring avenues for greater engagement. In 1993 a Whiritea Performing Arts Group made the largest New Zealand visit to North Korea. During the mid-1990s North Korean proposals included a 60-day cultural exhibition, a traditional medicine delegation and garment manufacturing deals, along with joint business ventures such as restaurants and art galleries. A Porirua and Wonsan sister-city relationship was also advocated.

Challenges remained though. Communication was sometimes difficult. A senior friendship society member resigned in 1991 after expressing frustration with communication. The challenge of relations with the North Korean government that ‘insist on us being a voice piece for their policies and propaganda’ troubled society members. Relations between a 1992 delegation and the friendship society were sometimes tense, while a 1996 North Korean exhibition arrived with little prior notification and did not follow advice regarding its itinerary. The society was ‘most concerned’ that an academic could not visit in 1998. Society co-founder Reverend Don Borrie told Pyongyang that items brought by exhibition groups were unsuitable, and noted the poor financial performance of exhibitions. North Korea itself insisted that the society establish an Auckland branch, and expressed concern over the level of society activities.

Unproductive contact
During New Zealand’s UN Security Council membership (1993–94), dialogue occurred but was unproductive. This was because North Korea focused on recording all the perceived wrongs committed against it, despite New Zealand attempts to move discussions back towards council issues. During 1994, officials in monthly air raid drills and, although becoming more relaxed as North–South dialogue developed, a general rule to keep extra cash on hand and fuel in their cars in case there was a need to move quickly. First aid equipment, hard hats and gas masks were standard office equipment and a military presence evident as part of daily life. This low level undercurrent of risk awareness could make New Year firework celebrations particularly exciting.
Beijing were ‘treated to a long and, as far as we could tell, standard lecture’ by the North Korean ambassador expounding ‘in ritual terms’ his country’s ‘paranoid view’ of US interest in the peninsula. Wellington was asked to adopt at least a neutral stance in the council on Korea. The North Koreans expressed ‘pleasure’ over the ‘opening of a book of bilateral dialogue in Beijing (and implicit threat of scope for many volumes ahead)’. They were told, however, that the meeting had no implications for New Zealand’s policy.

North Korea’s nuclear programme and peninsula tensions posed further challenges. In 1994 New Zealand told Pyongyang that the situation was ‘very grave’, officials noting the danger of possible war through miscalculation. Embassy staff in Seoul felt ‘somewhat exposed and concerned’ over the safety of New Zealanders. Peter Kennedy (ambassador in Seoul 1993–95) called North Korea an ‘active volcano, occasionally puffing smoke’. With a North Korean invasion deemed possible, evacuation plans for embassy staff were ‘dusted off’. The embassy provided advice and comfort to New Zealanders in South Korea but was disappointed with the absence of support from Wellington. New Zealand also supported the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation. Wellington felt KEDO provided an important framework agreement for Asian regional security, and helped demonstrate New Zealand’s credentials as a ‘responsible member of the Asian community’.

Establishing relations
New Zealand’s first diplomatic visit to North Korea in 1997 was related to KEDO. The first Track II visit occurred the following year, the foreign ministers met in July 2000 and that September an MFAT delegation visited North Korea. Tony Browne, director of the ministry’s North Asia Division, led negotiations with Ma Chol Su, director-general of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s Department of Asia Pacific Affairs. Scheduled by the North Koreans for two hours, these talks in fact lasted more than seven hours. Negotiations covered North–South Korean relations (these probably took the most time), disarmament and arms control, missiles, progress with KEDO, human rights, regional political and security issues, trade and wider bilateral links. According to Browne,

The main point we were making was that if we were to have a formal relationship we wanted that to be one that gave us the opportunity to discuss all issues. We were not there simply so that the DPRK could put another country into its trophy cabinet.

Browne was told human rights could be discussed providing there was no focus on North Korea. He thus delivered a statement not explicitly referring to that state, but clearly directed at the regime.

A key issue was New Zealand’s desire for cross-accreditation via Seoul instead of Beijing. Browne noted New Zealand’s small size and the fact that its few Korean experts were based in Seoul. The North Koreans were ‘surprisingly receptive and said that it was up to New Zealand, causing our mouths to drop open’. However, upon departure Browne was told this ‘might be a bit difficult’. After arriving back in Wellington, Browne advised the government to await Pyongyang’s response. He recommended that diplomatic relations be established, and briefed Prime Minister Helen Clark. After a few months silence Pyongyang granted New Zealand’s request.

Overall, the visit was described as ‘robust, and at times verg-
visit the North’. This was ‘somewhat of a coup’ given that Pyongyang had wanted cross-accreditation from Beijing, and other countries had accepted such an arrangement.

**Relations established**

New Zealand announced the establishment of New Zealand–North Korea diplomatic relations in March 2001, nearly 40 years after relations were established with South Korea. Wellington foresaw the tie facilitating engagement with North Korea on various issues, and the possible development of economic ties. Ferguson undertook the first accreditation visit that November, leaving Pyongyang feeling that the relationship was being ‘treated seriously’ by New Zealand. According to Ferguson:

credentials were presented at the National Assembly building via a very simple ceremony with the President [of the President of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-Nam] and a military officer. Somewhat ironically the DPRK permitted spouses, as well as staff, to accompany ambassadors during the credentials ceremony, whereas in the ROK at that time ambassadors were only accompanied by their diplomatic staff. It was very interesting being in Pyongyang, and very dark at night with little lighting.

A very formal meeting then took place, with a long preoration by the President followed by an opportunity to respond to all the points he had raised. In the course of the visit and dialogue with various officials it was noted that North Korea needed to fulfill its NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] obligations, to both the international community and to New Zealand. There was real concern that the North was not living up to these. The North was quite reluctant initially to talk about human rights, but New Zealand quietly persisted and the North eventually agreed. This established a precedent that New Zealand was not going to visit to just listen, but would raise issues, including uncomfortable ones. Many officials asked about bilateral assistance, such as in agriculture and medical equipment. Overall the visit was considered a success, and illustrated the power of diplomacy.

North Korea sought a wide-ranging relationship but had ‘few specific ideas on how to achieve this’. Economic benefits were sought, though the North Koreans ‘gave little indication’ they ‘understood the basic facts of international trade’. Ferguson concluded that the North Koreans wanted a successful visit, with the tone of meetings ‘courteous verging on the friendly’. The delegation hoped that New Zealand’s views were registered despite the ‘predictable’ nature of responses, and felt engagement was ‘more profitable than isolation of this pathetic yet dangerous regime’. However, patience would be needed, as it was ‘only a small step forward on what will undoubtedly be a long and frustrating journey’.

**Current relations**

Since 2001 various diplomatic interactions have occurred. These have included two 2012 North Korean delegations seeking better relations with New Zealand. However, Wellington understandably remains cautious, and with many others opposes such North Korean actions as its nuclear and missile tests. South Korea has supported this position. The South Korean ambassador in 2009 said New Zealand’s Korean policy was ‘reasonable and rational’, with Seoul closely consulted. He noted the difficulties of relations with the North given it had not ‘abided by past agreements’, and called for Pyongyang’s return to the Six-Party Talks. More recently, Seoul has referred to moving in the ‘same direction’ as Wellington on Pyongyang, with shared values as the basis of strategy. It respects New Zealand’s admission of North Korean delegations, though it is wary of North Korean intentions, and questions why some people in New Zealand support North Korea. There is a feeling in some quarters that Pyongyang primarily established diplomatic relations to exploit New Zealand by obtaining economic assistance.

During the Cold War New Zealand’s position on North Korea was primarily shaped by its perception of the authoritarian regime’s foreign policy as aggressive and unsophisticated, the priority accorded to relations with South Korea and the stance adopted by friends and allies. The development of New Zealand–North Korea relations was problematic, though moves to build ties assisted by the friendship society provided foundations for a diplomatic relationship. The negotiations themselves leading to this relationship were also challenging and sometimes tense.

While New Zealand’s position on North Korean visits is now more relaxed, serious obstacles continue to hinder diplomatic relations. The relationship with Seoul plus internationally held concerns over North Korea’s foreign policy, very poor human rights record and nuclear programme understandably affected Wellington’s approach. Constructive dialogue encouraging mutual trust, transparency, and co-operation is important. However, given that Pyongyang currently appears unlikely to make the fundamental changes that would facilitate stronger diplomatic relations, caution remains the prudent course.

**NOTE**

1. The New Zealand government’s perspective is primarily conveyed through archival material of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Immigration Service and Security and Intelligence Service. Activities of the New Zealand–DPRK Society promoting relations are outlined via its archives. Additional information has been gathered through interviews.

Foreigners leave North Korea before the border was closed in April 2013
Instability in Mali

Scott Walker backgrounds the recent French intervention in the troubled African state.

The conflict in northern Mali is winding up, the rebels are on the run, and France's president has more or less declared victory. So everything is working out fine, right?

Wrong. The situation in Mali today remains unstable. Perhaps 500,000 people in a country of 15 million face a lack of food as a result of the fighting and drought. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 50,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger, and 40,000 have gone to Burkina Faso.

And the big solution to help the country, currently in its fourth decade of heavy aid dependence... more aid.

Independence search

The Tuaregs in northern Mali have long sought independence for themselves in the vast, under-populated north, often known as Azawad. Several rebellions have occurred in Mali in the last hundred years. Former Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi had funded the Tuareg rebel group, the MNLA (The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), for many years. The MNLA also were rumoured to have strong links to al-Qaeda.

Dissatisfied with the progress of the government's efforts to fight the MNLA, a group of soldiers led by mid-level officer Amadou Sanogo seized power on 22 March 2012, citing President Amadou Toure's failure to put down the rebellion. The coup leaders installed Cheick Modibo Diarra as the new prime minister, which led to sanctions and an embargo by the Economic Community of West African States. The coup did not achieve the desired result, however. The MNLA asserted itself in the north, declaring independence for Azawad. However, three Arabic jihadist groups formerly allied with MNLA — Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) — took control of the north with the goal of implementing sharia law in Mali. The MNLA was no match for the better trained and armed jihadist forces.

French intervention

In early 2013, interim President Dioncounda Traore appealed to France for assistance after an assault from the jihadists threatened the capital, Bamako. The help came on 11 January 2013, when French armed forces intervened at the request of Sanogo's government. On 30 January, French and Malian troops claimed to have retaken the last Islamist stronghold of Kidal. And on 2 February, the French president, Francois Hollande, joined Traore in a public appearance in recently recaptured Timbuktu.

The African Union also sent forces, primarily from Chad, Niger, and Senegal. Meanwhile, around twenty countries of the European Union are contributing to an operation that is training 3000 Malians so that locals can take over all security operations in the near future.1

With the jihadists on the run, the Tuareg group, the MNLA, has now regained control of many parts of the north. It has thus benefited from the fact that French and African Union forces have targeted the Islamic radical groups. Billions of dollars of aid has been promised to help reconstruct the country. More than four billion has already been offered, although some of it is dependent on the elections that supposedly will be held in July. With perhaps half a million people displaced, a food crisis, and tens of thousands of refugees fleeing across the border in the last year, it is apparent that Mali faces the possibility of a serious humanitarian crisis.

Serious questions

It seems clear at the moment that the Islamic rebels are on the run. The leaders of MUJAO are attempting to negotiate an exit from the country, and several

The recent French-led intervention in the sub-Saharan African state of Mali appears to have stemmed the tide of terrorism and jihadist activity for the moment. The Islamic rebels are now on the run, and elections are planned, possibly even by July. However, to deem the operation a success is to ignore the fundamental status of the country as a major aid recipient that is not capable of handling security issues on its own. The situation in Mali today remains unstable. Moreover, rather than being an isolated incident, the situation is actually connected to an overall humanitarian and security crisis for the entire region.
I briefly focus on a number of points that the international community needs to keep in mind with regard to Mali.

This is a regional crisis, not a local one. Last week, Donald Yamamoto of the US Department of State acknowledged this fact:

The crisis in Mali, and security vacuum following the Libyan revolution, exacerbated the Sahel’s longstanding political, economic, and humanitarian vulnerabilities. Instability in Mali and increased arms flows from Libya in to the region, collided with a humanitarian crisis brought on by drought and poor harvests in the region already burdened by chronic poverty and food insecurity.

This spillover of conflict from Mali has affected neighbouring countries. One of the jihadist groups, MUJAO, claimed responsibility for killing twenty people in Niger in May in twin suicide car bombings on an army base and a French-run uranium facility. The same group has attacked military targets in Niger in the past, and has attacked Algerian forces several times in recent months. And it has emerged that hundreds of Nigerians associated with the rebel group Boko Haram have trained with Ansar Dine in northern Mali.

The humanitarian, political, and environmental problems of the region respect no borders. The conflicts in Libya, Tunisia, and other places have affected this Mali conflict. Thus, addressing the problems of Mali in isolation from its neighbours would appear to be foolhardy.

Aid problem

External aid dependence is contributing to the problem. To view Mali merely as an impoverished country that needs more aid would not be a totally accurate assessment. As a country that is entering its fourth decade of heavy aid dependence, Mali seems to be permanently in the back pocket of the international community. The very concept of ‘aid’ implies that outside assistance will come for a while until the country can get back on its feet. In this case, the whole identity of Mali is that of a country permanently dependent on aid. Without aid, there is no budget to keep the place running. This is not aid, it is a permanent part of what seems to be needed to keep the state of Mali running.

This does not mean that calls have not been made for an end to aid dependence. The Guardian notes that 50 per cent of the country’s public expenditures are made through aid, and aid-dependent countries over time lose accountability with their own citizens and lose their ability to set independent policy. With little evidence of an ‘exit strategy’ in the near future, we will likely see the amount of aid grow in Mali and other poor aid-dependent states in the next few years.

Overseas Development Institute Research Fellow Jonathan Glennie agrees:

Aid itself has undermined democracy, institutions and the capacity to govern in Africa…. The sense of powerlessness that has been instilled in governments, the civil service, parliaments and civil society in almost all African countries to varying degrees has led to what might be called the psychological malaise of aid dependence.4

Ironically, Mali was seen as a model of democracy and a star donor recipient… but in the end, the aid did not strengthen the state. Instead, it fostered bad governance and inefficiency.

Security narrative

There needs to be a shift away from a security narrative toward one of development. In poor countries, ‘development’ aid is typically understood to mean assistance to help the country to build its economy, social welfare, public health, and the like. However, in Foreign Policy Journal, Melissa Neelakantan argues that the context of ‘development’ in Mali has meant largely the development of security. While such a strategy may work in the short term, success is likely to be short lived. She claims that as long as Mali remains one of the world’s poorest countries, and as long as little economic development comes to the largely Tuareg north, rebels will continue to happen. Neelankanta believes that the problem is not just one of limited resources; Niger has been able to largely keep its own Tuareg movement under control by sending...
aid rather than troops. But Mali’s Tuaregs resent the fact that there have never been serious efforts to bring about economic development.

This focus on security has largely been directed at reducing the jihadist threat. This strategy has been successful in its immediate goals. The jihadist groups (Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIMA) were largely wiped out, and their leaders have been forced to flee the country. However, this has just strengthened the Tuareg rebel group, the MNLA, because it was not targeted as the most imminent security threat. This, in turn, fosters resentment on the part of Mali’s Arabs, who believe that the French and other Western countries are favouring the Tuaregs. The result will likely fuel more jihadist sentiment in the future.

**Difficult governance**

The reality of a poor country governing a sparsely populated region. Governing an area that takes up more than 50 per cent of its land mass but has less than 10 per cent of the population was always going to be difficult, particularly when the majority population there are of a different ethnicity. The reality is that the government must compete for authority in the region with a Tuareg rebel group and several Arab militant groups. While most of Mali’s economic development efforts go to the more populous south, people in the north feel neglected. A hunger crisis looms, as the World Food Programme argues that over 500,000 people in northern Mali need ‘life-saving food aid’.

And the crisis of governance is not limited to the economic realm. One of the primary functions of government is to provide order and stability. While from the outside we may see discrete actors — the government, the Tuareg rebels, the jihadists — the local inhabitants see an unstable situation in which looting is rampant and in which suicide bombings are all too common. As the UN general in charge of the UN-supported contingent of Burkina Faso troops in the Timbuktu area claims, it is difficult to know who is a jihadist, who is the MNLA, and who is a bandit. All these bandits have taken advantage of the security situation. The jihadists are getting supplies from people on the side of the road.

In such a crisis of governance, no one can feel liberated from terrorism, rebel groups, bandits or anything else.

**Uncertain outcome**

It is curious in retrospect how last year’s coup was ostensibly due to a frustration with how the government was prosecuting the fight against the Tuareg revolt. Yet things actually became worse immediately after the coup. This spectacular ‘own goal’ occurred, according to Reuters, because it created a political opening that emboldened the opposition to strike more directly.

The French-led intervention, with subsequent assistance from the African Union, seems on its surface to be an example of international co-operation against insecurity and terrorism. However, as always, when the news turns away from Mali, when we stop hearing of coups and of terrorists being trained there, and when the immediate humanitarian crises are over, we will forget… and then wake up to be surprised again by another calamitous event.

Northern Mali is still unstable. It is a humanitarian disaster waiting to happen… if it is not happening already. We are waiting for something else to happen.

The French, in my opinion, are in denial. President Hollande said in May: ‘The terrorists have been beaten. I don’t say there are none left, I don’t say there is no risk, but there is no longer any fighting.’ These statements, while perhaps not far off the mark, do not capture the fluid and unstable nature of the situation.

There may indeed be little fighting at the moment in Mali. But rather than real economic development, the country seems to have little to look forward to except more of the same — aid dependence, political instability, and factionalism — particularly in the north.

**NOTES**

2. Middle East Online, 23 May 2013, ‘Mali offensive opens Pandora’s box: Qaeda offshoot spreads its wings’ (www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=58960).
Keeping relationships in good repair

Murray McCully provides an update on New Zealand’s foreign policy.

I want to use this opportunity to provide a quick review of the status of our relationships and from that base to look forward at some of the issues we will need to confront in the years immediately ahead.

I think I can report that all of our important relationships are in good repair. Starting with our largest and most important relationship, Australia, I can report a continuation of the sort of co-operation that exists only between our two countries. This manifests itself especially strongly in the shared leadership role that we play in the Pacific. New Zealand exports to Australia, which have softened a little in the past two years, remain around the $10 billion mark — well ahead of our other markets.

While federal elections in Australia in September will call for a quieter period in the relationship over the coming months, I have no hesitation in asserting that this unique relationship will re-gather its normal momentum regardless of the election outcome, later this year.

Similarly, there has been a quieter period in our relationship with the United States as the second Obama administration continues to take shape. The relationship with the United States today is a fundamentally different and better one than was evident five years ago.

I believe the Key government’s strategy of removing this relationship from domestic political contention and slowly building trust and confidence has served our interests well. The initial interactions with Secretary of State John Kerry have been extremely positive and I will visit Washington later in May for our first formal talks.

Hopefully we are poised to make a major breakthrough in terms of our trade relations. Our exports to the United States have been bumping around a little over the $4 billion mark for around a decade now. It is heartening to see the level of ambition being brought by the Obama administration to the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, which bring the promise of a reinvigorated trade relationship in the immediate future.

Subdued approach

In China, too, leadership changes have imposed a more subdued approach to the diplomatic relationship over recent months, followed by the highly successful visit by the prime minister in April for his first formal engagement with the new leadership. Five years into the free trade agreement with China, our export figures are now sitting around the $7 billion mark, the result of a period of spectacular growth. We are broadly on track to reach the highly ambitious target of $20 billion of two-way trade by 2015 — by which time we are likely to see our exports to China match our exports to Australia. The recent decision to open a new mission in western China alongside our missions in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou is recognition of this spectacular trend.

Maintaining diplomatic relations with Japan has proven to be a livelier matter than I had anticipated. I am now on my sixth Japanese foreign minister. I am very much looking forward to Minister Kishida visiting later in May.

After many years of flat-lined trade and economic relations, with our exports sitting a little over the $3 billion mark, Japan is on the brink of major changes. The decision to join the TPP negotiation is a game changer for Japan and for the region, signaling a level of confidence and ambition we should welcome.

Our relationship with South Korea remains strong, and we welcome the enormous restraint with which they deal with the provocative behaviour from North Korea. But our trade relationship will continue to under-perform until a free trade agreement puts our exporters on an equal footing to many of their competitors.

All New Zealand’s important relationships are in good repair. Although those with Australia and the United States are in a quiet period because of impending or recent elections, they will soon bounce back. With the United States there are hopes of a major breakthrough in terms of trade relations. Sino-New Zealand relations are also subdued, but trade is burgeoning. Japan’s decision to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership is a welcome change and New Zealand continues to pursue a free trade agreement with South Korea. The government is pressing ahead with plans to strengthen relations in a number of other areas, including Russia, South Asia, Latin America, the Persian Gulf and especially the South Pacific. It is also alive to the potential benefits of closer ties with countries on the African continent.
Solid progress
In April I met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. While solid progress is being made on the Russia free trade agreement, there is a lot more to the relationship than that. We also recognise that Russia is a huge player in world affairs and we need to ensure that we maintain solid engagement. I am hopeful that we will be able to find dates for the prime minister to make an official visit to Moscow at President Putin’s invitation before this year is over.

In 2011, the government launched its India strategy, providing a framework to develop the enormous trade opportunities that will be available as that country’s huge population becomes wealthier. We hope for further progress towards a free trade agreement with India in the near future.

In the 2001–10 period, six of the world’s fastest growing economies were African. Huge business potential exists with returns to match. And this growth is spread over the entire continent, not just in the northern half. Since 2010 the average growth rate for sub-Saharan Africa was around 5 per cent and is expected to be above 5 per cent over the next twelve months. While this clearly justifies our decision this year to open a full-time mission in Addis Ababa, it also asks the question as to where else in that huge continent we will soon need representation.

Huge benefit
Consolidation of New Zealand’s relationships in ASEAN has been a key focal point for this government. Being part of a free trade agreement with ASEAN is hugely beneficial to New Zealand. So, too, is our place at the table of the East Asia Summit and other ASEAN-brokered meetings.

While the opportunities for trade and economic growth with ASEAN are huge, they will only be realised with a serious and significant investment of effort from both public and private sectors. The Cabinet recently signed off on our New Zealand Inc ASEAN Strategy as a basis for this renewed effort and I look forward to the prime minister launching this strategy soon.

There are four other regional relationships which deserve some reflection. First, there is the European Union, which, despite its well-publicised financial difficulties, remains a key player in world affairs. New Zealand’s heritage and international personality have been shaped by our commitment to European values — democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The European Union is our bedrock partner in the pursuit of these values internationally.

It is my hope that we will be able to see the trade and economic relationship achieve the same high levels of partnership through, at some point, the conclusion of a New Zealand/European Union free trade agreement. Europe’s current challenges have diminished the appetite for a comprehensive partnership agreement, embracing agreements on trade. In 2011 I announced that we were instead negotiating a framework agreement — alongside our neighbour Australia. Most elements of that agreement are now concluded.

Trade imperative
I take this opportunity to reiterate the important message that in the fairly near future we need to again pick up the trade and economic aspect of the relationship that at the moment is fairly static — to ensure it performs as successfully as the other aspects of this very important partnership.

Here I want to place on record my deep appreciation to EU Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, with whom I co-hosted the Pacific Renewable Energy Conference in April. Together we managed to attract commitments in excess of $635 million for projects that should take the Pacific from below 5 per cent to around 50 per cent renewable energy in the years immediately ahead. This has been a very exciting and successful new strand to our relationship with the European Union.

New Zealand’s exports to the Gulf Cooperation Council have grown on average by about 10 per cent a year over the last decade and growth in other aspects of the relationship has been as spectacular. While many other relationships suffer from inadequate logistical connections, New Zealand enjoys 28 flights per week from Emirates as well as the benefits of the codeshare arrangement between Etihad and Air New Zealand.

Massive sovereign wealth funds provide huge investment partnership opportunities for New Zealand, especially in agriculture as Gulf countries seek food security arrangements for the future. The completion of the GCC free trade agreement remains a priority for the government, and soon we will launch a New Zealand Inc GCC strategy. We have just made the decision to boost our resources in the Abu Dhabi embassy opened two years ago, and are pleased to see New Zealand Trade and Enterprise also expand their footprint in the Gulf.

Refreshed strategy
Back in 2010 the government published a refreshed Latin America strategy. As part of this strategy the prime minister has just completed a hugely successful visit to the region. In May Trade Minister Tim Groser attended a meeting of the Pacific Alliance, where we are now observers. In my view the Pacific Alliance will be a real force to be reckoned with over the next few years. While our geographies and seasons may limit the extent of our trade in goods, the services and investment aspects of the relationship with Latin America have huge potential.

I have deliberately left until last our role in our own neighbourhood, the Pacific. It is no secret that the government regards, and I personally regard, our role in this region as key to our international reputation and personality.

We now spend nearly 60 per cent of our total overseas development assistance budget in the region. And we are trying to spend it in a more ambitious way. The recent Pacific Renewable
Energy Conference is a good example. Preparing a prospectus reflecting Pacific renewable energy roadmaps, holding a conference and sourcing $635 million of funding is difficult enough. Turning $635 million of commitments into $635 million worth of projects will be even more demanding.

But shifting the region closer to 50 per cent renewable electricity supply is an important objective. This is exactly the sort of facilitative role New Zealand should, with our links into the region, be able to play. Another good example is the group of projects we are undertaking in the Western Province of the Solomon Islands, especially the expansion and sealing of the Munda Airport. A couple of 100-pound bombs and a 1000-pound bomb under the existing runway are just the start of the complications encountered in projects of this sort.

Huge benefits
But the new facility will bring huge benefits to the Solomons as they make the transition from the RAMSI mission. It will be a critical enabler for key sectors, especially tourism and fisheries. This is an ambitious approach to the use of our development resources, but one that should make a significant and sustainable difference.

As mentioned above, we have been making changes to our resource allocation around the world:
- the new mission in western China
- the new mission in Myanmar
- the commitment to a full time mission in Addis Ababa

There are clearly pressures building for a greater presence in Africa. In addition to growing markets there, Africa is the location of 60 per cent of the world’s uncultivated arable land and I hope to see increasing New Zealand private sector interest in that continent. The prime minister’s successful Latin American visit made clear the pressures for an expanded footprint there. And the continuing growth in trade with the Gulf — now a $1.6 billion market — will keep the pressure on our increased resources there.

Pleasing progress
Finally, regarding our Security Council campaign, I am pleased with progress to date. But as the 2012 campaign and Australia’s and Luxembourg’s success demonstrated, the final year really matters. And bigger countries with bigger resources always have an advantage over smaller countries with smaller resources.

We are working hard. I am just back from visiting thirteen countries — six in Africa and seven in Europe — in thirteen days. In fact it was fourteen countries in fourteen days if you count a brief stopover in Australia. I leave again within days for the Caribbean, where I will address the annual foreign ministers’ meeting and make bilateral calls.

New Zealand has an outstanding international reputation, built upon the good work of many people over many years. We work hard to maintain and enhance it. I hope and believe that, along with some hard yards in the meantime, this will leave us well placed when the UN Security Council ballot comes in October of next year.
Interests and values in international relations

Terence O’Brien discusses the mainsprings of New Zealand’s foreign policy.

Foreign policy for all, or most, countries is shaped by interests and by values. Interests can usually be readily defined — security, prosperity and well being of the country and its people are the essential features. Values derive from history, tradition, myth, cultural/religious background and ethnic make-up. Values can influence the choice of partners that a country selects through foreign policy, but interests play the material part.

What a country is and seeks to be determines foreign policy. For much of the 20th century as New Zealand emerged hesitantly into the international arena, our interests and values reflected our perceived situation as a small distant extension of an Atlantic-centred English speaking world, whose influences upon New Zealand were paramount. This Atlantic worldview lay at the core of the so-called Western enlightenment, where secularism, rational thought and scientific achievement were conceived as basic values for human improvement. They were matched by a conviction, too, that cultural differences are essentially a surface manifestation that would disappear as part of human progress driven by knowledge and technology. Material gain would be a yardstick of progress towards a better world.

It is seriously questionable whether human progress is, or should be, conceived as a universal, shared, single experience. Despite so-called economic globalisation, the world continues, after all, to be shaped by measurably different traditions of culture. Diversity reigns, as New Zealand knows from its own modern experience of seeking to fashion long-term relations in Asia, where interests drive New Zealand foreign policy, but where our values derive traditionally from elsewhere. We witness at first hand for ourselves how technology, ideas and economic models are employed differently and successfully in Asian countries with their distinct values. Asian economic success is undoubtedly creating aspirations amongst increasing numbers of Asian people for material advantage that is commensurate with that achieved in traditional Western industrial economies. But the idea that prosperous Asians will then ‘grow more like us’ is wishful thinking.

Identity of values remains something beyond shared material gain. The reputable American political scientist Samuel Huntington wrote twenty years ago that ‘Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, and separation of church and state often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures’. Huntington was here trying to justify his controversial assertion that the world is heading inexorably towards a ‘clash of civilisations’.

Superior virtue

In the Atlantic/European world a particular sense of superior virtue prevailed, according to which to be secular and enlightened is to be peaceful, and the rest of the world had only, therefore, to absorb Western knowledge and values to be enlightened and peaceful. But the 20th century produced two world wars of great savagery, a 40-year long Cold War based upon the grim threat of nuclear destruction and several cruel wars of decolonisation. These were ‘wars of other people’ into which distant New Zealand was drawn. They had their origins in rivalries and ambition amongst major countries of the Western enlightenment. Such wars emphatically exploded the claim to superior virtue by the enlightenment powers. But as we begin this new century the idea that the spread of Western values, and in particular the spread of democracy, will consolidate peace and goodwill globally persists in the capitals of powerful Western nations, and amongst non-government agencies that are increasingly influential in the promotion of values internationally. Superior virtue now focuses on democratisation. We will come back to this.

Interests and values shape the foreign policies of most, if not all countries. The former relate to security, prosperity and well being; history, tradition, myth, cultural/religious background and ethnic make up shape the latter. Values-driven and interests-driven foreign relations are not alternative pathways for conducting world affairs. They are essential connections. Values-driven relations aim to transform political and social behaviour of others, while any changes so effected can affect how interests are best served. New Zealand’s interests and values once focused on an Atlantic-centred English speaking world. Today, sometimes awkwardly, interests have pushed it into seeking relations in areas far removed from the source of its values.
The last 25 years or so have witnessed a resurgence of religion as a force in international affairs. Attempts by radical elements inside Islam to extend their control over the dominant religious and social belief system inside the Middle East have had worldwide repercussions. A clash between conservative and progressive forces inside religion is not confined to Islam alone. Similar struggles are evident within Christianity, the Jewish faith and the Orthodox churches, although levels of internal violence are much lower. Nonetheless, the global resurgence of religion alongside the forces of globalisation challenges modern diplomacy, peacemaking and international security. Resolving such religious conflict requires something much more than traditional hard-nosed calculations of national interest based on power, made by politicians, diplomats and military commanders. Expertise for dealing with such conflict and instability does not now, therefore, reside with governments alone, if it ever did.

In the Middle East the internal struggle within Islam is compounded by international politics and in particular longstanding interference by powerful outsiders with the aim of imposing their version of order on the region. Supervision of the world’s main source of oil, the overthrow of uncongenial regional leaders, the protection of favoured clients and of military bases, the suppression of insurgencies or vexatious regional separatism have motivated a succession of Western and other powers for over a century to interfere extensively in the Middle East. The United States is the latest in a long line of intruders that have employed lethal military force to secure their aims. It is self delusion to deny that the sorry record of prolonged intrusion is not a motivating cause behind the internationalised version of modern terrorism, with its gruesome and far reaching methods, which now with American persuasion shapes the global security agenda for many countries — even distant New Zealand.

Human rights
The 20th century was notable for many achievements. One of the most remarkable was the successful negotiation led by American energy and imagination at the United Nations, beginning mid-century, of a set of international conventions designed to elevate the dignity and rights of the human individual. These human rights provisions were intended to provide codes of government behaviour for recognising basic rights of their populations. Governments were answerable in principle to the international community for the discharge of those obligations after signing up to the conventions that basically covered civil and political rights, economic and social rights and community rights. The conventions provided a solid international framework for the pursuit of values-driven foreign policy by individual governments.

But there were, and are, drawbacks. The UN human rights are discretionary not obligatory. They define the rights but do not guarantee them. The international system lacks anyway means for enforcement in cases where duties or responsibilities are ignored by governments. Some governments are, moreover, selective in how far they accept some conventions but disown others. The United States, for example declines to sign up to the convention on economic and social rights, to the convention on the rights of the child, to that preventing discrimination against women as well as several others. Yet the United States energetically champions human rights in its self-proclaimed role as a universal beacon for humanity.

The very existence of internationally recognised human rights conventions serves, nonetheless, to challenge the absolute character of national sovereignty — in other words, what a government does behind its sovereign borders is, or can be, a question of legitimate outside interest. Gross violations like genocide, mass persecution and heedless neglect of basic human needs pose, therefore, a question directly of how or when the international community should intervene. In a world where national sovereignty is still the
foundation for global order, this remains highly sensitive ground. The search for a way forward led to a Canadian-inspired initiative as the new century began to devise international principles that did not assert ‘the right to intervene’ but rather proclaimed ‘the responsibility to protect’ on the part of the world community those populations under threat.

This was an astute attempt to avoid declarations that seemed directly to dispute sovereign authority, and to emphasise instead community obligation to support intrinsic universal human values. Along with others, New Zealand endorsed this enlightened move, but for many governments in the developing world sensitive about national sovereignty support remains half hearted. It would be wrong to claim that the principle can now be rated as a robust part of accepted international values behaviour in an era where internal conflict remains a dominant feature of world insecurity. The indecision that now surrounds the murderous agony in Syria emphatically proves that point.

Brave effort

Yet these developments helped thrust the focus of international attention upon the value of ‘human security’ as distinct from, or in addition to, ‘national security’, which is traditionally the central preoccupation of governments. That in turn led international aid policy to become more sharply directed to addressing basic causes of human insecurity — and in particular poverty. A brave new collective effort was launched as the new century began in the form of a set of Millennium Goals accepted by heads of government at the United Nations — both aid donors and aid recipients — to tackle basic causes of poverty in terms of a set of agreed sectoral targets. After more than ten years of effort, progress globally has been disparate and uneven. Indeed, there is accumulating evidence of a widening gap inside both developed and developing countries between rich and poor, with the attendant risks of deepening political and social tension. The enthusiastic claims by countries between rich and poor, with the attendant risks of evidence of a widening gap inside both developed and develop-

American influence

What emerges from all of this so far is that values-driven and interests-driven foreign relations are not in fact alternative pathways for conducting world affairs. There are essential connections. Values-driven relations aim, after all, to transform political and social behaviour of others, and such changes, if accomplished, can affect how interests are best served. In all of this, US influence and policy are paramount. Washington believes as an article of faith that the political character of other states directly affects America’s own security and economic interests. This means that US promotion of values in international relations becomes, therefore, not just an exercise of morality but an act of national security. The fear of insecurity professed by successive American governments over many years is perplexing to many outsiders, given that the United States is, and has been for a considerable period, the most powerful nation in world history. Since 9/11 it has mobilised itself into a ‘garrison state’ with extensive domestic surveillance that even imperils civil liberties. It is a sense that is mirrored domestically as well in America’s deluded gun laws, which likewise perplex outsiders.

This brings us back to the issue of superior virtue. Contemporary American attitudes are strongly influenced by the so-called ‘democratic peace theory’, according to which, it is claimed, democracies do not fight one another. The spread of democracy as a supreme value becomes, therefore, a vital part of ensuring a peaceful and stable world. Democracy is not defined strictly speaking as a human right by the UN human rights conventions, although the entitlements spelt out for basic civil and political rights (for example, freedom of speech) point clearly to democracy as the system most likely to guarantee such rights.

But the ‘democratic peace theory’ needs qualification. The historical record shows that the pathway to democracy can often be violent and destabilising, as for example when it unleashes forces of radical nationalism; that democracy cannot be imposed from outside, especially by force of arms — it is basically a home-grown product which takes time to mature; that ideal democracy is anyway a never ending quest; and that while democracies may be more peaceable they remain capable of belligerence, which is itself destabilising — take, for example, the American strategic policy precept that ‘all options remain on the table for the US President’ as leader of the world’s pre-eminent democracy whenever he ad-
dresses security crises in the world. That formula, stripped to bare essentials, amounts in effect to a threat of war, if that is judged to serve interests. At the bottom line ‘the theory’ implies as well that those countries that are non-democratic pose a generic threat to peace and well-being by the very fact of their existence. That is manifestly a dangerous fallacy.

**Double standard**

The way in which human rights have over past decades been variously blended with democracy, good governance and free market economics and promoted internationally as a sort of package for human improvement tends to dilute rather than strengthen the cause of values-driven relations. Likewise, inconsistent advocacy of human rights creates a double standard — criticism of Iran, for example, over human rights failures while at the same time equivalent or even greater shortcomings in Saudi Arabia are ignored because of the geo-political priorities of major powers is an obvious case of relativism, which undermines credibility. Even-handedness is a virtue that smaller countries, like New Zealand, may be more capable of applying than larger more powerful countries with extensive ambition and interests. But absolute consistency for large and small countries alike is an illusion.

This brings us to another dimension of values-driven foreign policy — so-called ‘soft power’. This notion was invented over the last decade of the old century in the United States to explain that American powers of persuasion, as the unchallenged global leader, do not rely solely upon unrivalled military or economic power, but also upon the attraction which America’s manifold accomplishments hold for others in the world — her inventiveness, self belief, resourcefulness, powers of recuperation and the like. American taste, fashion, culture and ideas have worldwide influence. Such soft power co-opts rather than coerces other countries to support American objectives and preferences. It is something more than image, public relations or ephemeral publicity, although these do play a role. At the bottom line, soft power helps define international reputations and reputation requires constant care and attention by governments, large and small.

The very nature of the US muscular response to internationalised terrorism and the part that negligent supervision by Washington of the US financial sector played in the global financial crisis have both served, in varying degrees, to debilitating US soft power. Pre-emptive military strikes, use of drones, torture, rendition, clandestine intrusion and targeted assassination in states with which the United States is not formally at war, all serve to denigrate the US reputation. At the same time, American credentials for global or even regional economic leadership have been compromised after the global financial crisis. Successful Asian economies are hesitant for their part now to follow American policy prescriptions — the majority so far have, for example, declined involvement in US-led negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership. In the normal course, leadership is either asserted or bestowed. Bestowal of leadership by others legitimises that leadership. Leadership that relies, however, substantively upon robust assertion lacks essential value in today’s interdependent and globalising world.

**Sufficient pedigree**

The inventors of the ‘soft power’ concept initially conceived it to be an exclusive American attribute alongside unrivalled US military power and economic primacy. Later reiterations of the concept acknowledge that others, including middle-level states, likewise aspire to or possess ‘soft power’. The idea that small states may also be similarly endowed was, however, perhaps a step too far for the original authors. Yet as a small, mature, modern, unthreatening democracy with capacity for impartiality and even-handedness, with reconciliation established through the Waitangi process as a core principle of its democracy, and a record of various ground breaking economic, social and political changes over a century or longer, New Zealand possesses sufficient pedigree for ‘soft power’. Indeed, looking back to when New Zealand first introduced its non-nuclear policy, which the United States for its own national security interests strongly opposed (leading it to seek to punish what it saw as New Zealand obduracy), the utility of New Zealand soft power as a protection was evident. Retribution was duly meted out to New Zealand but the hand was stayed of those in Washington (mainly the Pentagon) who wished to impose the severest penalties. The spectacle of the world’s strongest power intentionally debilitating a small modern democracy with a reputable international standing for an act of democratic choice was not, in the end, considered wise lest it boomerang on the United States.

Diversity is, indeed, one of humanity’s greatest strengths. New Zealand exposure to diversity in foreign relations began effectively in the mid-20th century when its traditional export markets in those industrialised countries with which it shared values, and alongside whom it had fought in two world wars, were increasingly distorted by intransigent trade protectionism on the part of those self same countries. Diversification became, for New Zealand, absolutely vital. New markets were pursued in the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Cuba and a range of other countries with which New Zealand had had few dealings, and shared few values, and whose international reputation was sometimes mediocre. But all of this had the effect of broadening New Zealand foreign policy horizons swiftly and extensively, and of nourishing a less ideological and pragmatic New Zealand external relations attitude. There was no missionary zeal on New Zealand’s part to change the values of new acquaintances and this tradition of operation stands New Zealand in good stead in Asia, the South Pacific and elsewhere. What New Zealand is and seeks to be in itself provides sufficient advertisement of our values, rather than any public practice of extensive moralising.

**Reinforced conviction**

The diversification experience, nonetheless, reinforced at the same time a conviction that rules-based international economic behav-
bour was indispensable to New Zealand success. The rules, and the management of the system that applied those rules, had in the New Zealand view to be fairly and equitably administered. This was not simply an expression of pious virtue. The international trade system developed as from the middle of the last century (under GATT — now the WTO) was purposefully skewed in favour of the larger northern hemisphere industrialised economies, which is nowhere more evident than in the indulgent loophole extended to the farm economies of Europe, North America and Japan, with their continued protection from fair unsubsidised New Zealand competition.

The vital importance New Zealand attaches to the value of equitable multilateralism endures today, although shades of emphasis are shifting as change to the centre of gravity of the world economy gathers pace. It is crucial now that the successful newly emergent economies of Asia, Latin America and elsewhere, upon whom the global economy vitally depends, accept to operate themselves within the rules-based system from which they have so conspicuously benefited. For that to happen it is necessary, however, that they be extended equivalent opportunity in the management and agenda setting of the multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO). Such opportunity has been traditionally monopolised by major industrialised Western powers to further their advantage. It is in New Zealand's vital interest that the necessary space now be created for a more even-handed system, notwithstanding our traditional values connection with those major powers that are reluctant to concede their monopolies.

**Extra dimension**

Important changes to the international order already agreed add extra dimension to the extent of New Zealand interests in the value of fair-minded multilateralism. The creation as from 2008 of the G20 head of government summit as a regularised feature on the global landscape, involving leaders from the top twenty economies of the world, was a move led by the United States ostensibly to share global political/economic management more equitably in the future. For New Zealand and for the great majority of states in the world that are outside the G20, this new top table cannot be a substitute for existing institutions (such as the United Nations and WTO) where the vital principles of universality of membership and of sovereign equality are enshrined.

It is in any event simply unrealistic to believe that the G20 could ever assume directly the responsibilities and authority of the multiple existing organisations variously established across a vast spectrum of international activity over the past 65 years. It is feasible, however, that the G20 could act as the strategic supervisor, somewhat overseeing existing institutions, but, as suggested already, this depends vitally on those institutions themselves being reformed to reflect modern reality. The G20 itself must establish robust effective lines of communication that allow for input from outside G20 ranks, New Zealand included. The G20 is a creation that recognises the new realities of the distribution of international economic power. Its key responsibility, however, is not to dictate policy programmes to non-G20 members, but rather to integrate domestic economic policies of its own select membership so as to navigate a way out for everyone from the global economic crisis. Collective G20 commitments to disavow trade protectionism, to ensure investment flows, to improve effective financial management, to avoid competitive exchange rate adjustments and to collectively diminish corruption all help send authoritative signals to the international community, even while they are unsurprisingly disparaged by unrepentant critics as proverbial rhetoric.

**Future context**

The successful pursuit of New Zealand interests over the century ahead will obviously be conditioned by trends in the wider world over which New Zealand has negligible influence, and which are not necessarily easy to predict. The global landscape appears somewhat brittle. Right now one sees a Europe deeply consumed by the question of its own survival as a union — financially, economically and politically. Britain is once again perversely agonising about its future place. Europe’s vital role in the world, which is valuable to New Zealand, seems inevitably debilitated as the result.

On the other hand, the United States confronts massive insolvency and stalled growth. Its decision-taking is paralysed by special interest politics, so that the American system of governance grows dysfunctional, even while the United States recommit itself to absolute global leadership and the traditional burdens of primacy involving sumptuous military spending that seems financially insupportable. There is, in fact, sufficient room for cuts that would not seriously imperil US primacy. At the same time, onerous social and psychological costs of almost continuous war fighting for more than twenty years are taking a toll in the United States. Optimists place much faith in the famous US powers of ingenuity and ultimate recuperation, but America’s relative standing and influence in the world seem set to decline.

East Asia is sustaining economic performance despite the global financial crisis and the economic, social and environmental stress caused by the sheer rate of modernisation. China has become the essential pivot for the regional, and indeed global economy. But China confronts the on-going need to reassure neighbours of its peaceable intentions at a time when various maritime sovereignty disputes are resurfacing. In addition, the perverse, obstinate, unpredictable behaviour of North Korea afflicts regional stability. As convenor of the G6 countries with principal interests in the Korean peninsula, China’s responsibilities are substantial. For their part, China’s neighbours, conscious of their shared and extensive economic connections with China, must reassure Beijing that in return for its peaceable assurances they will not be party to any strategy ‘to contain’ China, which does not itself seek to usurp America’s global role with all the burdens that are entailed, nor to change the world in China’s own image; but it does seek regional parity and US respect.
Diffuse power
All this suggests that power in the world and in the Asia–Pacific region is becoming more diffuse. A more hybrid international and regional order is in prospect. As far as East Asia is concerned, East Asian governments will first and foremost drive the actual form and extent of institutional co-operation. New Zealand has over twenty years and longer sought to fashion foreign policy that recognises and accepts that. The United States has, however, now recommitted itself to asserting regional economic leadership and strengthening as well its military presence. Along with most other regional governments New Zealand wants to avoid awkward choices, but some may lie ahead if China and the United States fail to compose their regional relationship and accept the realities of a changing context. Indeed, the sheer range and extent of global and regional challenges will test the ingenuity, adaptability, discernment and professionalism in small country diplomacy. The need, moreover, to diversify risk must continue to guide pursuit of New Zealand interests by extending our foreign policy interests and, therefore, economic opportunity in Latin America, Africa and other places.

The revolution in communications technology is empowering non-government influence in international affairs. No single government, however powerful and supreme, or group of governments is capable alone of resolving the crucial and evermore closely connected problems of global access to food, energy and water on a planet where resources are under stress from an increasing global population and where urbanisation, migration within and between countries, multinational crime and the like are expanding relentlessly.

A mix of old and new security concerns also confront this more hybrid world — extremism, nuclear proliferation, cyber security and corruption. The task of summoning the collective will globally, or even regionally, to manage and eliminate these scourges and to surmount the socio-economic challenges, and to do so in ways that now share the burdens and responsibilities equitably, will be an immense test over the century ahead. Strains in the relationship between a country’s values and interests will not become any easier to overcome.

NOTES

China and the United States need to compose their regional relationship

Cyber security is a growing problem
The European Union and the Asia-Pacific region: a Polish perspective

Peter Kennedy reports on a panel discussion with Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski on 3 May 2013.

After being introduced by Professor Rob Rabel, Foreign Minister Radosław (Radek) Sikorski opened the discussion by referring to the long trip from Poland to New Zealand and the ‘gravitational experience’ of passing over China. He had come from a European Union that was changing and reforming but ‘determined to have a harvest time soon’. The problem of indebtedness was not intrinsically European (the debt to GDP ratio of the United States was worse). This was not the first crisis in the European Union, nor would it be the last. The European Union contained one-quarter of the world’s GDP, more than the United States and more than Brazil, India and China together. It included also over one-quarter of the world’s currency resources (in Euro) — including one-quarter of the New Zealand Reserve Bank’s foreign reserves. Finally, it was the biggest exporter and second biggest importer in the world.

Minister Sikorski said he liked to think that Poland was one of the six bigger countries in the European Union. The group cannot be run by the United Kingdom, France and Germany alone. Further, since the beginning of the crisis Poland’s growth has been 20 per cent, compared to zero for the European Union as a whole. The Poles ‘would do almost anything to survive and prosper’. Poland had not yet adopted the single currency but was treaty bound to do so. Its largest trading partner was no longer NAFTA but ASEAN, with China the second single country partner after the United States.

The first to respond to the minister was Professor Martin Holland of Canterbury University. He noted that there was something of a ‘time lag’ in Asia and Australasia in understanding what the European Union was all about. The European Union was almost absent from our media. Foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton had yet to visit South-east Asia and there remained a challenge working out ‘who speaks for Europe’. The focus tends to be on German Chancellor Merkel or French President Hollande rather than EU institutions.

Professor Rob Ayson of Victoria University added that the role of the European Union in Asia seemed rather modest, in contrast to its role in its immediate partnership area. China has found it can pursue its own interests within the existing systems, but remains desirous of changing them. He considered that as the European Union becomes more deeply involved with China, it will look to Asia more pragmatically. He acknowledged the importance of the European Union’s development assistance to the Asia-Pacific region.

The next panelist was Asia New Zealand Foundation head John McKinnon. He noted that Poland and New Zealand were both a long way from Afghanistan but had come together in a mission that we considered important. He suggested there will be other occasions where we will come together again. Turning to New Zealand’s focus on Asia, McKinnon said there were three drivers: it was ‘changeover time’ with China leading a challenging period of change; close proximity and rapid changes in our demography (which will be revealed further by the new census); and the need to put extra effort into engagement with an area very different from Europe, the United States and Australia.

Called upon to comment further, Minister Sikorski noted the many areas of integration the European Union has undertaken but added that many member states ‘talk the talk’ of integration but do not ‘walk the walk’. More was needed. The European Union had achieved a European External Action Service, but it still had 5000 European embassies or consulates compared with 180 or so for the United States. In the context of the relationship with Asia, Sikorski personally did not believe China will grow exponentially, but is likely to be affected in the future by some tectonic shifts, for example on its borders. In response to questions, Sikorski said Russia was very important, but despite having a $2 trillion economy it was not treated as an equal, and its dependence on oil and gas for its wealth was worrying. In a final comment on the European Union, he said one of the main reasons for its current problems, and high unemployment in countries like Greece, was rigid labour markets. But this would be sorted: ‘no crisis should be wasted’.

From left: Roberto Rabel, Radoslaw Sikorski, John McKinnon, Rob Ayson, Martin Holland

Radoslaw Sikorski
After the missions: predicting New Zealand’s security future

Peter Kennedy reports on a recent symposium in Wellington.

On 22 May a packed audience of 170 came together in Wellington to participate in a symposium entitled 'After the Missions: Understanding New Zealand’s Security Future'. Formally opened by Commander Joint Forces New Zealand Air Vice-Marshal Kevin Short, the symposium discussed a range of issues related to the end of an intensive decade and a half of New Zealand military and civil operations overseas and considered what the future held in an increasingly complex security environment.

In his opening address Short said the strategy of the New Zealand Defence Force is to maintain the security of New Zealand into the future. History has shown that rarely do future predictions play out correctly. Thus it is prudent that New Zealand maintains a balanced force, capable of responding to crises as they unfold, be they humanitarian or combat in nature. Removing unnecessary duplication across the three services has been a major theme of recent reforms (avoiding the ‘vanilla’ approach at the expense of operational excellence). Turning to the future, Short noted that the United Nations is looking closely at Africa as instability spreads throughout its equatorial region. Deployments to Africa could be on the cards, or the Middle East or Central Asia. Although New Zealand servicemen and women are no strangers to Africa — they have served in Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mozambique and Sudan in recent years — it would be a very different kind of help. That said, the South-west Pacific would remain our top area of focus. That is why the NZDF needs to have the structure and depth to be able to sustain many different types of operations.

Deployment lessons

The symposium discussion then began with the first session that looked at what we might have learned from the three major deployments of the last decade: Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomons (RAMSI). Professor Rob Ayson suggested that the simple existence of a problem overseas did not justify deployment — we have to read it against New Zealand’s national interests. Professor Robert Patman said to do this we must understand what our national interests are. Later speakers suggested it was not so much our national interests per se — these tended to be relatively clear — but rather what the government of the day considers is necessary to protect them. And this can be hard to predict.

Dr David Capie noted that in today’s world conflict was more often within states rather than between them. Whilst the number of global conflicts had dropped sharply, the number of states that were neither democratic nor authoritarian had grown, with a consequent increase in instability. He outlined how international norms had changed over the recent period, and the increasing acceptance of the concept of responsibility to protect. Paul Sinclair made the point that although each mission is different, the major lesson to be drawn from them is the importance of partners. From the floor Colonel Martin Dransfield commented that some potential partners in the future may not operate at the standards that New Zealand is used to. In that context the chair, Peter Kennedy, suggested that the NZDF’s experience in Afghanistan training local personnel with little or no education should prove valuable in the future. Colonel Dransfield agreed.
Our partners
The second session was chaired by Dr Jim Rolfe and sought to determine how New Zealand’s partners might see the future. Dr Andrew Davies, from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, zeroed in on the mismatch between aspiration and resources, particularly in the Australian Defence Force, although he warned that New Zealand, despite its better planning, was ‘perilously close’ to getting itself in this situation too. At the moment, New Zealand came across as a good example of a country that had taken a hard look at its strategic situation and realised that it had capabilities on the books that were never likely to be used in anything but a war of choice, which would take place far from its sovereign territory. It had cut its cloth to suit both the budget (although stresses remain) and its strategic circumstances.

Differing views
The fourth and final session, chaired by Simon Murdoch, began with two differing views about the strategic environment and New Zealand’s deployments in the future. Dr Lance Beath opened with the quotation ‘only the dead have seen the end of war’ (attributed to Plato but in fact first used in George Santayana’s Soliloquies in England, Scribners, 1924). He went on to suggest that defence was a growth business, and that the NZDF remains in a high state of readiness. The constraints around future deployments included the available budget, the need to operate in a primarily maritime region (he acknowledged the current emphasis on amphibious forces) and conservative defence thinking in some quarters. Terence O’Brien gave greater emphasis to the collective maintenance of good world order. He argued that New Zealand needed to think more widely, and connect both security and economic aspects of our national interest. A serious New Zealand effort was required to explore in relevant capitals the opportunities for operational interaction with East Asian defence forces in peace support activity.

The future
Considering the future security environment, and how it might differ from the past, was the focus of the third session, chaired by Bill Mansfield. Colin Keating opened by suggesting that as we were at an important turning point, it was timely to look back at another major turning point, the end of the Cold War, when we had undertaken a major review of future engagements in the light of perceived interests. This was all the more important because twenty years ago we got some things spectacularly wrong. Further, it was important not to make false assumptions about the preferred options for engagement. He pointed out that ‘green’ (military) deployments do not always precede ‘blue’ (civil, including policing) and there have been a number of instances where the reverse was true. The key determinant was often cost.

Professor Patman argued that whilst increased globalisation may, on one level, bring us closer together, on another it is likely to prove much more demanding for a country like New Zealand in responding to international pressures. Further we needed to think beyond military confrontations alone to other tensions created by factors such as climate change and rapid changes in technology. This latter point was emphasised also by Dr Joe Burton, who linked climate change to food insecurity and conflicts generally. He touched in addition on threats caused by cyber attacks.
two Massey University academics put this interaction at the heart
Keating had touched earlier on ‘green’ and ‘blue’ elements and the
interaction between civilian, policing, and military actors. Colin
ly to be successful, it was argued, if using models based on greater
response from New Zealand. Missions of the future are more like-
bourhood and beyond will continue to demand an operational
conflict in our neigh-

Is the future likely to be more complex? Yes.
Can we learn lessons from the past? Yes.
Do our partners see the future the same way? Yes and no.
Are we facing a less operational world? No.

a less operational world for New Zealand. Conflict in our neigh-

Session 4: Simon Murdoch, Lance Beath, Terence O’Brien, Beth Greener
A member of the audience asks a question of Colonel Martin Dransfield

of the required structure for the future.

Summing up the debate, Professor Rob Ayson sought to an-
swer succinctly a series of questions:

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New Zealand International Review
25
DIPLOMATIC LADIES:
New Zealand’s Unsung Envoys

Author: Joanna Woods

Readers of NZIR will have heard of William Pember Reeves, Alister McIntosh, Frank Corner, Edmund Hillary, Don Hunn and Richard Woods. But what do they know of Maud Reeves, Doris McIntosh, Lyn Corner, Jane Mulgrew, Janine Hunn, Joanna Woods, and a dozen other ‘diplomatic ladies'? They can know much more now, thanks to Joanna Woods’s illuminating account of loyal New Zealand women who followed their diplomat husbands to far-away places and responded to adversity with resilience and adaptability.

First, let us get a sense of the scope of this book. Its chapters begin with Reeves’s posting to London in 1896 and ends with Maria McKay’s reactions to the events of 9/11 in New York. In between, chapters provide verbal snapshots, through the eyes of the ‘unsung envoys’, of New Zealand’s posts in Moscow, Washington, Apia, Saigon, Delhi, Tokyo, Ottawa, Santiago, Paris, Nuku’alofa, Port Moresby, Tehran, Rarotonga, Suva, Baghdad, and (again) London.

Each chapter begins with the husband-diplomat’s posting, then introduces the wife’s perspective, ranging from enthusiasm to apprehension. The challenges she encountered, and how she coped, make up the bulk of the chapter. Wood’s summaries of the political pressures bearing on the posts (ranging from war to media scandal), and accounts of the persons the diplomats encountered (ranging from kings, prime ministers and artists to spies, thieves and rascals), lift the book from a collection of ladies’ magazine articles to a serious narrative, one worthy of publication by Otago University Press.

From my academic perspective the most significant chapters dealt with how the wives, expected for decades to cook for and entertain their husbands’ diplomatic guests, in the 1980s organised themselves, campaigned, and achieved official recognition by the ministry. Pat Caughley, following in Marguerite Scott’s footsteps, drafted a woman’s bill of rights that was not adopted but which achieved an amendment to the Overseas Service Handbook acknowledging the contributions of spouses. In 1987 the Spouse’s Group gained representation in the Foreign Service Association. Now spouses are allowed to work for pay while abroad, and are not automatically expected to devote themselves to cooking and carrying for the embassy.

Also of interest is a chapter devoted to ‘coming out’ by gay and lesbian diplomats and spouses and their accommodation in the ministry’s posting policies (of course avoiding countries where capital punishment is a risk). By the 1990s New Zealand led the world conferring equal status to homosexual partners of its diplomats. This liberalisation came too late for Alister McIntosh, who missed out on the Commonwealth Secretary-General post in 1966 because of a ‘compromising situation’ in Singapore, this despite his exemplary service and marriage, parenthood and later knighthood.

Engaging vignettes punctuate the book, such as how Maud Reeves became a suffragette, Marguerite Scott reinvented herself from an electronic espionage specialist to a ministry wives advocate, Piera McArthur became a recognised painter in Paris, Joanna Woods had to wear a chador in Khomeini’s Iran, Pat Caughley excelled as a senior nurse in Cambodia, Pakistan and Cook Islands, and Janine and Don Hunn established a model banana plantation in Tonga. Remarkably, in Wood’s account no overworked wife, save a Danish secretary after a short marriage to Paul Edmonds, deserted her husband, nor did any husband leave his wife, all displaying exemplary loyalty.

Less to New Zealand’s credit are accounts of how Bella and Paddy Costello turned communist, two daughters of diplomats conducted unhappy love affairs with famous people (H.G. Wells, Pierre Trudeau), and Margaret Posseltwaite (previously known by her professional name Maggie O’Grady) famously liaised with John Collinge on the dining room table in the UK high commissioner’s residence while both were stalked by jilted lover Barbara Stones.

Wood’s Postscript decries the ministry’s recent cost- and personnel-cutting, including the reduction of support for spouses and children of diplomats abroad. She quotes forthright criticisms by spouses Gillian Green (‘This government has put the castration of MFAT in the hands of the ignorant’) and Bronwen Golder (‘we have no choice but to encourage our MFAT partners to pursue a career beyond MFAT’).

I should add that Wood’s prose is lucid as well as fluent, her source noting is as conscientious as an academic thesis, and her choice of photographs is nicely complementary of the text. For anyone interested in New Zealand’s diplomacy — and its diplomats of both genders — this book is a valuable resource as well as an entertaining read.

STEPHEN HOADLEY
Noah Feldman, a professor of the Harvard Law School, is most famously associated with his role in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in advising on the construction of a (then) new Iraqi constitution. Modern constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan, under US tutelage, have combined modern constitutional practice with reference to sharia law — a fact that may have come as a surprise to many in the West who championed those interventions. Feldman's articulation of that compromise, and his belief that not only was Islam compatible with democracy but also that ideological Islamism (the belief that Islam has a place in the polity and jurisprudence in Muslim majority countries) was a legitimate expression of the popular will, has not always been a welcomed message.

First issued in 2008, the 2012 reissue of this short book contains an additional introduction on a development of great significance for his original thesis, namely the meaning the Arab Spring and the rise of Islamist parties to some prominence.

Feldman's thesis needs to be taken seriously, and gives a strong insight into the debate within the Islamic world to reconcile tradition with the demands of what might be considered good government in a modern context. While some have labelled Feldman shortsighted for his work on the Iraqi constitution, his attempts to reconcile Sunni Islamist views on governance are about finding commonality within Islamic jurisprudence for modern conceptions of governance and human rights — and blaming one US academic for the Iraqi constitution may overlook the fact that the direction of the document was at heart the product of the Iraqi government itself.

A survey of political and legal practice around the world does confirm a number of Feldman's propositions. Islamist parties, and Muslim majority countries generally, are accepting a 'complex synthesis with constitutional democracy'. The Islamist movements, often Muslim Brotherhood offshoots, at least in the Sunni world, are not generally the product of the clerical establishment, and are run by laymen (often from the professional classes). The Shia world is witnessing a different kind of dynamic, and Feldman notes the case of Iran in particular, which has experienced, almost uniquely in this view, the rule of clerics. (In Saudi Arabia, Feldman notes that the regime has bent the religious establishment to its will, although other commentators have it the other way around, and in Pakistan hardline interpretations of sharia are embedded in the legal code.)

In essence, if politics is the art of the possible, Feldman's outline of how modern constitutional practice and the wellsprings of tradition in the Islamic world intersect, then this volume is a useful antidote to the fears that can result from the rise of Islamist parties, regardless of where they sit on a broad spectrum.

But those wary of Islamism are not completely wrong either, and Feldman, in getting to the larger narrative, and demonstrating that societies will necessarily seek to reconcile modern demands with the cultural wellsprings of the past, may have overlooked some of the evident problems. Feldman is correct to note, for example, that the hudud punishment for stealing (sevening of a hand) is both rare and requires extraordinary proof. The fact that it still exists in a handful of jurisdictions, and is advocated by some extremist groups that can point to a Quranic reference, is a massive problem in reconciling that particular interpretation of sharia with the notion of universal human rights. Feldman, in noting that scholars are not driving Sunni Islamism, rather raises the question of who is a legitimate (and 'well trained') scholar within Islam. Feldman is ready to dismiss the Taliban movement as 'not fully qualified'. (On what basis is Feldman deciding this?) It is also noted that Taliban punishments are the result of a harsh element of Pushtun culture. It does, however, remain questionable that the most extreme Islamic state of recent times, Afghanistan under Taliban rule, might have been more benign if only Mullah Omar and his coterie had managed to obtain some suitable clerical training.

While agreeing that a grand compromise between Islamist parties and modern constitutional practice is possible (and indeed a current reality in many countries), some caution is warranted. Over time it is easy to see that the habit of democracy will force Islamist political parties to moderate their tone, and to at least accept the ballot box. But the commitment of all Islamist figures, and especially the harder line elements (let alone the Sunni extremist groups, particularly al-Qaeda), still needs to be examined pretty carefully. To what extent has the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, for example, accepted the ballot box because it knows that it has the numbers? This raises the spectre of the tyranny of the majority problem which can bedevil the democratic ideal, and in Egypt's case is giving great concern to religious minorities and women's groups. While, as Feldman notes, a genuine separation of powers, and especially a strong judiciary (as one might expect from a law professor), is necessary, it might be worth noting that the strongest check on the power of President Morsi and his backers has been the preparedness of the Egyptian people to take to the streets to avoid a return to strongman rule.

Feldman, however, in noting the enduring appeal of Islamism, touches upon one important implication for the future. Perhaps the Islamist parties continue to endure because they have systematically been blocked from power in the Sunni world, including the military intervention in Algeria and the sidelining of Hamas in the West Bank. Islamist movements will have to fail or succeed on the strength of their ideas, particularly now that there are some prominent examples of such parties at the core of governing arrangements in Egypt and Tunisia. Turkey's very successful ruling party, the AKP, while described as 'Islamist', probably sits at the most moderate end of that spectrum.

In summary, Feldman's book is a forward leaning and positive book that quite consciously takes on some of the doom merchants who ponder the direction of the Islamic world. But Feldman, in doing so, might be less willing as a consequence of looking at the wider picture to acknowledge those streams of Islam, current and historical, which pose incompatibility problems with mod-
The recent armed conflict, escalating from a ground war to air-strikes, between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Myanmar’s (Burma’s) armed forces has added more uncertainty to the prospect of the truce talks between the two sides. The crisis in Kachin state has meanwhile heightened China’s dismay over the intensified unrest along its ethnically-diverse south-west border. China is also being torn between supporting Myanmar’s government and maintaining business ties with the Kachins. India, too, has reportedly registered discomfiture over a similar dilemma of endorsing the punitive action against the KIA but risking pushing the latter deeper into alliance with ethnic insurgent groups in its own troubled north-east or tacitly backing the Kachins but compromising its effort to catch up with China’s comprehensive and already well implemented relationship with Myanmar.

All the above has highlighted an intricate link in the interactions among the three neighbouring countries that Thant Myint-U (grandson of former UN Secretary-General U Thant) argues is largely overlooked internationally. Much has been said and written about the intentions, approaches, and potential regional and international consequences of the Myanmar–China–India three-way engagement and competition. Critical comments focus on Beijing’s diplomatic and economic support of the ‘pariah’ regime for access to Burma’s natural resources and the Indian Ocean. In that regard, the former junta and the current quasi-civilian government of Myanmar are typically criticised as well for their exploitation of China’s hunger for energy and anxiety over the ‘Malacca dilemma’ to offset international pressure for democratic reform and human rights compliance. India, on the other hand, seems to attract both sympathy and disappointment for its lack of the political and economic muscle to knock Myanmar off China’s orbit and balance China’s rising profile as a ‘two-ocean’ country.

There is little doubt that China sees an energy/resource conduit through Myanmar as a strategic hedge against its over-reliance on the Malacca Strait. Yet in his book, Thant Myint-U accompanying his readers surely and rightly through the meanders of another related daunting challenge that China hopes that its involvement in Myanmar may help meet. That challenge is to redress effectively China’s inter-regional economic imbalance and income disparity between its prosperous east coast and still poverty-stricken west interior. An important item on the ‘Go West’ agenda is to make China a ‘bi-coastal’ country. Myanmar, sitting on top of the Bay of Bengal, is seen as a new outlet to the sea for landlocked south-western China. Meanwhile, Yunnan province, which shares a 2000-kilometre border with Myanmar, is also emerging from being China’s backwater to become ‘a new regional hub’ for South and South-east Asia.

Thant Myint-U’s study, however, shows that China’s push across Myanmar is not intended simply for securing more resource/energy supplies or seizing new markets for the continued growth of its economic strength. Myanmar, rather, neighbours China’s largest concentration of ethnic minorities, the province of Yunnan, which once impressed Marco Polo as a place totally outside the Chinese civilisation. To a great extent, the modern history of this frontier province has indeed been a history of tribal wars and integration with China proper. Today, ethnic minorities in Yunnan are arguably more assimilated into mainstream Chinese society than at any time in history. Nevertheless, Beijing remains worried that China’s rapid but imbalanced economic growth may widen ethnic divisions in this province. The worst nightmare for the Chinese government remains that China follows in the footsteps of the former Soviet Union. Billions in annual national budgets have thus been channelled to Yunnan for its economic progress.

Similar to China’s ‘Look South’ strategy, India’s ‘Look East’ scheme, also via Myanmar, is not straightforward either, but is shaped by a mix of complex factors and pragmatic considerations. China’s growing activities in the Indian Ocean are a widely acknowledged concern. The prospect of a Myanmar dominated by China is obviously intolerable, too. India’s rapid economic growth since the 1990s has also increased Myanmar’s strategic importance as both a potential trading partner and energy supplier. Yet a more immediate challenge that has helped push New Delhi to back away from its hard-line approach to Myanmar is to defuse ethnic-based insurrections in its north-eastern states along the Indo-Myanmar border.

Thant Myint-U’s research reaffirms that India is not merely a nation state but a civilisation, which has stronger historical ties and cultural similarities with other South Asian countries than with its own north-eastern states. The latter have been in the Indian union since 1947, when the departing British colonial authorities passed their region on to the newly independent country in the sub-continent. Yet locals by and large still have not established devotion to India, or identified themselves as Indians. Continued negative popular sentiment in the north-east towards the rule of a seemingly indifferent mainland India has over the decades reduced the region to a protracted war theatre of secessionist movements.

Racial distinctiveness, local patriotism, aspirations for statehood and human rights grievances are among generally accepted explanations for decades-long violent demonstrations in India’s north-east, and Thant Myint-U notes that poverty is the more fundamental issue plaguing the region. While its per capita income was higher than the national average at India’s independence, it is today a world away from new economic centres like Bombay or Bangalore. The conclusion reached in the stories also coincides with that of Thant Myint-U, that if Myanmar is the gateway for a ‘Look East’ policy meant for deepening India’s com-

**WHERE CHINA MEETS INDIA:**
_Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia_

_Author: Thant Myint-U_
Published by: Faber and Faber, London 2011, 358pp, US$18 (hb), $13.40 (pb)._
100 years before the last one falls to bits.

...such robust weapons that they could continue killing for another War. What is more, even if production ended tomorrow they are other single weapons family since the end of the Second World were changed). In that sense it is better to speak of the Kalash-nikov's silhouette has become the world's de facto logo for the its flag being held aloft by an outstretched arm. In fact the Kal-ashnikov is still less than forthcoming in his recollection of events, the details of which have changed a number of times in interviews he has given since the early 1990s.

Chivers acknowledges that Kalashnikov played a role in the weapon's design, but so did many others in the weapons design bureau he nominally led, not to mention those who later helped refine the weapon for series production. Chivers also makes it clear that the German late war StG-44 Sturmgewehr assault rifle was the inspiration for the Soviet Army's 1947 competition to design a new automatic rifle for its troops. Hugo Schmeisser, the German weapon designer behind the StG-44 among others, was taken by the Soviets back to Russia and put to work in Izhevsk where Kalashnikov's team was based.

Chivers is scathing in his critique of how the Americans (and other Western powers) failed to recognise the importance of the StG44, in contrast to the Soviets, who immediately grasped that here was the infantry rifle of the future. Even in the late 1950s US military assessments of the AK-47 referred to it dismissively as the AK-47 'submachine gun'.

When the Americans did belatedly acknowledge their need for a modern assault rifle, the results were disastrous. Chivers rams home the difference in Soviet and Western weapons design philosophies through the débâcle surrounding the M-16's acquisition and introduction into US military service in the 1960s. The chapter dealing with this and the lethal consequences for government bureaucrats and senior corporate executives at Colt who colluded in a cover up that cost young soldiers their lives.

The only real criticism I have is with the structure of the book — the first 140 pages are spent presenting the reader with an exhaustive history of automatic weapons development, beginning with the Gatling Gun through to the First World War's Bergmann MP18 submachine gun. The frustrated reader needs to get through a third of the book before the Kalashnikov's story begins! It is an unnecessary indulgence — a brief synopsis a few pages long on what is essentially background would suffice for the general reader and anyone with an interest in the history of firearms will already be familiar with the Maxim Gun and similar early weapons.

But once he gets there Chivers delivers a brilliant study of the ‘Kalashnikov era’ and the impact this weapon continues to have on our world.
CORRESPONDENCE

Sir,
The article ‘Is Indo-Pakistan peace possible’ published in the last issue of NZIR (vol 38, no 3) gives a one-sided view of the subject, as is reflected in the maps published with the article.

The maps of disputed Jammu and Kashmir on pages 13 and 16 present the Indian position. The correct position of the region is depicted in the attached UN map. (available at the UN website www.un.org).

Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory whose final status is to be decided in accordance with the UN resolutions. The UN map clearly mentions ‘the dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control agreed upon by India and Pakistan’. The areas east of the line are under Indian administrative control and areas west under Pakistan’s administrative control.

NZIR should have ensured at least factual and correct depiction of facts.

DR ABDUL MALIK
Minister/Deputy High Commissioner
Pakistan High Commission
Wellington

Sir,
May I make a brief comment on Professor Jon Johannson’s excellent review of Professor David Hackett Fischer’s recent book Fairness and Freedom (vol 38, no 2). It is a good book. But there are shortfalls in a facet of my time slot of experience. Fischer acknowledges former Prime Minister Rob Muldoon’s books, but not his political skills, his stump campaigning and his journalism; nor his command of television, Parliament and the electorate; nor particularly his administrative skills in maneuvering our narrowly based economy through the decade of the Great Stagflation. Between 1968–84 Muldoon operated in a state of continuous crisis. In his vale Muldoon somewhat sardonically reminds Parliament ‘You forget the Two Oil Shocks’. To paint an accurate Muldoon, the historian has to get hold of the Wool Shock of 1968. Then pick up on our development budgets of 1977 and 1979, coming out of the National Development Conference of 1969, and the Holmes Task Force of 1976. Here we laid the strategies for broadening the sectoral bases of our narrow pastoral economy, particularly the transformatory petroleum sector. The whole apparatus of the state, not just a minister and a few officials, was involved with Think Big, the best researched, led and implemented development programme ever undertaken in New Zealand. With CER, Think Big was one of the two major achievements of the Muldoon administration. Leaders attract many portraits. An accurate portrait of Muldoon has to set him in the context of a challenging fifteen-year campaign, and a myriad of battles, to maintain the social and economic progress of a small, vulnerable political economy. Muldoon, whoever watered it, was always batting on a sticky wicket. He was, for instance, one of the few who picked up on, and tried to do something about, reform of the international monetary system.

HON HUGH TEMPLETON QSO
Wellington

NOTE FOR CONTRIBUTORS
We welcome unsolicited articles, with or without illustrative material photographs, cartoons, etc. Text should be typed double spaced on one side of the sheet only. Text or ASCII files on disc or emailed are most welcome. Facsimiles are not acceptable. Copy length should not be more than 3000 words though longer pieces will be considered. Footnotes should be kept to a minimum, and only in exceptional circumstances will we print more than 15 with an article.
The National Council meeting was preceded as usual by the NZIIA’s Annual Dinner the previous evening. There were 135 present to hear guest speaker, Foreign Minister Hon Murray McCully, give a survey of New Zealand foreign policy relationships. (The text of his address is to be found elsewhere in this issue.)

Proceedings at the council on 8 May 2013 began with apologies from President Sir Douglas Kidd and Vice President Professor Rob Rabel, both of whom were unavoidably absent overseas (the former leading the Commonwealth Election Monitoring Mission in Pakistan and the latter representing Victoria University in Australia). Acting Chair Peter Nichols noted that amongst friends and colleagues who had passed away in 2012 was the late Sir Brian Talboys, a stalwart member of NZIIA, who was also the first former foreign minister to be its president.

Both the president’s and the director’s reports were tabled in the 2012 annual report. Sir Douglas Kidd highlighted the very busy year that had occurred in 2012, on a par with the 2009 anniversary year, and expressed his pleasure at the resumption of Track II talks (with Japan) after a break in 2011. Peter Kennedy referred to the close working relationship the NZIIA has with a number of Victoria University institutes and also the very successful diplomatic officer training programme run in Port Moresby for the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Both reports were accepted accordingly by the National Council.

Turning to the election of officers, the National Council unanimously re-elected Sir Douglas Kidd as president and Professor Rob Rabel as vice president. Similarly, the treasurer, Professor Athol Mann, and managing editor of the *New Zealand International Review*, Dr Ian McGibbon, were re-elected unopposed. There were no new nominations for honorary vice president and the slate remains the same (except for the death of Sir Brian Talboys).

Murray Denyer was welcomed as the chair of the NZIIA’s new Tauranga branch. He was nominated also, and accepted unanimously, as the new chair of the Research and Publication Committee, replacing Suse Reynolds, who was thanked for her contribution. Three new members were elected to the Standing Committee following the retirement of Professor Les Holborow and Dr Rod Alley and the withdrawal (from the co-opted list) of Dr Scott Champion and Erima Henare. Honorary Vice President and Life Member Stuart McMillan took one of the vice president slots and Professor Gary Hauke the other, while Dr John Subritzky (director of the chief executive’s office at the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet) and Suse Reynolds (former chair, Research and Publications Committee) were elected as co-opted members.

The formal endorsement of the National Council was given to the award of new life memberships to Brian Lynch and Rod Alley, both of whom had been presented with their certificates by Foreign Minister McCully at the dinner the previous evening.

On the budget for 2013, Professor Mann noted that the increase in annual grant that the director had achieved would effectively eliminate the predicted deficit. Andrew Wierzbicki, representing editor Ian McGibbon, who was overseas, commented that there was no shortage of articles for the *New Zealand International Review*, which remains in good health, having for the first time in its 36 years existence posted a surplus (thanks to a large copyright payment). Suse Reynolds, reporting on the Research and Publications Committee, noted that progress had been made on website development and support and that a client survey had been prepared. Audience identification was a key element in developing the NZIIA’s communication strategy.

Reports on branch activities were presented by representatives of nine of NZIIA’s eleven branches. Only Hamilton and Dunedin were absent, though a report from the former’s chair, Dov Bing, was submitted. Auckland chair Gregory Thwaite noted the primary role of his branch in presenting seminars (eight during the year). He indicated a relatively stable membership and satisfactory financial position.

Christchurch’s chair, Alexander McKinnon, was also upbeat about his branch, which had had a good year despite the ongoing earthquake disruption but which entered 2013 somewhat in a state of flux because of the departure of a number of longserving members, including stalwarts Nancy and Stuart McMillan.

Former branch chair and NZIIA Life Member Ken Aldred represented the Napier branch in the absence of current chair...
Dick Grant. He pointed to another successful year, with well attended meetings and informative speakers. Hugo Judd, Nelson chair, reported a membership of 90, who had enjoyed eight meetings during the year, while James To, co-chair of the Palmerston North branch (with Nick Nelson), noted that meetings were well-attended, though membership remains low.

On behalf of Tauranga, Murray Denyer alluded to efforts to set up the branch after the inaugural meeting on 24 October 2012. Life Member Brian Foley again represented Timaru, standing in for Rosemary Carruthers. He indicated that membership remained steady and noted efforts to boost interest in the local region. Wairarapa Chair Derek Milne's report was equally positive, indicating a strong and vibrant branch able to attract a wide range of speakers to well-attended meetings.

Finally Peter Nichols reported that the NZIIA's largest branch, Wellington, had had another active and fruitful year with attendance at meetings between 30 and 100. Branch membership was 244 and branch finances were in good shape.

Discussion with branch members present focused on ensuring that all members of the NZIIA were aware of events occurring throughout the country and it was resolved to increase the 'cross fertilisation' of branch meeting notices.

The full list of officers elected at the National Council meeting:

**Patron**
Lieutenant-General Rt Hon Sir Jerry Mateparae GNZM, QSO

**Life Members**
Mr K. Aldred OBE, Dr R.M. Alley, Prof D. Bing, Mr B.M. Brown QSO, Mr G.M. Davidson CNZM, OBE, JP, Mr B.P. Foley, Rt Hon Justice Sir Kenneth Keith ONZ, KBE, QC, Mr B.J. Lynch ONZM, Prof A.W. Mann CMG, Prof W.D. McIntyre OBE, Mr S.W. McMillan, Prof W.T. Roy, Prof A.A. Trotter ONZM

**President**
Hon Sir Douglas Kidd KNZM

**Vice President**
Prof R.G. Rabel

**Hon Vice Presidents**
Rt Hon Sir Michael Hardie Boys GNZM, GCMG, Prof G.R. Hawke QSO, Dr J.S. Hoadley, Prof L.C. Holborow QSO, Mr G.R. McGhie QSO, Dr I.C. McGibbon ONZM, Dr M.A. McKinnon, Mr R.F. Nottage CNZM, Prof G.S. Orr, Dr R.E.B. Peren, Dame Laurie Salas DBE, QSO, Mr J.V. Scott, Ms A.V. Stokes QSO, Hon H.C. Templeton QSO, Mr J.S. Thomson, Prof D.G. Trow, Mr N.D. Walter CNZM, Mr A.F. Wierzbicki

**Treasurer**
Prof Mann

**Chair, Research Committee**
Mr M.J. Denyer

**Managing Editor NZIR**
Dr McGibbon

**Research Committee**
Dr Alley, Prof R.F. Ayson, Dr McGibbon, Dr McKinnon, Prof Rabel, Director

**Standing Committee**
President, Vice President, Treasurer, Managing Editor **NZIR**, Director, Prof Ayson, Mr J. Ballingall, Dr D.H. Capie, Dr R. Foley, Prof Hawke, Dr S. Gallagher, Prof Holborow, Ms A.M. Mason, Mr McMillan, Col P.J. Nichols, Mr Nottage, Ms S. Reynolds, Mr A.G. Scott, Dr J.A. Subritzky, Dr J.C. Tanner, Mr Walter, Mr Wierzbicki

The staff of the National Office comprises:

**Director**
Mr P.D. Kennedy

**Executive Secretary**
Ms S.T. Rajanayagam
Dr Roderic Alley
Dr Rod Alley is the longest serving member of the Standing Committee, to which he was initially elected in 1967. During that time he served also as chairman of the Wellington branch for several years as well as playing a key role in national conference organising. Dr Alley rates highly some of those held in the 1970s in providing critical platforms for the enunciation of an increasingly independent New Zealand foreign policy. He has addressed branch and national conference meetings, either as an individual speaker in the case of developments in Fiji or as a panellist.

Rod Alley has contributed regularly to the NZIIA’s publications, both in series form and through the *New Zealand International Review*. He has also been a regular book review contributor. He organised and edited the fourth volume of the *New Zealand in World Affairs* series, covering the years 1990–2005. He has also served on and convened the Research and Publications Committee. Rod Alley’s professional teaching and writing career has provided great value to the NZIIA, just as he considers he has received value in return.

Rod Alley was previously associate professor in political science and international relations at Victoria University of Wellington. He has served as a member of the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament. He is a senior fellow with Victoria University’s Centre for Strategic Studies and a long-serving honorary vice president of the NZIIA. His current activities include research and publication on New Zealand’s foreign relations, multilateral diplomacy, international humanitarian law, and disarmament.

Brian Lynch ONZM
Brian Lynch was the director of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs for nine years from 2004 to 2012. Before this he had a diverse career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before becoming deputy secretary of transport and then chief executive of the Meat Industry Association from 1992 to 2003. For his work in assisting the meat industry to rationalise and adjust to a very different commodity chain in the post-subsidy open market conditions of the 1990s he was made an Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit in June 2004.

During his time as director of the NZIIA, he was instrumental in increasing corporate and institutional support for NZIIA National Office from 35 to over 100 members and increasing the number of NZIIA branches by three. He was a regular contributor of articles, book reviews and conference reports to the *New Zealand International Review*, edited nine volumes of conference proceedings, and co-edited a major study of the New Zealand–United States relationship. In addition, he established formal links with approximately twenty counterpart organisations overseas. He was also a regular participant in Track II dialogues involving counterparts in Australia, China, India, Japan, and ASEAN.

Brian Lynch studied at the University of Canterbury where he completed masters degrees in history and geography. He was the foundation chairman of the New Zealand Trade Liberalisation Network, chairman of the Food Industry Foundation and the New Zealand Horticulture Export Authority and a senior adviser and alternate member on the New Zealand APEC Business Advisory Council. He is also a board member of the New Zealand Pacific Economic Council and a senior fellow of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University. His network of contacts is legendary.
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