DRONE STRIKES

- David Lange
- Guerrilla warfare
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Drone strikes: ethics and strategy

Natalie Dalziel discusses the United States’ increasing propensity to use drones in its global fight against terrorism.

The attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 not only set in motion a war of ideology but also entrenched perpetual terror in the minds of those who, one day earlier, had had no fear. To fight terror the United States has employed terror in the form of drone strikes, a strategy which twelve years on has not defeated al-Qaeda, which responds with a mere shuffle of human resources, and by simply getting out of the way; as such, the War on Terror persists. Since New Zealand’s virtual withdrawal from Afghanistan, this global war has been relegated to the back benches of the public’s consciousness; yet reconsideration of New Zealand’s stance on this conflict is pertinent. On 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush asked New Zealand whether we were with the United States or with the terrorists and we, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, did not hesitate to denounce these abhorrent acts of terrorism.

In December 2013 the first New Zealander was targeted and killed in a drone strike in Yemen, a strike which, according to Yemeni reports, also killed thirteen civilians whose wedding party was mistaken for an al-Qaeda convoy. As a result of this event the ‘them’ killed in drone strikes have been rendered ‘us’, as we resume our seat in the front row of the War on Terror. As such, it is timely for New Zealand to reconsider whether it supports the targeted assassination of its citizens in the absence of due process, and whether it is with the terrorists or against them. However, this time it must determine who the terrorists are.

Those who oppose the strikes consider the tactic terrorism — the incitement of fear for political ends — due to the means of target selection and the high number of civilian casualties. Furthermore, they argue, terror begets terror; the strikes motivate others to undertake acts of retaliatory terrorism against the United States and its supporters.

A barrage of legal frameworks exists governing drone strikes under both international and domestic US law. Consequently, no conclusive decision on the legality of drone strikes has yet been reached. In the absence of such a determination, New Zealand’s decision to support (or at least not oppose) the assassination of its passport holders by drone strike, and to accept the accompanying ‘collateral damage’ — in this case thirteen civilians — must be based on whether this remote control warfare is ethically and strategically flawed.

Drone types

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), otherwise known as ‘drones’, are remotely piloted vehicles — predominately aircraft — ranging in size from that of a model airplane to a large Cessna. The more advanced models yield underwater capabilities, or appear to resemble farm animals with the ability to traverse snowy and rocky terrain. However, it is not the farmyard variety that is cause for concern. Drones were first used in the Vietnam War for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration enlisted armed drones in counter-terrorist operations — a usage that has proved controversial. As may be inferred from their names, the Predator, Reaper, Fire Scout and Global Hawk are some of the models equipped with Hellfire missiles capable of reaching targets from up to 65,000 feet, with a comparably low price tag (the smallest costing approximately US$4 million).

Such advancements in technology have revolutionised warfare by removing the threat to pilots, offering the advantage of surveillance before military operations commence and eliminating the enemy’s recourse to counter-strike. Drone use has increased exponentially under the Obama administration, foremost in the federally administered tribal areas (FATAs) of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia as a continuation of the Bush Doctrine to target and kill members and supporters of the global terrorist organisation al-Qaeda. However, the United States is not the only state with drone technology. Over 30 states, based on whether this remote control warfare is ethically and strategically flawed.

As New Zealand’s role in Afghanistan comes to a close, the War on Terror has been relegated to the backseat of the New Zealand public’s consciousness, albeit prematurely so. With the first New Zealander killed in a drone strike in Yemen, it is timely that New Zealand reconsider its support for a tactic that opponents argue is itself an act of terrorism. As yet no consensus has been reached as to whether drone strikes constitute a breach of international law. We must, therefore, base our assessment on whether the tactic is ethically and strategically flawed. With every hell-fire missile that Nobel Peace Prize winning Barack Obama rains down on al-Qaeda and any civilians unfortunate enough to be in the way, a New Zealand decision on this question becomes more urgent.
including New Zealand, possess these aircraft, but heretofore only the United States, Britain and Israel have employed drones in combat; the rest have confined their use to surveillance. Drone strikes are at the forefront of the War on Terror, yet with increased use comes increased criticism that this remote control warfare is ethically and strategically flawed.

Ethical issue

The US government considers ethical conduct pertinent to its use of military force. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama stated:

Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.1

Ethics are a fusion of society’s moral definitions of right and wrong, and socially acceptable behaviours, culminating in a general consensus on what constitutes just behaviour in interpersonal relations. Numerous ethical codes have been cited as applicable to war. Those of a Realpolitik persuasion regard ethical considerations in war to be downright dangerous, as they can prevent a state from taking action conducive to its national interest. They denounce so-called ‘arm-chair’ moralists who apply ethics to warfare, and argue that attempts to do so are ridiculously futile due, simply, to the hellish nature of war. Alternatively, others argue that if we make no moral considerations when taking the life of an enemy, we effectively render them vermin that may be exterminated without moral regard. Instead, the least we owe our enemies — other human beings — is to demonstrate that their lives had some worth by holding someone accountable for their deaths. It appears that the majority of society agree with the argument that actions in war should adhere to some code of ethical conduct. For most, this code is Just War Theory.

Just War Theory comprises two concepts that govern ethically acceptable resort to war (jus ad bellum) and conduct within war (jus in bello). In accordance with this theory, a war is ethically permissible if the following conditions of jus ad bellum are satisfied. There must be a just cause for war, war must be proportionate to the harm inflicted upon a state, there must be a reasonable chance of success, the war must be sanctioned by a legitimate authority, the state declaring war must have the right intention for doing so, the war must be a last resort and, finally, the war must be publicly declared. Recently, jus ad bellum has been extended to also include acts of humanitarian intervention affording states the right to wage war against another that fails to protect its citizens (‘protection’ broadly conceived).

Central question

The Obama administration currently employs drones in continuation of the War on Terror. Therefore, central to the determination of the ethics of drone strikes is whether the War on Terror, at its inception, had just cause. A just cause for war is usually defined as a military act that violates (or threatens to violate) a state’s sovereignty. Under this definition, the War on Terror — and the use of drones in that war — is not morally justified. Although the terrorists’ actions on 9/11 were abhorrent, they did not threaten the sovereignty of the United States. However, it is legally and consequently, some would argue, ethically permissible to wage war in self-defence, or collective self-defence to assist another state in its attempts to repel an act of aggression. Chapter VII, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that ‘Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of an individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations’.2 Drone strikes allegedly targeted would-be terrorists in self-defence in the anticipation that they will commit an act of terrorism against the United States in the future. This is counter to the UN Charter, which does not allow for pre-emptive self-defence in speculation that a person may commit a crime in the future.

While it might be construed as ethical for the United States to retaliate in self-defence by using drones to target the 9/11 hijackers should they still be alive, or even the orchestrators of the attack discovered after the fact, targeting current members of al-Qaeda for the 2001 attacks perpetrated by now deceased members is ethically questionable, particularly since al-Qaeda has never claimed responsibility for 9/11. Moreover, the BBC asserts that when the War on Terror was declared, al-Qaeda was not an established organisation, but rather a group brought together by Osama bin Laden for this particular attack. It suggests that bin Laden was not aware of the name al-Qaeda (a name afforded to the group by the United States) and was not the leader of any established terrorist network until after 9/11.3 If this is so, al-Qaeda as an entity did not perpetrate an attack on the United
States in 2001. Therefore, to declare war in self-defence against
an organisation that did not exist until after war was declared
against it is unjust.

Nevertheless, although the War on Terror, at time of
declaration, did not meet the condition of just cause, the ethicality
of drone strikes cannot yet be disregarded. Just War Theory
provides that a state’s actions in war (jus in bello) can be just, even
if the war itself is unjust. Consequently, the use of drone strikes
may be ethical regardless of whether the War on Terror itself is
just, if the conditions of jus in bello are met. Jus in bello requires
that any act committed during war be of military necessity, be
proportionate to the harm inflicted and, most importantly, discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, for intentional attacks against the latter are considered ethically reprehensible.

Fundamental issue
Fundamental to the determination of ethicality of drone strikes is
whether they sufficiently discriminate between combatants, who
may be ethically (and legally) targeted, and civilians, who may not.
Proponents of the strikes argue that they are ethically superior to
other methods of combat, due to their precision and consequent
ability to reduce collateral damage. However, there is evidence to
the contrary. The United States employs two methods of drone
strike: ‘personality’ and ‘signature’ strikes. ‘Personality’ strikes
target identified alleged high-value militants. ‘Signature’ strikes,
an oft-used method of the Obama administration, face intense
criticism. They involve targeting individuals based on ‘pattern of
life’ analysis. According to the US government, they target groups
of men who bear certain signatures or defining characteristics
associated with terrorist activity but whose identities aren’t known
(my emphasis).4 If the target’s identity is unknown, or status as
a combatant or non-combatant is not established, this effectively
renders the target guilty until proven innocent, but proven inno-
cent he may never be as the United States does not always follow
up drone strikes with confirmation of who was killed. Instead,
reports from locals, aid workers and local media are relied upon
to identify the dead if possible, as victims are often burnt beyond
recognition, or bodies are unrecoverable.

Additionally, the United States employs a particularly
indiscriminate tactic known as the ‘double-tap’ method. This
involves striking the same area twice in relatively quick succession
to ensure that targets are deceased. This method has the effect of
deterring people from going to the aid of victims, thus increasing
the number of dead, and has killed numerous ‘first-responders’.
According to Ben Emmerson of the United Nations, ‘Since
President Obama took office, at least fifty civilians were killed
in follow-up strikes when they had gone to help victims, and
more than twenty civilians have also been attacked in deliberate
strikes on funerals and mourners’.5 The US government rejects
claims that drone strikes target civilians, and argues that civilian
casualties are ‘exceedingly rare’, perhaps even in the ‘single digits’.6

How the government verifies these claims after admitting that
the identities of signature-strike victims are sometimes unknown
is uncertain. Furthermore, the US government classifies all adult
males of military age as militants until their identity is confirmed
posthumously, which greatly distorts the number of civilian
casualties.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) is considered
to provide the most accurate account of casualty figures because
of its comprehensive array of information sources and robust
methodology. To date, it estimates that between 3114 and 4542
people have been killed by drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen
and Somalia.7 Of these between 460 and 1070 were confirmed
civilians, equating to 14–23 per cent civilian deaths. It is further
estimated that the United States kills a ‘high-value target’ less
than 2 per cent of the time; the remaining 98 per cent consists
of ‘low-value targets’, civilians or people whose identities are
unknown. It must be noted that both parties to the strikes
have an interest in varying the estimated number of deaths, the
targeted states to increase international condemnation of the
strikes by exaggerating fatality figures and the United States to
lessen international condemnation by decreasing the numbers.
Regardless of the number of civilian casualties, the ‘signature’
strike and ‘double-tap’ methods constitute a breach of the
principle of discrimination and are, consequently, unethical
behaviour.

Legitimate targets
The condition of military necessity requires that only those things
with military connections are legitimate targets. An example of
such would be the destruction of a naval base instead of a school
or a church, as the former provides a strategic military advantage.
This was enshrined in US domestic law in 1863. What constitutes
an act of military necessity is debated. However, it is generally
agreed that an act of war to achieve political ends does not consti-
tute an act of military necessity. An example of this was the arrest
of US Central Intelligence Agency official Raymond Davis. Da-
vis was arrested in Pakistan for the murder of two people. In the
three weeks preceding his arrest, the United States conducted six
drone strikes in Pakistan. While negotiations between the United
States and Pakistan for Davis’s release continued, no strikes were
undertaken. In the three-week period after negotiations ceased,
while the United States was awaiting Davis’s release, eleven strikes were conducted. After he was released, no strikes occurred for one month. The Congressional Research Centre and the Global Justice Clinic of both Stanford and New York University law schools argue that in this case the United States used drone strikes to influence the Pakistani government on more than one occasion:

The data we gathered, reviewed in light of parallel political events and key moments of US–Pakistani relations, suggests a troubling correlation between events of political significance and the intensity of drone strikes. Without access to confidential strike data held by the CIA, one cannot be certain that these strikes were not of military necessity. Even so, the pattern of strikes mirroring US–Pakistan relations indicates that the condition of military necessity is unlikely to have been consistently met.

The United States stands by its assertion that drone strikes are more ethical than other methods of combat, such as airstrikes or ground-troop deployment because these result in more civilian casualties than drone strikes. This may be so, but the Obama administration fails to publicly address the implications of ‘blowback’, which creates the potential for more civilian deaths in the long term in retaliation for the strikes. Resultant ‘blowback’ is of central concern to those who perceive the strikes as strategically disadvantageous.

**Unforeseen disadvantages**

The term ‘blowback’ refers to the unforeseen negative consequences arising from a political policy. Blowback occurs when a state’s short-term behaviour achieves an immediate objective but in the long run is self-defeating. The United States’ official counter-terrorism strategy aims to defeat al-Qaeda primarily by offering support to governments whose territories are infected with al-Qaeda operatives. They argue that repeated drone strikes have decapitated al-Qaeda factions by removing leaders and making organisation and planning extremely difficult, consequently reducing the likelihood of terrorist attacks against Americans.

Conversely, the drone programme manifests many forms of blowback that counteract this strategy. The first is termed ‘accidental guerrilla syndrome’. Drone strikes undermine the legitimacy of governments where they occur by breaching sovereignty and demonstrating a lack of respect for the host state. To a host state’s citizens, the government appears powerless and incapable of protecting its own citizens and unable to enact its own judicial processes. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari denounced drone strikes for ‘creating a credibility gap’, an assertion reinforced by the Pakistani high commissioner in London:

The whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens.

The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.

When a government is discredited to such an extent, people turn to groups such as al-Qaeda to seek retaliation against it out of anger over its failure to prevent the strikes. Hence, the strikes are used as a tool of recruitment by terrorist groups. Moreover, the United States pays millions of dollars in aid to Pakistan to assist government stabilisation efforts to counter terrorism, while at the same time destabilising the government with drone strikes, thereby entrapping all parties in a vicious cycle and contributing to another form of blowback: retaliatory attacks against Americans. The Pakistani ambassador to the United States told CNN that ‘the drone programme radicalises foot soldiers, tribes and entire villages in our region’. This view is echoed by many citizens living in the vicinity of drone strikes, and by academics.

**Important correlation**

A study by the Middle East Policy Council found a correlation between drone strikes and retaliatory attacks, concluding that ‘it is probable that drone strikes provide motivation for retaliation’. Moreover, the perpetrators of both the Khost bombing and the foiled Times Square bombing directly cited drone strikes as their motivation for the attacks. The Rand Corporation conducted a comprehensive study of how terrorist groups were disestablished and concluded that the use of military force was the least effective method. They argue that policing methods are significantly more effective at countering terrorism, as declaring war against al-Qaeda has increased public expectation that there is a battlefield solution, when there is not.

Furthermore, doing so tends to legitimize the terrorists’ view that they are conducting a jihad (holy war) against the United States and elevates them to the status of holy warriors. Terrorists should be perceived as criminals, not holy warriors.

Farea Al-Muslimi, a Yemeni man living in a village subject to drone strikes, this year stood before the US Senate to articulate the effects drone attacks are having on his community. ‘What radicals had previously failed to achieve in my village [turning people against America]’, he stated, ‘one drone strike accomplished in an instant: there is now an intense anger and growing hatred of

Villagers bury the victim an alleged US missile attack in a Pakistani tribal area near the Afghanistan border
In an effort to prevent further terrorist attacks, drone strikes inadvertently incite them by targeting the symptom of the problem rather than the cause: cited as an aggressive, interventionist US foreign policy. If the United States wishes to prevent terrorist attacks against its citizens, it must address the source of dissent.

It is doubtful that the United States would continue employing a tactic that appears to have such adverse strategic consequences unless that tactic was in fact contributing to the achievement of some goal. When asked recently how long the War on Terror will last, Michael Sheehan, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, answered ‘at least ten to twenty years’. This was then clarified by Army Colonel Anne Edgecombe: this did not mean ten to twenty years including the twelve already past, but ten to twenty years from today. One may reasonably conclude — to quote Orwell — that this war is not meant to be won. It is meant to be continuous. Hence one must consider what benefits the United States has obtained from the prolonged societal insecurity generated by war. Some suggest that a heightened state of vulnerability amongst a populace allows the government to usurp civil liberties such as privacy in return for the promise of security.

This article has touched on but a few of the many ethical and strategic implications New Zealand must consider when contemplating whether to support US drone strikes, particularly those that target New Zealanders. There are, of course, also pertinent political considerations to be addressed, such as whether we are willing to censor our denunciation of drone strikes to preserve US–New Zealand relations.

NOTES
8. Ibid., p.115.
13. Ibid.

People protest against US drone attacks in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan in September 2013

A Pakistani villager holds a wreckage of a suspected surveillance drone which crashed in his town near the Afghanistan border

A US missile strike on a compound killed five people near the Afghanistan–Pakistan border on 27 June 2010

Drone attacks against US sovereignty

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David Lange’s global diplomacy

Ken Ross assesses the performance of a former Labour prime minister.

‘In Lange’s case what attracted him to politics was not power over others, but the stage it provided on which he could perform. The additional attraction of the foreign affairs area was that it provided a world stage.’ (John Henderson)

Lange’s gonzo dynamics were his strength and in due course his fatal political weakness. He scores poorly on the maturity of mind and intellectual capital measures I use to consider the global diplomacy of the fifteen prime ministers New Zealand has had since 1945. When combined with his maverick approach, the three measures explain why Lange was sometimes flawed in his global diplomacy, most spectacularly his Yale speech on Anzac Day 1989 that led five months later to his early departure from the prime ministership.

Lange’s considerable portfolio of accomplished serious global diplomacy more than matches those flawed performances. He brought kudos to himself and to New Zealand. The Kirk brand — New Zealand as a progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to our national identity — flourished again. There were brilliant moments, including the 1985 Oxford Union debate. Lange struck out for an Oscar, not for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Lange’s gold medal has to be for promoting New Zealand’s enduring non-nuclear status. Norman Kirk would have been gruff with Lange for some of his antics along the way, but would have been well-pleased with the resulting non-nuclear status. Lange’s other medal-worthy accomplishments include recovering our international credibility, most particularly in India (and elsewhere in South Asia), Africa and the United Nations.

Lange secured invaluable exposure for New Zealand beyond our traditional audiences in Canberra, London and Washington, where we were too often expected to be a loyal little brother. The ‘Small State Rampant’ mantra that was first tagged to Peter Fraser was again in full flight. New Zealand’s good international citizenship credentials were being polished after Muldoon had muddied them.

Lange’s international good standing is captured here with three illustrations. Lange has recounted that Geoffrey Howe quipped to him ‘It has been a good day for you, Prime Minister’ when he (then Margaret Thatcher’s foreign secretary) and Lange were in Vancouver for the October 1987 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Chogm). Howe then mentioned to him ‘four African leaders have congratulated me on my government’s anti-nuclear policy’. As Lange notes, ‘he and I didn’t look much alike, but neither of us was slender and we both wore glasses’. When in London at the International Institute for Strategic Studies throughout 1996, I found that Lange was still approvingly remembered by many ‘wise old owls’ including for at least partially inspiring, most recently, New Zealand’s classy act throughout our UN Security Council term. Lange was an important bonus card when I was advocating Don McKinnon’s Commonwealth secretary-general candidacy in the late 1990s — assuring that like Lange had been, McKinnon was a paid-up member of Team Kirk.

Lange reflections

Of the fifteen prime ministers, Lange has been written about the most in regards to his global diplomacy. He is the one who has written the most insightfully on his own prime ministerial time, particularly about his global diplomacy. As well as his two memoirs Nuclear Free — The New Zealand Way (1990) and My Life (2005), much of Lange’s considerable portfolio of post-prime ministerial journalism survives in two collections, Broadsides (1992) and Cuttings (1994), each of which is well laced with his observations on his global diplomacy.

John Henderson, the smartest keeper of the flame for Lange’s legacy, was as the prime minister’s ‘chief of staff’ heavily engaged in Lange’s global diplomacy from mid-1985. He has served us well with several short Lange reflections. His proposed major contribution is awaited, with hope.

The stand-out dissection of the quintessential Lange is in Of New Zealand’s fifteen prime ministers since 1945, David Lange has been written about the most in regards to his global diplomacy. He is the one who has written the most insightfully on his own prime ministerial time, particularly about his global diplomacy. Lange gave the Kirk brand — New Zealand as a progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to our national identity — a new impetus. His standout achievement was in promoting New Zealand’s enduring non-nuclear status. He also secured invaluable exposure for New Zealand beyond our traditional audiences in Canberra, London and Washington and repolished New Zealand’s good international citizenship credentials.

Ken Ross was an analyst with the External Assessments Bureau, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet from 1976 until 2012. He has been a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra. This article is a short version of an article he has written the most insightfully on his own prime ministerial time, particularly about his global diplomacy. As well as his two memoirs Nuclear Free — The New Zealand Way (1990) and My Life (2005), much of Lange’s considerable portfolio of post-prime ministerial journalism survives in two collections, Broadsides (1992) and Cuttings (1994), each of which is well laced with his observations on his global diplomacy.

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Gerald Hensley’s 2006 memoir Final Approaches. It is a more companionable insight than Hensley gave seven years later in Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984–1987, his champagne-quality account that primarily reflects the contemporary establishment perspective of our traditional alliance capitals — Canberra, London and Washington. It is a brilliant illustration of Hensley’s earlier caution, described in Final Approaches, to remind us that files often lack ‘the human fingerprints of those who made them, all the muddle and misgivings, the atmospherics, which precede what actually happened’.3

The Lange library of prime ministerial literature begins with Vernon Wright’s David Lange, Prime Minister: A Profile (1984), a quick short effort. Most recently, Geoffrey Palmer in his Reform: A Memoir (2013) has contributed one of the best appreciations. There are the bunch of ‘seconds’ — from the second cousin, Michael Bassett’s Working with David: Inside the Lange Cabinet (2008); the second wife, Margaret Pope’s At the Turning Point: My Political Life with David Lange (2011), and the second efforts by Lange and Hensley. None of the ‘seconds’ rate better than second-tier contributions for informing ‘who is this prime minister, David Lange’. Lange’s and Hensley’s first contributions are finer accounts than their respective revisionist writings.

Late re-engagement
Near to his death, Lange re-engaged in his writing ‘because I thought it was time to say something for myself about my political career instead of having others make it up’. My Life, his re-telling of his prime ministership, was pedestrian as he sought to rebut the ‘others’. The explanation for his weak performance became explicable the following year when the paperback version of My Life appeared. The addition of a foreword by Margaret Pope and an introduction by Finlay Macdonald, his editor, acknowledged what a frantic effort it had been for Lange and them. Macdonald correctly highlights that the richness of Lange’s ‘final words’ are telling about his growing up.

Lange’s global diplomacy is best captured in the Margaret Clark edited For the Record: Lange and the Fourth Labour Government (2005), which also catches well the swirling advice that Lange had received from his mandarins and political advisors. The anti-nuclear protest movement is not heard here. In Bruce Brown (ed), New Zealand in World Affairs Vol III: 1972–1990 (1999), Ian McGibbon and Malcolm McKinnon landscape finely the global contours that Lange faced as he pursued his diplomatic goals. It is here that Rod Alley enables the protest voices’ strength to be assessed. A recent American perspective, from Roger Dingman, is a well distilled perspective without adding new revelations.4

Lange suffers the fate of Oscar Wilde’s wit that there is nothing worse than not being talked about. Most of his principal foreign interlocutors have been exceedingly spare in fitting him into their memoirs. The Downing Street Years (1993), Margaret Thatcher’s second volume of her memoirs, and her principal biographies — John Campbell’s Margaret Thatcher: Vol 2, The Iron Lady (2000) and Robin Harris’s Not for Turning: the Life of Margaret Thatcher (2013) — have no mention. We have to await Charles Moore’s second volume of his authorised Thatcher biography for his coverage of the pertinent period. Geoffrey Howe’s Conflict of Loyalty (1994) and George Shultz’s Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (1993) have no reference to Lange, ANZUS or New Zealand.

Bob Hawke and Bill Hayden do write of Lange in their memoirs, unsurprisingly in Hawke’s case not affectionately. Lange, with all his delinquent intellectual talents blazing, reviewed The Hawke Memoirs (1994) at length (2500 words) for The Bulletin (Sydney).5 In his 1996 memoir, Bill Hayden: An Autobiography, Hayden devotes twenty pages to Lange’s prime ministership, including the implications for Canberra. (In the early 1980s, when the party’s leader, Hayden had sought to have the Australian Labor Party adopt a non-nuclear stance akin to what their New Zealand cousins introduced: the result was Hawke replacing Hayden in February 1983 and soon after becoming prime minister.) Hayden’s assessment of the dynamic between Lange and George Shultz is among the most astute from any of those involved.

Glorious theatre
With Muldoon’s political demise in July 1984, Lange set about reinstating the Kirk brand. Lange warrants his high rating for the manner in which he accomplished this. To do so was a considerable accomplishment. To do so with the glorious theatre that Lange displayed enabled the spring back in the nation’s step, and without us becoming lemmings. The inability of Margaret Thatcher and Bob Hawke to run over Lange was exhilarating.

Lange performed global diplomacy credibly. Often he was a serious responsible prime minister. The re-establishment of decent relations with India is a prime instance. The endeavour in turning around our poor image in Africa was another. Our unsuccessful bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for a 1983–84 term reflected the damage Muldoon had sustained for New Zealand’s global reputation. Helen Clark has recently acknowledged Lange’s African initiatives meant our ‘colours were nailed to the mast of the global movement for a free South Africa’.6 The iconic photograph of a rain-drenched Lange, wearing a Nuke-Busters tee-shirt, at Victoria Falls exudes at least a thousand times over the adage a picture is worth a thousand words.

Lange backed that dynamic with astute appointments to head the diplomatic missions in New Delhi and Africa — Sir Ed Hillary and Chris Laidlaw. He picked well for his advocate in Washington — Sir Wallace Rowling.

Lange could sense when faraway international developments had ramifications for New Zealand. The United States’ military intervention in Grenada, the Caribbean ‘hotspot’, in October 1983 illustrates. The Commonwealth’s on-going concern for its small states, of which Grenada was one, was something Lange absorbed and then reflected in his decisions. This was particularly
so with the South Pacific islands states, Wellington’s ‘front garden’. Responding to the coup in Fiji in May 1987 — that saw Prime Minister Timoci Bavadra, the head of the local Labour Party, overthrown — was an instance.

**Deft performance**

Lange’s handling of relations with Vanuatu during his prime ministership was a more deft performance than Hawke’s much more aggressive style. Lange had the confidence of Vanuatu’s leadership, such as Prime Minister Walter Lini. That accomplished much in moderating the Lini government’s stroppy independent stances.7

Lange green-lighted two further important initiatives. Neither is well known to New Zealanders. Both were to pay valuable dividends when we sought to serve on the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994. The first was in New Zealand officials taking a lead role in seeking the successful re-inscription of New Caledonia, the French Pacific territory, on the UN List of Non-Self-Governing Territories in 1986. The second, in 1987, was initiating the bid for the new Security Council term (a bold move only five years after we had been left a bridesmaid when Muldoon had led the charge — so far our only failed bid).

Occasionally, Lange did superbly well. His dawn encounter on 1 May 1987 with Bill Hayden, the Australian foreign minister, at the Ohakea air force base in the central North Island is such a classic. Lange’s few public mentions of the occasion are of a light hearted tenor. He handled the encounter, which he has described as his ‘most bizarre’ with a foreign visitor while he was foreign minister, with aplomb. Lange sent Hayden home with a serious rejoinder to Bob Hawke.8

Lange lacked any skills to be a successful coalition builder in global diplomacy. He often recounted his boredom with summitry. When he stood himself down as foreign minister in August 1987 Lange faded from the international stage, no longer doing major global diplomacy.

**Nuclear issues**

During Lange’s prime ministership his global diplomacy was dominated by the nuclear issue — the USS Buchanam’s rejection, public support for the nuclear-free status as explored by the Frank Corner-led public inquiry, the passage of the legislation and the collapse of ANZUS. The astutest succinct story-telling public-ly available has to be Rod Alley’s account in *The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand* (1987).9 Malcolm Templeton’s *Standing Upright Here: New Zealand in the Nuclear Age 1945–1990* (2005) is the forensic account that places the others’ story-telling in better perspective. Most importantly, Templeton puts beyond doubt how valuable Helen Clark was to Lange so that New Zealand legislated a concrete-strength base for the non-nuclear policy. The final chapter of Malcolm McKinnon’s 1993 book *Independence and Foreign Policy* is the other quality account of these events.

There is an on-going paper war. 2013 saw three important contributions appear. Each reflected the concerns of one of the three ‘camps’ of combatants in the non-nuclear campaigns. The alliance loyalists were represented by Hensley’s *Friendly Fire*; the protest movement by banner carrier Marie Leadbetter’s *Peace, Power and Politics: the Making of a Nuclear-free New Zealand*; and the Labour leadership’s voice by Palmer’s *Reform: A Memoir*, a marvellous support act to Lange. This trio are essential building-blocks for what has yet to be published — the definitive account of this landmark episode for New Zealand.

The creators of the ‘Yes, Prime Minister’ television series would have had a wealth of material to develop scripts from Lange’s dynamics with his own officials and his principal interlocutors in the trio of traditional capitals. At home, Lange was blessed, and cursed, with an over-flowing bowl of first-class mandarins.

**Plentiful mandarins**

Lange is the only one of the fifteen prime ministers who had a plentiful supply of mandarins. Otherwise, there have been just three occasions when a single stand-out mandarin has become important for a prime minister to progress their global diplomacy: Alister McIntosh with Peter Fraser, Frank Corner with Norman Kirk and Simon Murdoch with Jim Bolger. I am developing in the book the mandarins and lemons theme to chase the contention that the former are an absolute necessity for a New Zealand prime minister generating quality global diplomacy.

So far, I have found too little published of the New Zealand officials’ diversity of advice to Lange. The story-telling that is the most valuable is from Merwyn (Merv) Norrish, the secretary of foreign affairs (1980–88). His chapter ‘The Lange Government’s foreign policy’ in the Margaret Clark edited *For the Record: Lange and the Fourth Labour Government* is the leading clear-sighted reflection from any of the officials most closely entangled in the events.10 From what else is available, primarily Malcolm Templeton’s writings, it appears that those closest to the thinking of Lange, and Palmer, were Tim Francis and Chris Beeby. There were various shades of superior grey matter circulating; leading that pack were Norrish, Hensley and Henderson. There were also the very smart and tradition-minded defence advisors, Denis McLean and Ewan Jamieson. This was the territory of C.P. Snow at his best, as in his *Corridors of Power* (1962) — it was not the turf for John Le Carre’s characters.

With Lange’s arrival in the Beehive Hensley knew what was needed — he had headed

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Denis McLean

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the Prime Minister’s small department for his predecessor’s final four years. But, he, Lange and all others failed to discern all of the essential linkages that Hensley reckoned would ‘settle the internal map of the Government, the network of personal links, antipathies and informal pathways that — whatever the formal arrangements — determines how each administration works’.11 It was to be a maze unlike any previous formation around a New Zealand prime minister: the crunch dichotomy was that in academic terms there were simultaneously prime ministerial government and Cabinet government operating on different floors of the Beehive. No instructional manual existed for this situation. It became a play of many layers — dramatic, comedic and, though without any dead bodies, much mystery.

Lange found ‘for the most part, the government had to pursue the [nuclear-free] policy against the advice of its permanent officials’.12 Malcolm McKinnon captures the officials’ predicament: official advice was ignored, but officials also suffered directly from the change in policy. It was the professional environment and standing of New Zealand diplomats and foreign ministry officials in Wellington, Washington, and elsewhere which was affected more than anything or anyone else by the ‘cold war’ imposed on New Zealand by the Reagan administration.13

Central role
In contrast, Helen Clark’s central role in ensuring New Zealand became non-nuclear is well recorded (to be elaborated in the forthcoming article covering her global diplomacy). In his 1990 memoir Lange acknowledges that it was only when Clark gave the okay did he know that the legislation was sure of its passage through Parliament — Labour’s parliamentary backbenchers took their lead from her rather than him as the prime minister.14 A substantially completed jigsaw comes together from that insight from Lange, complemented by insights from others, particularly Malcolm Templeton, Margaret Wilson, Colin James, Denis Welch and John Henderson.

Lange weakened his performance by publicly declaring that New Zealand’s non-nuclear stance was not for export: even so, the New Zealand example, as portrayed by him, reverberated globally to garner us a reputation as boxing well above our diplomatic weight. Sure, it partially froze us out in the traditional capitals; that for most New Zealanders was a price payable. This willingness was boosted by those capitals’ non-sympathetic responses to the French state’s terrorist action in New Zealand — sinking the Rainbow Warrior at an Auckland wharf on 10 July 1985.

Once he had published Nuclear Free — The New Zealand Way in 1990, Lange seldom commented on the fourth Labour government’s non-nuclear achievements. In that memoir,treasuring Bolger’s March 1990 U-turn Lange wrote his own final-term report card:

I think it came down to political reality. Nuclear-free New Zealand had gone beyond politics; support for the policy had long since detached itself from opinion about the government.... There is now engrained in the New Zealand public a conviction that New Zealand was right to deny access to nuclear ships and right to stand aside from the nuclear arms race.15 That the non-nuclear status continues undamaged past Lange’s death is the tribute he most deserved for his valuable support of the Kirk brand.

NOTES
8. David Lange, ‘The hazards of standing on ceremony’, Dominion, 3 Mar 1992, p.6. The only other time he mentions the Ohakea encounter is in his review (endnote 5 refers) of Bob Hawke’s memoir where he noted that Hawke also does not refer to his sending Hayden on the mission to Ohakea.
12. Lange, Nuclear Free, p.65.
15. Ibid., pp.208–9.
New Zealand and the world: challenges we must meet

Winston Peters outlines New Zealand First’s approach to international affairs.

The topic ‘New Zealand and the World: Challenges We Must Meet’ is a big canvas. As it suggests, it concerns a perspective on global issues and the increasing importance of our foreign relations and how we respond. However, at the outset it is appropriate to make a few remarks about the botched micro-meddling restructuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The misconceived reorganisation of MFAT was worse than just an exercise in incompetence and bungling, it was insulting because, looking back on my term as minister of foreign affairs, the staff of MFAT were always fully professional, very experienced and totally committed to serving New Zealand. Of course, no organisation is immune from change. And, as Disraeli observed, ‘in a progressive organisation change is constant’. But as the old saying has it — you do not burn your house down to cook a meal!

When we look out on the world we realise what a fortunate country New Zealand is. In the context of the globe we are a small state. And certainly, we are in proximity to many small states in the South Pacific. We are in a world of giants — the United States, China, India and Indonesia and many others. The ultimate challenge of our external relations policy is simple and stark and really the same as any other nation state’s. It can be summed up in three words: national self preservation. When it is all rendered down, it is about ensuring our security and stability in an uncertain world.

And arguably that world is growing more uncertain. The sources of stress around the world are manifold — and many consider they are growing in intensity:
- population growth
- climate change
- poverty
- dislocation to the world economy occasioned by the Western financial crisis
- corruption
- terrorism.

And that is by no means an exhaustive list of global challenges. These sources of stress are not arcane border disputes or fine points of diplomatic protocol. These are big cross-border challenges — and any possibility of a solution lies at a global level. That is the world we are part of and must relate to.

Growing risk

Frankly, we have no optimism that overall things will suddenly improve. On the contrary, it would be prudent for New Zealand to anticipate a world of growing social instability such as we are now seeing in states as diverse as Egypt and Ukraine. The longer this type of upheaval goes on, and the wider it spreads, the greater the risk is that it will morph into a wider global crisis.

So what is to be done? New Zealand First’s approach to international relations is, above all, to be realistic — and that is the approach we believe will best serve New Zealand well.

What does realism entail? Let us take a quick survey of our relationships around the world, because the global challenges we face need to be seen in the context of our existing relations with the rest of the world.

First and foremost we must work to strengthen bonds with our trusted allies — Australia and the United States. That is a starting point for New Zealand. Australia and New Zealand must continue to act collaboratively across a wide range of issues. We must also maintain a high level of military co-operation with Australia and that should extend to buying the same defence equipment and high levels of inter-operability.

We are particularly concerned that the changes that Australia introduced to its immigration law in 2001 ending the automatic right of citizenship for New Zealanders, if allowed to fester, have the potential to undermine our longstanding relationship. And
it is worth noting that in the eight years prior to that change in Australia’s immigration law, New Zealand First constantly warned that our country was being used as a bolt hole for later access to Australia. Sadly, our warnings were ignored and both the National and Labour parties, along with other political parties that similarly would not make a stand against unfocused immigration policies, must share the responsibility for the current unfairness for our countrymen and women in Australia.

Disingenuous criticism
Prime Minister Key’s efforts to blame the Labour Party are disingenuous in the extreme. His party labeled New Zealand First’s policy as racist and he is now attempting to blame others for coming back empty-handed from his visit to Australia in February.

The situation of the Kiwis in Australia post-2001 is not going away and our prime minister’s failure to make any progress is feeble in the extreme. Bear in mind we will not make any progress on this until we tighten up our immigration laws and Australia believes, as they did for 100 years, that our laws will not unfairly impact upon them.

The South Pacific is a priority and we must work with our neighbour states to improve regional economies and political systems. There is a significant risk some states in this region may fail due to weak institutions, structures and processes. New Zealand will not be unaffected if some nations of the South Pacific region become ungovernable. That is why we should increase our efforts and aid to support democratic institutions in the South Pacific.

We need new initiatives on a number of fronts and we will be much more effective if New Zealand properly resources Radio New Zealand as a source of reliable news and comment in the Pacific. In essence, Radio New Zealand is the voice of New Zealand in the region and that voice should be heard and it will not be unless we give it the resources.

We currently are failing to understand that our status in the world could be dramatically enhanced by an earned reputation in the whole region as a force for good. There is no avoiding the sad fact that our declining economic performance as a leading per capita income economy affects how the rest of the world sees us. In a former time ministers of foreign affairs and trade attended international forums with the unstated benefit of coming from one of the world’s great economies. Diplomats are, after all, human. They see beyond words and appearances. They know when they are talking to a Norway or Singapore. There is the unstated recognition and envy that these people come from economic powerhouses. That is a form of respect that we should never overlook.

Rather than this constant repetition of ‘punching above our weight’, we should recognise that economically we are punching way below it.

Vital challenge
China and India will continue to grow as global economic and military powers. Both are important and growing markets for our key exports. We often overlook the size and significance of Indonesia — a huge and populous state. Japan is still a critical player in the Asian region. The challenge here will be to keep an even keel in our political and diplomatic relationship with Japan and China at a time when the China–Japan relationship is under strain as a result of territorial disputes.

China–Japan tensions are real and may have all sorts of unforeseen consequences. China is now making more strident claims in the South China Sea, and is backing those claims by military postures and diplomatic activities. Japan has shown in the past an extraordinary ability to respond to national challenges. Its ability to defend its interests should not be under-estimated.

We are now in a multipolar world. And the political, economic and military pre-eminence of the United States is waning. How a multipolar world will function is still an open question. What we can say is that however it plays out New Zealand will have to fit in.

In a multipolar world there are varying combinations of political, economic and military strengths — the situation is fundamentally fluid and dynamic. In this world small states still have rights — but exercising those rights is likely to mean playing a deft hand.

Longstanding concerns
New Zealand First has had longstanding concerns with the Trans-Pacific Partnership because of the prevailing secrecy that cloaks the TPP meetings. However well-intentioned the TPP might be in theory, secrecy is an anathema in an open, free and democratic society. The National-led government has shamefully capitulated to the TPP veil of secrecy.

New Zealand may stand to benefit from multilateral and regional trade arrangements that will grow our economy and wealth. But we must be vigilant and not make blind assumptions. We could easily fall into arrangements that result in serious damage to our economic interests.

Regionalism is an important perspective and New Zealand must play a real role in our region within our capacity. We must do our fair share. As minister of foreign affairs, I spearheaded a major push to get more resources for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade — both for the ministry itself and also for the aid programme. The South Pacific region is the area where we can make a real difference and also perhaps act as an intermediary with the greater world powers as they too look to the South Pacific.

Essential requirement
In this world, annoyingly, you seldom get something for nothing. For New Zealand to successfully meet the tasks and challenges outlined above will call for investment in a well-funded foreign service. We must have an effective, professional and well-reourced foreign service to protect New Zealand’s interests.

That means we have to have people with the training, the experience, the judgment and the intellectual capacity to handle very complex and fluid situations — people who can understand events and distinguish signal from noise. For the government to put that at risk was folly of the highest order. One has to wonder just what intellectual processes were playing out in Cabinet for them to think that their judgment was superior to that of the finest government department that we had.

Although New Zealand may be a small actor on the international scene, we can still play a unique role, earning the respect of other nations, if we are deft, smart and agile with a well-resourced foreign service allowed to get on with the job. When we are influential after the general election later this year, we intend to give foreign affairs a high and immediate priority. We have done it before and we will do it again.
Finding our way in a transformed world

Terence O’Brien discusses New Zealand’s place in the international system in a time of rapid globalisation.

Our world is transformed by a spellbinding revolution in communications technology, by incessant flows of people, ideas, capital and commerce across borders, by striking progress in science, medicine and space/undersea exploration. We call it globalisation. While there are some distant corners of the globe as yet largely untouched by convulsive change, others are embroiled with cruel internal conflict. The causes are varied, but they include destabilising repercussions of globalisation alongside regional, ethnic and religious hostility. The Middle East today provides an example of such multiple pressures. In the world at large, however, while inequality and distribution of income remain to imperil growth and stability, more people have been lifted out of absolute poverty over the last 40 years than at any other time in history. China is chiefly responsible for that dramatic change.

Instantaneous exposure to cataclysmic events in real time through the media is what distinguishes modern human experience — Syrian victims of chemical weapon attack, the gruesome power of the Fukushima tsunami, hideous brutality of airborne suicide bombing in New York, the repeated agonies of tens of thousands of malnourished refugees in Ethiopia, Somalia and other places; and so it goes on and on and on. In a real sense the modern international relations agenda is shaped, or at least strongly influenced, by the power of communications technology. Our senses are overwhelmed by constant tragedy. What does it all mean? Where in the world are we headed? Is the international system up to the task of mediating the challenges?

There is a profound need for confidence, for reassurance, for predictability about safety and well-being — both individually and collectively — because this present globalisation of our world offers both great opportunity and heightened risk almost in the same breath. For governments, which are our collective agents, the need to co-operate constructively for the good of humankind and the planet itself has never been more acute. Globalisation has, moreover, extensively empowered non-government forces and influences, so that political authorities are not in charge in quite the same way as before. Powerful governments, notably the three greatest, despite their best efforts and even more so in the case of the United States, have responded (in the name of counter-terrorism and cyber security) by significantly enhancing intrusive powers of worldwide surveillance, scrutiny and clandestine disruption. This has provoked extensive popular concern, including inside New Zealand, about consequential threats to civil liberties, personal privacy and freedoms on the internet.

Vital necessity

The need to nourish trust between nations points, above all, to the vital necessity for accepted rules to govern predictable international behaviour. It was the cruelty and widespread desolation of prolonged 20th century conflict that first inspired efforts, led by the United States, to invent a system intended to create rules-based foundations for the collective pursuit of peace, prosperity, justice and respect for the rights and dignity of the human individual. The resultant United Nations and related systems were, and remain, an unprecedented global experiment. After some 70 years, however, the original architect, along with other governments, has grown progressively disenchanted with the experiment that is now severely tested by the forces of globalisation.

The United Nations contains, moreover, within itself the inevitable seeds of severe disappointment given the fateful link between its lofty ideals and the stark reality of niggardly government behaviour driven by narrow self-interest. The multilateral system does not exist in a vacuum. Its capacities and relevance depend squarely on commitment from member states, large and small, and their willingness to pool their sovereignties in collective effort. At the bottom line, it is the quality of...
their political and diplomatic relations one with another that, therefore, create the opportunities in, and set the tone at, the United Nations and in other international institutions. Logjam at the UN Security Council over, for example, what to do about the agonies of Syria are a function of degraded bilateral relations between key members — the United States and Russia — that are the result of a series of actions over time by each government that have vexed the other. There is not a monopoly of virtue around the Security Council table. Neither the system nor its members live up to expectations.

Yet the sheer range of responsibilities for collective effort assigned by common agreement to the United Nations and related agencies (from agricultural development to nuclear weapons; from fisheries to intellectual property; from the right of the child to the law of the sea and so on) cannot simply be disregarded. The very fact of universal membership, moreover, actually legitimises the system, and by providing a permanent negotiating platform across a vast range of inter-governmental activity (something the world has never previously experienced), it offers (however imperfectly) opportunity for large and small alike to bargain, to defend interests and help collectively set the rules of the road. The UN General Assembly performs the annual role of a safety valve for letting off steam by member countries on contentious issues as well staking out national positions on key problems and permitting senior corridor contacts between adversaries. Popular opinion is mostly captured, however, by deplorable gridlock at the Security Council, but there is vastly more to the actual system than just the council. Much of the United Nations’ work on economic and social improvement, refugees, human rights and averting conflict proceeds without fanfare.

**Justified frustration**

Nonetheless, frustration and disillusionment with the system and its inefficiencies, lack of drive and even corruption — as well as severe disappointments with related multilateral institutions — are entirely justified. Yet at the same time the idea of chucking over the whole multi-dimensional enterprise and starting afresh with a clean slate to invent a replacement system would be massively unrealistic in all the circumstances of the world today. The recent invention of the G20, comprising leaders of the world's twenty largest economies, in the wake of the 2008–09 global financial crisis is a new pinnacle feature on the international system landscape but not one to replace what already exists. Its principal task is to integrate the economic policies of its own select membership so as to navigate a way out for the entire world community from global economic crisis.

To remain relevant the international system today requires crucially that it be reformed to reflect the world as it is emerging in the first years of this new century. The G20 is a step in that direction. One thing is certain, international relations in the 21st century will surely be different from those of the 20th century, although some instincts in some major capitals remain obstinately stuck in old ways of thinking. Yet it is crystal clear that no one country or group of countries, however powerful, is capable alone of resolving a raft of key threats to well-being in this inter-connected world — the spread of highly dangerous weapons, climate change, energy supply, illegal migration, crime, internationalised terrorism, health pandemics — that demand co-operation from big and small alike. It is clear, too, that tectonic plates beneath international relations, and in particular the centre of gravity of the global economy, are shifting.

The emergence during the past 40 years of a group of newly industrialising countries, led by China and others, that has seized the opportunities presented by globalisation to achieve impressive economic advance is a fact now of international life. The very pace and intensity of these changes create additional pressures upon global resources and environment, as well as aggravating social and economic expectations. But the changes demonstrate, too, that to be modern and successful in the globalising world does not require that a country necessarily be Western. Indeed the 2008–09 global financial crisis and its aftermath, caused by negligent financial regulation, greedy speculation and severe insolvency in major Western economies, reinforces that point. For New Zealand the overall combination of circumstances serves conclusively to reshape the balance of our external interests.

**Threshold moment**

How can or should New Zealand's external policies adjust to this threshold moment, remembering that for an important part of the 20th century our security and our prosperity were conceived to depend upon close ties with a handful of powerful Atlantic nations? That convenient marriage of our security and prosperity interests was the product of two world wars plus an extended Cold War, and it created a particular New Zealand psychology of dependency which we seek to perpetuate today — even as the international context which produced that psychology is part of history; and even while New Zealand external interests as well as the complexion of our own society are being transformed. We need, of course, to guard a proper sense of proportion and remain...
steadfast about certain core values as well as key principles for an effective international system — most notably to sustain New Zealand support for the rule of international law. There are two particular considerations here.

First, it is crucial that the newly industrialising countries, and especially China, accept themselves to play by agreed rules, to act in predictable and principled ways. The international community, including New Zealand, has reasonable and justifiable expectations about such commitment. For it to happen, however, a greater role in management and agenda setting of the international institutions must be extended to Beijing and other key emerging governments; this will require the major Western powers — the United States, Britain, France — making the necessary space and sharing their longstanding monopolies of command. There is unsurprisingly some reluctance here. Inside the International Monetary Fund, for example, while there is acknowledgement that China deserves greater say and influence over global monetary policy because of its growing economic clout, Washington is dragging feet over action to secure necessary changes and expressing doubt about China’s actual willingness to assume the burdens of global responsibility. Here there is a real chicken and egg dilemma. Which comes first? The United States is, however, pursuing regional trade initiatives through leadership of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations that specifically exclude China. The balance of New Zealand interests squarely rests with effective accommodation of a peaceable China by major Western industrialised countries, globally and regionally, and acknowledgement on all sides that a more hybrid international order is emerging where leadership will no longer be the exclusive privilege of the West. Making the world safe for diversity becomes a supreme international task for the 21st century.

A second reason for affirming the prime importance of the rule of international law relates to New Zealand’s firm commitment to restore and expand its US relationship in the foreign, military, security intelligence and trade/economic policy integration areas. This is an exemplary objective, but we cannot ignore the reality of growing American disinclination to be involved in negotiation or ratification of a lengthening list of international treaties or codes. Conservative opinion in the United States holds that only politicians accountable to Americans should make laws governing that country, not (as they see it) unaccountable bureaucrats in multinational organisations. In some cases (the Law of the Sea, for example) where the United States has not signed, the administration constructively opts to act in practice as if it is a signatory; but in others (such as human rights, various arms control measures including the ban on nuclear weapon testing and on strengthening international justice), Washington now either stands aside from involvement or signs up only with specific exemptions regarding application to the United States itself. In the high politics of international security, Washington does not accept that the commitment of American military force necessarily depends upon authorisation from the UN Security Council. This is an immensely sensitive issue. Where the United States has launched strikes without council authorisation, as in Iraq in 2003, American leadership credentials have suffered; or, as in Kosovo during the 1990s, US incursion in company with others simply has not produced the vital solution to on-going problems.

**Nimble accomplishment**

It is a fact of New Zealand life that this country exists and operates in the international system below the radar screens of powerful countries. This is not necessarily a disadvantage. It provides the foundation for independent foreign policy whenever that suits New Zealand interests. Over the last decade of the old century, and the first years of the new one, under successive governments, New Zealand displayed nimble accomplishment, regionally and globally, politically and economically operating beneath the radar screens. It is a counsel of wisdom, nonetheless, that small countries should always remain on best of terms with the powerful. New Zealand shares interests, values and history with the United States. That is not, however, a recipe for simply perpetuating the original New Zealand 20th century psychology of dependency. A judicious relationship of ‘friend and not ally’ of the United States suits modern New Zealand, which now has other vital interests that it has nourished and needs to preserve, most of all a relationship with China that has taken some 40 years to cultivate and is now of central importance to New Zealand prosperity and well-being.

In precisely the same vein, the longstanding New Zealand commitment to the rule of international law, as a small country in global affairs incapable of asserting interests by compulsion or force of arms, remains crucial. There may, indeed, be difficult choices ahead between certain essential New Zealand interests and enhanced bilateral ties with the United States, especially at a time when Washington strives to reinvigorate US global leadership on its own terms in changing international circumstances, while the costs of that leadership are immense on an economy whose fundamentals remain under enduring stress, and when the American political system appears dysfunctional.

Foreign policy, it has been said, is all about managing contradictions. New Zealand has managed before and will doubtless do so again. We have, however, recently reformed the actual conduct of our external relations along the lines of ‘a business model’. New Zealand is pretty unique here since other governments have considered but discarded the ‘business model’ as a basis for conduct of their external relations, preferring to strengthen customary professional diplomacy with a balance of political, economic, commercial and security versatility — a recipe that served New Zealand interests previously. The new reforms have controversially entailed elimination of measurable
levels of senior and mid-level experience. It is far too early to judge how far the conduct of our relations and interests are improved or degraded by the changes.

**Sustained effort**

The lesson over the past 40 odd years for New Zealand in Asia is, however, that predictable enduring trade/economic ties inside the international system for governments depend first and foremost on something much more than a ‘business model’ — namely the careful sustained cultivation of political diplomatic relationships. Indeed, Asian leaders themselves have publicly warned outsiders to avoid an Aladdin’s Cave mentality in dealings with the region that concentrates only upon the glittering economic gains to be made and avoids deeper involvements and political commitments. The basic lesson is not new. The same message for New Zealand derives, too, from Europe where the stay of execution for exclusion of our farm exports at the time of British entry into the European Community rested entirely upon political diplomatic efforts. Trade policy alone was insufficient. And from that supreme diplomatic effort of some 50 years ago, a clear line of descent runs down directly to Fonterra today. The connections between professional diplomacy and economic advantage are real and longstanding. The same need for a broader and more sophisticated basis for relations building is true today for the Middle East, for Latin America and, of course, with regard to Australia, our most important partner comprehensively right across the board.

Prime Minister John Key has said that New Zealand’s relationship with China is ‘unquestionably and unashamedly an economic relationship’. The question of whether China, which has certainly heard that message, actually itself shares the same opinion is something else again. We should not assume so. The relationship experience is that sustained diplomacy is indispensable first to create and then to safeguard opportunity. Fonterra’s mishaps with infant formula milk powder in China and elsewhere suggest that commercial agility, while also absolutely vital, is not on its own sufficient to guarantee enduring predictable economic partnership.

**Important test**

How the world actually perceives present day New Zealand will be tested later this year when a vote of the entire UN membership will decide whether New Zealand wins a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for 2015–16. The vote is in effect a straw poll by the world on New Zealand’s contribution to the world. This is a pretty rare experience in the scheme of things for this country — we last sat on the Security Council twenty years ago, and our previous tenure was some 30 years prior to that. In nearly 70 years of UN existence, New Zealand has served a full two-year non-permanent term just twice (we served a half term of one year in the 1960s). The present bid for a seat sits amidst an overall New Zealand external effort that is itself conspicuously portrayed by politicians, officials and in documents as a concerted, comprehensive endeavour to restore international economic competitiveness to New Zealand through free trade agreements, foreign investment attraction and support externally for the New Zealand private sector. No one would dispute the absolute necessity of that goal, but the Security Council bid will not, of course, be decided on the grounds of a single-minded New Zealand crusade for transactional relationships across the globe.

In comparison to the previous bid, New Zealand has this time been on the campaign trail for much longer, and expended far greater resources. An impressive and effective website uploaded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade distinguishes the campaign effort. The final ballot is, of course, secret and any candidate must remain suitably sceptical about assurances of support, however readily given, right up to the final vote. Nothing should be taken for granted. The final stages of the campaign will decide matters as New York becomes the epicentre of the contest, and how New Zealand plays its hand on issues and crises before the United Nations, foreseen and unforeseen, will count. Our campaign effort to date reflects the seriousness of the competition that New Zealand confronts from Turkey and Spain for one of the two seats that are available. In 1993–94 New Zealand prevailed against serious competition, but it was a close run affair requiring more than one ballot. With a fair share of good fortune New Zealand can prevail again. There is, however, more at stake than previously in domestic terms. Success would vindicate the distinctive but controversial reforms championed by New Zealand political leaders at MFAT over recent times. Failure would, on the other hand, discount them. That helps explain the tenor of the present New Zealand campaign.

**NOTE**

Insurgency has been one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict throughout the course of human history and shows no sign of disappearing in the future. Indeed, at the time of this writing, insurgencies were on-going in (at least) the following countries: Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, India, Israel/Palestine, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen. Countering insurgencies is a major concern for regional governments, global coalitions and international security policy-makers alike.1 New Zealand has participated in coalition efforts to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, and it remains committed (now and in the future) to supporting the internal security efforts of numerous partner nations in the South Pacific.

### Paths to victory

Christopher Paul discusses what history tells us about how to defeat insurgencies.

Insurgency has been one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict throughout the course of human history and shows no sign of disappearing in the future. Indeed, at the time of this writing, insurgencies were on-going in (at least) the following countries: Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, India, Israel/Palestine, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Uganda and Yemen. Countering insurgencies is a major concern for regional governments, global coalitions and international security policy-makers alike.1 New Zealand has participated in coalition efforts to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, and it remains committed (now and in the future) to supporting the internal security efforts of numerous partner nations in the South Pacific.

Dr Christopher Paul is a senior social scientist at the Rand Corporation. This article is based on the presentation he gave to the NZIIA’s Wellington branch on 22 October 2013. It outlines the nature and key findings of a report that was co-authored by his Rand Corporation colleagues Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan.

When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what strategies and approaches give the government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious. A variety of concepts and areas of emphasis have been advocated, but such advocacy is usually based on relatively limited evidence. A 2013 RAND report, Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, seeks to improve this situation with thorough analyses based on a firm foundation of historical data. It offers an extensive and detailed comparative examination of insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since the Second World War.2 This short article summarises the methods and key results of that larger study.

Findings and analyses are based on detailed insurgency case studies. Each case is supported by a detailed case narrative and by quantitative data on nearly 300 individual factors. These analyses benefited considerably from both quantitative and qualitative data, as well as from the ability to move back and forth between the two. The qualitative narratives frequently suggested new factors or hypotheses, which were then tested comparatively across cases using the quantitative data. Patterns that did not make sense in the quantitative analyses were explored in the

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An age-old form of warfare, insurgency is still a problem for many governments today and merits careful study. Regional governments, global coalitions and international security policy-makers — all have an interest in finding the ways and means of countering such challenges. Historical analysis provides a good foundation for understanding the problem and seeking solutions to it. The Rand Corporation has undertaken an extensive and detailed comparative examination of insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since the Second World War, focusing on the 71 most recently resolved conflicts in particular. The findings of this important study provide useful guidelines for implementing an effective counter-insurgency strategy.
detailed narratives, with the nuance from the narratives subjected to quantitative analyses in the form of still more new hypotheses or factors.

The selected cases are the 71 most recent resolved insurgencies, spanning the period from the Second World War through 2010. In addition to being perfectly representative of the modern history of insurgency, these cases represent geographic variation (mountains, jungles, deserts, cities), regional and cultural variation (Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Balkans, the Pacific), and variation in the military capabilities and tactics of counter-insurgency forces and insurgent forces alike. The 71 cases do contain a subset of cases that are unlike the others, however, and are therefore not appropriate comparisons for the larger set of cases. Specifically, their outcomes were not driven by the effectiveness of the counter-insurgency force but by exogenous factors related to broader historical currents: the end of colonialism and the end of apartheid. We removed the cases that were fought ‘against the tide of history’ from those used for the quantitative analyses, leaving an analytic core of 59 cases (see Figure 1).

Key findings
The research quantitatively tested the performance of 24 counter-insurgency concepts against the historical record. These concepts were identified through a survey of the existing literature and based on previous research in this area. Some of the concepts were drawn from classical perspectives on counter-insurgency from the previous century, such as pacification and resettlement; others are contemporary concepts suggested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as ‘boots on the ground’. Table 1 lists the concepts. Each was represented by a set of quantitative factors in the data and was evaluated based on the strength of the relationship of those factors with case outcomes. We considered concepts to have strong support if the relationship between the implementation of the concept (as represented by the factors) and the case outcome was very strong (that is, implementation of the concept is a very strong indicator of outcome). We considered concepts to have minimal support if there was limited correlation between the implementation of the concept and the outcome. Finally, we considered there to be strong evidence against a concept if it was implemented in a greater proportion of losses than wins.

Seventeen of the 24 concepts had strong empirical support. There was strong evidence against one concept: ‘Crush them’. This concept was deemed present where the counter-insurgency force employed both escalating repress and collective punishment. Of 33 counter-insurgency forces implementing ‘crush them’, 23 lost to the insurgents.

Priority concepts
While many concepts were positively correlated with counter-insurgency success, our analyses revealed three priority concepts. These three concepts were implemented in each and every counter-insurgency win, and no losing counter-insurgency force implemented all three:

- Tangible support reduction
- Commitment and motivation
- Flexibility and adaptability.

The historical cases suggest that implementation of all three of these concepts is prerequisite for counter-insurgency success.

Tangible support refers to the ability of the insurgents to maintain needed levels of recruits, weapons and materiel, funding, intelligence and sanctuary. In every counter-insurgency win, counter-insurgency forces managed to substantially reduce tangible support to the insurgents; only two counter-insurgency forces managed to substantially reduce insurgent tangible support and still lost.

Tangible support is not the same as popular support. Although tangible support can come from a supporting population, it can also come from an external supporter — either a state sponsor or a diaspora or other non-state sponsor. The analysis concluded that tangible support trumps popular support. In many cases, tangible support came from the population, and the level of popular support corresponded with levels of tangible support. When they did not match, however, the outcome followed tangible support. All three cases in which the government had the support of the majority of the population but the insurgents’ tangible support was not significantly interrupted were counter-insurgency losses. Meanwhile, the counter-insurgency force won twelve of fourteen cases in which the counter-insurgency force reduced flows of tangible support to the insurgents but the insurgents retained popular support.

Commitment and motivation refers to the extent to which the government and counter-insurgency forces demonstrated that they were actually committed to defeating the insurgency, rather than maximising their own personal wealth and power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Degree of Evidentiary Support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacification</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimacy (government)</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy (use of force)</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Redress</td>
<td>Minimal support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Minimal support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unity of effort</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resettlement</td>
<td>Minimal support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost-benefit</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border control</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Crush them’</td>
<td>Strong evidence against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty/rewards</td>
<td>Minimal support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic communication</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Manual 3-24</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Counterinsurgency)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear, hold, and build</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Beat cop’</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Boots on the ground’</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Put a local face on it’</td>
<td>Minimal support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural awareness</td>
<td>Minimal support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment and motivation</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tangible support reduction</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticality of intelligence</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility and adaptability</td>
<td>Strong support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Degree of Support for 24 Counter-insurgency Concepts
balking external supporters by extending the conflict or avoiding (or fleeing) combat. In all counter-insurgency wins, both the government and the counter-insurgency force demonstrated their commitment and motivation, whereas the insurgents won all seventeen of the cases in which commitment and motivation were assessed as lacking. Note that this set of factors considered the commitment and motivation of both the threatened government and the counter-insurgency forces, not just one or the other.

Flexibility and adaptability captures the ability of counter-insurgency forces to adjust to changes in insurgent strategy or tactics. While some counter-insurgency forces failed to adapt in (and lost) early or intermediate phases in cases that they still managed to win, all successful counter-insurgency forces made any necessary adaptations in the decisive phase of each case.

**Distinct narratives**

A regular theme in discussions about insurgency is that ‘every insurgency is unique’. The distinct narratives for the 71 cases examined here lead us to concur, except that those distinct or unique characteristics do not matter at this level of analysis. All the findings of the study hold across the core cases without an exception for unique narratives or cases. This holds for the prioritised concepts, and it holds for the counter-insurgency scorecard (discussed next). Where the distinctive features and characteristics of individual insurgencies most certainly do matter is in actual efforts to implement concepts and practices on the ground. Our findings do not suggest a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to counter-insurgency at the execution level; rather, they suggest that there is a finite set of good practices that a counter-insurgency force should always aspire to realise, but how a counter-insurgency force actually does so — and how difficult it is — will vary depending on the context.

A simple scorecard of fifteen good practices and eleven bad practices perfectly discriminates the 59 core historical cases into wins and losses. Table 2 lists fifteen ‘good’ counter-insurgency practices or factors and eleven ‘bad’ counter-insurgency practices or factors.

Subtracting the total number of bad practices in the decisive phase of each case from the total number of good practices produces a scorecard score. If the score is negative (more bad practices than good), then the case was a counter-insurgency loss; if the score is positive (more good practices than bad), the case was a counter-insurgency win. This holds without exception.

**Perennial question**

Of perennial interest to scholars of insurgency are the force requirements for effective counter-insurgency. The granularity of the data in these cases does not allow for conclusions regarding force ratios between counter-insurgency forces and insurgents. These analyses do support some higher-level observations that should be of interest nonetheless.

First, in no case did the counter-insurgency force win unless it overmatched the insurgents and could force them to fight as guerrillas by the decisive phase of the conflict. Governments that attempted to transition their counter-insurgency forces to overmatch the insurgents usually sought to increase both the quality and the quantity of their counter-insurgency forces. While quantity may have a quality all its own, counter-insurgency force quality appears to have been more important than quantity in every case in which it mattered among the historical cases examined.

Second, most counter-insurgency forces used significant numbers of police, paramilitary troops, or militias, with virtually no correlation with outcome. This was because, too often, these forces were inadequately armed or trained or otherwise ineffective. However, in the 23 cases in which police or paramilitaries were not ineffective, counter-insurgency forces won 69 per cent of the time. This is another historical endorsement of the importance of quality of counter-insurgency forces and, further, an endorsement of the inclusion of such forces, if they can be adequately prepared.

We repeated all analyses for the subset of cases that involved forces from an external major power in support of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Counter-insurgency Practices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>15 Good Counter-insurgency Practices</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force realised at least two strategic communication factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency measures reduced at least three tangible support factors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The government realised at least one government legitimacy factor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government corruption was reduced/good governance increased since the onset of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force realised at least one intelligence factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force was of sufficient strength to force the insurgents to fight as guerrillas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force avoided excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate application of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force sought to engage and establish positive relations with the population in the area of conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term investments, improvements in infrastructure or development, or property reform occurred in the area of conflict controlled or claimed by the counter-insurgency force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The majority of the population in the area of conflict supported or favoured the counter-insurgency force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency measures established and then expanded secure areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/counter-insurgency reconstruction/development sought/achieved improvements that were substantially above the historical baseline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force provided or ensured the provision of basic services in areas that it controlled or claimed to control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The perception of security was created or maintained among the population in areas that the counter-insurgency force claimed to control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11 Bad Counter-insurgency Practices</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force used both collective punishment and escalating repression.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There was corrupt and arbitrary personalistic government rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-nation elites had perverse incentives to continue the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An external professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of the insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The host nation was economically dependent on external supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting was initiated primarily by the insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force failed to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force engaged in more coercion or intimidation than the insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The insurgent force was individually superior to the counter-insurgency force by being either more professional or better motivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force or its allies relied on looting for sustainment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The counter-insurgency force and government had different goals or levels of commitment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the government (28 cases). The findings show that external or externally supported counter-insurgency forces win almost as often as wholly indigenous counter-insurgency forces. This suggests that using external forces is not inherently a bad counter-insurgency practice. Further, results for cases involving counter-insurgency support by external actors match results from the core data; the same concepts whose implementation was correlated with counter-insurgency success in the broader data were also correlated with success in the external actor cases.

Two cautions

The external actor analysis raises two cautions. First, as noted previously, commitment and motivation on the part of the government and counter-insurgency force are critical to counter-insurgency success. This holds in external actor cases as well. No external counter-insurgency force or externally supported counter-insurgency force was able to prevail if the host-nation government was insufficiently committed. The caution, then, is for would-be external supporters; you cannot want it more than they do!

Second, every case that involved external professional forces supporting the insurgents was a counter-insurgency loss unless it was balanced by external professional forces supporting the government. This caution applies to those who advocate a ‘tight footprint’ in supporting counter-insurgency forces or support that is restricted to advisers, special operations forces and air power. History suggests that if insurgents have external conventional forces on their side, the counter-insurgency force needs such support, too.

The historical cases primarily followed one of two paths: the ‘iron fist’ path, with a focus preponderantly (and often almost exclusively) on eliminating the insurgent threat, or the motive-focused path, with primary or at least balanced attention to addressing the motives for beginning and sustaining the insurgency. While both paths can lead to success, historically, counter-insurgency forces following the iron fist path won only 32 per cent of the time, while those on the motive-focused or a mixed path won 73 per cent of the time. Not only have iron fist counter-insurgency efforts failed more often than they have succeeded, but also they have almost always involved atrocities or other counter-insurgency force behaviours that are considered ‘beyond the pale’ by contemporary Western ethical standards.

The durations of insurgencies vary widely. The median length of the 71 cases was 118 months (slightly less than ten years).7

Figure 2. Durations of 71 Insurgencies

Beating an insurgency takes longer than succumbing to one, on average: the median length of a counter-insurgency win was 132 months (11 years), while the median counter-insurgency loss was only 95 months (slightly less than eight years).8 Figure 2 shows the duration in months of all 71 cases.

Significant decrease

We conducted analyses to identify factors and concepts whose presence was correlated with shortening counter-insurgency wins and prolonging the peace interval after a counter-insurgency win. The following concepts, in addition to being endorsed as associated with counter-insurgency success, all significantly decrease the remaining duration of a conflict once they have been implemented:

- tangible support reduction
- border control
- strategic communication
- ‘beat cop’.

These additional factors are also significantly associated with decreased duration:

- the counter-insurgency force was of sufficient strength to force the insurgents to fight as guerrillas (counter-insurgency force overmatch)
- counter-insurgency or government actions did not contribute to substantial new grievances claimed by the insurgents.
- there were significant government reforms over the course of the conflict.

The analysis of post-conflict peace intervals was much more limited, but it identified two factors significantly related to the stability of a counter-insurgency win and extending the length of the post-conflict peace interval:

- there were significant government reforms over the course of the conflict.
- there were significant ethical, professional, or human rights-related military reforms over the course of the conflict.

Note that government and military reform is a supported counter-insurgency concept (see Table 1), and it contributes to reducing conflict length and increasing post-conflict peace intervals.

Important question

Because the counter-insurgency scorecard presented in Table 2 discriminates historical wins and losses so effectively, it begs a further question: once a counter-insurgency force manages to achieve a positive balance of good and poor counter-insurgency practices, how long does it have to sustain those practices to win? The answer: about six years, on average. Figure 3 shows the duration, in months, of the cases in our study in which the counter-insurgency
force ultimately prevailed. The figure also shows the amount of time the counter-insurgency force in each case spent with a negative scorecard balance (dark shading) and with a positive balance (light shading). All counter-insurgency winners had a positive scorecard score by the end of the conflict. The median remaining duration of an insurgency after the counter-insurgency force achieved a positive scorecard score was 69 months, so, on average, forces that establish effective counter-insurgency practices prevail in 69 months. Note that there is considerable variation around that average, but it suggests a planning point nonetheless.9

Taken together, these findings suggest the following recommendations for defeating insurgencies:

- Focus first on overmatching the insurgents, defeating their conventional military aspirations and forcing them to fight as guerrillas.
- Identify insurgents’ sources of tangible support and seek to reduce them.
- Recognise that essential tangible support may or may not flow from the population.
- Be prepared to continue good counter-insurgency practices for six or more years after a substantial balance of good counter-insurgency practices is first achieved.
- Avoid the exclusively ‘iron fist’ counter-insurgency path.
- Generate or retain capabilities to plan and pursue multiple mutually supporting lines of operation.

Recommendations for helping others fight an insurgency include:

- When building host-nation security forces to fight an insurgency, balance quality and quantity, but favour quality.
- Help host-nation governments reform — to improve their commitment and motivation and to increase legitimacy.
- Retain leverage over supported governments and elites to encourage sufficient commitment and motivation; avoid creating perverse incentives or dependencies.

Recommendations for counter-insurgency doctrine and theory include:

- Move away from strategic discussions that focus on a population-centric versus insurgent-centric dichotomy, and add nuance by specifying spectrums for targets (insurgent support versus insurgents) and actions (diminishing motives versus kinetic diminution) with the goal of achieving balance.
- Revise counter-insurgency doctrine to reinforce core principles and include key insights from this research.

NOTES

4. The astute reader will note that eighteen rows in the table are listed as receiving strong support; this is because a single concept, legitimacy, has been subdivided into two rows — one for government legitimacy and one for legitimacy of the use of force.
5. Before dismissing this result as trivial or obvious, note that there are several cases in the data in which an external actor contributed well-motivated and professional counter-insurgency forces in support of a government fighting an insurgency, but the government and indigenous counter-insurgency forces failed to demonstrate their resolve. All of these cases were ultimately counter-insurgency losses.
7. The mean duration was 128.4 months, pulled higher than the median by a few extremely long cases. The standard deviation for that mean is 99.3 months, due to the extreme variation in case durations, ranging from three months to 420 months (35 years).
8. The mean duration of a counter-insurgency win was 152.2 months, with a standard deviation of 109.9 months; the mean duration of a counter-insurgency loss was 112 months, with a standard deviation of 89 months.
9. The variation in the amount of time spent with a positive scorecard score prior to the end of the conflict can be quantified: the median was 69 months, and the mean was 101 months, with a standard deviation of 95 months.
Balaji Chandramohan comments on China’s aspirations to become a global power.

As the rise of Asian countries like India and China shifts the geo-political balance in the Asia-Pacific region, it is timely to examine the maritime strategies that such countries might employ and the impact their activities could have on the overall regional geo-strategic architecture.

China is an ancient continental land power with an incomplete oceanic awareness. With the transformation of China’s grand strategy from landward security to seaward security following the end of the Cold War, maritime security interests have gradually become the essential element in China’s strategic approach. Undoubtedly, the quest for sea power and sea rights has become Beijing’s main maritime strategic issue. As China’s maritime politico-economic-military leverage in the Asia-Pacific region escalates, so too does its desire to become a leading global sea power. This objective demands that it expand its maritime capabilities by developing its navy and preparing for armed confrontation.

From China’s perspective, its security environment is changing. The traditional territorial scramble is shifting from an emphasis on control of land to control of territorial waters, of maritime strategic resources and of critical sea-lanes. As a result, maritime economic competition has become a key focus for many nations. Given this, China’s maritime shift from a coastal to a high seas focus is understandable.

As a consequence, in recent years, Beijing has, purposefully, changed its maritime strategic thinking from Maoist-style coastal defence activities to offshore defence and ultimately far sea defence. This strategic aspiration is clear in China’s recent national defence white papers.

Although not having a maritime strategy for most of the 19th and 20th century, China has always been essentially a maritime country. With its 18,000-kilometre mainland coastline and 14,000-kilometre island coastline, China constitutes the single largest maritime landmass in the Asia-Pacific region.

**Early evolution**

The earliest of the current versions of China’s modern maritime strategy is generally believed to have already evolved by the early 15th century, when, during the reign of Ming Emperor Renzong, the famous Admiral Zheng He made seven successful naval expeditions between 1405–33, going as far as the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Africa. By today’s standards, however, Zheng He’s *Nautical Charts* presents a vision that can, at best, only be described as ‘coastal defence’. A late Ching dynasty scholar, Wei Yuan, who recorded his thoughts in the *Charts and Records of Naval Countries*, further elaborated his vision. Later, this maritime thinking became more focused following two major naval invasions of China: one by the Japanese in 1874 and the other by the French in 1884. In their aftermath, the Chinese emperor established a unified naval command, the Naval Office, on 24 October 1884.

However, successive rulers of China lacked maritime vision, partly because of colonial subjugation during the late 19th century. In the early 20th century, the Guomindang did try to build a fleet, but, by the late 1940s, when the communists came to power, ‘the constraint of very limited sources’ and ‘the nature of perceived external threats’ once again resulted in ‘low priority’ being accorded to China’s maritime build-up. This situation would persist during the next 40–45 years. It was not until the post-Cold War situation ended their mortal fear of an imminent nuclear war that the Communist leadership finally had both time and space to manoeuvre and apply long-term thinking to maritime strategy.

Apart from highlighting China’s continued dependence on
maritime space and resources, history also reveals how control over the open seas has always been an essential component of global powers’ status, whether colonial empires of the 19th century or super-powers of the 20th century. Today, this is perhaps the logic behind Beijing’s ambition to become the next global power. The oceans are a place for it to expand its influence and exploit resources. Accordingly, in the 1990s, China’s policies underwent a marked change, in the direction of expanding its operational reach and access to the open seas. According to current statistics, China’s coastal areas make up 30 per cent of its land, support 40 per cent of its population and generate 60 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, China’s expanding economic power and rising living standards have only further increased its dependence on the sea, thereby compelling its leadership to ensure the security of its sea-lanes and attempt further exploration for offshore raw materials.

**Huge area**

So far, Beijing has focused on expanding its authority over its own territorial waters, contiguous zones and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Its rights in these zones are duly recognised by the United Nations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, to which China was an original signatory and which it ratified in May 1996. Under this convention, China has access to the natural wealth of its 3 million-square-kilometre EEZ — whereas previous to 1992, when the convention came into force, it had legal authority only over the 380,000 square kilometres of its inland and territorial waters up to the 12-nautical-mile limit. If China’s inland sea of Bo Hai is taken into account, its maritime area now comprises about 4.7 million square kilometres.

But this is not all. Beijing plans to go still further and to explore and exploit resources even in contentious international waters. And this is where keeping tabs on its maritime thinking becomes so critical to the region’s peace and security. For example, explaining its claims in terms of the landlocked states’ rights under the UN Law of the Sea, China claims that it has the right to sail and exploit resources in the Sea of Japan. It claims access to the sea through the Tuman Jiang River in the northern province of Jilin. By this, Beijing seeks not only to obtain a great strategic advantage vis-à-vis Japan but also to open direct access to the high seas for its two hinterland provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang, which (it says) have no other direct access to the open seas. This should also bring prosperity to these relatively neglected provinces. The United Nations, in fact, has added a new category called the ‘developmental zone’ to China’s waters. Since 1991, Chinese ships have been sanctioned to explore valuable seabed resources in an additional 105,000-square-kilometre ‘developmental zone’ in the international waters of the Pacific Ocean.

**Limited access**

Notwithstanding these facts and perceptions, some Chinese scholars claim that their country’s access to the open seas is still limited. According to Liu Zhenhuan, the director of the navy’s Military Research Institute in Beijing, China might have the world’s fourth longest coastline, fifth largest continental shelf (in area) and tenth largest exclusive economic zone, but the ratio of maritime space under its jurisdiction to its land area is just 30:100 — less than a third of the worldwide average of 94:100. China’s maritime needs are emphasised by figures on its future requirements, especially for fuel and food grains for its population, which is expected to reach about 1.6 billion by the year 2020. Accordingly, its Ninth Five-Year Plan, covering 1996–2000, earmarked nearly 800 million yuan to be spent on marine technology, with marine environment, sea water utilisation, accurate survey of the continental shelf, utilisation of marine energy, and a comprehensive survey of the polar region and the Spratlys being the main thrust areas.

Several reasons lay behind this shift of focus. Firstly, the collapse of the former Soviet Union has finally removed from the minds of China’s leaders all fear of an imminent global war, thus providing them with time to think long term about national defence capability needs. Secondly, the shrinking of the Soviet/Russian naval presence, followed by reduction in the American naval presence in the Asia–Pacific region, has also provided China the physical space to manoeuvre. China’s leaders see a ‘power vacuum’ in the Asia–Pacific region, which apparently provides them with an opportunity to step in. Thirdly, the 1990s saw the Asia–Pacific region emerge as the most dynamic centre of economic growth, which has induced world powers, including Beijing, to take an increasing interest in various multilateral fora. Beijing feels compelled to look outwards for joint strategies for achieving

- security and peace; and
- a faster growth rate to keep up with the developments in the rest of the Asia–Pacific region.

Finally, in China’s immediate neighbourhood, apart from traditional strong actors like the US and Russian navies, Japan, Vietnam and other South-east Asian countries have also begun expanding their ‘ocean-going’ capabilities. This development can be seen as both a cause and a consequence of China’s maritime activity. To give one example, the recent confusion about the inclusion of the Taiwan Strait in the operational scope of the revised US–Japanese security arrangements has been a major cause of concern for Beijing. Issues like this have obvious implications for China’s changing maritime profile.

**Chain approach**

China’s maritime strategy involves a ‘three island chain’ approach enunciated by Admiral Liu Huaiqing in 1988. This provided for China, by 2010, to have established a permanent blue-water presence in the first island ‘chain’ arrayed on a Japan–Taiwan–Philippines axis, to include the South China Sea. By 2025 it proposes to establish a permanent blue-water presence in the second island ‘chain’ stretching from the Aleutians through the Mariana Islands.
to the east coast of Papua New Guinea, an area that includes the Malacca Strait. By 2050 the reach will extend to the third island ‘chain’ starting in the Aleutians and ending in Antarctica, to include New Zealand and Australian waters.1

China’s blue-water capabilities are now the main focus for China’s naval developments. As the Chinese Navy’s Indian Ocean deployments and increasing naval forays into the Pacific demonstrate, China intends to be able to operate more frequently beyond the East Asian littoral environment, which is characterised by a number of narrow seas stretching north to south adjacent to the Asian continent, ‘semi-enclosed’ by chains of islands. The newly Counter-insurgency measuresd Indo-Pacific region overlaps the first and second island chains. Countries that have been wary of this island chain strategy are the United States, Australia, Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam.

India is also concerned by China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy in the Indian Ocean. This involves building bases around India and encircling it like a string. China’s first step was the construction of a deep-sea port on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, 16 kilometres from one of the world’s busiest shipping routes; a vast construction site is engulfing the once sleepy fishing town of Hambantota. Second, China has helped Pakistan to build a deep-sea port in the town of Gadara in Baluchistan. At the same time, China has started to court the littoral states in the Indian Ocean, such as Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles, and has helped them with funds to boost their economies. In return, China hopes to be able to create bases in these littoral states.

Classic strategy

China’s String of Pearls strategy in the Indian Ocean is a classic example of a defensive maritime approach. It was embarked upon before the Obama administration implemented the United States’ forward policy in the Asia–Pacific region and while Washington was distracted by two asymmetric conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan. It is not clear whether Beijing is giving priority to this strategy today, but a defensive strategy like this, involving the building of alliances with countries such as Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, will take some years to bring to fruition. China is also interested in acquiring a base in East Timor, an aspiration that has aroused concern in both Canberra and Jakarta.

Starting in 2003, China began talking of its ‘Malacca dilemma’. This stems from the fact that the oil that lubricates its economy must pass through the Malacca Strait, a waterway only 2.7 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. The possibility that the flow of shipping through the strait could be shut down by a terrorist attack, natural disaster or at the behest of a foreign power leaves China’s energy and economic security tenuous at best. While the String of Pearls strategy may help mitigate China’s insecurity deriving from this Malacca dilemma, it could ultimately contribute to heightened tension and a return to a security-driven, treaty-based alliance system that could upset long-term Asian stability.

Potential projection

The expansion of Chinese influence in the South Pacific provides a potential basis for the eventual projection of China’s military power, especially as an external actor. The South Pacific region, which gained geo-political importance in the 20th century following two world wars, might witness significant changes with the rise of China as a maritime power. China understands that the region has rich resources in energy for its population. It has extended goodwill to the countries of the South Pacific by building such things as stadiums, courthouses, parliaments and resorts. Infrastuctural projects that modernise deepwater harbours, airports and land transport corridors in places like Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, the Solomons, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and the Cook Islands could have a possible dual purpose in terms of assisting Beijing’s military power projection in future.

The absence of a countervailing strong military presence in South Pacific assists China’s approach. It is to be noted that the South Pacific’s geo-political significance lies in the major sea lines of communication between the western hemisphere and Australasia that pass through it. This area is not fully patrolled by countries such as France, Australia, New Zealand, United States or any of the small islands states. As a result, China has filled the void in the South Pacific geo-strategic environment with an eye towards expanding its maritime power and realising its great power ambition.2

From being an inward looking continental power, China this century has started to look outwards through its maritime expansion and power-projection capabilities. Both India and China are continental great powers trying to expand their maritime profile in an effort to boost their growing international stature. However, unlike India’s maritime expansion and power-projection capabilities, which are welcomed by other countries in the Asia–Pacific region, China’s maritime orientation and power-projection has been a catalyst pushing countries like India, Vietnam, Philippines, Japan, Taiwan and Australia towards effective strategic co-operation and alliance with the United States. China’s growing maritime profile is here to stay in the 21st century.

NOTES
Questioning our natural alliance

Hugh Steadman calls for more careful assessment of New Zealand’s interests when supporting the Western alliance in response to contentious international events.

New Zealand is part of what is loosely termed the ‘Western alliance’. Its participation is founded on the cultural empathy that sprang naturally from its filial duty to its imperial motherland. It is an alliance cemented by the blood, which New Zealanders shed profusely in the Boer War and the two world wars that followed. In the Second World War, Britain and New Zealand were both saved from alien conquest by the decisive intervention of the United States and the crucial contribution offered by their mutual ally, the Soviet Union. With the war over, and fascism vanquished, our ‘natural’ allies fell out with their ‘unnatural’ ally.

The ensuing Cold War, into which the New Zealand public was dragged willy-nilly and with varying degrees of enthusiasm, proceeded to shape international relations for the next four decades. The Cold War, with its doctrine of mutually assured destruction, posed a real threat to the continued existence of humanity. It was, therefore, with universal relief that the Soviet Empire was finally seen to blink.

Just two months after having been elected to the position of general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in May 1985, in a momentous speech given in Leningrad, Mikhail Gorbachev marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union and, with it, the end of the Cold War. Two months after Gorbachev’s speech, in July 1985, French intelligence agents sank the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour.

By 1986, with glasnost, perestroika and demokratizatsiya rapidly being implemented in Russia and with public opinion reinforced by the actions of the DGSE (the French equivalent of Britain’s MI6) and the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, the time was ripe for the New Zealand government to act on the nuclear free mandate given to it in the election of 1984. This policy was duly enshrined in legislation in June 1987. Seeing that the excuse for the continuance of the Cold War was fast evaporating, the Lange government could be forgiven for assuming that its decisions in this area would not be of much significance in regards to New Zealand’s participation in the Western alliance. Ten years earlier, Gough Whitlam had failed to get away with an independent foreign policy for Australia — but these were different times. Or were they?

As it turned out, no backsliding from the alliance was to be permitted. The Godfather was of the view that having once joined it, the only way to leave the Mob was in a box. New Zealand’s waywardness posed a threat to the united front that the leadership of the Free World demanded. Politics being the art of the possible, in the following year David Lange duly signalled his kowtow to Washington. This came in the form of agreeing to the construction of the Waihopai ‘communications centre’ and the gift of a contract to Australia to build two Anzac frigates — a class of ship primarily designed for the defence of aircraft-carriers, of which New Zealand had none, but of which the United States had many.

No debate

Since that brief interlude, and having once again stepped back into line, New Zealand has seen no serious public debate about where its foreign policy direction should point in relation to that of the Western alliance. Other than Helen Clark’s refusal to involve the New Zealand military in the actual invasion phase of the Iraq War, New Zealand has consistently toed the Western line.

It is indeed remarkable that there seems to have been so little public debate in New Zealand about this apparently unthinking acceptance of its continued membership of an alliance which is now operating under radically different circumstances to those that prevailed during the Cold War.

As a member of a military alliance, a smaller nation should expect that there will be costs involved. The most obvious of these is the automatic inheritance of all the enemies that the
more powerful members of the alliance are likely to bring with them. This comes together with the expectation that the smaller members, as a demonstration of solidarity with their larger allies, will participate in any hostile acts they are called upon to commit — even against those who are not necessarily their natural enemies. These disadvantages to membership of any such alliance have to be weighed carefully against the benefits to be derived from it.

As with any protection racket, protection is the intended advantage that a member nation would expect to ensue from payment of its dues to a military alliance. The value to be placed on, and the accumulated cost that should be paid for, such protection depends on the seriousness of the military threat faced by the individual member. A factor of perhaps greater significance is the probability or otherwise of the major players in the alliance, when push comes to shove, being able, or willing, to honour their contractual obligations for the defence of the weaker member.

**Important question**
The argument offered by the United States to counter New Zealand’s nuclear free policy was that New Zealand was freeloading; sheltering under the US nuclear umbrella without contributing to its cost. The question New Zealand should have been asking in return was whether or not the United States would risk triggering a nuclear war in order to come to the aid of such an insignificant strategic asset as New Zealand? The answer is almost certainly not.

Machiavelli argued that for small nations allied to large nations, treaties of mutual defence are worthless. The small nation cannot inflict sanctions on the larger for its failure to fulfil treaty obligations, so the larger nation has nothing to fear on that score. The brutal fact is that irrespective of any treaty, the larger nation will do what it perceives as being in its national interest at the time. If it suits it, it will let the smaller nation succumb and if it does not suit its perceived national interest that its smaller ally should succumb, then it will come to its aid, irrespective of whether or not there is a mutual defence treaty or understanding in existence. In the Second World War, the United States’ rescue of New Zealand from a possible Japanese invasion was dependent on the United States’ perceived self-interest and not on New Zealand’s membership of a Western alliance prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

There is no lack of analysis on the military threats posed to New Zealand. Salient among these are any threats that might develop to New Zealand’s extended lines of communication. However, any attempted interdiction by a hostile nation of the right of free passage through these channels is going to pose a far greater threat to other and more powerful nations, which will move to counter it, irrespective of any puny contribution to their defence that could be made by New Zealand. Furthermore, New Zealand is exceptionally fortunate in that it is self-sufficient in food production and could support its population, admittedly with much inconvenience and discomfort, were it to be isolated from the rest of the world.

**Greatest threat**
Even though popular belief has it that New Zealand might be the last country on Earth on which life would be extinguished, should the powers of the northern hemisphere manage to create a nuclear winter this is probably the greatest military threat that the country faces. New Zealand’s membership of military alliances that place reliance on such weapons will do more to increase the probability of such an event than to mitigate against it. It is not through alliances, but rather on the diplomatic front and through the ardent advocacy of the rule of international law and the strengthening of international institutions, that New Zealand can do most to counter this threat.

Then there is the obvious threat of foreign invasion, which for New Zealand, by virtue of its geographical isolation, is probably more remote than it is for virtually any other nation state. However, that is not to say it is non-existent. It is a threat that will increase as climate change or financial desperation displaces other nations and, in the worst case, sets them at war with each other. New Zealand is singularly ill-equipped to deal with such a scenario, but could at small expense do much to meet it. This could be done by converting its armed forces from their current primary configuration as foreign expeditionary forces to a conscript army trained in guerrilla warfare and supported by a navy and air force designed primarily for the policing and defence of the country’s territorial waters.

And finally there is terrorism. Terrorism does not spring from a vacuum: one man’s terrorist being another man’s freedom-fighter, it is almost always triggered in reaction to the actions of others. The Zionist terrorists who brought about the state of Israel were reacting against the violence and injustice imposed on them by Christian powers. The IRA sprang from years of British misuse and prejudice. New Zealand’s natural allies in the Western world are heavily compromised by their involvement in endless military and manipulative machinations designed to secure their energy supplies from the Islamic world. Finland and Switzerland, devoid of direct links to nations perceived by Islamic terrorists as their enemy, do not face the same threats as the United States, Britain and France in this respect. The Arab proverb ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ has as its corollary, ‘the friend of my enemy is my enemy’. It does not call for genius to devise a foreign policy that reduces New Zealand’s risk of terrorism. George Bush’s infamous statement to the US Senate that ‘If you’re not with us, you are with the enemy’ is both a threat to be ignored and a lie to be disproved.

**Other benefits**
Of course, it could be argued that membership of the Western world’s defence community confers other benefits besides ‘protection’. These benefits come in such form as support for shared values, friendly access to trade agreements and participation on favourable terms in the globalised economy. However, as, for example, both Switzerland and Finland, or New Zealand’s free trade agreement with China, bear witness, these benefits are not dependent on participation in a military or militaristic alliance.

In the very recent past, there have been several plain sight incidents that would indicate the potential dangers of New Zealand’s continuing unthinkingly with the policy of obedience to the whims of the current leadership of the Western world. The most recent has been in the Ukraine.

After four years of investment in trade talks, which were shortly to lead to a free trade agreement with Russia, New Zealand administered a slight to the Russian leadership by leaving the talks in protest at events in the Ukraine. Clearly, this decision caused more harm to New Zealand’s interests than it did to Russia’s. To keep in line with Washington’s position, New Zealand evidently felt obliged to make a sacrifice of far greater
significance to itself than any to the United States that that country has called upon itself to make. The day following the recall of Tim Groser from his trade talks in Moscow, a more powerful member of the alliance, France, declared its intention of making no such sacrifice, and stated that its planned delivery on a $2.6 billion contract of two vessels to the Russian navy would go ahead as planned. Subsequently, the New Zealand minister of foreign affairs (as a minister in a government that is on record as being no respecter of referenda) announced that in line with the position of its natural allies New Zealand will not recognise the rights of self-determination by the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, despite the clearly expressed wishes of the vast majority of Crimea’s population. Is it in New Zealand’s best interests to be seen by other nations as an enemy of democracy?

**Absurd stance**

Two or so weeks further down the track, John Key announced New Zealand’s implementation of the US sanctions against Russia and that, for the time being, New Zealand would not be sending troops. The headlines should have read ‘Mighty Mouse leaves all options on the table’. Not only is New Zealand harming its commercial interests for the sake of its alliance, but also it is making itself look absurd on the world stage. The arguments about the legitimacy or otherwise of Russian actions are indecisive, whereas the armed seizure of power in Kiev by enemies of Russia, as prompted and supported by the United States, was clearly provocative and unconstitutional.

China has recently become New Zealand’s most important trade partner. The interchange of goods and people between the two nations is far greater than that between New Zealand and the United States, and the trend is all in favour of the Chinese relationship. John Key, during his April 2013 visit to China, when questioned on the sabre-rattling then coming out of North Korea, announced that if war broke out he anticipated that New Zealand would be joining its ‘natural allies’ in the conflict. This was obviously an unintentional gaffe, with Key of a generation largely unaware that China suffered 800,000 casualties fighting New Zealand and its natural allies in the previous Korean War. Someone in MFAT might have wondered whether or not there was a message intended in the unexpected delays that New Zealand meat exports encountered on the Chinese dockside shortly after Key’s visit.

With our American ally’s freeing up of military resources from the bogs of Iraq and Afghanistan, fresh room has been found for the pivot into Asia in order to ‘contain’ our major trading partner. A Pentagon paper in April 2011 stated that China’s increasing ability to protect its sea-lanes posed a threat to the security of the United States, in that it was becoming harder to interdict Chinese trade should that be required. In a subsequent American naval exercise in the Pacific, to which China was conspicuously not invited, but the ‘containing’ nations, including New Zealand, were, the New Zealand presence would have sent a signal to China, unwelcome on both sides. This message would not need to have been sent were New Zealand to have adopted a more southern and neutral position vis-à-vis the protagonists in the great East–West conflict.

**Rational policy**

As the American focus pivots towards Asia, President Obama is pursuing a more rational foreign policy than that of his predecessor. Now, he appears to be seeking a self-regulating balance of power between the nations of the Middle East, rather than adopting the traditional partisan policy that left the United States overly committed to one of the factions. To Israeli and Saudi fury, Iran is once again on the road to being accepted as a responsible member of the family of nations. While the Israeli obsession with being the sole cockerel on the Middle East midden held the full sympathy of the American foreign policy elite, New Zealand accepted the American diktat that it should conduct no trade with Iran. Soon, when Israel’s self-seeking charges concerning Iran’s imaginary weapons of mass destruction are finally discredited, these sanctions might be removed. In contrast to the United States, foreign trade is crucial to the New Zealand economy. Our refusing to trade with the Middle East’s most populous nation was a sacrifice, evidently accepted as a reasonable price to pay for the continuance of American favour.

In Syria, another victim of deliberate Western destabilisation, the population has been tipped out of an undemocratic frying-pan into the hellfire of a civil war, amply fed with foreign fuel. Faced with the war-crime of deploying Sarin against a civilian population by whichever of the members of the Western alliance at whose door the blame should rest, New Zealand’s leadership unhesitatingly joined in the alliance’s diplomatic offensive by claiming, against all common sense, that the Assad regime had been responsible. The false flag operation, intended to enable American military intervention in the conflict to move from covert to overt, was soon discredited. However, once again, New Zealand’s allegiance to the Western bloc had led it to further undermine what remains of its international reputation of fair-mindedness and impartiality.

The problem that New Zealand now faces is that its leadership appears to have failed to notice, or has chosen to ignore, the evolution of the Western alliance since the end of the Cold War. Up to that point, a reasonable case could be made that the Western alliance, with its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, was a defensive arrangement designed to deter the predatory intent of communism against the freedom loving capitalism of the West. As the Cold War came to an end, the peoples on both sides of the ideological divide were entitled to anticipate a peace bonus of reduced expenditure on armaments and its associated balance of existential terror. Unfortunately, with the collapse of the Soviet empire, the ‘victors’ at the head of the Western world...
appear to have decided that the opportunity now existed for
to adopt a more aggressive global policy.

Aggressive approach

Instead of allowing, as Gorbachev believed had been agreed, that
the former Warsaw Pact countries should remain as a Finlandised,
neutral buffer zone between Russia and NATO, the West moved
aggressively to incorporate them into its zone of military and eco-
nomic domination. The stationing of anti-ballistic missile defence
units on NATO’s new eastern borders and the recent putsch in
the Ukraine are further examples of this continued aggression.
NATO, no longer having, as its raison d’être, the defence of the
northern European plain from Soviet tank armies, now allows it-
self to be deployed in combat as far afield as Afghanistan. Instead
of the anticipated peace bonus on the ending of the Cold War,
the West’s military expenditure, after a brief initial hesitation, has
steadily increased in line with the demands of a strategy that calls
for full spectrum global dominance.

The question requiring urgent debate in New Zealand
is whether, given the apparent post-Cold War change of
stance from defensive to aggressive and the changes in the globalised
economy that have occurred over the same period, it is in
this nation’s best interest to re-
main firmly welded to one of
the increasingly hostile camps? Would New Zealand’s inter-
ests be better served by adopt-
ing a position of impartiality
and neutrality?

If the analysis demonstr-
ates that New Zealand’s
best interest lies in the
more neutral position, then
there follows two inevitable
corollaries. Firstly, New Zealand should pursue the development
and expansion of the rule of international law and give its full
support to further evolution of the UN Charter. Secondly, it
should abandon its current commitments to an alliance which is
given to egregious breaches of that charter.

Mikhail Gorbachev

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In one sense Australia’s early External Affairs Department was quite advanced in its treatment of women. It may have been driven by the wartime shortage of men, but from the first recruitment of diplomatic ‘cadets’ in 1943 intakes included women (this contrasted with New Zealand where women were recruited only as research assistants, not diplomatic trainees). Women faced a quota of 25 per cent of available places (against application numbers of 40 per cent) but nonetheless the first three appointees announced were all women: Bronnie Taylor, Diana Hodgkinson and Julia Drake-Brockman (the men were on active service and announcement of their appointments took longer). (From the beginning also Australia had a formal training programme for its new female and male officers that was — and remains — ahead of the minimal approach adopted in New Zealand.)

But that is where it ended. In her book Rachel Miller observes that the attitude towards the new female cadets by departmental management on occasion was ‘decidedly condescending in tone’. When Bronnie Taylor married a fellow cadet a couple of years later she had to resign (in fact both partners resigned though only Bronnie was required to). Further, the treatment of female administrative staff (including Maris King, who later became high commissioner in Nauru and then Nuku’alofa) made no allowances for their gender or age. As a 19-year-old King was only Bronnie was required to). Further, the treatment of female administrative staff (including Maris King, who later became high commissioner in Nauru and then Nuku’alofa) made no allowances for their gender or age. As a 19-year-old King was

In one sense Australia’s early External Affairs Department was quite advanced in its treatment of women. It may have been driven by the wartime shortage of men, but from the first recruitment of diplomatic ‘cadets’ in 1943 intakes included women (this contrasted with New Zealand where women were recruited only as research assistants, not diplomatic trainees). Women faced a quota of 25 per cent of available places (against application numbers of 40 per cent) but nonetheless the first three appointees announced were all women: Bronnie Taylor, Diana Hodgkinson and Julia Drake-Brockman (the men were on active service and announcement of their appointments took longer). (From the beginning also Australia had a formal training programme for its new female and male officers that was — and remains — ahead of the minimal approach adopted in New Zealand.)

But that is where it ended. In her book Rachel Miller observes that the attitude towards the new female cadets by departmental management on occasion was ‘decidedly condescending in tone’. When Bronnie Taylor married a fellow cadet a couple of years later she had to resign (in fact both partners resigned though only Bronnie was required to). Further, the treatment of female administrative staff (including Maris King, who later became high commissioner in Nauru and then Nuku’alofa) made no allowances for their gender or age. As a 19-year-old King was only Bronnie was required to). Further, the treatment of female administrative staff (including Maris King, who later became high commissioner in Nauru and then Nuku’alofa) made no allowances for their gender or age. As a 19-year-old King was
return from Korea that he was planning to marry a Korean, he received a paternalistic comment about the wisdom of his coming home to see how the situation was first rather than marrying overseas. Canberra in those days was something of an outpost itself and Ok Che Ashwin struggled with the culture shock of a foreign environment. She arrived with a trunk full of silk cocktail dresses to conquer this great metropolis and found most of her counterparts turned up to private home functions in ski pants and mohair jumpers (homes were so badly heated).

The removal of the marriage bar occurred as late as 1966, but views on women officers and partners fluctuated depending upon how enlightened (or not) managers were. Twenty years after the original three female cadets were recruited, Alison Broinowski was the only woman to be included in the 1963 intake. Equal pay did not arrive until 1973. Rachel Miller concludes her entertaining social history of the early years of Australia’s foreign service women with the ‘new deal’ ushered in by Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alan Renouf, a career diplomat, who determined in 1974 that any lingering confusion between wife and baggage, and their priority in the Australian Foreign Service, would ‘cease forthwith.’ He was influenced by a forceful partner (Emilia) ‘who has chewed my ear on this subject for twenty-five years’.

PETER KENNEDY

NOTE


THE CHINESE QUESTION IN CENTRAL ASIA
Domestic Order, Social Change, and the Chinese Factor

Authors: Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse

China’s relationship with Central Asia has become increasingly important to the Middle Kingdom. What is the reason for this? Some Central Asia watchers proclaim that Central Asia is important for a very simple reason. According to the rule of geo-politics — and here Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory would be employed — that region is not just a part of the Eurasian heartland but the most important place of the ‘world island’. In addition, Central Asia is rich in raw materials, and this is the reason why it has become so important to China; and The Chinese Question in Central Asia provides a detailed account of China’s quest for the Central Asian energy market.

According to authors Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union China needed to find a source for importing oil. Several countries emerged as most important for China. Kazakhstan was apparently one of the first that started to forge a relationship with China in the early 1990s, when Nursultan Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan’s president, supposedly advocated ‘Eurasianism’ with its stress on symbiosis between Russia and Kazakhstan. China reciprocated Kazakhstan’s overtures and was attracted by Kazakhstan’s natural resources.

Besides oil, Kazakhstan gas became quite desirable to Beijing, as the authors note: ‘In 2010, China ran approximately a quarter of Kazakh production, mainly through Aktobemunaigas, Tiurgal Petroleum, Kumkhal Resources, and Karazhanbas Mayn.’

Turkmenistan also emerged as one of the most important countries for China in Central Asia. ‘In April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed their first energy agreement, according to which, by 2004, Ashgabat will deliver to Beijing 30 BCM/a per year for the next thirty years.’ It looks like Mackinder’s theory is vindicated and that China is interested in Central Asia because it is following in Mackinder’s footsteps. This is definitely a good point. Still, one should not apply Mackinder’s theory in its totality. Rather, one should ask why Central Asia should be regarded as the most important part of Mackinder’s heartland for Beijing. After all, Central Asian states are not as rich in natural resources, such as gas and oil, as other countries, including those of Eurasia–Russia, for example. In addition, as the authors note, ‘Infrastructure has often been neglected by the Central Asia states’. It might also be agreed that China, itself a continental power, has actually embraced not Mackinder, with his emphasis on the central Eurasian landmass, but the American Alfred Thayer Mahan, who emphasised the importance of control not over the heartland but rather over the sea routes. ‘Mackinderism’ of a sort has presumably been reinforced by ‘Mahanism’. Still, with all the limits of Mackinder’s geo-politics, geography still matters, at least for China, and shapes, in a way, Beijing’s approach to Central Asia.

The major reason for China’s interest in Central Asia is recognition that other sources of supply for gas, oil and other raw materials require delivery by sea routes. It is true that China, following Mahan more than Mackinder, has continued to build its navy. Nonetheless, it will take time before China’s navy could seriously challenge the US Navy, even if the US economic and military decline continues. Sources of supply in the heartland are much safer. The US débâcles in Iraq and Afghanistan and America’s clear inability to engage in a big war with Iran — as the Syrian fiasco demonstrates — make the heartland the safest place for the control of raw materials.

Russia, of course, could be another source of materials, and Beijing continues to develop a relationship with Moscow. But Moscow is loath to see China as its only market for its raw materials, such as gas. This has enhanced Central Asia’s importance in Chinese eyes as a significant and secure source of raw materials, especially gas.

China’s interest in Central Asia, and increasingly China’s economic and, consequently, geo-political might, have led to its
growing cultural influence. Observers usually ignore this aspect of China’s relationship with Central Asia and the Russian Far East. Western observers usually see China — still a totalitarian state — as having no intellectual/cultural appeal. Laruelle and Peyrouse show that this is hardly the case. Today Chinese would appear to be the second most taught foreign language after English in both the Russian Far East and Central Asia. And the trend goes along ‘with a growing number of students departing to do their studies in China’. Central Asians’ gravitation to China is also fostered by the peculiar nature of the Chinese geopolitical posture, which makes China different both from Russia and the West. Indeed, ‘while Russia and the West are allegedly out to manipulate Central Asia in accordance with their own immediate interests, China is credited not with an absence of national interests, but with the additional ability to foster Central Asia’s own long-term interests’.

The authors do not make any long-term geo-political predictions. But the material they present suggests that a continuation of present trends could render China the dominant power in Central Asia in the not-so-distant future.

DMITRY SHLAPENTOKH

PEACE, POWER AND POLITICS: How New Zealand Became Nuclear Free

Author: Maire Leadbeater
Published by: Otago University Press, Dunedin, 2013, 292pp, $55.

If you were a member of Visual Artists against Nuclear War, the Free Kindergarten Association, the pharmacists who were also against nuclear war, or the numerous bodies of uncertain size which sprang up in the 1980s to oppose New Zealand’s military links with the United States, this book will bring those exciting days flooding back.

Maire Leadbeater’s detailed history of the struggle is the account of an active participant. It is clear, even-handed in tone and, as far as an outsider can tell, accurate. The story she recounts is of a peace movement which was in 1975 ‘not large and regarded by many as well outside the mainstream’ but which grew in a decade to the point where ‘politicians were forced to take it into account’.

This was accomplished by a brilliant and sustained publicity campaign which might be and perhaps is the subject of close study by corporate public relations consultants. The heady mix of strong convictions, youth and high energy was hard for more conservative forces to combat. The tactics were the familiar ones of protest — letters, marches, banners and eye-catching stunts extending to ‘provocative demonstrations involving full nudity’, which always has a radar-like attraction for the media. Like the devil, the protesters always seemed to have the best lines. This and a formidable network of supporters meant that a quick response could always be mounted to dominate the headlines.

The culmination was the 1984 election (the result of which she plausibly believes was influenced by the movement) and the battle over the proposed visit of the US destroyer USS Buchanan some six months later. She gives a good account of this as far as her chosen sources go, but, as befits a supporter of action on the street, ignores the failure to consult Cabinet or ministers about the decision. The rejection of Buchanan and the consequent end of ANZUS is seen as a victory for ‘the little people who wrote letters, marched, sang’.

There is a touch of understandable triumphalism in this. There are breathless accounts of the great demonstrations against the intelligence centres at Tangimoana and Waihopai and against American warships entering our harbours, and ‘millions of Europeans’ are said to have been exposed to Kiwi anti-nuclear fervour. The momentary halting of USS Longbeach as it entered Auckland harbour is hailed as being ‘just like Dunkirk’. And indeed the thickets of initials for the tangle of groups and brief associations amid all the action give an occasional resemblance to military briefings.

But the book is more reminiscent of the long tradition of religious writings in which faith overcomes seemingly insurmountable obstacles and mighty deeds are recounted for the edification of the faithful. It is the Acts of the Apostles of Peace. One activist is indeed quoted as saying ‘it made me realise that the peace movement is part of a new religion’.

David Lange’s role in this is treated tactfully but warily. He is quoted as saying ‘the logic is that you have a form of military alliance’ but the government’s dilemma, in that it was elected on a platform of staying in ANZUS as well as being non-nuclear, is not mentioned. When officials are darkly described as working with their US colleagues, this was to implement not US policy but the government’s dilemma, in that it was elected on a platform of staying in ANZUS as well as being non-nuclear, is not mentioned. When officials are darkly described as working with their US colleagues, this was to implement not US policy but the government’s dilemma, in that it was elected on a platform of staying in ANZUS as well as being non-nuclear, is not mentioned.

After the highpoints of describing the events around Buchanan and the Rainbow Warrior, the book rather tails off into discussing nuclear power (not only dangerous but also not ‘ethical’), food irradiation, the purchase of frigates and South Pacific anti-colonial issues, including New Caledonia, East Timor, Micronesia and Fiji. Though an effort is made to view them through an anti-nuclear prism, they are more a list of the issues that interested the Left in New Zealand over the two decades of the book — interestingly all are concerned with foreign policy rather than domestic issues and even the decline of safeguards against food irradiation turns out to be the fault of the Australians.

The book ends with the sensible but lowering conclusion that ‘we do not live in a peaceful world and we do not live in a nuclear-free world’. The author hopes for a legally-binding international convention to do away with all nuclear weapons. This is a laudable aim, but the campaign for that will be more than the visual artists or free kindergartens can manage.

GERALD HENSLEY
On 19 February New Zealand First leader Rt Hon Winston Peters addressed a meeting at VUW on ‘New Zealand in the World: Challenges We Must Meet’. (The edited text of his address is to be found elsewhere in this issue.) Lieutenant-General (retired) Agus Widjojo (chair of the Executive Board, Yayasan Indonesia Cerdas Unggul and senior fellow at the CSIS Jakarta) gave a lecture on ‘Democratisation in Indonesia and the Role of the Armed Forces’ on 25 February.

On 3 April, in association with the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre, the NZIIA arranged a meeting at VUW to hear HE Wang Lutong, China’s ambassador in New Zealand, speak on ‘New Zealand and China: Looking Ahead, What China’s Comprehensive Reform Means for New Zealand’.

On 4 April, in association with the Latin America New Zealand Business Council, the NZIIA convened a panel discussion at Parliament. After Trade Minister Hon Tim Groser made some observations on his recent visit to Chile and Colombia, Charles Finny, chairman of Education New Zealand (who visited Latin America with the prime minister in March and led an education delegation there in November) and Professor Warwick Murray, director of the Victoria Institute for Links with Latin America (VILLA), gave some ideas on taking the relationship forward. A panel of ambassadors from Latin America then commented on these ideas.

**Auckland**

The following meetings were held:

- **24 Feb** Frans Timmermans (Netherlands foreign minister), ‘Europe and Oceania: The Role of Shared Values in Facing the Rise of Asia’.
- **10 Mar** Prof Rosemary Foot, ‘Present-day Security Tensions in the Asia–Pacific Region’.

**Christchurch**

The following meetings were held:

- **11 Feb** Frank Feinstein (data analyst and media researcher), ‘Inside the North Korean Propaganda Machine’.
- **20 Feb** Katharine Vadura (adjunct senior fellow at the University of Canterbury’s National Centre for Research on Europe), ‘Incorporating Rights in Disaster–Development: The European Union and the Pacific’.
- **25 Mar** Prof Natalie Chaban (Jean Monnet Chair in European Identity at the University of Canterbury and president of the Ukrainian Studies Association of Australia and New Zealand), ‘Ukraine: Where the Heart of Europe Beats’.
- **1 Apr** Prof Rosemary Foot, ‘Asia–Pacific Security Tensions and Their Management in an Era of Independence’.

The branch AGM was held on 12 March. Officers elected were:

- **Chair** — Chris Jones
- **Vice Chair and Treasurer** — Margaret Sweet
- **Secretary** — Sally Carlton
- **Committee** — Prof W. David McIntyre OBE, Peter Penlington, Ursula Rack, Angela Woodward.

After the AGM Professor David McIntyre spoke on ‘The Commonwealth in the Aftermath of the Colombo Chogm’.

**Nelson**

The branch had an active programme in late 2013. On 18 September Stuart Prior, former New Zealand ambassador to Moscow, spoke about recent developments in Russia and the rise of President Putin. He was joined by his wife Olga, who spoke about the role of women in the Soviet Union and in today’s Russia. Then in November the branch hosted two politicians — Hon Winston Peters and Hon Phil Goff. On 7 November the former outlined his views on the challenges facing New Zealand internationally, and on the 26th the latter assessed some recent international issues of importance to New Zealand. Rounding out the year was a meeting on 10 December in which the branch chairman, Hugo Judd, gave an account of a recent study tour to Burma (Myanmar) he participated in. Joining him was Peter Cozens, former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at Victoria University, who focused on the growing strategic importance of Burma, placed as it is between China and India.

This year’s programme began with an address, on 25 February, by Green Party MP Kennedy Graham on climate change and other environmental issues. The representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office followed on 13 March; he assessed the recent rapid changes in Taiwan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China and with New Zealand. On 3 April visiting professor of international relations at St Anthony’s College in Oxford, Professor Rosemary Foot, spoke about the resurgence of China in the East Asia region. *(Supplied by Hugo Judd)*

**Palmerston North**

On 27 November 2013 Ross Cassells spoke to the branch about the changes in governance within the village of Nukiki in the Solomon Islands between 1991 and 2012. He began by arguing that while RAMSI had assisted with capacity-building at the state level, there was little help for the provinces. Governance for the village level was left to programmes such as those run by Volunteer Service Abroad to address. He described the differences between

Ross Cassells

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**Christchurch**: Treasurer, Christchurch Branch NZIIA, Margaret Sweet, 29B Hamilton Avenue, Fendalton, Christchurch 8041. Rates: $60 (couples), $55 (individuals), $30 (student)

**Hamilton**: Treasurer, Hamilton Branch NZIIA, c/- Politics Department, University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton. 3240. Rates: $40 (ordinary), $30 (student/retired)

**Hawke’s Bay**: Contact, Dick Grant, 73 McHardy St, Havelock North 4130. Email: hbnzija@gmail.com Rate: $50 (ordinary)

**Nelson**: Hugo Judd, 48 Westlake Rd, RD1, Richmond, Nelson 7081. Rates $50 (individual/couple), $20 (student)

**Palmerston North**: Contact, Dr James To, International Pacific College, Private Bag 11021, Palmerston North 4442. Rates: $40 (ordinary), $35 (student)

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CORRIGENDUM

In the article ‘Discovering Asia’ by John McKinnon in the last issue (vol 39, no 2), the words ‘than information’ were omitted from the first sentence of the second paragraph on page 4, under the side heading ‘Educational contradiction’. The sentence should read: ‘The gap, if there is one, is therefore less information than information that renders what is happening in Asia intelligible from a New Zealand perspective.’
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