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CORRESPONDENCE

INSTITUTE NOTES

OBITUARY
Professor William Theodore Roy IDSM.
Discovering Asia

John McKinnon outlines the work of the Asia New Zealand Foundation in 2013.

For the Asia New Zealand Foundation 2014 is our twentieth anniversary. It was established at one of those seminal moments, which seem to occur about every ten years or so, when New Zealand 'discovers' Asia. Or, put more correctly, when the political leaders of the time recognised that there was a gap between our interactions with Asia and our knowledge of it, and by 'our' they meant not just, or even mainly, the official community which engaged with Asia but the broader New Zealand world who were caught up in it, whether they knew it or not.

The foundation was, therefore, established deliberately to occupy a space in parallel but distinct from government. The government contributed, then as now, a substantial part of the foundation's funding, as well as appointing its non-partisan board on the recommendation of the minister of foreign affairs. Many distinguished New Zealanders have been members of the board over the 19 years of its existence. In addition, the foundation enjoys the support of a panel of honorary advisers, selected from amongst prominent individuals in the countries of Asia.

The foundation's work was focused on three main activities: education; culture, including media and sport; and business. This is still largely the case, although the emphasis has changed over the years. But the purpose has not. In terms of summing this up in a snappy phrase, I say that we 'equip New Zealanders to thrive in Asia'. We do so mostly by working with and through partners and stakeholders. The foundation is large in ambition but small in resources so necessarily much of what our very able staff do is to prompt, facilitate, and catalyse others to act.

Our benchmark, if I was to identify one, would be the familiarity which many if not most New Zealanders have with Australia, North America and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, or with the South Pacific, on the other. By that I mean that New Zealanders have a very rich array of experiences and information to draw on when they move to or do business in or otherwise interact with those countries. They have family and personal networks, professional and business associates, and thus a variety of ways to evaluate and interpret what is retailed through government pronouncements or the global media. This is much less so with Asia, let alone with other parts of the world. Clearly this is changing — more of this below — but part of the foundation's work is to level this up. This does not mean that doing business in Asia instantly becomes 'easier', whatever 'easier' means. To be honest, doing business in Australia or the United States is not always easy either. But what it should mean is that the New Zealander entering Asia is better placed to do business there than otherwise — 'better equipped to thrive in Asia'.

Does this matter? Let us look, for instance, at the situation in 1994 when the foundation was established and at the one in 2013.

Larger profile

If we look at the pattern of trade — the mode with which we are most comfortable in evaluating our external relationships — we can see that the Asian economies now loom much larger in our external profile than they did then. Much of this is the story of China, but it is not only China. In 1993, New Zealand's major trading partners were, in order: Australia, Japan, the United States, the European Community (excluding the United Kingdom), Asia (excluding Japan) and Oceania. In 2013, New Zealand's major trading partners are, in order: Australia, China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Germany, Malaysia and Thailand. In 1988,

In the last twenty years the Asia New Zealand Foundation has played an increasingly important role in educating New Zealanders about Asia. The foundation's purpose has been to 'equip New Zealanders to thrive in Asia'. Its efforts are focused in three target areas: the population as a whole, the school population and opinion-leaders. The first aims to provide information that renders what is happening in Asia intelligible from a New Zealand perspective. The second is approached through three lenses: cultural competency, preparedness for the workplace, and language learning. The third, which has been a staple of the foundation's work since its establishment, includes supporting journalists, teachers, artists, and others to travel to Asia.
for another example, 5 per cent of New Zealand's goods exports went to China. At the end of 2012, 15 per cent did.

This expansion in trade has been matched by a number of free trade agreements, all since the new millennium: with Singapore (2001), with Brunei (the original P4, in 2005), with Thailand (2005), with China (2008), with the ASEAN 10 (2010), Hong Kong (2011) and Taiwan (2013). There are many others under negotiation, including with India and South Korea, as well as the multilateral Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreements.

Given these developments it is understandable that when New Zealanders look at Asia, they look through an economic and commercial lens.

But this is only one part of the story. There are two others I wish to highlight. The increase in our trade with Asia is in part a consequence of the increase in wealth in that part of the world — with more wealth comes more disposable income to purchase the goods and services that we produce here. But with more wealth also comes more power. As Sunzi said many centuries ago, and has been repeated many times since, it is the wealth of a country which underpins its military power. And so it is in Asia today. And if that is happening simultaneously in several countries, there will inevitably be points of sensitivity to manage. This is the region we now live in, and understanding it and understanding it well is at a premium if we are to ‘thrive’ in Asia.

Major trend
The second might be said to be ‘Asia discovers New Zealand’. It would be fair to say that when the foundation was established in 1994 the focus was on ‘over there’, that is, programmes that facilitated New Zealanders trading and working in Asia. If there has been one major trend to which we have responded in the intervening nineteen years it is a recognition that our future with Asia is also made in New Zealand. How we evolve as a society in which people of Asian descent are a significant part of the community is now an inseparable part of ‘thriving’ in Asia: inseparable but also distinct. Even if there was nobody of Asian descent living in New Zealand, we would still need to be smart about Asia. And even if we did not sell a single packet of infant milk formula or anything else to Asia, we would still be under an obligation to welcome and embrace our Asian communities, old and new.

Those communities, of course, have been growing in numbers since 1994. When the foundation was established New Zealand’s Asian population was approximately 3 per cent. At the 2006 census it was 9 per cent and, based on that census, is projected to be 16 per cent by 2016. The 2013 census figures on ethnicity will be released in December. They will almost certainly show a significant increase in the Asian population, in part because the census interval is seven rather than the usual five years.

Important aspects
It is understandable, given social realities, that we speak in terms of aggregates such as ‘Asian’, ‘Pasifika’ and ‘New Zealand European’; understandable, but incomplete. In examining these figures it is worth bearing some other aspects in mind:

- The ‘Asian’ communities are diverse not only in national origin but also in terms of the length of time they have been in New Zealand. Members of long established Chinese and Indian communities understandably bridle when asked ‘When did you arrive in New Zealand?’ Nobody asks me that. Indeed, our very use of ‘Pakeha’ in some contexts to mean the totality of the non-Maori population may need to be reviewed, if we are to reflect contemporary as opposed to 19th century realities.
- Even discounting ambiguous definitions, the numbers of New Zealand-born in the recent immigrant communities is steadily increasing, and will continue to increase. The grandparents may be challenged by settlement in New Zealand, but the parents may well have received their tertiary education here, and the grandchildren will be sent to local kindergartens and schools, at one with others of their age group. Let me give just one example. At the recent launch of the Wellington Diwali Festival, at Labour Weekend, a group of exquisitely dressed Indian girls performed a traditional dance. When the MC interviewed them after their performance, it was evident from their responses that four of them were New Zealand-born and were at school here at Wellington East or Victoria University. Only one was foreign-born and she was from Malaysia.
- Change is a two-way process. Our society is changing as its composition alters. But every immigrant who settles here is also embarked on a process of change, of ‘New Zealandisation’. It may not be obvious to those not familiar with the immigrant communities but it is to those who come here. And it is encouraged by official representatives, who are unthinking in their calls to their respective peoples to learn about New Zealand so that they can be comfortable and successful living here — a mirror image of what the foundation is endeavouring to achieve.

Important role
Given these changes an important part of the foundation’s work has to be to build knowledge and understanding of Asia in New Zealand. For while it is reasonable, as I have just done, to distinguish what happens here from what happens overseas, it would be naive to imagine that the fortunes of Asian immigrants to New Zealand are not ‘heard back’ in their respective home countries.

New Zealand is far from being the only country to be responding to high levels of immigration. But the foundation’s surveys suggest that we should not be too downbeat about our
response. Since 1997 the foundation has undertaken an annual ‘Perceptions of Asia’ survey. In October, we released a review of these surveys from 1997 to 2013. They indicated that as the numbers of Asians in New Zealand increased over that period, so did New Zealand ‘comfort levels’ with the Asian community. The survey process does not allow us to draw a causal relationship between these two findings, but at the very least they suggest that knowledge and experience build empathy and understanding. That should not be taken for granted: the exact opposite reaction is not unknown. And nor should we be complacent. But for me that is a very positive finding, and bodes well for our future in and with Asia.

Turning to the foundation’s activities, I will now set out how we are operating in this context that I have sketched out. I find it easiest to describe these activities in terms of targets: the population as a whole, the school population and opinion-leaders.

**Educational contradiction**

There is something of a contradiction in terms of ‘educating’ New Zealanders about Asia. On the one hand, there is no shortage of information about Asia and as with any field of knowledge these days it is accessible with a few clicks on the computer or touches of the smartphone. On the other hand, I am regularly told that the mainstream media have limited coverage of Asia and still source most of their copy from the United Kingdom or the United States. There are now no New Zealand correspondents in Asia, and have not been any since 2006, when Television New Zealand closed down its Hong Kong-based Asia bureau.

The gap, if there is one, is therefore less information that renders what is happening in Asia intelligible from a New Zealand perspective. So we are tackling this gap in a variety of ways.

- Our website has a newsroom field in which we post short articles about recent developments in Asia. Some are from professional journalists, and some are from academics. The requirement is that they be short, topical and provide a New Zealand angle.
- The newsroom also carries interviews with New Zealanders doing interesting things in Asia, such as building surfboards in Java, or Asians doing interesting things in New Zealand, such as playing rugby with the Highlanders.
- The newsroom material is available to any other media outlet or agency. The likes of business councils and Confucius institutes often reproduce our material, which is good. But we also aim to increase mainstream media awareness of various experts and stories on Asia and New Zealand, and to provide story angles that they might pursue.

- We have started a series of public forums. The first was on language learning and held in Hamilton in September. A panel of experts offered its views and then interacted with the audience. The event was worthwhile in itself, but also provided podcasts and media copy for our website, which is still available.
- In addition to these new areas of activity we are continuing with our support for festivals: the Chinese Lantern Festival, the Indian Diwali Festival of Lights, the South-east Asian Night Market in Wellington, the Japan Festival, and other such events. The purpose of our support is twofold: to bring international programmes of high quality to New Zealand; and to introduce the richness of Asian cultures to all New Zealanders. Judging by the turnout at the festivals I have attended in 2013, we are successful on both counts.
- We are considering whether there is a similar way we can support the annual Eid Festival (end of Ramadan) as a means of broadening understanding of Islamic cultures in New Zealand, many of which originate in Asia.
- We are also continuing our research activities and regular surveys. As I mentioned, these latter are now building up into a very solid data-set, which give us the ability to anchor our thoughts about New Zealand’s future with Asia in fact.
- And finally, we are not entirely neglecting the mainstream media. We provide study and travel grants to professional journalists to give them hands on experience of Asia.

**Schools focus**

The second area of attention is schools. For the first time this year, we undertook a survey of what Year 12 and 13 students knew and felt about Asia. Some results were encouraging — there was a widespread recognition that Asia mattered, both to New Zealand and to the students as individuals. There was much less confidence among this group that they knew anything like enough to be able to ‘thrive’ in Asia. From this point of view their perspectives were not too different from that of their parents as reflected in our general surveys. Another interesting and also surprising response was that most of the information about Asia that they did have was not gleaned, as might be supposed, from the internet, but from schools. Information may be abundant, but ‘educating’ students to know where to find it and how to use it still rests largely with
our schools.

Fortunately both our education system and our national curriculum give ample opportunity for schools to stretch themselves in this area, given the appropriate encouragement and support. We look at this through three lenses: cultural competency; preparedness for the workplace; and language learning. The first two line up with the circumstances I mentioned above. Our society is increasingly diverse. All children need to know how to live and thrive in an environment in which not everybody is ‘just like me’. Many schools are already doing this very well. I visited an Auckland primary school a while ago in which all children were being taught Chinese for an hour a week. They sang a Chinese song to a group of visiting Chinese performers, hard on the heels of the haka.

And alongside social diversity also comes diversity in job opportunities. The likelihood is that everybody in the New Zealand workforce in 20–30 years time — so when children entering school now are looking for jobs — will need some Asia nous, whether they are in employment here or overseas. Our view is that their life chances will be much enhanced if they have Asia-relevant skills and competencies in hand.

**Language facility**

Language is the most difficult of these three. From my own experience I am both enthusiastic but also realistic about language learning. It is an undoubted fact that if there is one language to equip oneself in the world that language is English and, by our great good fortune, that is the mother tongue of most New Zealanders. For many that is enough. I would argue strongly that it is not enough any longer, not because English will disappear any time soon as the dominant global language, but because increasingly those who are multilingual will be advantaged, in employment prospects and elsewhere, over those who are monolingually English.

As we already have English ‘in the bag’, as it were, it should be easy to add other languages. But instead we seem to have the reverse effect. ‘We know English so we don’t need to bother’. The foundation’s view rather is that we need to encourage schools, teachers, parents, employers and every other part of the community to recognise this new circumstance. If you believe that New Zealand is lagging in this area then my plea to you is, do not throw brickbats at the schools, use your influence as parents, grandparents, employers and citizens to encourage and support change. In the foundation we are developing tools, in collaboration with the education authorities and school principals, to create incentives to language learning. The flexibility of the New Zealand education system is a great asset here. My vision is that New Zealand will be the first dominantly English-speaking country where bi- or multi-lingualism is the norm, not the exception.

While the Asia New Zealand Foundation obviously promotes the learning of Asian languages, we see value in all language learning, whether it be Spanish, Somali or Samoan. Second, our promotion of Asian language learning is not and cannot be at the expense of the mastery of te reo Māori, whether by native or non-native speakers. Indeed, early exposure to te reo is likely to have a beneficial effect on future language learning, especially for languages such as Bahasa (scarcely taught in New Zealand schools at all) which belong to the same language family.

**Opinion-leaders’ role**

My third area of focus is what we loosely call ‘opinion-leaders’ and by that I mean individuals (or organisations for that matter) who can take their experience of Asia and amplify it beyond their own profession or area of work. I will not dwell on this, as this has been staple of the foundation’s work since its establishment, and it continues to be so. We support journalists, teachers, artists, and others to travel to Asia, and we do so because we know and expect that they will use that experience to broaden understanding of Asia when they return home. A key part of this activity is our Young Leaders Network, a group of about 300–400 people with a passion for Asia and working in Asia-related jobs or planning to do so. About a third of them are based overseas. The network is allowing them to learn from each other. But they are also ‘ambassadors’ in the broadest sense, sharing their own personal journeys with the wider community. Our future challenge is to maintain connections with all these beneficiaries of our work.

This is at home. But another part of our mandate is to nurture links with opinion-leaders in the countries of Asia. I have already mentioned our panel of honorary advisers, who do sterling service in this regard. The Asia New Zealand Foundation also leads what are known as ‘Track II’ dialogues with a variety of counterpart institutions in the region. We have had six such dialogues in 2013. In some, of course, we are partners with this very institute.

In conclusion, let me make two points of clarification. I have talked throughout about ‘Asia’. That, of course, is a gross simplification. Even in our geographically constrained definition, Asia encompasses twenty countries and a multiplicity of cultures, all worlds in themselves. We do recognise this in our work, but we also have to simplify and aggregate, so my apologies to those who may feel I have been too casual in my discussion.

Second, Asia, large and powerful as it is, is not the whole world. The foundation does not have a mandate beyond Asia, but those from countries not in Asia should not feel neglected. The world is dynamic, and just as Asia is now impinging on New Zealand much more than it did several decades ago, so I predict will Africa and Latin America, not to speak of our long established partners in Europe, North America and our own neighbourhood. The issues we face — of understanding and familiarity — are not dissimilar in scope, although they may be in intensity. But if we cannot work out how to ‘thrive’ in Asia, then I doubt we will have much chance with any other part of the world.
Norman Kirk’s global diplomacy

Ken Ross argues the case for Norman Kirk’s pre-eminence among post-1945 prime ministers in projecting New Zealand overseas.

‘I joined the Labour Party because Norman Kirk spoke for me on the folly of external involvement in the Vietnamese civil war and the immorality of apartheid and nuclear weapons. It has been among the great satisfactions of my life to see those positions become accepted as mainstream views in New Zealand.’ (Helen Clark)

Norman Kirk has been the most capable of our prime ministers since 1945 for projecting New Zealand internationally. His branding in the early 1970s of New Zealand as a progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to our national identity, was an inspired moment for New Zealand’s international reputation. In doing so he evoked the diplomatic role that has come to best suit us: being a good international citizen.

Global diplomacy is what prime ministers do to advance their government’s foreign policy.

A new look at Kirk’s global diplomacy is warranted. My key conceptual ideas — including Dag Hammarskjöld’s ‘maturity of mind’ and Henry Kissinger’s ‘intellectual capital’ — that highlight Kirk’s ranking ahead of the other fourteen prime ministers we have had since 1945 were outlined in this journal’s previous issue. This article is a short version of the two chapters on Kirk that are in my forthcoming book on the global diplomacy of New Zealand prime ministers since 1945. One of the chapters covers how it was that Kirk’s maturity of mind and his intellectual capital were match-fit when he became prime minister. The second chapter sets out, on the basis of Kirk’s actions while prime minister, the case for the Kirk brand being our best.

Kirk’s top rating is due to three factors: his portfolio of diplomatic attainments that constitute the basis of the Kirk brand; the fact that David Lange, Jim Bolger and Helen Clark have ensured the brand is still the smartest basis for global diplomacy by New Zealand prime ministers; and Kirk being match-fit when he became prime minister to immediately commence his global diplomacy.

Important assets

When Kirk arrived at the prime minister’s office on 8 December 1972, he was already friends with the leaders overseas who were going to most enable him to make his mark. In addition, he was to be exceptionally served by his foremost mandarin, Frank Corner, the secretary of foreign affairs and the head of the Prime Minister’s Department. Corner, in turn, was ably supported by his senior departmental officials, particularly Malcolm Templeton. During Kirk’s time Templeton was a Wellington-based deputy secretary and then from September 1973 New Zealand’s permanent representative at the United Nations in New York, a pivotal position for promoting Kirk’s vision.

In their subsequent writings, Corner and Templeton provide the smartest record of Kirk’s handling of New Zealand’s foreign policy while he was prime minister. Corner’s principal contribution is a lengthy chapter in Margaret Clark (ed), Three Labour Leaders. Templeton’s chapter in the same book covers Kirk’s performance on his iconic initiatives — nuclear weapons and racism. Templeton has added to that contribution with his books, particularly Human Rights and Sporting Contacts: New Zealand Attitudes to Race Relations in South Africa 1921–94 (1998) and Standing Upright Here: New Zealand in the Nuclear Age 1945–1990 (2006).

Scholars have been tentative about Kirk’s accomplishments. A decade ago, in their respective histories of New Zealand, Michael King and James Belich were far from fulsome about Kirk’s 20 months as prime minister. David Capie has subsequently commented briefly on Kirk’s global diplomacy, and Jon Johansson has done so with more brevity. Otherwise there has been no substantial academic commentary on Kirk’s global diplomacy of New Zealand since 1945.

Of New Zealand’s fifteen prime ministers since 1945, Norman Kirk has pride of place in projecting New Zealand internationally. In branding New Zealand as a progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to our national identity, he not only inspired a pinnacle moment for our global diplomacy but also established an enduring role, one best suited to our strengths — that of being a good international citizen. His outstanding effort has been cemented in place by the strong support performances of some of his successors on both sides of the political divide, notably David Lange, Jim Bolger and Helen Clark.
Norman Kirk, year: David Grant’s bencher in the Kirk government. Government

...the late 1950s who publicly supported the ‘No Maori No Tour’ campaign. When, in 1963, the French arrived at Moruroa to test nuclear devices he was outspoken in Parliament, advocating for the 80,238 petitioners calling for the New Zealand government to oppose the testing — his speech on 10 July 1963 exudes his opposition.

Further achievements lock in his pre-eminence. His willingness to stand tall for fellow progressives is best exemplified by his backing of Bangladesh’s Sheikh Mujibar Rahman and Chile’s Salvador Allende at critical moments. Kirk set his high standards with his initiative in February 1972, ten months before he became prime minister, when he helped garner rapid international recognition of Bangladesh’s independence after its break from Pakistan. Kirk’s Bangladesh story, little known to the New Zealand public, has had a remarkable resonance beyond New Zealand. The initiative, which turned on Kirk’s Socialist International role as the chair of its Asian bureau, heralded his special attribute once prime minister — he is the only one of the fifteen who led international efforts, from the front.

Determined stubbornness

The Chilean episode followed Allende’s violent death on 11 September 1973 during a military coup half-way through his six-year term as the country’s democratically elected president. Kirk’s determined stubbornness in refusing to give the new Pinochet regime the standard diplomatic recognition made him a standout opponent globally. Hayward records that on 10 October 1973 Kirk was still not ready to concur with his officials’ submission to do so, writing ‘a giant “NO”, five inches high. Underneath, he scrawls “They are still killing people for exercising their democratic rights”. It took five weeks before he was persuaded not to withdraw Wellington’s ‘working agreement’ with Chile. As late as 4 July 1974 Kirk, in his final foreign affairs debate intervention in Parliament, declared that ‘at no stage had New Zealand indicated approval of the new regime’.

Kirk’s persuasive advocacy at international forums gave him a presence that overshadows the efforts of our other prime ministers. Most noteworthy were his performances at the April 1973 South Pacific Forum in Apia; at the August 1973 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Chogm) in Ottawa; and his address to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1973. Derek Ingram has recounted that in Ottawa Kirk ‘made a profound impact, and Third World Commonwealth countries found they had a new friend’.

With Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s president, Kirk seeded the Commonwealth’s emergence as the foremost advocate for small states, particularly for those who are members of the organisation but also more generally. The small states were just beginning to emerge in Kirk’s time — there were just a third the number now. His big boost to New Zealand’s international aid effort sits well in its global diplomacy portfolio. His broadening of the country’s diplomatic network, from 30 to 45 in the three years 1973 to 1975, was an important stepping stone for the branding exercise.

Brand manifesto

‘New Zealand in the World of the 1970s’, Kirk’s initial foreign policy statement as prime minister issued on 22 December, became the ‘manifesto’ for his brand. Subsequent statements by Kirk developed further his brand. Together his statements, including the big speeches, constitute a comprehensive understanding of New Zealand’s talent for being the best good international citizen that we can achieve.

The key to judging Kirk’s contribution is an observation that Keith Jackson made in 1970. Until then, Jackson argued, New Zealand’s foreign policy generally was to ‘acquiesce in the policies of its major partners even where it has important reservations about such policies’. Jackson provided an adept analysis of New Zealand’s foreign policy options as it switched from Britain to the United States as its principal security guarantor.

Kirk broke that pattern. In his introduction to the first annual report tabled in Parliament by him as foreign minister, he wrote:

From now on, when we have to deal with new situations, we...
shall not say, what do the British think about it, or what would the Americans want us to do. Our starting point will be, what do we think about it? What course of action best accords with the fundamental principles of our foreign policy? In calling off the 1973 Springbok tour, Kirk aligned New Zealand with the progressive side of the race issue on the global level. Both domestically and internationally that action became the seminal moment for measuring New Zealand's standing on racism at any time since the Second World War. Before Kirk was prime minister, Walter Nash had failed abysmally to lead on the issue in 1959–60. Keith Holyoake had held back, making limited manoeuvres during the 1960s then shaming us internationally with our 1966 UN Security Council vote that gave comfort to the breakaway regime in Rhodesia while alienating the Africans and many other governments. Kirk drew a line in the sand, which was widely acknowledged internationally.

Pertinent comparison
A comparison of Kirk with his Australian counterpart, Gough Whitlam, is pertinent. He outshone Whitlam when they both sought support among Commonwealth leaders for opposition to France's nuclear testing at Moruroa and when assisting the African leaders, led by Julius Nyerere, to gain a strong statement against racism at the 1973 Chogm in Ottawa. Lee Kuan Yew writes that during the meeting Kirk was already an 'old friend' and that Kirk, rather than Whitlam, 'emerged as the voice of the South Pacific supported by Western Samoa, Tonga and Fiji'.

This pair, though driven by intense personal rivalry, cooperated constructively for their jointly inspired international goals in a way not seen since by subsequent pairs of Australasian prime ministers. Their rivalry lacked the destructiveness that was evident between Muldoon and Malcolm Fraser and, even more so, between Bob Hawke and Lange.

The difference in their backgrounds was stark — Kirk had left school at twelve, Whitlam was born into Australia's elite and had a mega-education and substantial legal career before becoming a parliamentarian. They developed parallel universes on the opposition to French nuclear testing, where each was at the forefront in his own initiative (frigates to Moruroa and the case at the International Court of Justice in The Hague respectively) and also on the Springboks. Whitlam banned them outright from Australia while Kirk proceeded more softly with a 'conditional postponement'. Kirk then handled the racism issue more forthrightly at the Chogm.

After his long Asian trip in December 1973/January 1974 that so affected his health Kirk had three final high profile moments that tail off his diplomatic high. He chaired, in his capacity as foreign minister, the annual ANZUS Council meeting on 21–22 February; hosted Julius Nyerere for several days in mid-March; and attended that year's South Pacific Forum in Rarotonga in late March. His weakening health then ended his engagement with global matters. International travel was no longer possible — even so, he kept in his diary a scheduled re-appearance at the United Nations in September. He failed to make it to a Socialist International leaders' gathering that Harold Wilson called soon after his re-election as prime minister in February 1974 — Kirk never visited Europe while prime minister.

Enduring brand
That the Kirk brand is still vital and vibrant is a story-line I develop in my forthcoming book and which will be to the fore in the articles on Lange, Bolger and Clark to appear in this journal. Muldoon's reactionary posturing is well known. His determination to undermine the iconic components of Kirk's brand by encouraging sporting contacts with the white South Africans and having the United States Navy visit generated massive protests from those who stood by Kirk's brand. With Muldoon's political demise in 1984, Lange, with Helen Clark leading his support team, set about reinstating the brand. They succeeded. Lange warrants his high rating for the manner in which he accomplished this.


Kirk was inspirational to Clark — this article’s epigram captures her regard. She has carried the torch for his brand, particularly on nuclear issues. In the mid-1980s, Clark was, even more then Lange, the most critical player in the fourth Labour government for cementing in the legislative basis to the non-nuclear posture and for hardening the resolve of a substantial bloc of middle-class women who held out on National in 1990 until the party U-turned on the non-nuclear issue; once it did then National was assured of a comfortable election win later that year. When Clark was prime minister in March 2003 she made an outstanding reiteration of the Kirk brand — not to join the coalition of the willing intent on a military intervention in Iraq; instead she sided with Canada, Chile, Mexico and others to argue that without the second United Nations’ resolution the military intervention was not on.

Life story
After finishing school at twelve, Kirk for the next eighteen years eked out a livelihood. When 30 he was elected Kaiapoi’s mayor. That was his first public move reflecting his determination to make a difference by becoming a political leader. Six years later when he became an MP he could now afford books and take international travel — the two ingredients which had become so important nearly two decades later when he began to project a maturing national identity as he stepped onto the international stage.

Through the 1960s and early 1970s Kirk built up his intellectual capital. He had an enormous intellect to absorb so much. What became significant for New Zealand was that he gave freshness to the query ‘who are we’. This national identity question
was swirling around the country’s modest intelligentsia — the two leading historians, Keith Sinclair and Bill Oliver, had stimulated the thinking with the publication of their respective histories of New Zealand. John Beaglehole and Fred Wood were in their prime. Michael King and James Belich have described how the national identity theme bubbled through the 1960s. It was not a debate, as those engaged were of one mind in wanting our own independent character as New Zealanders.

In this environment, Kirk, in his own way, evolved his thinking, accumulating insights from his reading and travels. He was a self-contained personality, yet absorbed what was occurring in the chatter about national identity. Kirk was comfortable mingling with the anti-nuclear and anti-apartheid protestors as their views broadly coincided with his. He was a politician par excellence in reading the mood. Consequently, once he was prime minister his engaging the public in what he sought to accomplish became a hallmark of his style.

As an MP he, at last, could afford to buy books (‘his patient friends’) rather than borrow them from libraries. (His favoured books were autobiographies, biographies, world affairs, history and philosophy.) Kirk began to travel beyond New Zealand: in the early 1960s he went overseas as a member of parliamentary delegations to Asia. When, in late 1965, he became the Labour leader his travel broadened and became more frequent. As the Opposition leader, Kirk received multiple travel grants from the British and US governments.

### Socialist internationalism

Kirk began meeting other progressive social democrat leaders, particularly at Socialist International gatherings. The Socialist International was to be a fruitful finishing school for Kirk. He came to know Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, Harold Wilson, Indira Gandhi, Salvador Allende, and several Israeli Labour leaders, particularly Golda Meir. Conor Cruise O’Brien was in this field of intellect.

Weekly news magazines, such as *The Economist*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Far Eastern Economic Review* and the *Bulletin* (Sydney) were regulars in his briefcase before Kirk became prime minister.

It is less clear which Americans may have been the most central to Kirk developing his intellectual capital. They might be those who he may have read, or listened to on radio, such as the public intellectuals George Kennan and J.K. Galbraith; former Kennedy White House advisers, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr and Ted Sorenson; and media personalities, particularly the broadcaster Alistair Cooke (his weekly reports from America were heard in New Zealand by relayed BBC broadcasts), David Halberstam, and the *New York Times’* James Reston.

### Last thoughts

Long after Kirk died he was not forgotten by Julius Nyerere, Lee Kuan Yew and Nelson Mandela. We have Frank Corner, Gerald Hensley, Margaret Shields and Cath Tizard to thank for reporting the three leaders’ recollections of Kirk, and the brand of diplomacy he carried for us. Lee told Corner in 1999 that Kirk ‘was by far the most impressive New Zealand Prime Minister I have known. He was a heavyweight. He had “gravitas”’.

The inscription on Kirk’s gravestone in Wainui cemetery knows him finely: ‘Toe te kupu, toe te mana, toe te whenua’ (‘His words remain, his prestige continues, and his nation endures’).

### NOTES

12. Corner, p.146. Hensley commented on Television One’s *Agenda* programme on 7 October 2006 that ‘Lee Kuan Yew still talks about his meetings with Norman Kirk — that was the degree of the impression that he could make on his fellow Prime Ministers’. Margaret Shields recalls her 1992 encounter with Nyerere in her ‘Women in the Labour Party during the Kirk and Rowling Years’, in Clark, p.136. In her memoir *Cat Amongst the Pigeons: A Memoir* (Auckland, 2010), p.296, Cath Tizard mentions that when she was the governor-general she had hosted Nelson Mandela at Government House in November 1995. During their chatting, he had impressed with his insights on Kirk.
13. Corner, p.146.
The Colombo Chogm: a troubling outcome

W. David McIntyre comments on Chogm 2013, which, obscured by Sri Lankan distractions, was the most controversial since the days of apartheid.

Chogm 2013 in Colombo was a public relations disaster and a damaging setback for the Commonwealth. This was because media coverage of the run up to the meetings and the meetings themselves was almost exclusively dominated by debate about the aftermath of Sri Lanka’s 30-year civil war. Charges of human rights violations and war crimes had led to Sri Lanka’s withdrawal from being host in 2011. When the invitation was renewed there were numerous calls for countries and organisations to boycott the meetings in 2013, or for the venue to be changed again, not least because President Mahinda Rajapaksa as host becomes chair-in-office for the Commonwealth for the next two years.

In the event the Canadian prime minister adhered to his longstanding threat to boycott the meetings and the Indian and Mauritian prime ministers also absent themselves. Only 26 out of the Commonwealth’s 53 heads of government (sixteen prime ministers, nine presidents, and one ruling monarch) came to represent their countries. Three countries, Grenada, Kiribati, and Maldives, did not attend and Fiji is under suspension. Half of the delegations were led by vice-presidents or ministers. Media concentration on Sri Lankan controversies proved a huge distraction, which all but ruled-out attention to the rich multi-course fare that now fills Chogm Week.

Under normal circumstances it would have been entirely proper for Sri Lanka to play host. In the heyday of Empire Ceylon had been the premier Colonial Office posting and the scene of interesting constitutional experiments. Independent Ceylon was one of the three Asian Dominions that signed the London Declaration of 1949 that marked the start of the New Commonwealth. Sirimavo Bandaranaike was the first women prime minister in the world in 1960 and in 1972 led the country to become of the Republic of Sri Lanka. Members of the Tamil community had long held prominent roles in Sri Lankan public life, but after Bandaranaike introduced policies that favoured Sinhalese some young Tamil activists began to agitate for a secessionist state of Tamil Eelam in the north. Over the years the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam evolved into a guerrilla army that waged war with the government from the 1980s and was not defeated until 2009. They were responsible for the assassination of two heads of government and attempts on the lives of others. Intervention of an Indian peacekeeping force failed to suppress the movement. Attempts of regional devolution were unsuccessful and the final suppression of the Tigers by the Sri Lanka armed forces was accomplished with such force that there was a world-wide outcry about human rights violations against civilians caught up in the war zones.

Examination of these issues by the media was inevitable and necessary, but the matter was of such longstanding and so complex that a fair and balanced assessment would always be hard to achieve at the best of times. Coverage at the time of the Chogm could only be superficial and was largely propagandist. Yet it was this distraction that obliterated any adequate coverage of the 2013 Chogm.

Birds-eye view

It will be useful, therefore, to take a birds-eye view of the rich and various fare of Chogm Week. It was preceded by an All-island Inter-schools Arts Competition and a Commonwealth Festival in Colombo based on a Sri Lankan village and its handicrafts. In the week 10 to 17 November 2013 twelve distinct dimensions were associated with the Chogm:

- Youth Forum
- People’s Forum,
- Business Forum
- Pre-Chogm Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
- Ministerial Meeting on Small States
- C-Mag, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group
- the Chogm proper with opening ceremony and brief Executive Sessions
- Civil Society Round Table with foreign ministers
- Youth Dialogue session with heads of government
- the Retreat
- the Commonwealth Games Federation breakfast
- the Communiqué and concluding press conference.

Very little of this got reported but is available for the cognoscenti on the internet.

The 2013 Chogm Week in Sri Lanka was a disaster for the Commonwealth’s reputation and leaves its supporters fearing for its future. Over the last fifteen years the governmental Commonwealth has been declining in comparison with the growth of regional and global summits. The rise of the corporate and voluntary Commonwealths, with their Business, Youth, and People’s Forums, has widened participation and raised many hopes. Each of these Commonwealths performed effectively in Sri Lanka, but attracted almost no attention because of the controversy over the host country’s human rights record in the aftermath of the brutal termination of its 30-year civil war in 2009. That the distraction was allowed to happen causes real fears for the future of this unique association.
After four years of concentration on democracy and core values culminating with the signing of a Commonwealth Charter by the Queen on Commonwealth Day in March 2013, the emphasis has switched to development. Specifically the Commonwealth is preparing for the post-Millennium Development Goals era after 2015. The theme for the 2013 meetings was ‘Growth with Equity: Inclusive Development’.

Youth forum
Proceedings kicked off with the ninth Commonwealth Youth Forum, 10–14 November, in the Ruhuna Magampura Conference Hall, at Hambantota, the new port city in the far south built with Chinese money. There were reminders that 60 per cent of the Commonwealth population is under 30 years of age. Investment in youth is seen as central to sustainable and inclusive development with the hope that this will reap a ‘demographic dividend’. To give a more continuous voice to young people a Commonwealth Youth Council was elected that will visit member countries and draw up a Strategic Plan. Sri Lanka will also host a World Conference of Youth in May 2014. In their recommendations to heads of government the forum called for youth-specific indicators to be attached to all development goals and for a Commonwealth Youth Development Index to be used for measuring progress in these endeavours.

The Commonwealth People’s Forum also met from 10 to 14 November in the Chaaya Trans Hotel, Hikkaduwa, near Galle in the south-west of the island. With over 400 delegates it was one of the largest gatherings of civil society representatives and its Outcome Document, Civil Society Perspectives for a Commonwealth Post 2015 Development Agenda, was more succinct and focused than previous such documents and has claims to be singled out as the best paper to come out of Colombo. Probably stems from the re-launching of the Commonwealth Foundation in 2012 focusing on ‘participatory governance’ with the dual goal of enhancing civil society organisations’ collaboration with each other and with institutions of government in order for citizen voices to get included in decision-making processes. To monitor progress in this the Foundation has moved to results-based management. At the Hikkaduwa Forum the emphasis was on civil society participation in development processes and first priority was given to the pursuit of a ‘stand-alone goal’ of empowering girls and women ‘to achieve gender equality, prevent and eliminate violence against women; and integrate women’s empowerment into all relevant goals’. This outcome document was presented to foreign ministers in the Civil–Society–Ministers Roundtable on 14 November by the chairman of the foundation, former Governor-General Sir Anand Satyanand, and Vijay Krishnarayan, the executive secretary. To emphasise the import of the civil society document, it was read out to emphasise its opening line: ‘We the people of the Commonwealth...’

Business focus
The largest of the pre-Chogm events was, as usual, the Commonwealth Business Forum, 12–14 November, in the Cinnamon Gardens Hotel, Colombo. With over twenty corporate sponsors the forum could proceed on generous lines. A dozen heads of government and over 100 business leaders addressed the 1600 delegates from 95 countries including 100 from China. ‘Wealth creation and Social Development’ in the Commonwealth and particularly the area of the South Asian Association for Regional Development (SAARC) was the theme. Optimism was expressed that a long cycle of growth, possibly ‘a historic high’, was in the offing. Commending the Australian initiative of applying zero tariffs to developing countries, the forum called for the establishment of a Commonwealth Trade and Export Corporation. It restated the significance of small and medium enterprises in creating employment and growth. It reviewed the work of the Commonwealth Investment Promotion Agencies Network and outlined plans for an Energy Network. It reported that the ‘deal flow’ discussed at the forum would yield US$2 billion in new projects.
The pre-Chogm Foreign Ministers’ Meetings on 13 and 14 November handled the on-going work of the Commonwealth and its inter-governmental organisations — the Secretariat, the Fund for Technical Cooperation, the Foundation, the Youth Programme, and the Commonwealth of Learning. It received their reports and approved strategic plans and budgets. The Ministerial Meeting on Small States took place on 12 November and re-emphasised the special vulnerability of ‘Ocean States’. The meeting urged Australia to use its position as incoming president of the G-20 to advocate the needs of small states.

The other ministerial group, C-Mag that monitors violations of Commonwealth principles, met twice in Colombo. On 13 November it considered the report of the Commonwealth Observer Group for presidential elections in Maldives and also a report from the secretary-general’s special envoy, Sir Don McKinnon, but kept Maldives on its agenda because of delays in completing the election process. At a second meeting on 17 November it could note the inauguration of a new president after credible elections and decided to remove Maldives from the agenda. This meeting also elected Murray McCully as vice-chair of the group.

Main gathering

The Chogm proper was held over the weekend 15–17 November in the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall, Colombo, another China-subsidised project. At the opening ceremony, after the usual colourful dances, President Rajapaksa in welcoming heads of government was unrepentant in face of the waves of criticism of his country’s human rights record. He stressed they were stepping into a new era of ‘peace, stability and renewed economic opportunities’ after three decades of the menace of terrorism. ‘In ending terrorism in 2009, we asserted the greatest human right, the right to life’. The out-going chair-in-office, Tony Abbott of Australia, said ‘The Commonwealth is not a community of power, wealth, geography, religion or language, so much as a community of values’ and he hoped that their discussions would ‘foster all our best instincts’.

The concluding speaker was Prince Charles, who had been deputed by the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth to represent her in view of her decision to reduce taxing overseas travel. In its way this was a major innovation. The Queen has always taken a special interest in the Commonwealth and is the person with the longest experience of its evolution, having been in attendance at all the meetings since 1953 except the Lagos meetings on Rhodesia in January 1966 and the first actual Chogm in 1971 when, against her inclinations, she was formally advised by Prime Minister Heath, prompted by the FCO, that the risks of attending outweighed the advantages. Prince Charles’s previous experience of Chogsms had been confined to Edinburgh in 1997, when he sat on the podium with the Queen when she took part and spoke at these meetings for the first time, and Kampala in 2007, when he did not attend the opening ceremony, but was very much in evidence during Chogm Week and actually took part in the Civil Society Ministerial Roundtable. Both President Rajapaksa and Secretary-General Karimnesh Sharma referred to the prince’s involvement with Sri Lanka through his charitable endeavours and Charles referred to his previous visit in the wake of the 2005 tsunami. In a modest speech the prince looked back on this visit, stressed the Queen’s deep affection for the Commonwealth and ‘the special importance she has attached to it throughout her reign’, and went on to say that ‘those very sentiments have been an ever-present cornerstone in my own life also’.

Important element

The most important element of the Chogm is now the Retreat. These began as a time for relaxing personal contact confined to heads of government and spouses, without officials, a time apart during the days of week-long Chogms. But now that heads of government give only two-and-a-half days to the meetings the Retreat has become the centrepiece where the serious business is taken. But this has meant the admission of officials and ministers, which detracts from their value as a place where heads of government can make relaxed personal contacts.

The Retreat was held close to Colombo at the Water’s Edge Country Club in the suburb of Kotte. In their concentration on development the meeting noted that there was rising inequality both within member nations and between nations and that in
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striving for growth they must aim for ‘equity and inclusivity’. In the Colombo Declaration of Sustainable, Inclusive and Equitable Development the critical element was put as creating productive employment opportunities and making improvements in employability. It was accepted that, while some of the Millennium Development Goals had been reached, ‘certain targets remain off track’. To ensure that the Commonwealth is properly represented in international planning for a Post-2015 Development Agenda the secretary-general is charged with constituting an ‘open-ended High Level Working Group of Heads’ to produce a Commonwealth Statement on the new development agenda.

No consensus

Consensus was not possible, however, on the issue of climate change. The Commonwealth Expert Group on Climate Finance had recommended the creation of a Green Climate Fund to assist vulnerable island states and the least developed African states. While the majority, including John Key, endorsed this proposal, Canada and Australia withheld support.

The human rights issue, which dominated media coverage of the Chogm and involved numerous bilateral discussions between Commonwealth leaders, including John Key, and the president of Sri Lanka did not figure in the agenda. However, the Communiqué did reaffirm, in one long sentence, the people of the Commonwealth’s commitment to the core values of ‘democracy; human rights; international peace and security; tolerance, respect and understanding; freedom of expression; separation of powers; rule of law; good governance; sustainable development; protecting the environment; access to health, education, food and shelter; gender equality; young people; the needs of small and vulnerable states; and the role of civil society’. Clamour to discuss human rights at the final press conference was firmly rebuffed by President Rajapaksa.

The next Chogm was to have been held in Mauritius, but in view of Prime Minister Ramgoolam’s boycott of the meetings he was not present to renew the invitation and Malta has stepped in to be host in 2015. This could also be seen as Malta’s bid to provide the next secretary-general. Offers to be host in 2017 by Vanuatu and 2019 by Malaysia were also accepted.

Troubling outlook

In spite of the wealth of activity just described, the import of the Colombo experience gives cause for great anxiety. Facing the dilemma presented by the calls for boycott or change of venue, only three heads of government decided to make a stand, but another 23 stayed away and some departed before the end. The editorial board of the Commonwealth’s premier journal, The Round Table, included members who advocated boycott, so it was decided to send people to report Chogm Week but not to hold the customary seminar at the venue. This was partly because the three venues, Colombo, Hambantota, and Hikkaduwa, were hundreds of miles apart. At The Round Table’s post-Chogm Conference in Cambridge in January 2014, members were treated to a forthright cry from Guyana-born Sir Ronald Sanders, former Antiguan diplomat now fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London, who had been rapporteur of the Eminent Persons Group that produced the first draft of the Charter that went before the 2011 Chogm and was finally signed by the Queen in March 2013. Under the title ‘Can Malta rescue the Commonwealth?’ his devastating commentary on Colombo was:

All but those in denial admit that the Commonwealth is now a wounded organisation. It is facing questions related not only to its meaning but also its existence. Over the next two years, the Commonwealth can mark time sleepwalking into irrelevance or it can make use of the present existential threat to prepare the ground of a substantial and meaningful re-launch... in Malta.

Preparations for such a re-launch and for nominations for the next secretary-general should clearly begin right away.
Diplomatic postings: the case for non-professional appointees

John Collinge argues that non-career diplomats can be effective representatives and can co-exist with their career counterparts.

The hostility of career diplomats to political appointees in key capitals is both understandable and well known. Perhaps not so well known or publicised are the reasons for such appointments.

In New Zealand, non-career diplomatic appointments are generally made only to the key postings of London, Washington and Canberra, except in special circumstances or to accumulate diplomatic capital, such as the appointment of Sir Edmund Hillary as high commissioner to India.

To take London as an example, there are more than 50 Commonwealth countries competing for attention and more than 200 countries in total. Because of this, it is necessary for some form of order. There, politicians tend to speak to politicians, first secretaries to first secretaries, second to second, and so on. This is not rudeness — it is simply, of necessity, to ensure efficiency.

Of course, there is no hard and fast rule, but this divide operates quite comprehensively in practice. In London, I heard many complaints from second and third secretaries as to this ‘barrier’. They were endeavouring to do their job well, but felt frustrated at the limitation.

As a result, political appointees become particularly involved when there are issues of broad policy. During my time there as high commissioner, issues of policy which cropped up included the anti-nuclear stance of New Zealand, whereas Britain and France (for defence reasons) were strongly committed to a nuclear deterrent. This was settled, after some debate and in spite of the UK media pressing the issue, as ‘a disagreement between friends’, in the words of Prime Minister John Major.

Then there was the BSE (mad cow disease) scare in Britain in relation to beef in particular, and the issue of New Zealand’s role in relation thereto. Should New Zealand take advantage, or should it retain its comity with Britain by continuing as a supplier in the British off season — a marketing accord with the local community? The latter view eventually prevailed.

Then there were protectionist moves by continental Europe, which had the effect of border restrictions in Britain on New Zealand produce, particularly in relation to dairy products, which needed both political and legal input to resolve.

Complementary efforts

None of the politicking in relation to such issues need interfere with the normal functions of a career diplomat in dealing with their counterparts on the same issues — the two efforts are complementary at different levels and fit nicely with each other, thereby maximising effectiveness of effort.

Then there are issues which might be described as those of image. For example, the republican debate of the time was described in British papers as ‘anti-British’ — something that needed rebuttal. Local activists (and probably those with a commercial interest) criticised New Zealand’s animal husbandry practices — that also needed explanation. Political appointees are usually better equipped to deal with the media, who usually require an instant response. Necessary public responses are an important role in Britain where the media, such as the BBC World Service, are influential in the world.

In addition to the policy and media roles, the function of high commissioner is representational, that is, attendance at functions representing New Zealand as a matter of presence. Obviously, the appointment of a high-ranking person with a public persona can be and is viewed as a compliment to the host country.

The number of functions which a high commissioner attends in a representative capacity depend upon the person, but in the
United Kingdom there are so many opportunities and obligations that it is not uncommon to have breakfast, lunch and dinner engagements in a single day in between the normal work role. There is more potential work across the length and breadth of Britain to very different audiences across a wide range of fields than any one person can reasonably handle.

**Representational role**

Another function is participating in various organisations as New Zealand representative, for example, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, the Imperial War Museum, the British New Zealand Business Association and Trade Council, the Royal Life-saving Society and the New Zealand Wine Council, to name a few. These also tend to be roles of an overview and policy kind.

A commercial background also assists. The importance of Britain to New Zealand needs little elaboration. London is, of course, a hub for New Zealand and is often the gateway into the EU countries. It is also a financial hub — and much of New Zealand financial and insurance interests are based there.

The usual line taken against non-career diplomats, by both Opposition politicians and career diplomats, is that appointments smack of cronyism. However, it is particularly important that a government has comfort in that there is someone who can promote and be sympathetic with and articulate its position — often on the spot and usually by way of instant response. It is not usually a case of obtaining authority to speak or to ascertain the policy.

The second criticism commonly voiced is the implication that non-career diplomats have not the experience for the task, whereas career diplomats are steeped in diplomacy and have experience in international affairs. However, the career diplomat is likely to have been a career civil servant. There is nothing wrong with that, but the non-career diplomat will invariably have had a life outside politics and administration, a breadth of experience and wider background which will serve him or her in good stead in the representational and other roles. The work of a high commissioner also relates to the private sector — assisting the promotion of New Zealand products there.

**Qualification issue**

The third criticism is in relation to personal qualifications, such as academic background and experience. This will often be personal to the appointee, but in my view it would be difficult to argue that George Gair, Russell Marshall, Jonathan Hunt and Paul East had inferior credentials. In my case, I had a post-graduate degree from Oxford University, I had worked in the United Kingdom as a university lecturer and, importantly, I had played cricket for the university in the county competition. The English tend to treat cricket in the same way New Zealanders treat rugby — with a passion beyond its importance.

As a result of this background, I already knew or was known to or had a direct association with many people in power — by way of example only, this included the secretary for foreign affairs and Commonwealth and the deputy secretary, and the secretary to the British Cabinet — and John Major is well-known as a cricket nut. By total coincidence, the world expert on BSE or mad cow disease was Professor John Collinge of London University — our families derived from the same small hamlet of Crompton in Lancashire in the mid-1800s. It is helpful for a high commissioner to have had a good working knowledge of

High Commissioner Sir Lockwood Smith outside his London residence

British and, of course, to be an Anglophile and be ‘plugged in’ to that community.

Possibly a fourth criticism is that non-career diplomats to London seem to attract adverse publicity. That is partly because they are subject to political attack, but also attack by career diplomats. A chapter headed ‘Conduct Unbecoming’ in the book *Diplomatic Ladies* by Joanna Woods (the wife of a New Zealand senior career diplomat) is one example. She said that ‘The general public saw no distinction between political appointees and career diplomats as... New Zealand and its diplomatic service became the laughing stock of London.’ Facing legal challenge, she subsequently unreservedly apologised for these and other remarks, the book was withdrawn from bookshops and libraries and unsold copies pulped, and the chapter in question omitted from the republished version. Hopefully, that will be the end of such efforts.

**Ideal choice**

So far the current high commissioner to London, Sir Lockwood Smith, has escaped uncathed. That is because none of the above lines of attack apply (his comment to the Vintners Guild on the difficulty of obtaining New Zealand chardonnay was, in fact, in the context of his promoting the distribution of New Zealand wine). He is an ideal choice for high commissioner — of high academic background and well versed in politics and policy-making over a long period. Importantly, he was a former minister of trade and the fact that he is also a farmer with an eye for prime beef will not be amiss in rural Britain.

I feel sure, too, that he will receive full co-operation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in a professional way. I also record, to the credit of MFAT, that I received every co-operation during my time there. In this I pay tribute to the then secretary, Richard Nottage. (Of course, this may also have been facilitated by the fact that I had, again coincidentally, been best man at his wedding, and he best man at mine.)

Perhaps the Americans understand the importance and significance of non-career diplomats better than we do. But all of this is no reflection upon the role of career diplomats. The two can and do co-exist in a positive way — and their collaboration adds value to the post.
Following the 1953 armistice in Korea, New Zealand recognised the need for peaceful dialogue to reduce the danger of renewed hostilities. However, dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) was difficult. North Korea's obstinacy was criticised at armistice commission meetings at the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ); in 1958 it reportedly refused to 'negotiate even the most innocuous subjects on any terms other than their own'. By 1973 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that it had urged Pyongyang to 'adopt better and less provocative behaviour (as we have been doing before playing our one card, recognition) for over 20 years'. Unofficial contacts could also be controversial, as illustrated by the July–August 1978 visit of a North Korean delegation to New Zealand, which included discussions on a fuel (coke) deal. Diplomatic relations were only established in 2001.

David Taylor (ambassador to Korea 2002–06 and director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Asia Division 2006–08) presented his credentials in Pyongyang in September 2002. Taylor made three visits in 2002 — two were Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) site visits — and travelled once a year from 2003 to 2005. The initial visits aimed to build relationships. Pyongyang welcomed food aid and greater contact, and unsuccessfully sought establishment of an embassy in North Korea and funding for visits to New Zealand. It also sought investment in agriculture, aquaculture and forestry. The North Koreans suggested the possibility of exporting handicrafts, clothing, Korean liquor and medicines to New Zealand, but little demand was seen for such products, and doubts existed over the means of transporting them.

Generally positive but uninformed views of New Zealand existed in Pyongyang. Its foreign policy was viewed as independent because of the anti-nuclear stance. North Korea did not ‘press’ the issue of the country's role in the Korean War. During one visit Taylor received positive information on the Japanese hostages issue which relates to North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s. A North Korean official laughingly noted that although Taylor was the first foreign diplomat to be told this information, he could not share it because of communication restrictions. As tension increased on the Korean peninsula, dialogue focused on security issues, such as nuclear developments.

Encouraging a peaceful approach was challenging, not least because the North Koreans were very suspicious and defensive. Visitors would be invited to speak, typically for about 30 minutes.
A ‘very formulaic’ response would follow, sometimes consisting of just a read statement. Occasionally dinners facilitated more ‘free flowing’ talk. Visits were ‘carefully managed’, and delegations could only see those the regime trusted. Requests to talk to the military were declined, and the delegation’s itinerary was often ‘not known till the last minute’. Once the schedule was in place it was generally followed. Pyongyang required that foreign diplomats use its translators. Finding that the tone of their position was inaccurately conveyed, New Zealand diplomats successfully asked to use their own translators — one of the first countries to achieve this. Furthermore, it was difficult to establish the facts around sensitive issues when officials Taylor met spoke in rhetorical terms, and were defensive about their position. On the nuclear issue, for example, they responded to questions by referring to ‘defensive purposes’ and ‘US threats’. It was difficult to shift a conversation to broader questions and interests. North Korean officials were required to maintain the party line.

**Ministerial visit**

Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters visited the North from 14 to 17 November 2007 — the first, and so far only, visit by a New Zealand minister of foreign affairs, and the first by a Western minister in the aftermath of North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test. The Six-Party member countries supported the visit. Peters had accepted his counterpart Pak Vi Chun’s invitation to visit while in Manila for the July 2007 ASEAN Regional Forum and associated meetings. He was accompanied by a six-person delegation that included Taylor and Jane Coombs (ambassador 2006–09) along with media.

MFAT viewed the opportunity as an ‘important contribution to the international process to denuclearise the DPRK and encourage the normalisation of its relationships with the rest of the world.’ The first objective was to encourage North Korea to meet its Six-Party Talks commitments within a reasonable timeframe and normalise relations with the international community. The other objectives were to: explore opportunities to develop the bilateral relationship if the talks made significant progress and investigate options for providing development assistance.

Before leaving for Pyongyang, MFAT warned Peters of the challenges involved in meeting North Koreans. He was enjoined to remember that they had their ‘own unique style of engagement’, involving ‘lengthy presentations’ on issues of concern rather than ‘give/take dialogue’. Such presentations would typically be aimed at ‘convincing you that the US and Japan are to blame for many of DPRK’s ills, starting with the US’s alleged “invasion” of the peninsula to use one outside the city. Peters met the minister of foreign affairs, president of the Presidium, agriculture and acting trade ministers along with the acting chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. In his various meetings, he encouraged the North Koreans to abandon their nuclear programme, and to seek stability and prosperity. For its part, New Zealand, he told them, welcomed progress in the Six-Party Talks, and was willing to develop bilateral relations if this continued. Capacity-building and training were identified as the likely focus for future development, along with possible scholarships.

The North Koreans identified livestock and grass seeds as especially important, and appreciated the possibility of scholarships, especially in scientific and IT fields. Conscious that these areas came ‘uncomfortably close’ to dual-use technology covered by UN sanctions, the New Zealanders ‘steered’ the scholarship discussions towards less problematic subjects, such as agriculture. They found that North Korean officials espoused a ‘much more positive’ view of relations with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) than previously, raising the possibility that the North was ‘on the cusp of change, albeit slow change’. North Korean officials thanked New Zealand for its humanitarian aid, and spoke warmly of the New Zealand–DPRK Society. However, they displayed little comprehension of the need for greater transparency in facilitating increased economic engagement. They also ‘scolded’ New Zealand for supporting a UN human rights resolution, and accused it of a ‘lack of understanding’.

Ultimately the delegation viewed the visit as ‘historic... in terms of the as yet undeveloped New Zealand–DPRK relationship’, and an ‘important opportunity’ to provide ‘tangible support’ for the Six-Party Talks. In Wellington officials felt that it had demonstrated New Zealand’s willingness ‘to step forward and play its part to encourage peace and prosperity’ on the peninsula and in the region. Indeed, New Zealand could be confident that ‘it has done what it can to help at what is a critical moment in the road to denuclearisation’. While the Six-Party Talks were the ‘key catalyst’ for change, there was ‘clearly a place for others, like New Zealand, who as the Minister put it, comes from a position of principle, to make a contribution’. According to Coombs, the visit helped shine a little light on ‘a very little understood and deeply troubled and troubling country’. In her opinion, Peters handled the visit ‘very well’, and provided a clear message to Pyongyang regarding New Zealand’s position on human rights and nuclear testing.
Recent visits
Coombs went to North Korea twice during both 2006 and 2007, and once in 2008. She found that foreigners were welcomed with warmth and courtesy, despite their visits being ‘very controlled’. On arriving for one visit, she was taken to the North Korean government guesthouse and hosted to a ‘very generous and welcoming’ twelve-course dinner. Visits to model farms, factories and hospitals were ‘hugely revealing’, as even these were under-developed. Staff also sometimes spoke openly. For instance, despite the presence of a ‘minder’, hospital staff talked about serious health issues, such as malnourishment. Because of the formal and lengthy nature of dialogues, identifying nuances and tracking changes demanded careful attention. Care was needed in responding, since everything said was conveyed to higher officials.

Richard Mann (ambassador 2009–12) visited in 2009 and 2011. During the former the North Koreans ‘quite strongly deplored’ a protest he made against missile testing. A proposed 2010 visit was deemed ‘inappropriate’ in the wake of North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. Indeed, the latter prompted a review of the Seoul embassy’s crisis contingency plan. During Mann’s 2011 visit, the North Koreans not only denied responsibility for the sinking but also maintained that the bombardment had occurred only after South Korea had ignored demands to stop live firing in the area.

As with his predecessors, Mann encountered challenges. Diplomats could not directly contact the North via phone or email, and visits were made through China. Officials always monitored and escorted foreign visitors, the programme was only received on arrival, and visiting diplomats had no freedom of movement. Nor could cell phones be used. Mann found that officials, while ‘quite open’ and engaging seriously, could be ‘quite blunt’. In stating their desire for friendship based on respect of their country’s sovereignty and non-interference, they alternated between being ‘quite friendly and open’ and ‘strongly stating their position’. In discussions on the North’s nuclear programme, which Pyongyang sought to justify, Mann expressed New Zealand’s ‘fundamental principle’ of opposing nuclear proliferation, its nuclear free position and support for regional security. Wellington, he noted, ‘strongly supported’ the Six-Party Talks, progress on which was stalled by North Korea’s walk out. Mann urged Pyongyang to resume the talks.

Future diplomacy
Wellington’s influence and resources are limited, but it has a strong interest in a peaceful Korean peninsula. Constructive dialogue is vital. Apart from regarding New Zealand as non-threatening and generally neutral, North Korean diplomats are aware of similarities between the two countries, such as their location. New Zealand’s expertise, especially in agriculture, is valued. Other types of assistance could be considered with better relations. For example, capacity-building and technical training might reinforce incentives for Pyongyang to act constructively. Coombs believes that dialogue helps internationalise peninsula issues. It demonstrates to Pyongyang that issues have global and regional repercussions, and that all countries have legitimate concerns.

According to Taylor, New Zealand is part of the ‘choir’ encouraging the North Korea to follow a more ‘engaged and constructive track’. In recent years Myanmar has shown ‘courage and leadership’ in making positive changes that have encouraged better relations. A similar ‘real commitment’ by Pyongyang would be a major step towards reducing tensions in the region.
Yoichiro Sato comments on the problems confronting Tonga in seeking to exploit its EEZ resources.

For Pacific Islands nations, seabed mineral resources offer growing potential for boosting their economic development. The vast exclusive economic zones (EEZs) they hold are host to various mineral resources that are as yet untapped. Furthermore, the seabed of international waters in the Pacific has been opened to international mining consortia under the management of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) of the UN Law of the Sea Commission. While most participants are from the developed countries with a large capital endowment and advanced technology, Pacific countries like Nauru and Tonga have partnered with an international investor to join mining in the international seabed.

In EEZ mining, the national government holds authority both in licensing prospecting the area for mining resources and overseeing their extraction. In addition to setting the price of the license fees, it has another important responsibility in ensuring that subsequent operations are environmentally sound.

Despite Tonga’s ‘democratic transition’ after the Nuku’alofa riot of 2006, the royal family continues to dominate its politics. The absence of transparent law governing the deep-sea mining and the Tongan government’s decision to sign international joint exploration and production agreements have set the stage for the partial privatisation of national resources without a fair return to the general government coffers. The Tongan government’s involvement in seabed mining in international waters exposes it to the risk of losses and liabilities that will have to be shouldered by the taxpayers. For the poorly developed governance competency of Tonga, seabed mining simultaneously offers too much economic lure and demands too much supervisory responsibility.

Hydrothermal vents
Deep water within the Tongan EEZ is host to numerous hydrothermal vents known as ‘black smokers’ on the seabed, which produce polymetallic sulphide deposits containing various metals, such as copper, lead, zinc and gold. By March 2008, the Tongan government had granted a 15-year exploration license to Nautilus Minerals, a Canada-based firm active in deep-sea mining throughout the Pacific, for an 80-square-kilometre area off Nuku’alofa known as the Lau Basin. Nautilus organised its first exploration voyage in September 2008. The Tongan government also awarded the Korean government a similar exploration license in March 2008, and three exploration voyages were carried out in the following month. The project attracted US$13.8 million in investment from five ‘local’ companies. The Korean exploration continued until the end of 2012.

The Tongan government is also involved in Nautilus’ deep-sea mining outside the Tongan EEZ. In 2008 it sponsored the application by Tonga Offshore Mining — a subsidiary of Nautilus Minerals — to explore the Clarion Clipperton Zone in the Central Pacific midway between Hawaii and Mexico governed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA). In 2009, concerned by the question of responsibility and liability of the sponsoring states, the government asked for postponement of consideration of its application but was persuaded to proceed. Developed countries and their business sectors are critical of the ISA legal opinion that places too much responsibility and liability on the precautionary principle. However, the image of a restrictive US government constraining the exploratory activities of US firms is not at all applicable to the Tongan case, where the sponsoring government totally lacks enforcement capabilities to fulfil its supervisory and regulatory responsibilities in a remote area. The exploration right was granted in July 2011, and the agreement between the ISA and Tonga Offshore Mining was signed in January 2012. The Tongan government signed an agreement with Tonga Offshore Mining for the initial fifteen years for a royalty to the Tongan government of US$1.25 per dry ton for the first 3 million dry tons of nodules.
mined per year, and US$0.75 per dry ton for all subsequent tons mined thereafter in that same year. Nautilus has signed a similar agreement with Nauru Ocean Resources Incorporated with sponsorship of the Nauru government to explore seabed mineral resources in separate ISA governed blocs. While the Tongan-sponsored bloc has announced good resource prospects, the Nauru-sponsored blocs have not. Meanwhile, Nautilus has tied the Tongan project to Nauru’s through an arrangement swapping interests in the two subsidiaries. It now controls 100 per cent of the Tongan project and Tonga is allowed to hold 50 per cent of the Nauru project.

Poor governance

While seabed mining of the Tongan EEZ seems promising, the lure of a quick profit in the poorly governed regulatory environment invites shady figures. An investor group, comprising mysterious firms allegedly based in Denver and London and centred on a Russian individual, signed agreements with the Tongan government on hydrocarbons exploration and mining and established three Tonga-registered subsidiaries. Princess Royal Pilolevu Tuita owns 20 per cent shares in each of the three subsidiary firms, and the three firms were given exploration rights for eleven years and production rights for 35 years in the event of discovery of minerals in the ‘37,000 square kilometers of marine scheduled lands’. The area amounts to 5.5 per cent of the Tongan EEZ, and international investment of US$20–40 million is sought for the initial exploration, which will start in 2014. Tonga’s ‘new business models and practices’ to bring US$20–40 million is sought for the initial exploration, which will start in 2014.

Tonga’s experience with international negotiations and legal training concerning deep-sea mining has been addressed by collaboration of international and regional organisations like the European Union and the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SOPAC). However, critics are skeptical about acculturation of the Tongan elite through these workshops. Tonga’s ‘Strategic Development Framework, 2011–2014, states:

The opportunities for oil exploration and seabed mining remain in the future, however, government recognises the potential contribution these could make to the future development of the Kingdom. Government also recognises that there are many lessons to be learned from other countries where oil and mineral wealth has greatly disrupted political reform and social solidarity. Government will review the need for new legislation to ensure that exploration and any future mining or extraction of resources will generate a significant benefit to the Kingdom. This legislation will include measures to ensure royalties and other charges are received by Government and to protect the economy and political system from any possible economic disruption and potential corruption that might eventuate from a failure to effectively manage mineral wealth. Tonga issued three exploration licenses in its EEZ in 2008 with a national law on seabed minerals mining. Legislation was scheduled for August 2013, but had not been completed as of mid-September 2013.

Patrol boats

Lack of physical enforcement capability is another concern. Tonga’s only patrol boats that are capable of offshore water conditions are the navy’s three Pacific patrol boats. Donated by Australia, these boats are primarily used for fishery and search and rescue patrols, for the Australian conditions for fuel subsidies are restricted to these operations. The Tongan government currently has no mechanism to ensure that part of the licensing revenue from seabed mining will be set aside for the patrolling costs.

The seabed mining potential of Tonga is high, and so is the risk of its abuse. The poor domestic governance of Tonga has so far proven to be incapable of properly managing the licensing of prospecting and mining the seabed resources within the country’s EEZ. Furthermore, the government’s sponsoring of a deep-sea mining operation in international waters by an international firm has exposed the country to environmental liability and expanded financial risks that it has no way of controlling through proper supervision. It is to be hoped that the country takes advantage of its seabed mining resources incrementally to keep pace with the building of its own supervisory capability and refrains from taking large risks in international waters, where its supervision cannot reach.

NOTES

3. Ibid.
7. ‘Denver firm optimistic…’, op cit.
8. Ibid.
Peter Kennedy reports on a recent NZIIA symposium.

On 13 November Victoria University’s Centre for Strategic Studies and the NZIIA combined to host the Asia–Pacific Integration Symposium. This all day symposium was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the New Zealand Defence Force, the Ministry of Defence and the Asia New Zealand Foundation and looked at the dramatic reshaping of the international economic order against the process of strategic rebalancing occurring in the Asia region. It asked the question: are these two processes compatible, complementary, or on a collision course?

In his introductory comments Sir Douglas Kidd, president, NZIIA, suggested that the government could perform better in informing New Zealanders about developments like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He turned then to John Hayes, chair of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Select Committee, to give the opening address. Hayes commented that New Zealanders liked to think of themselves as integrated players in the region. We were, however, slower than Australia at reaching this point. Whilst the centre of global economic gravity has shifted to China, the security situation in the region has become more complex also. New Zealand has done a good job of establishing economic linkages and we fully support ASEAN’s target of building an ASEAN Political–Security Community by 2015. But we have not done sufficient parallel thinking around the Pacific.

The first session, on ‘New Zealand’s Regional Engagement: where is it at?’ — under the chair of Chris Seed — began with Professor Robert Patman suggesting there were two camps of thought about the emergence of China as the number two power in the world. The first is that US/China economic integration makes the prospect of war ‘most unlikely’. And the second is that declining power of the United States will disturb the trend toward integration and make war almost certain. He disagreed with the second. New Zealand’s challenge was to remain ‘resolute and nimble’ as it came under pressure to side with one or other partner.

Terence O’Brien followed by asserting that under a more hybrid international order a Western-democratic-English-speaking society was not necessary. We needed to resist viewing Asian relationships through a US lens and forge a separate relationship. Stuart McMillan agreed that New Zealand will have to adapt, but the speed and nature of that adaption were not yet clear. We need to cease looking at the US–China relationship through a rivalry telescope and consider an integration process more along the lines of that which removed the threat of conflict in Europe.

In a provocative question from the floor, Sheryl Boxall asked if the ‘age, gender, and “Cold War” thinking’ of the panel was possibly framing the context for discussions. She suggested moving away from the politics of power and coming up with more creative and innovative ideas.

In Session Two, chaired by Fran O’Sullivan, the panel considered whether or not the different strands of regional economic integration were all headed in the same direction. Opening the debate, John Ballingal noted that many international agreements are moving from bilateral to ‘mega-agreements’ in a regional context, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Phil O’Reilly added that ASEAN is starting to think like a trade group: it is not only talking about tariffs but more about the movement of skills, labour and knowledge. Stephen Jacobi emphasised that APEC is central to regional economic co-ordination and is the ‘glue’ that holds many of these agreements together.

The third session, under Dr Andrew Butcher, moved on to regional security integration, with Dr Jim Rolfe emphasising that trust reduces conflict but unsure if we are in a phase of ‘building community’ or whether this is an ‘inter-war lull’. The process of moving to a security community was still in motion. The symposium’s guest speaker from Singapore, Dr Tan See Seng, commented that there was a bit of an excess of institutional architecture in the region, but having a lot of overlap of functions in the region was good for building long-term diplomacy and trust. He made the interesting point that when there are disputes in the region, there is a preference toward these being settled by global bodies, rather than by regional bodies.

The final session, chaired by Sir Maarten Wevers, faced the difficult question: are patterns of economic and security integration converging or diverging? Wevers noted that things are coming together quite well in the Asian region, but it was a continuing process. Dr David Capie suggested existing patterns are neither converging nor diverging. ASEAN had done a good job of raising a sense of community but efforts at formal security building in the region have made only modest gains. ‘History is never tidy’. Dr Brian Easton referred to the successful economic integration of the European Union but said that it was unlikely that the Asia–Pacific region would integrate to that degree.

In his round-up Brian Lynch concluded that the two processes are generally compatible and complementary, and not on a collision course.
Without passion: New Zealand’s very Cold War

Roberto Rabel reviews a recent NZIIA book on New Zealand involvement in the confrontation that dominated international politics in the second half of the 20th century.

The Cold War was fundamentally an ideological confrontation. If once debatable, this assertion was validated emphatically by documentary evidence from former communist bloc archives.1 It was also underscored by the Cold War’s unexpectedly abrupt ending with such little violence — a few notable exceptions notwithstanding, such as the summary execution of the little mourned Nicolae Ceausescu, communist leader of Romania and self-styled ‘Genius of the Carpathians’. There was subsequent violence aplenty in the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession and in the struggles still simmering in parts of the former Soviet Union; but these conflicts have gravitated around ethno-national and religious issues rather than Cold War fracture lines.

An ideology collapsed, not states or nations per se. That is why the Soviet Union disintegrated but Russia endured and Germany was reintegrated. Similarly, Poland and other former Warsaw Pact members quickly became NATO members, while Czechoslovakia’s ‘velvet revolution’ was followed by a comparably ‘velvet’ split into two countries, both of which repudiated communism. Admittedly, one-time communists clung to power in parts of the former Soviet sphere of influence, but they were obliged to reinvent themselves and engage in considerable value-engineering of their policies. Nowhere has there been a credible attempt to reassert the superiority of ‘real existing socialism’ as an alternative system to capitalism. So definitive was its outcome that the Cold War now seems more remote and incomprehensible for young people around the globe than the world wars.

During the Cold War, however, international politics were dominated by competition between two contrasting visions of world order. In effect, Washington and Moscow served as corporate headquarters for competing ideological franchises locked in a 45-year struggle for greater market share. But the franchise-holders of the ‘Free World’ and the communist bloc were more diverse than General Motors or Lada dealerships. This was true on both sides of the ideological divide. In the end, relations proved intrinsically more brittle between Moscow and its satellites; but it did not always seem that way and the United States often encountered problems with its nominal franchise-holders, such as the Gaullist right in France.

Echoes of the Soviet-American confrontation reverberated locally and regionally in different ways. In Europe, the Cold War’s impact was more deep-seated in most respects than in the United States and defined national political cleavages in countries such as Italy and France for decades — as well as dividing a continent. In Latin America too, Cold War preoccupations were intertwined — sometimes fatally — with domestic politics, and the threat of communism was used to justify sundry repressive regimes of the right, while the opposite tack prevailed in Cuba, where one of the last creaky relics of the communist era remains in power. In Asia and Africa, the Cold War was entangled with decolonisation, especially in Vietnam, which proved disastrous for Washington’s successive ill-starred collaborators in Saigon, though not for their counterparts in Seoul, Singapore or Jakarta. In short, the Cold War was ideological in character, but the precise dynamics of that ideological contest were inflected locally.2

Instructive study

New Zealand’s experience offers an instructive case study of the interplay between global and national politics during the Cold War, illustrating how one nation pursued its own distinctive interests while responding to common challenges faced by smaller allies of the two super-powers. Notwithstanding some dissenting voices, the country
was in the Western camp throughout the Cold War. Its soldiers fought in several Cold War-related conflicts in Asia: Malaya/Malaysia, Korea and, most controversially, Vietnam. New Zealand was thus involved in some of the most violent manifestations of an ideological confrontation that saw almost no direct combat between the two major antagonists. But, amongst Western bloc countries, it was one of those which opposed communism with the least passion and intensity. The Cold War had few residing reverberations in domestic politics, which is one reason why its ending was noted in Wellington rather than celebrated with euphoric outpourings about the collapse of the Soviet Union’s ‘evil empire’.

Instead, New Zealand’s chattering classes, like their counterparts in much of Western Europe, frowned on President Ronald Reagan’s use of that term.

By the 1980s, in fact, New Zealand appeared to have adopted an approach to the Cold War veering toward ‘moral equivalency’, whereby the United States, the Soviet Union and China were regarded as having equally legitimate models of political, social and economic order, with some even assuming there would be convergence amongst them.1 Ironically, too, in the mid-1980s when New Zealand policy-makers appeared intent on outdoing their American counterparts in pursuing one of the world’s purest models of full-blooded, free market capitalism, they became locked in a dispute with the United States about nuclear ships which became a convenient badge of national identity. Rather than seeing red, for most New Zealanders, the Cold War had by then become a convenient badge of national identity. Rather than seeing

Policy alignment

Once committed to the anti-communist cause, New Zealand moved to align its national security policies accordingly. Three of the chapters in this collection cover aspects of this process. Stephen Clarke details the active role played by the Returned Servicemen’s Association (RSA) in helping win public endorsement for the re-introduction of compulsory military service in a 1949 referendum — the only one ever held on a foreign or defence policy issue. Reflecting the Labour Party’s lingering uncertainty about full-blown support for the Western cause, the referendum gave Fraser the public mandate to have a division ready for rapid deployment to the Middle East in the event of a possible hot war with the Soviet bloc and in continuation with the ‘Europe first’ defence strategy pursued during the Second World War. Peter Cooke traces the consequent effort to create a ‘3NZEF’, which ultimately was abandoned in the mid-1950s as the course of the Cold War and the onset of a nuclear age rendered unlikely a conventional great power conflict in Europe (and with it the relevance of a Middle East strategy). Also complementing New Zealand’s early Cold War effort was a programme of defence science within a Commonwealth framework. But, as John Crawford shows, New Zealand’s defence science initiatives were modest to the point of being desultory, reflecting the country’s limited resources and perhaps even more limited enthusiasm for such work by successive governments. Both Crawford’s and Cooke’s contributions highlight the pragmatism and absence of ideological passion which characterised New Zealand’s Cold War engagement for the most part.

In contrast, one of the most interesting chapters in the collection appears to point to a level of zealotry in at least one dimension of official responses to the Cold War. Aaron Fox’s extensively
documented reflection on the excesses of ‘state-sponsored anti-communism’ focuses especially on the career-ending persecutions of suspected communists or sympathetic ‘fellow travellers’ in the New Zealand Public Service. Yet, the reality of Soviet espionage attempts to infiltrate Western governments is not in doubt, and Fox acknowledges that the jury is out on alleged ‘spies’ such as Dr William Sutch and Patrick Costello, pending the full release of intelligence files from Western and Soviet archives. Perhaps what is most striking about the efforts to preserve national security through the ‘institutional anti-communist paranoia’ depicted by Fox is that they were a pale shadow of the McCarthyist witch hunts in the United States. Tragic as they were for the individuals affected, these activities were driven less by the passionately ideological anti-communism evident in some other states and more by the exigencies of active participation in Western collective security and intelligence networks — as Fox’s chapter ultimately highlights. Achieving a balance between individual rights and perceived national security requirements was by no means a Cold War peculiarity and continues to bedevil Western governments in the 21st century — including New Zealand’s.

**Important steps**

The book does not have any dedicated chapters on the formation of the ANZUS alliance or involvement in the Korean conflict — presumably because these have been covered comprehensively in authoritative works by Ian McGibbon and David McIntyre. These developments in the early 1950s were important steps in New Zealand’s shift from its traditional British security cocoon to an increasing reliance on its alliance with the United States and Australia. But this shift was a gradual one and much of New Zealand’s Cold War engagement continued to be played out in a Commonwealth context, as exemplified during the Malayan ‘Emergency’ and Malaysia’s subsequent ‘Confrontation’ with Indonesia.

It is appropriate, therefore, that the collection includes perspectives on the parallel paths of Cold War involvement pursued by two of New Zealand’s closest Commonwealth partners. Jeffrey Grey’s succinct but thoughtful essay shows Australia followed a similarly gradual course to New Zealand in terms of a shift in strategic reliance from Great Britain to the United States. While acknowledging Cold War particularities, Grey stresses the importance of recognising continuities in Australian foreign policy and ends with the salutary admonition to scholars ‘to pay at least as much attention to continuities and similarities as to the differences between Cold War policies and those pursued in other periods, lest we confuse the transitory with the truly significant.’ Jack Granatstein outlines how geographical proximity inevitably meant a heavy influence on Canadian policy by its super-power neighbour — a reality that many Canadians came to resent. As a consequence, Granatstein argues that, although through a different path, Canada was in a comparable position to New Zealand at the end of the Cold War: still broadly aligned to the Western camp but a somewhat disinterested bystander.

**Military planning**

As befits the growing focus on South-east Asia as the front line of New Zealand’s ‘Forward Defence’ policy from the 1950s, the book includes several chapters on involvement in this region. Damien Fen ton traces the course of New Zealand military planning for a possible combat commitment in the region within the framework of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) — illustrating again how political pragmatism meant there was never adequate resourcing to allow New Zealand to deliver its agreed contribution if called for.

**New Zealand gunners in Korea**

New Zealand soldiers question local Vietnamese in Phuoc Tuy province during New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam War

**RNZAF A-4 Skyhawks of 75 Squadron at Clark Air Base, Luzon in the Philippines in the 1960s**
upon. Alongside military planning to counter communist threats to South-east Asia, successive New Zealand governments agreed about the importance of development assistance as a means of inoculation for the contagion of communism. David Lowe’s chapter examines the most high-profile development initiative of the 1950s and 1960s in the region: the Colombo Plan. Focusing particularly on the extent to which the plan facilitated cultural projections of Australia and New Zealand into the region, Lowe reaches the interesting conclusion that the cultural impact in South-east Asia was dubious but that the impact on the New Zealand and Australian publics was more far-reaching in awakening their consciousness of Asia.

The section on South-east Asia is rounded out with perspectives on the two countries — Vietnam and Cambodia — that arguably suffered the graviest costs of enmeshment in the Cold War. The chapter on Vietnam by Caroline Page has a narrow focus on the official propaganda campaign to justify involvement in a controversial conflict — the most extensive and sustained such effort ever by a New Zealand government. Paul Bellamy documents how New Zealand reacted to the horrors of the Khmer Rouge takeover of Cambodia after 1975. He shows how geo-politics led New Zealand and other Western states into the position of indirectly supporting a genocidal regime. While alternative options were limited, the episode is one of the most dismal in the history of Western diplomacy in the Cold War, with the Cambodian people poorly served not only by their murderous masters but also by the international community.

**General weakness**

Regrettably, the section on South-east Asia exemplifies a more general weakness in the collection. While the chapters offer sound analyses of their specific topics, they are relatively narrowly focused. A more general overview of New Zealand engagement with South-east Asia would have been useful, especially given the divisive debate which involvement in Vietnam occasioned with far-reaching consequences for bipartisan and popular support for New Zealand’s sustained involvement in the Cold War.

The same cannot be said of the final piece in the collection. In what is the most impressive and possibly most illuminating of the chapters, Roger Dingman offers an American viewpoint on the 1980s ANZUS dispute that marked the effective swansong of New Zealand involvement in Cold War. Based on extensive research in sources from the United States as well as New Zealand, Dingman systematically dissects the dispute as it unfolded, providing insightful and incisive commentary on the key actors. More importantly, he expertly sets the dispute over nuclear ships in broader context. Dingman concludes that New Zealand’s actions had no real impact in prompting other Western allies to deny port access to American vessels or to abandon their security relationships with Washington. But he adds a critical qualification in adding that the dispute spread ideas into the international arena that would pose challenges to the Cold War norms enforced by the super-powers. He concludes that smaller powers also had an impact on how the Cold War was played out and counsels that ‘perhaps we should pay as much attention to relations among allies as we do to conflicts and accommodations with adversaries’.

In a sense, this point constitutes the generally unrecognised leitmotif of this collection. Although the other contributors do not acknowledge it as explicitly as Dingman, almost all their chapters (those on Canada and Australia included) underscore how the Cold War was usually more about relations with allies than adversaries for most Western participants and perhaps nowhere more markedly than in a country located in the strategic backwater of the South-west Pacific. In states such as New Zealand, where Cold War ideological divisions were echoed only faintly in national politics, a commitment to steadfast alliance solidarity depended heavily on shared external threat perceptions. As threat perceptions diverged over time (notably after the Vietnam débâcle), the rationale for alliance solidarity weakened, encouraging a more flexible stance by some Western states. This trend was especially marked for a distant franchise-holder like New Zealand, which effectively came to adopt an international posture compatible with a more diffuse and complex international system by the time the more starkly bipolar era of the Cold War came to a close.

When viewed through this lens, the perspectives offered in this book undoubtedly enrich our understanding of numerous dimensions of New Zealand’s Cold War involvement. The chapters are almost uniformly well-written and cogently argued. The collection would have been even stronger if the contributors had done more to set New Zealand’s experience in broader international context and to consider why the defining ideological struggle of the second half of the twentieth century aroused such relatively little passion in this country to the extent that its conclusion was virtually anti-climactic. Attentive readers interested in this question will, nevertheless, find much of relevance in the contributions included in this volume. Taken together, they provide an important foundation for reflecting on both the distinctiveness and the significance of New Zealand’s Cold War experience.

**NOTES**

1. For the seminal work summarising the so-called New Cold History made possible by these archival findings, see John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, 1997).
2. This was also reflected in how the Cold War ended, as noted in an *Economist* book review: ‘communism collapsed differently in every country, as the journalists who reported the story could see’. ‘Wall Stories’, *Economist*, 7 Nov 2009, p.72.
4. McGibbon suggests in his chapter, p.30, that documents from the Mitrokhin Archive confirm that Costello was indeed a Soviet agent.
MODERN AFGHANISTAN: A History of Struggle and Survival

Author: Amin Saikal

Professor Amin Saikal, as the director of Middle East and Islamic studies at the Australian National University, is a highly regarded scholar. He is also originally from Afghanistan. In the voluminous literature on Afghanistan that exists now, what does Saikal offer in this volume? The particular contribution here is to make sense for a general audience of the highly complex world of Afghanistan’s politics since the middle of the 18th century.

Saikal starts his narrative with the founding of Afghanistan in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, running through the establishment of the Mohammadzai dynasty created by Dost Mohammad in the 19th century (whose own powerful brothers would spawn rival families for influence), which in turn gave way to Nadiri rule from 1929. The last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, engaged in a long power struggle with various relatives who functioned at times as regents, and was eventually deposed by his cousin (and former premier) Daoud in a coup in 1973. Daoud’s coup, which incorporated leftist elements, would spark a spiral of events that would culminate in yet another coup (the communist coup in 1978), the subsequent Soviet invasion to save an allied regime in 1979, a period of civil war following Soviet withdrawal and international neglect, the rise and fall of the Taliban, and the post-9/11 US-led intervention. That intervention would lead to the rise to power of Hamid Karzai, a Durrani Pashtun by background, whose family had been associated with the royalist camp of Zahir Shah.

The machinations of Afghanistan’s ruling families and factions are bewildering, full of intrigue and infighting, and Saikal does an excellent job of making sense of a world that would otherwise be opaque to most onlookers. This is a book about elites and their struggles. Saikal makes three broader observations about what this has meant for Afghanistan, which, as he notes, has taken harder blows in modern times than most countries. First, Saikal identifies royal polygamy as a destabilising factor in the Middle East, but notably so in Afghanistan. The multiple and complicated families of the Durrani kings, and the absence of mandated primogeniture, made for numerous power struggles between siblings (particularly half-brothers) and cousins. Political dualism was not confined to the royals, as the communist movement was irrevocably split between two factions, resulting in periodic purges. Second, although Afghanistan was a ‘graveyard of empires’, for the people of the country this has meant a constant succession of foreign interventions. In fact, royal polygamy compounded the ability of external powers, notably Russia and the United Kingdom during the ‘Great Game’, to support rivals and pretenders. Notably, the invasion by the Soviet Union in support of one particular government faction would throw Afghanistan into a traumatic dislocation, the results from which it is still suffering. But Saikal is also critical of US foreign policy, including what he sees as missed opportunities in the post-war period to assist stability, such as in the 1950s when Daoud (then Zahir Shah’s premier) was treated with suspicion on account of his neutrality and the (ill-informed) perception that he was ideologically inclined to the Soviet Union. Washington’s sudden focus on Afghanistan and its problems after 2001 is also critiqued here, including Saikal’s judgment that the people of Afghanistan have not seen the benefits of international assistance, in part because of his view that the ‘Karzai cartel’ has been characterised by nepotism and corruption. Third, Saikal notes the instability of Afghanistan that gave rise over time to various waves of ideological extremism, of which the Taliban are the most recent and perhaps most obvious manifestation. But Saikal also points to the period of communist rule, in which, early on, attempts to overturn religion and tradition were made too quickly and without any public legitimacy.

Saikal’s outlook for Afghanistan is not uplifting. He sees two scenarios. The first is a continuation of the insurgency, which he notes was reaching ever more dangerous levels a decade after the original intervention, and on-going bloodshed. The second is a Taliban victory in Kabul and in Pashtun-dominated regions, but with resistance from the rest of the country (much like when the Taliban were in power prior to 2001).

A few additions would improve the accessibility of a book like this. The single map provided is quite basic; there is scope here for a bit more clarity around the geography of Afghanistan and its neighbourhood (there are no provincial divisions shown, for example). There are also no pictures of the prominent leaders discussed, which might assist non-specialist readers acquire greater familiarity with them. And although Saikal consciously seeks to examine politics at the highest level, he could usefully have included a short introductory explanation of Afghanistan’s myriad ethnic, regional, tribal and religious divisions (or, as he calls them, "strategies")
Salient among these was the failure of the British military, or political definition of success. His electorate's patience rather than on the achievement of any terms for organisational levels are interchanged.

That said, Saikal's volume is still remarkable in its ability to navigate the twists and turns of Afghanistan's political divisions. It helps us avoid the tendency to approach a problem like Afghanistan through the ahistorical lens of the current headlines and surface impressions.

ANTHONY SMITH

BRITISH GENERALS IN BLAIR'S WARS

Editors: Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan
Published by: Ashgate, Farnham, 2013, 346pp, $39.27 (pb).

This short review can do scant justice to this exceptionally interesting edited volume of 26 contributors, including first-hand accounts and commentaries, by a selection of those who held senior positions in the recent campaigns fought under the premiership of Tony Blair. No one has yet discredited Bismarck's adage about politics being the art of the possible. This book documents the way in which Britain's political leadership's demanded the impossible of its military and of how the latter have striven to adjust to the daunting situations in which, as a consequence, they have found themselves. Major-General Jonathan Bailey's initial chapter, 'The Political Context: Why We Went to War and the Mismatch of Ends, Ways and Means', provides an excellent insight into how abuse of the British Cabinet system of government helped further the march of folly. (When General Bailey retired in 2005 he was director general development and doctrine.) The book deals initially with the 'successful' and minor campaigns in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone, all of which helped build Blair's confidence to the point at which he decided to embroil his country in the spectacularly 'unsuccessful' major interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The two latter campaigns provide the main emphasis of the book, both in regard to the conduct of operations and to the many lessons currently being drawn from them.

Multiple themes emerge from the individual commentaries. These start with the political failure at the outset to define any clear vision of success (other than to impress the all-important American leadership with the staunchness and competence of their British ally). As one contributor points out, there can be no clearer indication of this failure than the 2014 date set by the Cameron government for the final British withdrawal from Afghanistan, clearly chosen on the basis of the limits of his electorate's patience rather than on the achievement of any military or political definition of success.

Contribution after contribution draws attention to significant failures of adaptation to dramatically changed circumstances. Salient among these was the failure of the British military, flying in the face of an ever decreasing share of the national budget, to abandon its preparation for a hot war on the north German plain, at the expense of preparations for potential counter-insurgency campaigns around the globe. The unexpectedly prolonged campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan left parks of expensive, rusting and undeployable equipment in Europe, and troops on the ground elsewhere inadequately equipped for the task in hand. Worse still, they found the British officer corps ill-prepared, firstly to recognise and then to make the mental adjustments called for by the dramatically changed circumstances they faced.

Of direct relevance to the New Zealand situation is the attention paid to the nature of military operations carried out by coalition forces. The attempt to establish compatibility between the American and the British concepts of counter-insurgency — the warrior versus the peacekeeper — is a case in point. More problematic, were the restrictions different national contingents had placed on their deployment by their respective governments. In both Iraq and Afghanistan force commanders had no ultimate control over the availability and willingness to participate in any given operation of contingents of troops nominally under their command.

As one contributor points out, though the consequences of actions in a counter-insurgency situation are 20 per cent military to 80 per cent political, it is nevertheless the military that is expected to carry out most of the action. Under these circumstances, the contributions illustrate multiple points calling for changed attitudes and new skills among the military and for the re-configuration of the interfaces between the military, civilian agencies and the government responsible for the equipment and deployment of those armed forces.

To this end, of particular interest are the contributions made by prominent military historian Sir Hew Strachan and by Lieutenant-General Paul Newton. These deal with the steps now being taken by both the British civil service and the military to ensure they are better positioned to cope with any future such situations that might arise. Newton's final posting (2010–12) was as commander force development and training (FDT), a new institution established to turn the British military into a learning organisation, as opposed to an organisation resting on the laurels of the training already received.

Anyone reading this book cannot help but be impressed by the overall standard of articulation of analytical thought presented by this group of senior commanders. Clearly, at the most senior level, the desired transformation of British military thinking is already under way. It is unfortunate that there is no comparable institutionalised educational process for the politicians responsible for their deployment.

HUGH STEADMAN
A Nation’s Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers

In an important speech made shortly after becoming prime minister in 1972, Norman Kirk asserted: ‘we shall strive to relate what we say and do abroad to the values that govern our policies at home... We believe in the individual worth and dignity of every man, woman and child regardless of race or colour.’ While inconsistent in its application, Kirk’s aspiration has been a constant in New Zealand foreign policy following the experience of what real marginalisation meant during the Great Depression. However, this has been tempered by a wary pragmatism, ever alert to domestic sentiment and the wishes of stronger allies. While partly buffered by its isolation, New Zealand has remained alert to the global controversy surrounding refugee and asylum seeking. This has forced continued policy change, not all of which has been positive. These tensions have persisted in New Zealand’s handling of refugee and asylum seeking, comprehensively analysed in this wide ranging, well-sourced and thorough investigation by Ann Beaglehole.

Since 1944, when they were first distinguished from other migrants in its official statistics, New Zealand has accepted more than 30,000 refugees. That creditable record of acceptance per head of local population has been strengthened by a willingness to accept refugees considered hard to settle, including the disabled, emergency protection cases, and even some suffering from HIV/AIDS. That has been commendable given the proclivity of other receiving nations to often ‘cherry pick’ the most skilled and able from available refugee pools nominated by the UN high commissioner for refugees.

More negatively, refugee policy has been stigmatised domestically through calls by trade unions, Maori opinion, and populist politicians demanding prior attention to local need. As recounted here, Bert Bockett, New Zealand’s director of employment, was unapologetic in 1947 about discrimination against some groups in favour of others as it was not a fundamental right but a privilege for any alien to enter New Zealand. By contrast Fred Turnovnsky, when meeting a local Reserve Bank cashier who had previously refused his request to remit funds to get his parents out of Czechoslovakia to the United States in the late 1930s, commented that it may interest ‘you to know that my parents were killed by the Nazis’.

Pleasing stronger friends and allies features throughout the study: Cold War alignments influenced decisions to accept Hungarian refugees following that country’s 1956 uprising; likewise Czechoslovakia in 1968; the substantial number accepted from Indo-China after 1975 and, more recently; and Helen Clark’s political decision to get her Australian counterpart John Howard off the hook by accepting the so-called Tampa refugees. Though now more diffuse, external impacts have persisted. Hence, it is hard to disentangle the costly, protracted, and error-strewn official handling of the Zaoui case, well described here, from the post-9/11 US-led campaign against global terrorism.

Three important, recurring themes feature in this study. The first is a hesitant, uneven, yet discernible evolution over the last eight decades towards a more coherent official refugee settlement policy. That process was assisted by a growing agnosticism towards the once dominant British heritage, immediate advantages of credible multilateral citizenship, and the felt need to gain acceptance within an increasingly burgeoning Asia-Pacific community of nations. From the ‘sink or swim’ approach adopted towards Jewish refugees in the 1930s through to the more organised handling of Polish children arriving in 1944, to the establishment of the annual quota system in the 1980s, recognition of need, including post-arrival pastoral care, has steadily been institutionalised.

However, that has not been possible without a second theme vividly portrayed. This has been the vital role played by voluntarism and the initiative of key individuals. It was the wife of the Polish honorary consul-general, Countess Wodzicka, who, during the Second World War, suggested to Peter Fraser’s wife that New Zealand accept the Polish orphan children. More recently, Ron O’Grady, Peter Cotton, Keith Taylor, and Aussie Malcolm through their different callings have displayed tenacity in asserting humanitarian need, enhanced refugee and migrant service co-operation for specialist services, and enlistment of voluntary sponsors. This combined pressure had, by 2007, seen $62 million allocated to language and qualifications services, employment, community development and advocacy programmes. The current system of six annual intakes of approximately 125 refugees each is assessed here as working well through enhanced inter-agency co-operation and planning functions in place.

Third, this account offers a revealing picture of New Zealand’s wider social milieu. Along with the prejudice and stereotyping facing arrivals has been magnanimity — noted is the generosity of Southland farmers donating money and clothing in 1965 to the oddly assorted Old Believers from Russia fetching up in Invercargill. Yet provincial New Zealand under the so-called ‘pepper potting’ policy, designed to avoid alien enclaves, was never easy for migrants, particularly refugees who in time grew to despise that categorisation when finding the veneer of seeming tolerance peeling away to reveal indifference.

This study is authoritative, though the author — a Central European exile herself — might well have seasoned such an amble serving of judicious balance with the spice of more forceful advocacy, given its necessity and her knowledge. New Zealand’s record over refugees and asylum seekers has improved, but towards the latter in particular it remains a work in progress.

RODERIC ALLEY
Sir,

For someone long interested in the development and workings of our nuclear-free legislation, the appearance of Gerald Hensley’s recent book *Friendly Fire, Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984–1987* promised an interesting read, particularly considering positive reviews of it that have appeared, including that by Roger Dingman in your November–December 2013 issue (vol 38, no 6), and as it is described on the back cover as the ‘definitive account’ of a key turning point in New Zealand history.

Unfortunately, a careful reading of Hensley’s book reveals it to be a history marred by mistakes ranging from minor to very serious, misquotation and misrepresentation of documents, and subtle displays of his extreme dislike of the legislation and everything associated with it. As Sir Geoffrey Palmer remarked recently, Hensley never liked the policy and still does not. For brevity, only a few major points of concern are considered.

Despite Hensley’s statement in his Preface that ‘accuracy is critical when history is still being argued over, mistakes soon appear. As early as page 6, Hensley claims that ‘in 1969 the Holyoke Government had banned such visits [by nuclear powered vessels] pending US acceptance of absolute liability in the case of an accident.’ This is incorrect. There was no ban, even under the 1972–75 Labour government.

In August 1971 the British were enquiring about the possibility of visits by their nuclear-powered submarines, and in December that year the United States lodged a formal request for a visit by the nuclear-powered submarine USS Scamp early in 1972. However, by this time our government, like other governments, had become concerned about the safety of naval nuclear reactors and had laid down certain requirements for any such visit relating to the state of the reactors during the visit. This required the provision of technical information relating to the reactors that the United States never releases. The government to which the ship belonged was also required to accept absolute and unlimited liability for any damage from any nuclear incident during the visit, something the United States would not accept at that time. The visit did not proceed.


Strangely Hensley does not include Templeton’s book in his Select Bibliography, although he refers to it in his Preface but only as describing the rise of anti-nuclear feelings from 1945. Yet Templeton devotes over 150 pages in the second section of his book to an extensive and continuous discussion of the history of the nuclear-free policy and legislation.

Hensley does include Michael Bassett’s 2008 book *Working with David, Inside the Lange Cabinet* in his bibliography, however. In his Preface Hensley says that Bassett’s history is ‘an indispensable background and he was the pioneer in trying to unravel the mysteries of the first attempt at a ship visit’. Yet Bassett’s 616-page book lists in the index less than 40 pages devoted to the nuclear-free policy and spread throughout the book.

John Henderson, director of Lange’s Advisory Group 1985–89 and director of the Prime Minister’s Department 1987–89, examines Bassett’s claim in a contribution to a 2004 conference, the proceedings of which were published in 2005 in a book entitled *For the Record, Lange and the Fourth Labour Government*. Bassett, Henderson says, attributes Lange’s hard line on the nuclear issue to his capture by a small but influential group of left-wing and predominantly female Labour Party figures. He presents domestic Labour Party politics as the ‘missing piece’ of the ANZUS rupture jigsaw. ‘David Lange used the nuclear-ship issue to try to heal the rift in the Labour Party but was outplayed by the opposing faction.’

Hensley echoes this theme, and in repeated references to actions by, or the influence of, the Left or the Hard Left throughout his book.


The reverse is closer to the truth. It was not a small group of Labour officials who held Lange to ransom. Lange was constrained not by a few key Labour left figures, but by the strength of public opinion which makes up the centre ground of New Zealand politics. The anti-nuclear stance had the strong support of mainstream New Zealand. [It still does.]

‘It became part of a growing sense of nationalism’, Henderson says. Many other sources support his argument.

Margaret Wilson, respected academic and former member of Parliament, was president of the Labour Party from 1984 to 1987. In her 1989 book *Labour in Government 1984–1987* she presents a very different picture of the interaction between the party as a whole and the government. She states, for example, in relation to the USS Buchanan visit that to counter any possibility that the visit might be approved, the only action we [the group referred to by Bassett and Hensley] could take was to let people speak for themselves. So we asked party members to express their feelings to their local MPs, to the government and to the party. This produced thousands of letters and telegrams of support for the policy. Such a response would not have been possible without widespread community support.

This agrees with Henderson’s argument.

Hensley, in what is clearly an attempt to downplay the significance of Labour’s 1984 nuclear-free policy, points out that we had been one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, pledging thereby not to hold nuclear weapons on our territory. In fact we signed it in July 1968, but only ratified it in September 1969 — a small but surprising mistake.

He continues: ‘the only loophole, for the anti-nuclear campaigners, was that this commitment did not cover ships or aircraft in transit’. Yet he then devotes a whole book to the consequences of closing this ‘loophole’! This same ‘loophole’ was a problem for a number of other countries not wanting nuclear weapons in their ports.

By contrast, Hensley very seriously misrepresents Labour’s 1984 election policy when he states that the policy ‘barred ships that might be nuclear-armed or -powered from the country’s territorial waters’. The policy was that ‘Labour will legislate to make New Zealand and its territorial waters nuclear free’. Sections 5 to 7 of the legislation make clear that this means no manufacture, acquisition,
development, storage or deployment of nuclear weapons therein. Hensley was head of the Prime Minister's Department under David Lange and should have known and understood this policy and the resulting legislation in detail.

Further, as Hensley also should have known, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees the right of innocent passage for all ships through our territorial waters and the legislation acknowledges this in section 12. Restrictions on ship visits, as spelled out in sections 9 and 11 of the legislation, apply only within our internal waters, any areas of the sea that are on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea, our ports essentially. Section 12 is discussed in my 1998 Working Paper No 8, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1987 — From Policy to Legislation*. This is an extremely serious misrepresentation of Labour policy and subsequent legislation, likely either to mislead readers relying on Hensley’s claims or to make them think that New Zealand is ignorant of international law in this area.

Confidence in what Hensley presents is further undermined by what can only be described as a very negative misrepresentation of Labour’s policy on ANZUS. He writes that it called for “the acceptance of absolutely equal partnership” and also “an absolute guarantee of the complete integrity of New Zealand sovereignty”.

This insistence, he claims,

showed a strange lack of confidence in the country’s ability to hold its own in dealing even with friendly countries; others were called on to guarantee its absolute independence. It was a sign of how the treaty had become a focus for feelings of national inadequacy.

The Labour election policy manifesto actually read

The next Labour Government will re-negotiate the terms of

our association with Australia and the United States for the purpose of ensuring the economic, social and political stability of the South East Asian and Pacific regions. The basic requirements of such an updated agreement will be:

(a) New Zealand’s unconditional anti-nuclear stance;
(b) the active promotion of a Nuclear Weapons-Free South Pacific;
(c) the acceptance of absolute equal partnership on all issues handled within the terms of the agreement and unanimous agreement on all decisions taken under those terms;
(d) an absolute guarantee of the complete integrity of New Zealand sovereignty.

Margaret Wilson has described this as aimed at an updating of the ANZUS Treaty to recognize changes in the positions of the signatories in its more than 30-year life. It was an attempt ‘to preserve a relationship with the United States while embarking on a more independent foreign policy’, a very different interpretation from that proposed by Hensley.

Other mistakes occur in Hensley’s book. He calls Secretary of Foreign Affairs Merwyn Norrish secretary of foreign affairs and trade, even in a photo caption. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs only became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1993. This is a small but irritating mistake.

Hensley had access to an extensive range of material from US, British and Australian sources as well as from local sources. It is sad to find doubts about accuracy, reliability and bias marring what otherwise would be a valuable account of events in the period he examines.

ROBERT WHITE
Former Director Centre for Peace Studies,
University of Auckland

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Institute Notes

National Office and branch activities.

On 7 November Dr Stephan Lehne, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, gave a presentation at VUW on ‘The State of EU Enlargement Policy: How Far from Membership is Turkey?’

A one-day symposium was held in Wellington on 13 November. The topic was ‘Asia–Pacific Integration, The Economic and Security Dimensions for New Zealand’. Four sessions considered:
- New Zealand’s regional engagement: where is at?
- Regional economic integration: it is all headed in the same direction?
- Regional security integration: can we predict the future?
- Convergence or divergence?

A panel discussion, ‘Expanding Friendship on a Solid Footing’, was held in Wellington on 20 November to mark 60 years of diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Germany. The panellists were German Ambassador HE Dr Anne-Marie Schleich, Ian Hill (MFAT’s divisional manager Europe), Dr Dave Lowe (New Zealand–Germany science and innovation co-ordinator) and Elisabeth Perham (alumna of German educational exchanges). Ken Gorbey (vice president and project director of the Jewish Museum, Berlin, 1999–2002) chaired the discussion.

On 14 November the NZIIA co-hosted with the EUC Network and the Delegation of the European Union to New Zealand a presentation in Parliament’s Grand Hall by Ambassador HE Sem Fabrizi (head of the EU Delegation) on ‘EU as a Global Player’.

Ms Buket Uzuner (bestselling Turkish novelist) gave an interesting presentation, ‘The Long White Cloud — Gallipoli’, at VUW on 19 November.

On 2 December a delegation from the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) met with the NZIIA at Te Papa. Leader of the CPIFA delegation was HE Li Zhaoxing, honorary president and former Chinese foreign minister. This was the first meeting between the two institutes for many years. Both sides agreed to remain in contact during 2014, which would be the 80th anniversary of the NZIIA and the 65th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (and the CPIFA).

On 12 December Vijay Krishnarayan (Commonwealth Foundation director) addressed a meeting on ‘The Rise and Rise of Civil Society: Future Directions of the Commonwealth’.

Mike Summers, a member of the Falkland Islands’ Legislative Assembly, addressed a meeting on ‘The Falkland Islanders Right to Self-determination’ at Victoria University on 30 January.

Auckland

The following meetings were held:
10 Oct Dr Ashok Sharma (lecturer, Department of Political Studies, Auckland University), ‘India–China Relations: Lingering Conflict, Growing Co-operation or Adjusting For Co-existence?’
16 Oct Prof Robert G. Patman (Department of Political Studies, Otago University), ‘The Emergence of a Post-Hegemonic World’.
5 Dec Tim Wright (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) and Tilman Ruff (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War), ‘The Humanitarian Imperative to Ban Nuclear Weapons’.

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the two Koreas’ must work towards a ‘virtuous cycle’ based upon confidence-building, and giving Pyongyang a pathway to a better future through improved infrastructure, as well as sticks and carrots while adhering to international norms. However, apart from the resumption of a joint-venture operation near the North–South border, there has not been much more progress. On this note, Park mentioned the role of the United States, Japan and China in helping resolve the situation. He concluded his talk by referring to the New Zealand–Korean relationship and values. The seminar was very well received and enjoyed by all who attended. Representatives from the local ethnic Korean community were delighted to greet and chat with the ambassador after his presentation. (Supplied by James Toczko)

**Wairarapa**

On 4 November Dr Jack Vowles (professor of comparative politics, VUW) addressed the branch on ‘Democracy: Pre-conditions and Consequences’.

**Wellington**

The following meetings were held:

- 22 Oct Dr Chris Paul (senior social scientist, RAND Corporation), ‘Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies’.
- 4 Nov Lyndon Burdon (doctoral candidate in political studies, University of Auckland), ‘New Zealand in the Modern Nuclear World’.
- 11 Nov HE Yongku Park (Korean ambassador), ‘The Korean Peninsula and Korea–New Zealand Relations’.

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OBITUARY

Professor William Theodore Roy IDSM
11 January 1923–19 December 2013

William Theodore Roy (emeritus professor at the University of Waikato), service No 421758, captain, Gurkha Brigade, died at Waikato Hospital on 19 December 2013. Born in Lucknow, India, Theo was the son of an Indian professor of English. His mother, a New Zealander from a South Island family, was a CMS missionary. He first went to school in the Himalayan foothills, where he stayed with his Cornish grandmother. In the winter he joined his parents in Lucknow. When his parents went for two years to England, Theo, at the age of nine, stayed with Seyed Rashid Ali Abbasi, Taluqadar (feudal lord) of Karori. It was here that Theo received a thorough education in Islam.

His formal education was undertaken at La Martiniere Military Academy in Lucknow. This was followed by the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun, after which he was commissioned in the Indian Army. Joining the 3/3 Gurkha Rifles, he was involved, at the age of eighteen, in the Burma Campaign, serving as a platoon and later company commander. He was the only one of his siblings to survive the war.

After 1945 Theo went to Lucknow University and after graduation he joined the Indian Civil Service. When his father died in 1950, Theo’s mother decided to return to New Zealand and Theo enrolled for a masters degree in Indian languages at the University of Auckland. After graduation he joined the Adult Education Department of the University of Auckland and became a lecturer in history. Theo’s course on comparative religion was famous in Auckland. His mother had taught him the Bible and he could quote whole pages by heart. His considerable knowledge of Islam and Judaism attracted many supporters from these communities in Auckland to his course.

In 1961 Theo was appointed as a lecturer in history in the Waikato branch of the University of Auckland, which in 1963 was to become the University of Waikato. In 1970 he was appointed professor of politics and he remained departmental chairperson until he retired in 1987. In 1974 Theo and I established the NZIIA’s Hamilton branch, with Theo becoming its first president. From that year on the branch convened between twelve to fourteen lectures each year. These lectures were attended not only by students and academic staff but also by many members of the Waikato community. Theo himself was a popular lecturer in the community and never turned down an invitation to speak. He was one of the most colourful characters at the university. His students simply loved him.

Departmental parties for undergraduate and graduate students were well attended, and when Theo and his lovely wife Irene made their entry they received warm applause from the students. When one of the students had behaved inapropriately at one of the parties, Theo summoned him to his office the next morning. The undergraduate student came to his office at 10 am when we were having coffee in the reception lounge adjacent to Theo’s office. He asked the student why he came to see him. Before the student could answer, Theo walked to the door and took a kukri from the wall and slashed it back and forward, asking the student in a low key manner whether he was aware what the kukri was used for in battle. The student by that time was afraid of what might happen to him. Theo put the kukri away and asked the baffled student why he had come to see him. The student explained his behaviour at the party. Theo said: ‘Well, don’t do it again’. The student has never forgotten this meeting with Theo and on occasion at visits to the university he reminds me with a big smile about Theo’s performance.

When Theo retired, students from around the country attended his farewell dinner. Several of them reminded him that they had been quite mediocre students, but that Theo had taken them under his wing. All of them had made great improvements in their academic work and become successful in their careers.

It is rare for an academic to receive such accolades from his students. Students who were in trouble found Theo always made time to listen to them and give them sound advice. As a scholar Theo published widely in the field of Asian politics and history. He was well known throughout South-east Asia, the Indian sub-continent and East Asia. When attending a conference in one of these countries, you would have colleagues come up and say: please give my warm regards to Professor Roy. As an active member of the NZIIA till his 89th year, Theo would regularly attend meetings with his companion June. His contribution was recognised by the life membership conferred on him by the National Council in 2011.

Theo had three sons and daughters-in-law and six grandchildren. He was the holder of the prestigious Indian Distinguished Service Medal as well as the Nepal Star, bestowed on him for his service in the Gurkhas. He was also a fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society and a fellow of the Society of Arts. Theo was a memorable figure and a person who bridged cultural differences in an exemplary way, and I believe many have learned a great lesson of tolerance and curiosity about other people’s cultures from him.

Professor Dov Bing
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