INDIAN ELECTIONS

Jim Bolger

Disarmament
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33 INSTITUTE NOTES
India votes: a Modi landslide

Ashok Sharma provides an overview of the recent elections in India and suggests likely policy directions under the new administration.

Between 7 April and 12 May 2014 India went to the polls to elect the sixteenth Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament. With nine phases, this was the longest election in the country’s history. An estimated 814 million voters in a nation of 1.27 billion were eligible to cast their votes to elect a new government in New Delhi. The election was a test for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. The Indian National Congress-led UPA government had been in power since 2004, its second term (2009–14) marred by corruption scandals and a persistent deadlock resulting from smugness and arrogance on the part of the opposition. The UPA government was known for its anti-corruption drive, social security programmes and policies promoting inclusive growth. Also, it was the first time a non-Congress party had secured an outright majority in the Lok Sabha.

The verdict is historic as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) under the leadership of Narendra Damodardas Modi won convincingly. The election was a record 100 million votes. The BJP, the party headed by Narendra Damodardas Modi, which had won the 2009 elections, had crossed the majority mark of 272, and ended up securing 336 seats. This is the first time a single party has secured a majority in the lower house of the Indian Parliament since 1984, when the Congress Party did so after the assassination of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This was an increase of 100 million votes from the 2009 election, the highest ever increase in a national election. Women voters constituted 40 per cent of the total electorate, and around 23.1 million or 2.7 per cent of the total eligible voters were aged 18–19 years. In this world-record election, some 540 million voters (87 per cent of eligible voters) went to the polls.

The vote margins were staggered, with nine phases, and the external security challenges became decisive factors in economic growth, unemployment, terrorism and communalism, and the external security challenges were. The vote margins were staggering, with nine phases, and the external security challenges became decisive factors in economic growth, unemployment, terrorism and communalism, and the external security challenges were.

A total of 814 million voters from the 18+ age group were eligible to vote. The major theme of the campaign was the performance of the Congress-led UPA government during its second term (2009–14). It was the Congress government that made all the promises, but the performance of the government was not up to the mark. The UPA government was known for its anti-corruption drive, social security programmes and policies promoting inclusive growth. Also, it was the first time a non-Congress party had secured an outright majority in the Lok Sabha.

The outcome of the election, therefore, was a significant victory for the BJP and Narendra Damodardas Modi. The verdict is historic as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) under the leadership of Narendra Damodardas Modi won convincingly. The election was a record 100 million votes. The BJP, the party headed by Narendra Damodardas Modi, which had won the 2009 elections, had crossed the majority mark of 272, and ended up securing 336 seats. This is the first time a single party has secured a majority in the lower house of the Indian Parliament since 1984, when the Congress Party did so after the assassination of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. This was an increase of 100 million votes from the 2009 election, the highest ever increase in a national election. Women voters constituted 40 per cent of the total electorate, and around 23.1 million or 2.7 per cent of the total eligible voters were aged 18–19 years. In this world-record election, some 540 million voters (87 per cent of eligible voters) went to the polls.

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August 2013, the Indian rupee sank to an all-time low of 68.80 against the US dollar, and India’s GDP growth almost halved from 8 per cent in 2010–11 to around 4 per cent in the 2011–12 fiscal year. Economic slowdown and the Indian rupee’s value crisis have become the two main concerns that have impacted the nation and its economy. Between 2012 and 2013, the rupee lost 20 per cent of its value, until the rupee’s rate was 65.55 against the US dollar in 2013. In 2014, a demographer’s claim—that the number of women aged between 15 and 29 would decrease from 300 million in 2010 to 280 million in 2020—accentuated the importance of job creation, an area in which the government had failed to deliver.

Congress became an important issue on the election. In April 2014, the election was marked by the most电视 advertising in the history of the Indian political system, with Rahul Gandhi, who replaced a mute two-term Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. It also had leadership issues. In the 2014 election it put up an essential on tackling terrorism. India is considered to be strong on tackling terrorism, and in its election manifesto it clearly stated that there would be zero tolerance for terrorism.

Security failure

The Congress Party also failed to deliver on security issues, especially on tackling the increasing incidence of terrorism. India has been one of the countries worst affected by terrorism, according to the data from the National Bureau of Investigation (NIBI). It is ranked the third most dangerous place in the world as far as terrorism is concerned, next only to Iraq and Pakistan. Between 2004 and 2013, India witnessed an average of 298 IED blasts and 1337 resulting casualties annually. In the post-liberalisation phase since 1990s India has seen a rise in the number of terrorist incidents. These include the 2002 Gujarat riots, the 2004 Godhra massacre, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2010 Andhra Pradesh serial blasts. In the 2014 election, the Congress Party placed the issue of terrorism as one of its main campaign themes.

Campaign strategy

An important factor of Indian politics in recent times has been the rise of anti-corruption political parties, representing regional issues, with leaders who are emotionally charged and mobilise the electorate. The rise of parties such as the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is a reflection of the rising importance of issues like corruption and social justice in Indian politics.

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Foreign policy

Narendra Modi is the country's strongest prime minister, but some changes can be expected. The BJP's election manifesto, aimed at achieving a 'web of allies', promised 'zero tolerance' on terrorism, and pledged to reconsider India's nuclear doctrine of no first use. The large Cold War-era India-US nuclear agreement will be reviewed, and the US–India relationship is entwined with the US strategic partnership. India's military modernisation and the development of strategic card will ensure that economic and strategic engagement with the United States and the West develops further.

Domestic challenges

India's largest socio-economic challenges include the slow economic growth, poor governance, and social unrest, and it will require a commitment of up to 6% of the GDP to address them. The Modi government will strive to improve the economic, social, and governance environment by tackling the biggest economic challenges, including job creation, poverty reduction, and a growing middle class. The government will focus on infrastructure development and the modernisation of the economy with a focus on micro, small, and medium enterprises. The government will also focus on improving the education system and poverty reduction policies.

Important role

India's role in the world is crucial to achieving its goals. The government will focus on improving India's position as a global leader in terms of economic growth, political stability, and social development. The government will also focus on improving India's global image and reputation by addressing the biggest economic challenges, including job creation, poverty reduction, and a growing middle class. The government will also focus on improving India's position as a global leader in terms of economic growth, political stability, and social development.
compatible relationship. In the wake of the US visa ban on Modi for his failure to tackle riots in Gujarat, Abe invited him to Japan. Modi had visited Japan in 2007 when he was in opposition. Both India and Japan have worked in recent years towards defence and security ties. Japan has been India’s energy partner, supplying crude oil, and is also a key player in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Both India and Japan are concerned about China’s aggressive military posture.

India’s relationship with China has not been normal since the 1962 India-China War, and bilateral disputes, and Chinese aggressions on the border China invades continue to prevent any improvement in relations between the two neighbours. Modi is determined to address this in his tenure, and might adopt a more pragmatic posture towards the more India-centric view that China’s interests have been advanced by China. But in the midst of any provocations by China or Pakistan, Modi will also be a moderate and hands-off in altering strategic compulsions.

Surprising invitation

Coming to Pakistan and its South Asian neighbours, Modi has imprinted his international accomplishments by reaching out to them. His victory is a historic first in normalising relations with Pakistan by inviting all South Asian leaders to his swearing-in ceremony. The presence of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during the ceremony is historic. It signals Modi’s approach towards neighbours concerning conflicts and especially Pakistan, for a new, open and friendly co-existence with them. Any further dialogue with Pakistan will be contingent on Pakistan meeting certain preconditions. Modi is determined to normalise relations with Pakistan, without, however, letting China’s ambitions on the region and its role in the region, get in the way. The presence of Nawaz Sharif at the ceremony signifies a step forward in India-Pakistan relations, which were not on very friendly terms. There is an indication that this might be the period for India-Pakistan to move on peace and stability in the region. It was during P. V. Narasimha Rao’s tenure in 1991 that the India-Pakistan Conference Process was established. This was a new approach in India’s foreign policy. Modi’s visit to Pakistan can be seen as a new approach which aims at improving relations with Pakistan and even tackle the most intractable issue, Kashmir. However, India–Pakistan ties have yet to overcome the 1962 India–China War and border disputes, and Chinese military posture.

Both India and Japan are concerned about China’s aggressive military posture. As India’s relationship with the United States, increasing economic development and the broader Indo-Pacific region are all commendable. The BJP is a radical party with the goal of building India as a global power, which it hopes to achieve through the non-alignment of Non-Aligned Movement. (The world is a familiar foe but the NAM is no friend.) Inviting China to its address is a bold move of the Indian Prime Minister. China is the region’s most influential power and it may adopt a more pragmatic position towards India. Modi’s approach towards Pakistan is likely to be moderate and hands-off in altering strategic compulsions.

NOTES
1. Election results 2014: India shuns the left in Mumbai, The Times of India, 7 May 2014 (www.mumbai.mint.com/)
2. Indian election result: 2014 is Modi’s year among most dangerous places in the world, The Times of India, 4 May 2014 (www.mumbai.mint.com/)
3. Indian election result: 2014 is Modi’s year among most dangerous places in the world, The Times of India, 4 May 2014 (www.mumbai.mint.com/)
4. Indian election result: 2014 is Modi’s year among most dangerous places in the world, The Times of India, 4 May 2014 (www.mumbai.mint.com/)
6. Indian election result: 2014 is Modi’s year among most dangerous places in the world, The Times of India, 4 May 2014 (www.mumbai.mint.com/)
9. Election results 2014: India shuns the left in Mumbai, The Times of India, 7 May 2014 (www.mumbai.mint.com/)
10. Modi claims to be the economic reformer, The Times of India, 7 May 2014 (www.mumbai.mint.com/)
12. The New Zealand International Review, 5
13. The New Zealand International Review, 5
In April–May the world's largest democracy elected a new government. The parliamentary elections proved a triumph for the conservative and nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which won a thumping majority. The strategic orientation of the new government under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be of interest not only to India's immediate neighbours but also to countries like New Zealand — and Australia, which is increasingly focusing its attention on the Indian Ocean.

Narendra Modi has assumed power with a popular mandate that reflects a long, under-prepared view among the general Indian population — a desire to see India's narratives from a geographically and demographically large country with equal power to something more important in the international system. In that sense, there is a preference for assertive diplomacy and a power backed by a sound and surging economy.

The new Indian stealth frigate INS Sahyadhi, which recently commissioned, is an example of how India's military power will be bolstered. India's more realistic approach will be accepted by countries that are often called India's strategic far flank, such as Australia and New Zealand, which want India to side with India's posture in its ascendancy than to look for intervention of external powers in South Asia, an approach which often viewed India as a reluctant global player.

In that quest, there is a preference for assertive diplomacy and a power backed by a sound and surging economy. This new stance on India's part will supposedly be welcomed according to a realistic world view, rounding up in a couple of notes on the different realism principles that got laid at hand with the principle of strategic autonomy.

When translated into policy terms, all this means that, with the new stance on India's part as far flank, the strategic orientation after the general elections will be change India's strategic outreach and strengthen its internal functioning. Its economy and military power will be bolstered. India's more realistic approach will be accepted by countries that are often called India's strategic far flank, such as Australia and New Zealand, which want India to shun its dependency on countries such as Australia and New Zealand have a preference for India's new emphasis on developing friendly relations with its neighbours has found consensus both within its ruling elite and the academic community. Balaji Chandramohan comments on India's strategic orientation after the general elections and foresees possible problems in the nuclear field.

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and among the countries in its neighbourhood. This approach is deeply rooted in recognition that the latter, especially the SAARC countries, are susceptible to China’s Yuan Diplomacy. It behoves New Delhi, therefore, to change its regional security strategy. A more flexible stance will help to bolster India’s positive image as a global power player.

In pursuit of this objective, Modi’s administration is likely to make a paradigm shift in India’s existing approach to countries with large Indian-origin populations; in this context, New Zealand, Australia and Fiji will all enter the equation. As the chief minister in Gujarat state, Narendra Modi presided over an impressive expansion of participation by Gujaratis in their economy, through investments, joint ventures and other commercial interests. His government may well tap into the enormous potential that exists in the substantial Gujarati populations in these countries.

Pragmatic approach
A pragmatic approach to the region might induce India to extend development aid to Fiji and to consider an increased diplomatic presence in the Cook Islands, New Caledonia and Vanuatu, to mentions a few. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will do well to support a special representative in the South Pacific. A second diplomat attached to an existing diplomatic mission established in the region is in order to ensure greater effectiveness, with an appointment that should be of a high level, with the ambassador reporting to the under-secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The representative might be added by ministerial order for the region, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A representative who is specially designated for the South Pacific might be engaged, as India has no embassies in these countries.

New Zealand is a welcoming country, and with Prime Minister John Key’s enthusiastic approach, it is situated in the region situated between India and Australia. The fact that both now have right-wing governments that believe in conducting their strategic priorities through a realistic approach augurs well for increased defence co-operation.

For India to play a major role in international affairs, the new Modi-led government in New Delhi must take seriously the strategic and economic importance of the countries on the ‘Far Flank’, and overseas what to do in an assertive economy in New Zealand.

For India to play a major role in international affairs, the new Modi-led government in New Delhi must consider expanding its diplomatic presence in the Cook Islands, New Caledonia and Vanuatu, to mention a few. As well as carving out its major presence in the region, India is expected to join China’s in responding to the area’s economic needs. A decisive push for the long-awaited free trade agreement with New Zealand is expected to be given new impetus under Modi’s leadership.

Practical approach
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be much friendlier towards business people seeking business and tourist visas from countries like Fiji and New Zealand, since this can only help increase investments back in India.

Greater focus

After taking charge as Indian prime minister, Modi has decided to bring together the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. This means that there will be greater focus on making the diaspora an integral focus in the conduct of India’s foreign policy.

Fiji, Australia, New Caledonia and New Zealand have sizable and long-established Indian expatriate communities. These communities wield significant economic and political influence in each country and provide an excellent conduit for the exchange of information between the South-west Pacific neighbours and the Indian homeland.

It is to be noted that the Indian expatriate presence in the region has the potential to facilitate Indian soft power promotion in the region, particularly given the post-colonial cultural and ethnic ties that bind Fiji. Increasingly, Indian diaspora based in India helped in the brokering of the strategically important Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008. The diaspora based in New Zealand is likely to play a similar role in promoting India’s nuclear ambitions in the region in the near future.

Ideologically, too, conservative right-centre political parties in power tend to approach diplomatic negotiations in trade relations with an open mind. Modi’s political orientation suggests that a free trade agreement between India and New Zealand is likely. India’s desire to conduct further nuclear tests is likely to increase Indian nuclear deterrence capabilities. From New Zealand’s perspective, this makes the Indo-US nuclear deal in September 2008 an obvious conduit for increasing India’s nuclear deterrence. It is expected that the free trade agreement would help increase Indian investment in New Zealand, while New Zealand would provide a platform for India to increase its soft power projection in the region.

Nuclear ambitions

In its election manifesto the Bharatiya Janata Party stated that it would consider revising India’s nuclear doctrine, which at present provides for no first use of nuclear weapons and not using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state. Moreover, past behaviour suggests that the BJP in power will not hesitate to conduct further nuclear tests to increase Indian nuclear deterrence capabilities. From New Zealand’s perspective, this makes the Indo-US nuclear deal in September 2008 an obvious conduit for increasing India’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. It is expected that the free trade agreement would help increase Indian investment in New Zealand, while New Zealand would provide a platform for India to increase its soft power projection in the region.
On the flip side, the Modi government will help quickly to resolve some of the outstanding issues between Delhi and Australia in India and New Zealand, such as the free trade agreements. This will be welcomed by both Canberra and Wellington, who are keen to improve India's trading profile with New Zealand.

India's new government is likely to be more assertive in its foreign policy that will include greater strategic orientation and so be involved in accommodating the strategic policies of some of the outstanding issues between India and New Zealand, which are keen to improve India's trading profile with New Zealand.
Jim Bolger’s global diplomacy

Ken Ross assesses the National prime minister’s contribution to the process of establishing New Zealand as a progressive small state.

Jim Bolger ranks alongside David Lange and Helen Clark as the three outstanding support acts to Norman Kirk’s best-for-us global diplomacy brand — New Zealand as a progressive small state, with deep internationalism central to our national identity. Bolger’s capable performance derived most from his strong maturity of mind and an international landscape that played to his capability. Bolger’s capable global diplomacy derived from his strong maturity of mind. He was ably backed by the best support team that any of New Zealand’s fifteen post-1945 prime ministers has had. Foreign Minister Don McKinnon and top mandarin Simon Murdoch were the standouts in Bolger’s global diplomacy team.

Crucially, Bolger had a global landscape that played to his capability. A succession of international developments boosted his prime ministership into a substantial success for New Zealand’s world profile. The highly regarded performance on the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994; being at the forefront of the global protests against France resuming nuclear testing at Moruroa in 1995; and his capable hosting of the 1995 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Chogm) are Bolger’s prime moments in global diplomacy.

Bolger has laid out some of the thinking that enables us to appreciate his maturity of mind. His introductory comments to the Stout Centre’s conferences on the prime ministerships of Sir Keith Holyoake and his own are instances. He also made thoughtful comments at the Stout conference that focused on the first term of David Lange’s government. When Bolger was interviewed in April 2013 on Radio New Zealand’s Sunday morning programme by Chris Laidlaw he revealed his thinking on global developments.

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‘When I replied that I was a New Zealander, he shook my hand again and said: “Thank you for your government’s courageous stance in the Security Council and telling the world what was really happening here in Rwanda.”’ (David Shearer)

Shearer’s recall is of the most impressive episode of Jim Bolger’s global diplomacy — our chairing the United Nations Security Council in April 1994 when Rwanda was the foremost issue. It is commemorated on the Aotearoa New Zealand national memorial in the United Nations. Bolger was joined by Foreign Affairs Minister Don McKinnon and Helen Clark as the three outstanding support acts to Norman Kirk’s best-for-us global diplomacy brand. It is also an episode fully highlighted in New Zealand but less so among the wise and in the more global context for why New Zealand can be trusted to be a high international performer in critical moments — the essence of the Kirk brand.

Thinking revealed

Less than six months after he concluded his time as prime minister in December 1997, Bolger had told his story, and well, in his memoir Bolger: A View from the Top — My seven years as Prime Minister. Much of the memoir focuses on his global diplomacy. A decade later the Stout Research Centre organised a conference on his prime ministership — the proceedings, edited by Margaret Clark as The Bolger Years 1990–1997 include a fine account of Bolger’s global diplomacy, which is also well covered in the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs’ New Zealand in World Affairs Vol IV 1990–2005.

Bolger has laid out some of the thinking that enables us to appreciate his maturity of mind. His introductory comments to the Stout Centre’s conferences on the prime ministerships of Sir Keith Holyoake and his own are instances. He also made thoughtful comments at the Stout conference that focused on the first term of David Lange’s government. When Bolger was interviewed in April 2013 on Radio New Zealand’s Sunday morning programme by Chris Laidlaw he revealed his thinking on global developments.
Jim Bolger with Don McKinnon

questioned Muldoon on the wisdom of the All Blacks touring

(At a caucus meeting in 1976, when still a backbencher, Bolger

when in his Cabinet, his opposition to the 1981 Springbok tour.

regime in South Africa. Bolger had made clear to Muldoon,

policy but also his support for sporting contacts with the apartheid

motion in 1987). Bolger repudiated not only Muldoon's nuclear

by committing his government to New Zealand's bid for a 1993–

quence was that the Kirk brand would continue to flourish.

ensured he became prime minister nine months later. A conse

Ahead of the 1990 general election was the pivotal moment that

Bolger's abrupt adoption of bipartisanship on the nuclear issue

Pivotal moment

Bolger's dramatic expansion of New Zealand's peacekeeping

9

Bolger, always adept at opportunism on the nuclear issue

Bolger began his prime ministership in December 1990, the same month

On his opposition to racism in South

Some of the contributions, while not limelighted, were

Do

Jim Bolger with Don McKinnon

nullities of Norman Kirk.

Bolger is a poignant testimonial of a tough ordinary New

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Nuclear protesting

The news of the proposed French President Chirac’s announcement in May 1995 that France would renew nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll had been well publicised. The Kiwifruit should have led the way. Jim Bolger’s story of the protest night of the大概是 of the South Pacific Forum was told as a caution to other issues on the agenda. The story was not told, however, as Bolger’s political heritage: he was at the forefront of the protests. The Kiwifruit story was told after the international accord reached by New Zealand and France. The Kiwifruit story is the story of the protests that followed President Chirac’s announcement.

Bolger’s shrewd counsel and political acumen resulted in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty being signed in 1995. He acted on the strength of their respective opposition to France’s nuclear testing. Australia’s prime minister, Paul Keating, was driven to make some very strong criticisms of Major. Keating had been described as the ‘eternal patrician’ at the Commonwealth’s stages. In doing so the Kirk brand shone. Bolger’s signature moment is his hosting the 1995 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. He accomplished the task with the panache of a man who had been driven to make some very strong criticisms of Major.

Support team

Bolger’s global diplomacy was well boosted by Don McKinnon, his shrewd counsel and political acumen. McKinnon performed as well when she was upgraded to the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1996. In McKinnon’s skill that was acquired that legacy.

McKinnon’s skill that was acquired that legacy.

The kiwifruit story is the story of the protests that followed President Chirac’s announcement.
In Jim Bolger’s words, his prime ministership was more adventurous than any other of the fourteen prime ministers.

**Influential mandarins**

Simon Murdoch was Bolger’s main mandarin. As head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (1991–98), he became the most influential of Bolger’s officials, providing a culture of global diplomacy. Murdoch was integral to Bolger’s global diplomacy. Murdoch’s top-of-the-class credentials is John Galvin, from whom he had learnt much when on Muldoon’s staff. Most telling of Murdoch’s mandarin touch is John Howard’s comments on the Prime Minister. In light of Howard’s comments on the Prime Minister, it is surprising that Murdoch was integral to Bolger’s global diplomacy. Murdoch was integral to Bolger’s global diplomacy. Murdoch’s mandarin touch.

In his memoir, Howard comments that Murdoch ‘was gun-shy about serving’ in his memoir, providing non-global diplomatic illustrations. Bolger acknowledges Murdoch as ‘an outstanding public servant’ in his memoir, providing non-global diplomatic illustrations. Bolger acknowledges Murdoch as ‘an outstanding public servant’ in his memoir, providing non-global diplomatic illustrations. Bolger acknowledges Murdoch as ‘an outstanding public servant’ in his memoir, providing non-global diplomatic illustrations. Bolger acknowledges Murdoch as ‘an outstanding public servant’ in his memoir, providing non-global diplomatic illustrations. Bolger acknowledges Murdoch as ‘an outstanding public servant’ in his memoir, providing non-global diplomatic illustrations. Bolger acknowledges Murdoch as ‘an outstanding public servant’ in his memoir, providing non-global diplomatic illustrations.}

**NOTES**


2. Anne Clifton, ‘It all began with Muldoon’, in Margaret Clark (ed), The Bolger Years 1990–1997 (Wellington, 2006), p.96. Shearer was describing his experience as a UN diplomat.


The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), or the more general issue of economic integration, has been central to the theme of raising New Zealand’s competitive advantage. And we have been central to the theme of raising Japan’s economic performance to an international standard. And we have been a key player in the theme of raising the competitiveness of the TPP region as a whole.

The TPP is a comprehensive agreement that includes trade and investment liberalization across a range of sectors. It covers agriculture, services, intellectual property, government procurement, and competition policy. It also includes a number of specific commitments related to market access, investment, and competition policy.

The TPP is being negotiated by 12 countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, the United States, and Vietnam. It is intended to be a model for future trade agreements and is expected to significantly increase market access and reduce trade costs for its members.

The TPP negotiation process has been ongoing since 2007 and has included significant discussion on issues such as intellectual property, labor standards, and investment. The agreement is expected to be finalized in 2015, with implementation starting in 2016.

In conclusion, the TPP is an important agreement that will have significant implications for the global economy. It will provide a platform for further economic integration and will help to create a more open and competitive global trading system.

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Stoking the engine of growth

Tim Groser discusses the Trans-Pacific Partnership and trade integration in the Asia-Pacific region.

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The link between involvement in comprehensive free trade agreements, or trade and investment integration agreements, and external reform is certainly evident now. It has been evident in countries across the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand’s approach to trade and investment integration has been one of structural adjustment to enable the success of its internal economic programmes. And central to that adjustment is the success of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The entry of Japan into the TPP negotiation was transformational. The addition of the world’s third largest economy inevitably raised the stakes.
Utter transformation

In terms of using external pressure as a dynamic, China’s WTO accession is acknowledged to have run its course, hence the strong interest of China in a variety of free trade agreements. We are one of the countries with which China has a comprehensive free trade agreement. It has utterly transformed our economic relationship for the better. New Zealand is, of course, far too small an economy to have much of an impact on the world’s second largest economy—hence the strong Chinese interest in another mega-regional trade deal, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations involving sixteen countries, including Japan and New Zealand.

Potentially, China may also see the TPP as another opportunity. There is certainly an unmistakable increase in interest from senior Chinese officials in the TPP. I am constantly asked for briefings on the TPP and I am always happy to do that. So the link between involvement in comprehensive free trade agreements, as trade and investment integration agreements to explore new, and second-tier reform to explore new and we are delighted that the Japanese government sees the TPP in this light, is a very promising development. Firms who should be concerned about losing, we would have no chance of growth. Companies would only invest in Japan. China would not be another welfare. The TPP is frameworks which were supposed to be channels to the Asia Pacific. Opposition to that kind of change by Japan’s prime minister was inevitable and not an easy thing. There is no sense of us not competing for our market share, which is shrinking in that sense. There is nothing improper in that. It is human nature to fear change, which is often resisted. When we take our first uncertain steps in opening up the highly protected sectors of our economy.

Wine example

New Zealand’s wine industry, for example, was completely opposed to liberalization. They pointed out that closely guarded to this point. The wine industry was completely opposed to any liberalization. They pointed out, perfectly accurately, that Australian grape yields, helped by the warmer American climate, were far higher than was attainable in any region of New Zealand with its cooler climate. At that stage, prior to liberalization, we did not export a single bottle of wine. Our wine was not of sufficient quality and our accompanying infrastructure. We required an import license to import any wine. Domestic wine producers feared their market share would only survive behind high domestic trade barriers.

We went ahead with very slow but progressive liberalization in the teeth of their opposition. Today, the New Zealand wine industry is incredibly strong and has a fantastic future. It is innovative, overwhelmingly export oriented and competitive internationally. It is more competitive by being the highest quality in the world, not being the lowest cost producer. If we could compete on quality, we would compete on price. Against this background, Prime Minister Abe’s view about a new future direction for Japanese agriculture seems to be worth hearing in mind. He stated:

Japan has agriculture products which are carefully grown in the finest manner. As the world becomes ever more unclear, Japan and self-Japanese agricultural products
will become increasingly popular… the TPP is a new, is a big chance.

In other words, competition is not just about one country – you can see the New Zealand wine example shows, free access and competitiveness – and nothing high cost. It is a new area for export in today’s world that is going to produce the winners. We have no doubt that opening is highly valuable for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the future.

Third, these mega-regional deals are all under negotiation globally. The TTP – the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement – and the RCEP – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement – are both under negotiation now.

Fourth, and I think this is most intriguing, these are what some analysts call the ‘closer economic agreements’, ‘partnership agreements’, they all as the TPP and the RCEP.

Competitive liberalisation

My focus is on the TPP, by far the most mature negotiation of these mega-regional deals, but a word first on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. This is a world of work underway in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. When you step back and try to make sense of this, what do you see? First, and most obviously, an explosion of interest among governments in negotiating new and binding international trade and investment integration agreements – call them free trade agreements, trade and investment integration agreements – with each other. They are literally ‘collapsing’ these bilateral agreements of the 1990s.

Second, these new mega-regional agreements are not low-quality agreements including many exemptions in Rabbijn’s terms. This is a sharp contrast to many poor quality free trade agreements of the 1990s.

Third, I think it is a major change, how and what we have shifted competition and the hard-core issues of liberalisation in the TPP. It is a much broader discussion, the hard-core issues of liberalisation. I am talking about all the political formula in advance the hard-core issues of liberalisation of agricultural crops, non-agriculture goods and services.

Fourth, the TPP is the world’s number one, second, and third economies. First, China and Japan – respectively, centred on the United States and Japan – and to a lesser extent, the Mekong countries. Crucially, the RCEP does not include the United States but does include China and India. The TPP, of course, centred on the United States and Japan – importantly, the world’s major one and two members of APEC.

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Within Asia, China is the largest component – the only major country.

What is happening in Asia is not unique, but is the largest single component of what is understood as globalisation. What we are seeing right now is the TPP – the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement – and the RCEP – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement – are both under negotiation now.

Three crucial mega-regional deals are also under negotiation globally. The TTP – the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement – and the RCEP – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement – are both under negotiation now.

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regional trade deal, the TPP.*

Legally, the constituent parts of these mega-regional deals such as the TPP are not free trade agreements — still contained to state, but in many cases they will be 'empty shells' — they will contain no new market access over and above the political talk, but does not mean nothing. Being made the free trade agreements deals since these free trade agreements will have been international for years. This is a race against time for any negotiating partners that happens to accept the risk. This is a race against time for any negotiating partners that happen to accept the risk. It is not P5, but P4 — four small APEC economies. And then we invited —

Deep roots

The TPP has deep roots: it started with a bilateral free trade agreement between Singapore and New Zealand. We then invited other economies to join the negotiation and agreed to the inclusion of Japan, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Eventually, Brunei asked to be included and we negotiated into the TPP agreement as the legal base. Since New Zealand is the legal administrator, or 'Depository' of P4, we continue to be the administrator of the TPP. We are delighted that Japan, in particular, has joined the TPP. This is an important step forward in our relationship with Japan.

Crucial stage

The TPP is now at a crucial stage. I think it is a race against time for any negotiating partners that happen to accept the risk. It is not P5, but P4 — four small APEC economies. And then we invited —

Extraordinary nation

Today, when we look at Japan, what do we see? We see an extraordinary nation. In terms of geography, it is Japan to only some 35 per cent bigger than New Zealand. Even in population, with some 126 million people, compared to Japan is a huge country, has Pakistan and Nigeria both have more people. And yet in terms of economic clout, Japan incredibly contributes some 12 per cent towards the global GDP. This is a testimony to the genius of the Japanese people, even though we recognise that in the last 20 years Japan has been transformed, and yet it remains.

The Japanese prime minister's response — known as 'Abenomics' — represents a personal and dramatic response to these deep-seated problems. As he said to the OECD ministerial meeting only weeks ago and I was in the audience at those meetings. The Japanese economy has been reborn through my 'three arrows'. Compared to seven years ago, the economic landscape has changed completely… I will never be afraid of reforms. The Japanese economy is back. The Japanese people are tough, the conditions are all right. They understand that if we don't make reform, we will not be able to reform our economy. The conditions are all right. We not only have the local economy, we also have the regional economy. The Japanese economy has been reborn through my 'three arrows'. Compared to seven years ago, the economic landscape has changed completely… I will never be afraid of reforms. The Japanese prime minister's response — known as 'Abenomics' — represents a personal and dramatic response to these deep-seated problems. As he said to the OECD ministerial meeting only weeks ago and I was in the audience at those meetings. The Japanese economy has been reborn through my 'three arrows'. Compared to seven years ago, the economic landscape has changed completely… I will never be afraid of reforms. The Japanese prime minister's response — known as 'Abenomics' — represents a personal and dramatic response to these deep-seated problems. As he said to the OECD ministerial meeting only weeks ago and I was in the audience at those meetings. The Japanese economy has been reborn through my 'three arrows'. Compared to seven years ago, the economic landscape has changed completely… I will never be afraid of reforms. The Japanese prime minister's response — known as 'Abenomics' — represents a personal and dramatic response to these deep-seated problems. As he said to the OECD ministerial meeting only weeks ago and I was in the audience at those meetings. The Japanese economy has been reborn through my 'three arrows'. Compared to seven years ago, the economic landscape has changed completely… I will never be afraid of reforms. The Japanese prime minister's response — known as 'Abenomics' — represents a personal and dramatic response to these deep-seated problems. As he said to the OECD ministerial meeting only weeks ago and I was in the audience at those meetings. The Japanese economy has been reborn through my 'three arrows'. Compared to seven years ago, the economic landscape has changed completely… I will never be afraid of reforms. The Japanese prime minister's response — known as 'Abenomics' — represents a personal and dramatic response to these deep-seated problems. As he said to the OECD ministerial meeting only weeks ago and I was in the audience at those meetings. The Japanese economy has been reborn through my 'three arrows'. Compared to seven years ago, the economic landscape has changed completely… I will never be afraid of reforms. The Japanese prime minister's response — known as 'Abenomics' — represents a personal and dramatic response to these deep-seated problems. As he said to the OECD ministerial meeting only weeks ago and I was in the audience at those meetings. The Japanese economy has been reborn through my 'three arrows'. Compared to seven years ago, the economic landscape has changed completely… I will never be afraid of reforms.

The entry of Japan into the TPP negotiation is a tremendous accomplishment for the region and for the world. Japan's entry into the TPP will complement the level TPP agreement involved and how a high-level TPP agreement would complement the

Japan's entry into the TPP will complement the level TPP agreement involved and how a high-level TPP agreement would complement the
Second, Japan has so much to gain from the TPP if it is successful. The TPP is a clear path for an Asian pivot in the future of global trade, and Japan has a huge amount to gain from the TPP negotiations. In the words of Prime Minister Abe in his statement of 15 March 2013: 

"Japan is in a good position in the Asia-Pacific region. Through the TPP, we can raise concerns, be they in agriculture, technology or services, and prevail. Therefore, if we take the opportunity provided by the TPP, we will be able to enter into a new era of high value-added trade." 

Japan’s agriculture future does not lie in trying to compete on cost, but on quality. And there is a future there. It is in high quality produce and food safety that Japan agriculture has a huge advantage. The TPP offers a chance to go forward and take advantage of this. Japan agriculture has a deeply difficult future. I know this from a recent visit. There are huge problems. The numbers are disturbing. At any age, the biggest problem is that few farmers are in trouble — and I know from a recent visit I made to Hokkaido, that even there (Hokkaido is regarded as among the stronger agriculture regions) farm profitability is a huge problem; less than 10 per cent are under the age of 65. Without rejuvenation of your farming communities, Japan agriculture has a deeply difficult future. Given Japan’s role both in the world economy and in the Asia–Pacific region, it would be irresponsible for us to fail at this parameter. To succeed with the TPP will require real political courage. But I am confident that Abenomics has provided the Japanese nation with the confidence to continue to take these steps towards a much better future.

Finally, let us consider the benefits from the TPP in terms of the less obvious and sometimes controversial: the gains to Japanese agriculture from the TPP. The TPP may not be converted into a new era of high value-added trade, but it can certainly be regarded as the first step towards this new era. Japanese agriculture is in a political cul-de-sac — a road that, without some major change, leads nowhere. At the same time, let me recall the central facts mentioned by the Prime Minister Abe in his statement. Japan agriculture has a deeply difficult future. Japanese agriculture has a deeply difficult future. The TPP may yet still stumble if governments finally lack the courage to take the final decisive decisions to confront their huge problem; less than 10 per cent are under the age of 65. Without rejuvenation of your farming communities, Japan agriculture has a deeply difficult future. Given Japan’s role both in the world economy and in the Asia–Pacific region, it would be irresponsible for us to fail at this parameter. To succeed with the TPP will require real political courage. But I am confident that Abenomics has provided the Japanese nation with the confidence to continue to take these steps towards a much better future.
My subject today concerns a balance sheet — a balance sheet for disarmament to be precise. I am told that the British scientist Dame Mary Archer once said, ‘It sounds extraordinary but it’s a fact that balance sheets can make fascinating reading.’

Well, the balance sheet for disarmament is no exception to this rule. Readers find themselves riding a roller coaster, soaring to lofty heights only to plunge to the deepest depths. There is motion — always motion — but the direction is often unclear; unfortunately, at the end one finds oneself right back where one started. But what a ride!

Before I became the United Nations’ high representative for disarmament affairs, I served as the under-secretary-general for management, where I acquired plenty of experience in dealing with balance sheets. The balance sheet for disarmament, however, consists of a lot more than numbers — as important as numbers can be, especially when it comes to weapon stockpiles. A fair assessment of such a balance sheet would have to take into account not just where things stand now, but how we got to where we are, and where we are likely to go.

Allow me first of all to clarify some terms before I get into trouble. The UN Charter refers to ‘disarmament’ and to the ‘regulation of armaments’ and these are among the oldest and most durable goals of the United Nations Organisation. In practice, ‘disarmament’ refers to the abolition and elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, namely biological and chemical weapons. Though these weapons have radically different effects, they share a common characteristic: they are inherently indiscriminate — they cannot differentiate between military and civilian targets, so their use becomes extremely difficult if not impossible to justify under international laws of war. This is essentially what the International Court of Justice ruled in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The United Nations has not sought to regulate but to eliminate nuclear weapons precisely because of their uniquely indiscriminate effects, in both space and time.

The goal for conventional arms is different. The charter clearly recognises the right of member states to self-defence, which includes the policing of borders, the supply of armed forces for international peacekeeping purposes. There is, of course, a danger that such weapons can also be used indiscriminately, as was amply demonstrated during the Second World War and in countless armed conflicts that followed. Yet the United Nations does not seek to eliminate conventional weapons, but to limit, to reduce, and to regulate them. There are exceptions to this rule in which certain categories of conventional weapons deemed excessively injurious or inhumane have been prohibited, through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. This mandated the prohibition or ban on the use of specific categories of conventional weapons that have uniquely horrific effects — effects that trouble the conscience of humanity. These include, for example, laser blinding weapons and explosives that release shrapnel that is invisible to medical x-rays.

These definitions are important in constructing any balance sheet for disarmament. They help us to recognize what it is we are measuring.

Measurement difficulty

The problem with disarmament is that it is very much like beauty — it appears differently in the eyes of its beholders, and this makes measurement of progress difficult. Let us take two of these categories: nuclear and conventional.

A fair assessment of such a balance sheet must take into account not just where things stand now, but how we got there and where we are likely to go. Optimism took the global record with respect to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and marvel at how much extraordinary progress has been made. Yet pessimism, however, the truth, regards in actually quite grim. Things are not necessarily going to get better. The balance sheet for disarmament must acknowledge this and assume that it will be a long and hard road ahead.

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The optimist looks at the global record and marvels at how much progress has been made. Over centuries, the world has witnessed shifts in power dynamics, changes in international laws, and the implementation of new norms that underpin various spheres of human activity.

The optimist looks at the global record with respect to nuclear disarmament. The two countries have joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, recognising the principle of complete and irreversible nuclear disarmament, and additional zones in North-east Asia and the Arctic. And let us not forget, says the optimist, that 190 states have now joined the International Agreement on Cluster Munitions, entering into force in 2010. In 2001, the international community adopted a Programme of Action to prevent the illicit trade in, or seeking to have such weapons. We just do not know for sure how many states today boast that they are "biological weapon states" or "chemical weapon states". Who is arguing now that there is a bio-weapon umbrella? It is, of course, true that neither the Biological Weapons Convention nor the Chemical Weapons Convention has universal membership — but 168 states have ratified the Biological Weapons Convention, while 190 states are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has universal membership — but 168 states have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, while 190 states are parties to the Biological Weapons Convention.

No one disputes that the biological weapons, from an international perspective, are the ultimate weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in 1997, following 16 years of negotiation. It is the first and only international treaty to ban all forms of chemical weapons. The treaty is supplemented by a Protocol to ban the use of all chemical weapons and to provide for the destruction of all such weapons. The treaty was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the World Health Organisation. The secretary-general's mechanism — the first international mechanism to inspect and improve its implementation. In 2010, the Convention entered into force. And in April last year, the General Assembly, adopted the Amended Protocol, which will come into force upon ratification by five states parties.

The optimist cites the tidal wave of support worldwide for the CWC, with over 100 states parties verifying their destruction of over 95 per cent of the 8.67 million chemical munitions and containers covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention has also facilitated the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria. The Convention has been particularly effective in Vietnam, where the government has resolved to destroy its entire arsenal of chemical weapons and has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2016. The Convention has been successful in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), which has announced its willingness to ratify the Convention. The Convention has also been successful in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2015. The Convention has been successful in the Syrian Arab Republic, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2016. The Convention has also been successful in the United States, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2018. The Convention has been successful in the United Kingdom, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2019. The Convention has also been successful in the People's Republic of China, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2020. The Convention has been successful in the Russian Federation, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2021. The Convention has also been successful in the French Republic, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2022. The Convention has been successful in the German Democratic Republic, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2023. The Convention has also been successful in the Italian Republic, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2024. The Convention has been successful in the Japanese Republic, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2025. The Convention has also been successful in the Canadian Commonwealth, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2026. The Convention has been successful in the Australian Commonwealth, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2027. The Convention has also been successful in the New Zealand Commonwealth, which has committed to destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile at the end of 2028.

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with the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons — the Russian Federation and the United States — have escalated their arsenal efforts by implementing their disarmament commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention and still have a long way to go in terms of further disarmament.

**Pessimistic view**

Now what does the pessimist say about nuclear weapons? For most optimists, the world’s nuclear arsenals seem to be the farthest thing from the minds of their contemporaries, but for the pessimist, nuclear arsenal proliferation is an eternal problem. In short, the world is divided on nuclear weapons issues. First, he called upon the Security Council to convene a summit on nuclear weapons in North Korea, the concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities, the proliferation, citing the nuclear weapons and missile activities to consider even discussing a nuclear weapons convention.

Second, he called on the Security Council to consider even discussing a nuclear weapons convention. As the United Nations has proposed a number of nuclear disarmament proposals announced when they were proposed to the NPT. And in 2013, the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency found that similar NPT provisions — and thus the non-nuclear-weapon states’ rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is itself significant, given that many thousands of them are still called non-nuclear-weapon states. In particular, and most of the states possessing such weapons refuse to sign or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which has been in force for 44 years, as the legal deficiency of the treaty is itself significant, given that it is not the most detailed disarmament proposal of its kind by any secretary-general, so I will only propose a new agreement to ban nuclear tests.

Further, he also added, long-term plans are to place in man-made existing nuclear reactors or those delivery systems. If we consider the total population living in states that possess such weapons — and add to this the populations of those states belonging to a nuclear alliance — then literally most of the world’s population is still non-binding and outside of any treaty framework. The UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament are supposed to be leading the way of a new, non-disruptive, and universal disarmament treaty.

**Legal deficiency**

In terms of the risk of not banning nuclear disarmament yet — well, then recently the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has still not entered into force, and will not until 2021. There are no requirements for verified destruction, and no weapons or their delivery systems can be maintained or used for nuclear weapons.

Some of these weapons are still on high alert. Some are ready for ‘first use’. And some continue to be deployed abroad in what are still called non-nuclear-weapon states. So, while the optimist and pessimist continue their endless debate about nuclear weapons, the reality is that the world is far from nuclear disarmament.

**Important calls**

With respect to conventional arms, the pessimist points to the fact that it took until 2013 for the world community to conclude such a treaty. This suggests that the world will still have nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. There are no negotiations under a treaty, bilateral or multilateral.

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We have some bilateral treaties that set limits on deployments of energy-related nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States, but no requirements for verified destruction, and no treaties addressing the issue of non-peaceful use. There are no legally binding agreements that limit but to eliminate them. And the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which has been in force for 44 years, obliges its parties to undertake negotiations in good faith on bringing about the complete, irreversible, and irrevocable elimination of their national nuclear weapon programs where undertaken when they were proposed to the NPT. And in 2013, the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency found that similar NPT provisions — and thus the non-nuclear-weapon states’ rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is itself significant, given that many thousands of them are still called non-nuclear-weapon states, even discussing a nuclear weapons convention.

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Disarmament and non-proliferation are central to nuclear disarmament and to secure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, he identified several ways to strengthen the role of law in disarmament, including the establishment of a global and non-military forum to promote disarmament and other weapons of mass destruction. Firstly, he proposed the need for greater accountability and transparency in arms trade, with a view to closing legal gaps. One notable action, he noted, was the establishment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This treaty, in concert with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is the most reliable way to prevent their further use, as the world will eventually come to grasps with the wisdom of achieving this goal by means of a multilateral convention that closes the legal gaps prepared by the nuclear powers.

Military expenditure

The growing support for a humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons threats.

Disarmament is a subject that I deeply believe will serve the world and to secure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, he identified several ways to strengthen the role of law in disarmament, including the establishment of a global and non-military forum to promote disarmament and other weapons of mass destruction. Firstly, he proposed the need for greater accountability and transparency in arms trade, with a view to closing legal gaps. One notable action, he noted, was the establishment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This treaty, in concert with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is the most reliable way to prevent their further use, as the world will eventually come to grasps with the wisdom of achieving this goal by means of a multilateral convention that closes the legal gaps prepared by the nuclear powers.

Military expenditure

The growing support for a humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons threats.
Russia—New Zealand ties: two looming milestones

Ian McCallion notes several anniversaries in relations between New Zealand and Russia that will occur in August 2014.

This year Russia’s actions have raised the spectre of war in Europe 70 years after the Second World War ended in a blaze. President Putin’s actions in Ukraine and Kiev and recent referendums of the Crimea have awakened deep-seated memories of World Wars I and II. The last time the two did not run smoothly, was as a result of the victory or the defeat of an enemy.

The losses suffered by Russia in the defeat of Germany were stupendous — an average of 8000 soldiers a day were lost for four years (on a population basis eight times New Zealand’s casualties). It is to be hoped that current issues in the relationship can be resolved in a way that allows that shared heritage to be given its due weight and credit.

Ian McGibbon notes several anniversaries in Russia—New Zealand ties: two looming milestones.

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**The course of diplomatic relations between the two countries has been meandering. The National Party gained power in the 1950 general election pledged to close the Soviet legation in New Zealand. This was achieved in 1951. Cold War tensions were further heightened in 1956 when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, in response to the Titoist threat. The bush government responded with a military buildup and an expansion of the Defence Force, but the Soviet Union was not appeased.**

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In 1958-59 New Zealanders and Russians generally fought on separate fronts, though they occasionally became aware of each other. In 1918, after the October Revolution in Russia, New Zealanders and Russians generally fought on separate fronts, though they occasionally became aware of each other. In 1918, after the October Revolution in Russia, New Zealanders and Russians generally fought on separate fronts, though they occasionally became aware of each other.

Another world war 25 years later would bring New Zealand and Russia once again together. Of course, this was a common enemy once again brought them together.

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India's hungry and enslaved
Badar Alam Iqbal examines two major problems confronting India.

Globally, between 2010 and 2013, nearly 842 million people suffered from chronic hunger, a tragic figure on a scale never before recorded, and one that is not going to get better soon. In fact, progress in reducing hunger has slowed down in many developing countries, especially in Asia. The World Food Programme estimates that 870 million people in 2011 were undernourished, or chronically hungry, and that figure has not declined in any significant manner since then. For every 100 people, there are 80 who are chronically hungry. The very fact that this has not improved in any significant manner tells us that the problem is not being addressed adequately. The 2017 report of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) reports that there are 870 million people who suffer from chronic hunger. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reports that there were 870 million hungry people in 2011. The number of hungry people has not gone down since then even though it has been calculated that 3.5 billion people are hungry at any one time across the world. This suggests that the challenges are much greater than generally perceived. In India, the situation is even worse. India is home to a third of the world’s hungry people. In 2011, the country was home to 209 million hungry people, the highest in the world. The number is higher than Bangladesh, which is home to 150 million hungry people. The number of hungry people in India has not declined significantly since then and the situation has, in fact, got worse.

India is home to a third of the world’s hungry people. According to the International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) 2017 global hunger index, as many as 153 per cent of the people are under-nourished, 88 per cent of children are under-nourished, and the under-five mortality rate is 4.1 per cent. Because of these shocking figures, India is classified as the “alarming category.” The hunger has resulted in poverty. With nearly 14 million slaves, India is home to half of the global slave population. The hunger and slavery trends are adversely affecting the country’s growth and development.

Developing countries, which have made significant strides in reducing hunger, are affected by the impact of economic growth. An increase in economic growth does not necessarily reduce hunger, but an increase in per capita income of the population reduces poverty. An increase in the number of jobs available for the youth and women reduces poverty, but not necessarily hunger. The number of hungry people in India has not declined since 2001.

The situation in India is even worse. The number of hungry people in India has not declined since 2001. In fact, the number of hungry people in India has increased significantly since then. The number of hungry people in India has doubled since then, and the number of hungry people in India has increased from 130 million in 2001 to 217 million in 2013. The proportion of people who are undernourished has increased from 26.9 per cent in 1990–92 to 17.5 per cent in 2013. The proportion of children who are undernourished has increased from 30.6 per cent in 1990–92 to 40.2 per cent in 2013. The under-five mortality rate has increased from 4.1 per cent in 1990–92 to 6.1 per cent in 2013. The number of hungry people in India has increased significantly since then.

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Table 1: Status of Hunger in South Asia (in millions with percentage in brackets)

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Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation, State of Food Insecurity in the World (2012); Global Hunger Index.

Table 2: Changes in Prices of Global Cereals in 2013

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<tr>
<th>Cereal</th>
<th>Change in prices in %</th>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
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</table>

Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2013."
Table 5. Major Countries Having the Largest Numbers of slaves in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Slaves</th>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>15,096,262</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3,094,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6,171,132</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>11,071,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>538,623</td>
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Source: Global Slavery Index, 2013.

Fourth place

The global slavery index puts India fourth in regard to prevalence of slavery (as a proportion of country’s population). "In India, women and girls are trafficked for sex and sold into domestic servitude. Men are trafficked to work in mines. Trafficking is widespread in all parts of the country. "The majority of trafficked people are from the north of India. 

The country is the global slavery index, is listed in the survey as having up to 4600 people still enslaved. They include trafficked women and people who are coerced into working in construction gangs.

Major culprits

The major industries in which forced labour is very common in India and other nations are brick kilns, rice mills, embroidery factories and agriculture. For instance, in private evidence to the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Women, Uttar Pradesh’s Department of Labour and Employment informed the committee that in the state’s 2011 Uttar Pradesh, there were between 200,000 and 300,000 child labourers.

The Trafficking in Persons Report has also brought to light many instances of women and girls from the north-eastern Indian states and Orissa being sold or coerced into sexual slavery in states with low female-to-male gender ratios, including Haryana and Punjab, or forced into prostitution.

The Walk Free Foundation has pointed out that the new survey to be carried out in 2014 will sharpen the existing data on slavery. But in the absence of concerted and committed efforts by governments, it is unlikely to paint a better or happier picture of slavery in the world.

NOTES

CONFERENCE REPORT
Global security

Brian Lynch reports on a recent conference in Bratislava.

The Asia Pacific-focused assessment of present global hot spots would likely highlight frictional relations among the big powers in Northeast Asia, tension in the Korean peninsula, and the likely slowing down of the economic juggernaut from China. While it is tempting to observe that through a comparatively different lens, the pacific doleful place is half the world away. The Global Security Forum held by the Slovak Atlantic Commission in Bratislava from 14–16 May 2014 was almost entirely centred on the current concerns of continental Europe, notwithstanding the relatively prominent place in the discussion was given to the implications of the Ukraine crisis, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and continuing unrest in eastern Ukraine. This consisted of an ‘App’ which enabled two-line comment from July August issue 2014.indd   27 16/06/14   12:54 PM Victoria University of Wellington’s Centre for Strategic Studies. Atlantic Commission to attend the 9th annual session of the GLOBSEC Bratislava. Brian Lynch is a former diplomat and NZIIA director. He was invited by the Slovak

Definitive positives

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Another factor why the potential part of modern thinking in the conference that many participants found compelling. For two decades and more since the Berlin Wall crumbled and took the Soviet empire with it, European leaders had been able to count on the support of the United States, enjoying unipolar supremacy, the Soviet empire with it, European leaders had been able to count on the support of the United States, enjoying unipolar supremacy, the

Definitive positives

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First World War. If there remain some uncertainties about where future relationships will take shape and the impact of a new Cold War, there is potential for subsequent regional integration. The European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have been

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Ukrainian crisis

During the2014 Twenty-seventh European Security Conference proceedings and more than 20,000 Facebook 'followers'.

The audience members to be carried immediately on screens in the conference hall; there were 1500 such 'posts' over the three days of proceedings, and more than 100,000 tweets were recorded, along with more than 10,000 Facebook 'likes'.

... in 1917, and in the struggle against the Anglo-Saxon world and its 'moral degeneration'. He in truth regarded continental Europe as a 'natural ally' of Russia, and was portray as a follower of the 'clash of civilisations' philosophy.

It was acknowledged that there was a legacy of hostility in Moscow as an outcome of the 1990s, to engage in Bandwagoning into Europe and indicate how NATO dealings meeting the alleged 'aggressive' maneuvers in Eastern Europe Honesty. Geographically NATO was, now no longer a distant spectre. It had deployed 40,000 troops from the 18 countries in Eastern Europe and had 12,000 military personnel on the front line: 300,000,000 of the Russian population lived in the region. The threat was real.

There was an immediate reaction from the West, with the 'clash of civilisations' philosophy.

... that it was a 'natural ally' of Russia, and was portray as a follower of the 'clash of civilisations' philosophy.

... and the West had made only when previously the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, and when no effective countermeasure was adopted.

NATO viewpoint

NATO insists on measures taken in response to the Russian challenge. In 2014, NATO had the public at a low point in its history. "The war has made it clear that Russia is a serious threat to the West. We have made progress, but we have not yet achieved the desired outcome. The situation is still evolving, and we must remain vigilant." NATO's Secretary-General said during a press conference in Brussels.

... in the struggle against the Anglo-Saxon world and its 'moral degeneration'. He in truth regarded continental Europe as a 'natural ally' of Russia, and was portray as a follower of the 'clash of civilisations' philosophy.

... to the press to deal common defence and foreign policy ambitions. It is not always clear that the message of NATO's commitment to European security is being effectively communicated.

... the issue of who controlled the borders of the buffer zone was an issue of serious concern to President Putin. The situation was exacerbated by the prospect of a pro-European Union, pro-NATO government emerging in Ukraine, for this would mean a reduction in Russian influence in Eastern Europe.

... of core policy responsibilities, from Kosovo to Afghanistan. The situation in Putin's country was considered as one of the most serious threats to the stability of NATO, as it had become necessary to reassess the alliance's role in the region.

... by one country to alter the borders of a neighbour was obviously meant for a Moscow audience, along the lines that Moscow had a right to defend itself.

... would have to undertake an even more basic restatement of fundamental principles. Now, in light of Russia's assertion of a perceived 'sphere of influence', there had to be a shift in thinking about the role of NATO in the region.

... but not been a decisive factor in the outcome of the crisis.

... evidenced at least a decade past, that Russia was set on rebuilding its power and influence. It would want to do this before demographic shifts and economic change made it too late.

... of an eventual solution to the crisis; now was not the time to break off contact and communication with Moscow.

... and how the West's readiness for an unambiguous hard power response should it be needed.

... having. The newly established Eurasian Economic Union. All that being said, two other important points had been made.

... had to be considered as well. It was noted that Europe had made only token protests over the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, and when no effective countermeasure was adopted.

... of our joint military advantage in the region. And to be considered as well was the view that Europe had made only token protests over the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, and when no effective countermeasure was adopted.

... as a legacy of hostility in Moscow as an outcome of the 1990s, to engage in Bandwagoning into Europe and indicate how NATO dealings meeting the alleged 'aggressive' maneuvers in Eastern Europe Honesty. Geographically NATO was, now no longer a distant spectre. It had deployed 40,000 troops from the 18 countries in Eastern Europe and had 12,000 military personnel on the front line: 300,000,000 of the Russian population lived in the region. The threat was real.
There were seeds of discontent at the very start of this period of central Europe, the seeds that would possibly grow into full-blown civil war. As a base for policy formulation, Stability was not the thing that might work for major economic problems.

Panelists spoke of a sense of a new reality. Europe is not the same. An earlier era, a time of relative stability, is not the same as 20 years ago. The world is different now, and there is no longer a stable Europe. The future is uncertain, and there is no guarantee of economic growth. The world has changed, and this has been reflected in the way European leaders have approached issues.

The gloomy prospect envisaged was that the next parliament would come from groups eschewing the European Union's best interests. Particularly if, as equally miserly or worse turnout this time would raise doubts about the legitimacy of the elections. An adequate number of younger generation contributors. Policy community, credible non-official presenters and moderators and audience interest. Particularly if, as equally miserly or worse turnout this time would raise doubts about the legitimacy of the elections. An adequate number of younger generation contributors. Policy community, credible non-official presenters and moderators and audience interest.

Troubling question

While that belief in shared interests implied mutual acceptance within some of the shared views that had become the core feature, in a question reserved for the role of the individual. The individual was much more prevalent in the debate than the group. The role of the individual was much more prevalent in the debate than the group. The role of the individual was much more prevalent in the debate than the group. The role of the individual was much more prevalent in the debate than the group. The role of the individual was much more prevalent in the debate than the group. The role of the individual was much more prevalent in the debate than the group.

The topic of “Western Leadership” — was it a case of out of sight out of mind? A case of, “I don’t understand what all this means, I can’t keep up with everything.”

Very little
THE MIGHTY TOTARA: The Life and Times of Norman Kirk

Author: David Grant
Published by: Random House, Auckland, 2014, 512pp, $45.

David Grant was a Labour MP 1972–75 and 1978–90, and was a Cabinet minister during the leadership of Prime Minister Jim Anderton in the early 1980s. He was a member of the Labour Party seminar in Auckland with a version of this book, which he describes in his introduction as a ‘stirring and confident expression of what the Labour movement needs to get back to its roots and its passion; its shrewdness; its voice that could vary from a conspiratorial whisper to a stentorian bellow; and a newly discovered capacity to handle TV, thereby capturing audiences.’

Unfortunately, Grant has a great deal of economic background from David Grant’s book, but it is not surprising that he does not have a full understanding of the book’s contents. However, several well-informed members of Kirk’s caucus who could have helped

A consensual view of Kirk before he was in the 1972 budget, he was a creature of the early Kirk era and a notable politician who understood the needs of the young. Kirk knew himself, he would spend the country back to health. Labour’s

Welfare state and he refused to accept that any corrective measures were needed. His files of the Monetary and Economic Council’s reports to the Treasury were well-informed members of Kirk’s caucus who could have helped

Little changed during the first term of Kirk’s Holyoke, although he faced much criticism while in office. However, several well-informed members of Kirk’s caucus who could have helped

In fact, spending on the scale promised in such a manifesto is singularly light with the evidence. Grant deals erratically with some of the weaknesses within Kirk’s Cabinet team, although it

By the time Norman Kirk won office in 1972 New Zealand’s economy was in a state of ‘congestive heart failure’; an eye specialist suspected

A man with a vision of Kirk before he was in 1972 that he was a creature of the early Kirk era and a notable politician who understood the needs of the young. Kirk knew himself, he would spend the country back to health. Labour’s

The author’s background reading is slight, and his sources

Unfortunately, Grant was very selective with his interviews. Unfortunately you will not get...
THE NEW MIDDLE EAST: The World After the Arab Spring

Author: Paul Danahar

THE SYRIA DILEMMA

Author: Paul Danahar

The New Middle East is written by the BBC's Paul Danahar. This is an overview of the impact of Middle Eastern political change, with chapters on Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, US foreign policy and the Gulf. Danahar takes a few big themes: He ponders the notion of the post-Islamic Middle East and the potential for the region to make a slow rise of the ultra-orthodox — Danahar sees this community as invariably a work in progress. He equally dedicates some space to the superficial world of Middle Eastern politics, which include the Arab Spring and the West's response to the uprisings. Danahar speaks to the fact that the Middle East is becoming a less complex region with fewer countries, which Danahar also includes. He quotes Anne Marie Slaughter, former director of the State Department's Policy Planning, as Danahar also includes. He quotes Anne Marie Slaughter, former director of the State Department's Policy Planning, on the need for a long-term strategy to prevent the growth of extremist groups. Danahar disagrees with this, noting that democracies are not always a good thing in the Middle East. Danahar also includes Danahar on the West's response to the uprisings. Danahar includes Danahar on the West’s response to the uprisings. Danahar includes Danahar on the West’s response to the uprisings.

Danahar's view is that the West cannot afford to view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — the West should not view it like this on account of the regional repercussions — 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Israeli diplomat, in the halls of Washington the ghosts of Iraq and Afghanistan are living with the ghosts of Brussels and Rome. The spirit of Iraq does not weigh lightly on the former diplomats and policy makers of the US, UK and France. The Syria Dilemma was complicated by President Obama's attempt to make the case of Assad use of chemical weapons to Congress. This was made possible by the international consensus amongst the great majority of the UN Security Council and the international community on the need to take serious action against Assad. The resolution passed in 2013 was a major victory for the Obama administration and a turning point in the Syria conflict. It also had the effect of undermining the position of Bashar al-Assad and his regime.

Those who believe that the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime is a clear violation of international law and a threat to the security of the region argue that there should be a military intervention to remove Assad from power. However, this view is not shared by all of those involved in the debate. Some argue that military intervention is not the answer and that political solutions are needed to end the conflict.

The other side of the argument is that the international community has a responsibility to protect civilians from harm and to prevent the use of chemical weapons. This view is shared by some of the very people who are now calling for military intervention. The question of whether to intervene is not an easy one, and it is likely that there will continue to be debate on this issue for some time to come.

The Syria Dilemma is a reminder of how intractable this conflict is and that the only way to resolve it is through a comprehensive and inclusive political process. The international community must work together to find a solution to the conflict that is just and sustainable.
Institute Notes

National Office and branch activities.

Angela Kane, the UN high representative for disarmament, delivered the NZIIA's annual Foreign Policy Lecture on 7 April at a meeting organised with the UN Association of New Zealand. Dr Kane, who represents the UN on the commission and her experience in representing the commission in some of its international workload.

Wellington

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