POLICING TERRORISM

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Policing terrorism in a void
John Battersby reviews New Zealand’s approach to a major security concern in light of recent study group findings.

In the course of the 20th century New Zealand has experienced a number of significant incidents, including multiple casualty murders and bombgings which have taken life and damaged property. These incidents have come to be referred to by their specific geographic identity, for example ‘the Trades Hall bombing’ or ‘the Aramoana massacre’. There have been occasional exceptions, but in the main New Zealanders remain reluctant to talk about terrorism in New Zealand; they regard it as non-existent in the past and unlikely in the future. New Zealand’s legislative architecture to deal with the problem is poorly designed — of the two specific pieces of legislation on terrorism, both exist as a reaction to some immediate external stimulus, and neither contains a genuine, well-thought out design to combat terrorism. The definitions provided in this legislation are problematic. There is little public debate about terrorism — and where it has occurred it quickly becomes entwined with commentary on race relations, civil rights and other issues, blunting any political desire to remedy the situation. This has also left New Zealand law enforcement and intelligence agencies policing terrorism in a void, and at risk of uncertainty about what it is they are enforcing and how exactly to go about it.

In order to illustrate the issue, a cohort of frontline responders was chosen and their views canvassed on a range of terrorist related questions in February–March 2016. This cohort was drawn from police, military and related civilian organisations across New Zealand, whose responsibility it would be to deal with any terrorist event should one occur. The value of this group is that they were drawn from those who are conscious that terrorism is a potential concern, and possessed of training in different aspects of serious criminal investigation, improvised explosive device search, identification and render safe, post-blast investigation and disaster-victim identification. Members were all operational in terms of New Zealand (and a number had overseas experience), dealing with (and investigating) violent and armed incidents, improvised explosive devices and forensic crime scene investigation.

The cohort comprised 37 people, who, when asked to define what they thought terrorism was, produced 37 different definitions. A number were similar, but even taken together they were not inclusive enough to cover the range of events that have comprised terrorist events elsewhere. That a range of different individuals had different opinions is in itself unexceptional, but that this range of individuals — specifically selected because they would be responsible for dealing with a terrorist event — had views that were so varied, confirms the problem: the current legislative void leaves a critical level of uncertainty at an operational level.

Widespread uncertainty
That this uncertainty extends beyond law enforcement agencies is suggested by the recent Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand, which identified a lack of clarity and currency in legislation governing these services. A consequence of this lack of clarity, the review found, was a conservatism in interpreting legislation on the part of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), which constrains the efficiency and adaptability of these organisations and risks new and emerging threats being missed.

Before being asked to supply a definition of their understanding of terrorism, the cohort were asked if New Zealand had ever...
experienced a terrorist threat in the past. Nine answered that no threat had previously existed or that they ‘did not know’. Eight responded affirmatively, that there had been a terrorist event, but did not identify one. The remainder (just over half the group) indicated affirmatively that there had been a terrorist event in the past, and identified at least one such event or threat. Seventeen identified the 1987 bombing of the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior by French secret service agents, five identified the 1984 Trade’s Hall bombing, and five Operation Concord — the 2015 threat to contaminate milk products with 1080 poison. There were singular mentions of the 1982 bombing of the Wanganui Police Computer building and Operation Eight (the 2007 Police raids under the Suppression of Terrorism Act).

The attack on the Rainbow Warrior on 10 July 1987, which stands out as New Zealand’s most recognisable terrorist event, evoked considerable outrage at the time it occurred. Not only had a member of the Western alliance and a nation considered friendly to New Zealand sent covert agents and smuggled in an explosive ordinance, but also they then carried out an attack on a vessel in a New Zealand port, after which all but two absconded. The two captured agents were convicted of manslaughter under the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961. However, the illegal entry of people and smuggling of explosives, the acts of planning and executing the attack and the attempt to evade detection afterwards all point to a conspiracy to commit a violent act for a political purpose. All of this could have been the subject of offences defined in terrorism legislation had any existed at the time. But none did and these actions were not prosecuted.

Emergency powers

The New Zealand government quickly enacted legislation allowing for emergency powers in the event that an international terrorist event was considered to be occurring, and gave a definition of terrorism (discussed below), but did not consider it necessary to consider any new offences. The assumption was that any offences detected under existing criminal legislation would be sufficient. There are significant limitations in treating new and evolving terrorist activity within the parameters of traditional crime types. This reliance is completely at variance with the practice of all other Western nations.

The Trades Hall bombing of 27 March 1984 remains an unsolved case. A suitcase containing a motion-detonated explosive device was deposited in the corridor of the Trades Hall building on Vivian Street in Wellington. This building had some political identity in terms of its association with workers and unions, suggesting a political motive. The suitcase was noticed as out of place and it exploded when the caretaker went to remove it, killing him and blowing debris across the street. The Police had suspects but ultimately do not know who did it, and no arrests were ever made. As an event involving an explosion in a public area using a device that was expertly and deliberately constructed for the purpose, it cannot be ruled out as a possible terrorist act. The lack of any obvious political cause or overt reason attached to the incident, however, has left it as an unsolved criminal matter.

The police investigation dubbed Operation Concord was a response to anonymous letters sent in late 2014 to two organisations — Federated Farmers, an organisation representing the nation’s farmers, and Fonterra, a major New Zealand dairy distribution company. The letters contained small packages of milk powder, which, when analysed, were found to have in them a concentrated form of 1080 poison — a pest control toxin used widely by the New Zealand government in national parks and other areas. The letters contained a threat that certain milk products would be deliberately contaminated unless the government ceased the use of 1080 by the end of March 2015. The milk products concerned were sold throughout New Zealand and exported to several overseas markets by a number of manufacturers. The potential threat to human life was obvious and the potential impact on the New Zealand economy was significant. Prime Minister John Key and Minister of Primary Industries Nathan Guy both publicly described the threat as ‘ecoterrorism’, and a senior Primary Industries official stated that the threat was ‘designed to cause fear in order to generate a domestic policy outcome’ — a description that many would accept as terrorism. The Police, however, described the incident from the outset as ‘criminal blackmail’ rather than terrorism.

Under-stated events

The events identified by the cohort were hardly a comprehensive list of possible terrorist activity. Only singular references were made to the 1982 bombing of the Wanganui Police Computer by an anarchist responding to perceived new intrusive police powers or to Operation Eight (to be discussed below). Both of these events deserve a greater profile, if only for the purposes of discussion. No reference was made to the bombing of a Huntly railway bridge in 1951 amid labour unrest. There have been a number of incidents involving falsified New Zealand passports being discovered in the hands of terrorists, and in one case a for-
eign secret service was discovered trying to obtain them. It was reported in 2014 that more than 30 New Zealanders had left the country to join Islamist groups (a comparatively high rate per capita in terms of both our overall and Islamic population) — and a further number were of concern to the SIS.7 In March 2016, following reverses in Syria and Iraq, ISIS leaders were reported directing their foreign fighters to return to their own homelands for purposes of perpetrating attacks there — a circumstance that should be of immediate concern.8

More recently, the first prosecutions occurred of individuals for possessing and disseminating jihadist paraphernalia in New Zealand. Once again these individuals were prosecuted under criminal statutes.9

It is clear that overseas influences (including the activities of foreign secret services) are impacting on New Zealand and should be raising enough concern to place some priority on an effective review of legislation to meet current identifiable threats to national security. Even setting aside external influences, New Zealand’s experience in the past — and in the more recent Operation Concord — indicates that sufficient impetus exists domestically to prompt extremist behaviour, for which a consistent litmus test should be applied to establish whether these things are terrorism or not.

Legislative problem

A closer look at New Zealand’s current legislation further demonstrates the problem. In the wake of the Rainbow Warrior bombing the New Zealand government enacted the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. This Act defines terrorism, and allows a limited-term use of emergency powers in the event of it. It defines a terrorist emergency as one in which any person is causing, or attempting to cause, death, injury or harm to buildings or infrastructure or to any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, natural feature, chattel or animal in order to coerce any government or government agency, or group of persons (here or overseas) for the purpose of furthering any political aim overseas.10

This definition would have allowed the legislation to be invoked in the case of the Rainbow Warrior bombing since the intention of sinking the vessel appears to have been to prevent it protesting against French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. But had the intention been to influence Greenpeace’s activities in New Zealand, then the legislation could not have been used. Nor, with the constraint of influencing activity overseas, could it have been invoked for any of the other events listed by the cohort as potentially terrorist events. Not surprisingly, the Act was not invoked at the time it was passed, and has never been since.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, subsequent UN resolutions prompted New Zealand to enact the Suppression of Terrorism Act 2002. This legislation defines terrorism as an act which

- results in the death or serious injury of one or more persons
- risks the health and safety of the population
- destroys or seriously damages property of great value or importance
- causes major economic loss or major environmental damage
- seriously damages or interferes with infrastructure if this is likely to endanger life
- involves the release of an organism if it is likely to devastate the national economy of the country.

Whatever is done must be undertaken for a political, religious or ideological cause and must be done with the intention of coercing the government, an overseas government or an international organisation (but not a non-governmental organisation) to do, or abstain from doing, any act.

Definitional difficulty

The difficulty with this definition is that, in many cases, nothing less than an act on a grand scale, done for a political, religious or ideological cause to coerce a government or government body, would suffice for a terrorist act. Moreover, it would be possible for an act to cause wide-scale destruction for the given motives and with the prescribed outcomes but still not qualify because it was not ‘likely’ to devastate the economy (if it was a small biological attack) or endanger life (if it was an infrastructure or cyber-attack). The fundamental weakness of the Act is that for a terrorist act to be deemed to have occurred it must actually be carried out. Conspiring to carry out such an attack may not meet the threshold of terrorism under the legislation and, therefore, where such a conspiracy is detected and disrupted by law enforcement agencies the perpetrators are unlikely to be charged under it.

The Suppression of Terrorism Act has been invoked only once. In 2004 an investigation was initiated by the Police into an apparent training camp in the Urewera forest.11 Military style weapons were used and the use of Molotov cocktails was observed, as well as what looked like rudimentary military combat training. In the course of the investigation verbal threats to kill the prime minister and US President George Bush (who was rumoured to be intending a New Zealand visit) were intercepted. In October 2007 An aircraft aiming at one of the twin towers in New York during the 911 attack
the commissioner of police terminated the surveillance phase and a large-scale police operation ensued, resulting in multiple arrests. The evidence collected was then considered by the solicitor-general, David Collins, against the Suppression of Terrorism Act. He encountered the difficulties inherent in applying the legislation and did not authorise any prosecutions under it. He concluded that the Act was ‘unnecessarily complex, incoherent, and, as a result, almost impossible to apply to the domestic circumstances observed by the police in this case’. Collins himself considered that the police ‘had good reason to investigate’ the alleged activities.12 The Independent Police Conduct Authority subsequently found that ‘Police were entitled, on the information they had, to view the threat posed as real and potentially serious, necessitating investigation’.13 However, the legislative weakness of the Suppression of Terrorism Act rendered the entire operation largely pointless, other than as a disruption to something that may or may not have posed a genuine threat. Thirteen of the original seventeen arrested were released, leaving only four to face lesser charges under the Crimes Act 1961 and Arms Act 1983. All four were subsequently convicted of some (but not all) charges. The sentencing judge observed that ‘In effect, a private militia was being established… a frightening prospect in (but not all) charges. The sentencing judge observed that ‘In effect, a private militia was being established… a frightening prospect in our society, undermining our democratic institutions, and anathema to our way of life.’14 It is valid to ask whether this was terrorism or not, but there is no valid answer because a flawed legislative framework prevented one.

High threshold

As it stands, whatever is made of the activities under investigation by Operation Eight, none were on so large a scale as to be a terrorist act under the Suppression of Terrorism Act. When the events identified by the cohort are considered, similar conclusions are reached. The Trades Hall bombing clearly would not meet the threshold under the Act as nothing is known of its ‘intent’; the attack on the Rainbow Warrior would not be defined as terrorism because Greenpeace, as a non-governmental organisation, is not an international organisation as defined by the Act. Finally the subject of the 2015 Operation Concord investigation could not be considered terrorism under the Act because, despite threatening to contaminate milk products, the offender did not actually do so and, therefore, the listed adverse outcomes did not occur. The recent charges for possession and dissemination of jihadist videos and literature would not provide sufficient grounds to invoke either the 2002 or 1987 legislation.

Apart from minor amendments to address the fact of New Zealanders leaving to fight with jihadist groups overseas, New Zealand has done very little to address its unsatisfactory legislative situation. Meanwhile, the frequency and nature of jihadist terrorism continues to evolve around the world and provide New Zealand with ample evidence of the type of threat, the nature of offending and powers that might be necessary to combat terrorism should we experience a threat. In the time of New Zealand’s inactivity, Australia has undertaken five major legal reviews, resulting in significant legislative amendments, and continues to review its counter-terrorism policy on a regular basis.15

The lack of workable legislation possibly reflects a lack of understanding, or a lack of willingness to embrace discussion of what terrorism means to New Zealanders. The legislation that does exist has been prompted by external influences (the Rainbow Warrior and 9/11 attacks), and has been so closely influenced by those specific events as to be impracticable for any other subsequent situation. The lack of a legislative framework impacts operationally, constraining the effectiveness of efforts to prevent and/or investigate potential internal security threats. Considering the cohort’s responses in this study, frontline responders have no clear idea what a terrorist event would be and, despite the fact that there are several possible historical examples of politically inspired violence having occurred in New Zealand, there is limited cognisance that a domestic terrorist threat is possible here. Inevitably, civil rights concerns will be aired and they need to be, alongside the rationale for an effective legislative framework for law enforcement and intelligence services to operate under. While these two aspects are often pitted against one another, the solution need not be zero-sum. Unless the deficiencies in our legislation are addressed, New Zealand intelligence and law enforcement agencies will be limited in their effectiveness by the continuing legislative void that exists here.

NOTES

2. Two focus groups were convened containing these members, on 18 February 2016 (Royal New Zealand Police College, Porirua) and 7 March 2016 (NZDF, Trentham Military Camp); an identical survey was given to all participants and a group discussion followed. The findings discussed here concern the survey responses only.
4. NZ Herald, 10 Mar 2015.
In his thriller, *2017: War With Russia*, Sir Richard Shirreff, a general formerly deputy commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, gives short shrift to the Germans. According to the *Financial Times*, which has seen the book, the German leaders are craven apologists for Moscow and the Russian foreign minister is made to say: 'In Germany we can count on the willing fools which believe what they read about Russia in *Spiegel*.'

As the title suggests, the book is an apocalyptic treatment. But Shirreff, who appeared on TV One’s Q+A programme in May, was not much less apocalyptic when he spoke as an analyst. Other senior NATO officials have been warning about dangerous developments in Russia and Europe.

The big question in this is what role Germany will play. The country has long seen itself, and been, the main interlocutor between Russia and the West. In this role it has had a modifying effect on some of the more confrontational attitudes embraced by various other countries in Western or Eastern Europe, by NATO and by the United States. That mediatory role, most evident during the Cold War but continued later, has been appreciated by Russia.

Much will depend on how Angela Merkel, federal chancellor of Germany, and Vladimir Putin, president of the Russia Federation, get on with one another. Merkel became Germany’s chancellor in 2005. While Dimitri Medvedev was president of Russia, Merkel cultivated good relations with Russia. It had been predicted that because of her East Germany origins she would take a tougher stand against Russia. Although she proved more outspoken than some of her predecessors, she did not abandon the policy under which a number of West German chancellors, particularly, but not exclusively, Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), nursed West Germany’s relationship with the then Soviet Union. West Germany recognised a number of countries then under Soviet domination, including East Germany. This policy of rapprochement, known as ostpolitik, led to the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the reuniting of the German people and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reunited Germany continued the special relationship it had had with the Soviet Union after that country had become the Russian Federation.

The reuniting of the German peoples and the avoidance of war were strong West German motivations in ostpolitik. So, too, was a sense of German guilt towards Russia over the Second World War and the loss of millions of Russian lives during the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The Russian intervention in Georgia and Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia occurred while Medvedev was president, but Merkel continued good relations with Russia after that.

When Vladimir Putin reassumed the presidency of Russia, Merkel lost faith in him initially because of a number of human rights incidents. These included the arrest of members of Pussy Riot, a Russian feminist punk band which, among other performances, produced a video called ‘Punk Prayer — Mother of God Chase Putin Away’. The group considered Putin a dictator and objected to the Russian Orthodox Church assisting his election. Merkel also objected to Russian restrictions on homosexuals and to moves forcing non-government organisations that received foreign funding to register as foreign agents.

Merkel and Putin nevertheless talked to one another frequently. They had no difficulty communicating: having been brought up in East Germany, she speaks Russian; having been a KGB agent in Dresden, he speaks German.

But it was the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the subsequent referendum and the Russian intervention in Ukraine, most apparent by November of that year, that brought about a dramatic change. The European Union, the United States and a number of other countries imposed sanctions on Russia, froze the assets of a number of Russians and imposed a limited number of

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**Europe’s problems have been compounded by rising tensions between Russia and Europe and Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. These have been exacerbated by a number of developments, including Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in Syria. Sanctions have been imposed on Russia by the West. For some years during the Cold War the then West Germany adopted policies towards the then Soviet Union that helped to maintain peace. That traditional role between Germany and Russia, now under severe challenges, will be critical in maintaining peace on the European and Euro-Asian continents in the decades ahead.**

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travel bans. Merkel led the EU move. Although she was under pressure from the United States to adopt that stand, she did so with apparent conviction, even if doubts have been raised about her personal enthusiasm.1

Various constraints
In dealing with Russia, Merkel faced and still faces various political, historical and business constraints. First, she is aware that in the former East Germany there is a reader acceptance both of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russia’s seeming resolve to exert a sphere of influence in Ukraine. Germany also has hundreds of thousands of migrants, many living in the former East Germany, from Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Most migrated there after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, views favouring Ostpolitik are strong within Germany. Germany’s foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, of the SPD, which is in a grand coalition with the Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), continues to believe in Ostpolitik despite its belief having taken a few knocks. For a while views being put forward by Steinmeier and Merkel seemed inconsistent with each other, though Steinmeier eventually moved his pronouncements closer to those of Merkel. A former chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, of the SPD, is friends with Putin and celebrated his 70th birthday with him (though he was much criticised within Germany for doing so). Schroeder is chairman of the board of Nord Stream AG, a company which brings gas from Russia to Germany.

Thirdly, German business leaders, some of whom had major investments in Russia, were at first very reluctant to see sanctions placed on Russia. About 6000 German businesses invest in Russia. Their cumulated investments are worth about €20 billion.2 Fourthly, a number of other European countries did not want to see sanctions placed on Russia. Europe is facing deep unemployment problems and anything limiting trade was bound to be viewed with reluctance. At the end of April this year the French National Assembly, for instance, voted to lift sanctions on Russia. Italy also opposes the sanctions. Moreover, the European Union was facing a eurozone crisis and tensions over the austerity measures, particularly in Greece, and Germany was getting some of the blame for the rigidity of the measures taken. Fifthly, much of Western Europe, including Germany, where nuclear power has been abolished, relies heavily on gas pumped from Russia. There is both Russian and German investment in the gas supply. Some other EU countries hold that Germany has pursued its own energy and economic interests with Russia while stiffering the links that others have forged and argue that the establishment of the Nord Stream 2, whose pipeline goes under the Baltic Sea bypassing Ukraine and Poland, is against the spirit of the sanctions. The United States, Poland and the president of the European Council were among the critics of Nord Stream 2.

Hopes dashed
Putin at first hoped that the sanctions would be rejected or would fail. When it became clear that they would go ahead, he ordered retaliatory measures. They included bans on imported agricultural products and food imports from the European Union, the United States, Canada, Norway and Australia. Certain American and EU individuals were also banned from visiting Russia.

New Zealand was not included in the Russian list, but New Zealand agricultural exporters were asked by John Key, the prime minister, not to exploit the market gaps left by the bans on those named in the Russian sanctions. In 2010 New Zealand started negotiations with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the latter two in a customs union, for a comprehensive and modern free trade agreement. Progress was suspended in 2014 by New Zealand after the events in Ukraine.

For Russia the effect of the sanctions made its economic problems worse. The economy depended heavily on oil and gas exports and the country had been hit hard by a drop in the price of oil. For about three years from 2011, the price of oil was somewhere between US$90 and $120 a barrel. During 2015 it fell to half of that and by February of this year it was down to $30 a barrel.

German–Russian relations were further affected by two major developments in 2015: the increased number of people who migrated from the Middle East and Africa to Europe; and Russia’s September intervention in Syria.

Although Greece and Italy, as the countries which were often the migrants’ point of entry into Europe, were profoundly affected, Germany was at the heart of the issue. It was in Germany that many of the arriving peoples wanted to settle. Merkel extended a welcome to the migrants and refugees. She also took a lead within the European Union in promoting a plan to allocate the migrants and refugees to EU countries and the later plan of getting Turkey to accommodate refugees and to prevent them entering the European Union. Germany took more migrants than any other EU country.

Security risk
Medvedev, by then Russian prime minister, called Merkel’s migration policy stupid. He commented that allowing migrants to enter Europe without controlling them was a security risk. He said: ‘Some of these people — and it’s not just a few strange individuals or utter scoundrels, but hundreds and possibly thousands — are entering Europe as potential time bombs, and they will fulfil their missions as robots when they are to told.’3

After Russia entered the Syrian conflict at the end of September 2015, the flow of migrants from Syria continued, a development that caused General Philip Breedlove, then NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, to draw the conclusion that: ‘Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponising migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures
and break European resolve.4

That view must have had wide currency in NATO. Shirreff, in his thriller, makes a Putin-like character say: ‘My strategy of increasing the flow of refugees into Turkey by bombing civilian targets in Syria and so putting ever greater pressure on the EU has worked better than I ever thought possible.’

But is this true? Although there is little doubt that Merkel and the European Union were being undermined by the migration crisis, saying, as Breedlove did, that Syria and Russia were using it as a deliberate policy is sweeping. It could be considered more a dramatic flourish than as a solid piece of analysis. Russia was surely establishing itself as an important player in the Middle East when it sent bombers to Syria. It might have been pleased by the damage the migrant flow was having on Europe and the way in which it was undermining Merkel but probably considered those effects to be unintended consequences rather than a primary motivation.

Nevertheless, Russia exploited Europe’s migration crisis in an information or misinformation campaign. About the same time as General Breedlove outlined his views, Jānis Sārts, director of NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, based in Riga, Latvia, an organisation that became functional in 2014, argued that Russia was waging an information campaign intended to stir up anger in Germany over refugees, and was agitating against Merkel.

**Solid evidence**

There is solid evidence for Sārts’s comment. The information campaign had begun before the heaviest flow of migration and was directed towards Russian speakers in Europe, including the Russiendeutsche, the ethnic Russians who emigrated to Germany. It initially sought to justify the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, but later the focus was on the migration crisis. RT, once Russia Today, a government-funded network, and Sputnik International were the main networks, but there are alleged to be a very large number of people who are paid to flood social media sites with views compatible with those of the Kremlin. The official Russian view is that RT and Sputnik are challenging domination of news presentation by such organisations as the BBC, CNN and Deutsche Welle and are presenting a Russian viewpoint. RT has programmes broadcast in English, German, Spanish, French and Arabic as well as Russian. The information war is not one-way and Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which receive US government funding, provide news and information to countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. The BBC broadcasts in Russian and other news organisations are available in Russia. Al Jazeera has a large audience.

An interesting example of the information war occurred at the beginning of this year. A 13-year-old girl of Russian origin living in Berlin disappeared for about 30 hours. She apparently told her mother that some Mediterranean-looking men had forced her into a car, taken her to an apartment and raped her. The Berlin police investigated and came to the conclusion that she was neither kidnapped nor raped but that she had spent the time with friends. The incident had happened after the sex attacks on women in Cologne on New Year’s Eve. The Berlin police were restrained in what they felt they could say because they did not want to reveal details that would harm the girl. Russian media made much of the story and social media in Germany was rampant. RT and Sputnik began covering the case in Germany. Even Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, asked why there had been a cover-up. This upset the German foreign minister, who blamed Russian propaganda. The Russian ambassador to Germany, Vladimir Grinin, was called in to the German foreign ministry and a protest delivered to him. Despite the police denials, the story that she had been kidnapped and raped, probably by Middle East men, persisted and there were a number of demonstrations alleging a cover-up and against immigration. The Russian versions of the incident made much of the fact that the girl was of Russian origin.

In March this year the BND, Germany’s intelligence service, and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution began an investigation to check whether Russia is using the old KGB methods in order to weaken the position of Angela Merkel. The focus is on the methods of disinformation. During the Cold War these were called ‘active measures’. The investigation is being conducted on behalf of the German government. During the Munich Security Conference last year Merkel used the phrase ‘hybrid warfare’ referring to Russia. Hybrid warfare is generally defined as using conventional warfare methods by military means, irregular warfare, information warfare and cyber warfare.5

**Newspaper stresses**

It is probably easier to conduct an information or disinformation campaign now because of the stresses that Western media sources are under. Newspapers are struggling to survive. They have fewer staff, and those staff have less time to do analysis and investigations or to challenge what is being written, spoken or shown elsewhere. In many television networks audience ratings dominate, greatly limiting coverage. On the other side, there has been an outstanding growth in the blogosphere. Some blogs and websites are highly informed, but many do not feel the restraints of good journalistic practice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many people tend to read only material that reflects their viewpoint. In the days of far fewer news sources there was a wider group of people reading, listening to or viewing the same sources, which helped the public discourse.

A notable example of how a newspaper can expose propaganda occurred during May when Le Petit Journal, a French newspaper, examined a Russian television broadcast that depicted France in chaos. Le Petit Journal consulted all those quoted on the Russian broadcast and found they had been misquoted and sometimes their comments had been inverted.6

One of the effects of the migration crisis in Europe has been the growth in support for far right and anti-immigration parties, some of which are also anti-EU. Norbert Hofer, of the far right Freedom Party, was only narrowly defeated by Alexander Van der Ballen, an independent but formerly a Green, in an election for the presidency of Austria late in May. The Freedom Party is eurosceptic. Russia seems interested in encouraging divisions in Europe. A Russian bank has given a loan to France’s National Front (FN), a socially conservative anti-immigration party that opposes the European Union. Marine Le Pen, its leader, had supported Russia over the annexation of Crimea. A number of other organisations of both left and right opposed to the European Union are reported to have received Russian loans. In the days of the Soviet Union an inclination towards the left was a requirement to arouse Soviet interest.
Military moves

Europe’s tensions have been increased by military actions and statements. Russia has several times made specific reference to the use of nuclear weapons. Whether this is intended to make clear that no armed clash of any sort should occur is unclear. Russia has also developed a new nuclear missile, the SS-30, with independently-targetable warheads. The United States has withdrawn most of its non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe, but some remain there.

In May this year Germany decided to boost its troop numbers for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Part of the reason given was Russia’s increased assertiveness.

Curtis Scaparrotti, a US Army general, has been appointed to replace General Breedlove as NATO commander. He previously headed the United Nations Command in South Korea. ‘A resurgent Russia [is] striving to project itself as a world power,’ Scaparrotti said after being sworn in on 4 May. He is also on record as saying: ‘We face a resurgent Russia and its aggressive behaviour that challenges international norms.’ He added that the Atlantic alliance’s forces must be ‘ready to fight should deterrence fail’.

Also during May the United States activated a missile shield in Romania. The shield is officially intended to provide protection from missile attacks from the Middle East, but Russia regards it as directed against Russia. A similar missile defence system is planned for Poland.

It is difficult to know how seriously to take the present threats. There is, for instance, a concern about the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Is Russia likely to move against them? Feeding those fears is the fact that there are large populations of ethnic Russians or Russian-speaking people within these states. During the time of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states were under Soviet domination. Part of the justification Russia used for intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea was that there were substantial numbers of Russian people in those areas and also that they traditionally were a part of Russia’s sphere. The make-up of the populations and previously being within the Soviet bloc make for parallel conditions. Yet Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are all members of NATO and any attack on them would bring about a NATO response. Putin has so far operated in circumstances in which there is not a direct risk of war. It is reasonable to assume that he will continue to make the same calculations.

Good reason

On the NATO side, besides any belief in the need for deterrence there is a good reason to call for more troops. Both of the leading candidates for the American presidency are putting forward the view that US allies should do more for their own defence. There is a profound belief within NATO, with considerable justification, that NATO relies on US commitment. So a boost in the troops would bring about a NATO response. Putin has so far operated in circumstances in which there is not a direct risk of war. It is reasonable to assume that he will continue to make the same calculations.

believe that it needs geographical space between its borders and any threat it perceives.

In any case, there is no reason to believe that the Merkel–Putin relationship will remain frozen in the same shape. Merkel is a pragmatic politician much too sophisticated to put personal feelings or ideology in the way of maintaining peace in her time. If the absorption of the Middle East migrants in Germany is successful and not disrupted by acts of terrorism or other violence, the Russian propaganda campaign will either have to find another cause or taper off. What must persist is the conviction in Germany and Russia that if there is widespread conflict those two countries will be at the heart of it and suffer hugely.

Permanent damage

If Germany became merely subservient to the United States, whether through NATO or in some other way, the relationship would be permanently damaged. Enough Russians now believe that Germany simply reflects US policy. Germany would make a mistake if it abandoned its independent voice and approach.

The developments between Germany and Russia and more broadly NATO and Russia have implications for New Zealand. There are undoubtedly dangers for world peace in the situation as it has developed and is developing within Europe. The military moves make it clear that the tensions are not confined to rhetoric. New Zealand should avoid any action or statement that might cause Russia to think that its development or influence is being contained — a policy that New Zealand has adopted in relation to China. Similarly, it should use its influence within NATO, with which it has a partnership agreement, and within the Security Council to discourage any policies that might make Russia believe it is being contained. New Zealand should continue to embrace and advocate its well-established policies against nuclear proliferation and warfare. It should emphasise the rule of law and the norms of international behaviour.

Germany will continue to be highly significant in keeping peace with Russia. It would serve New Zealand’s interest to encourage a continued independent German role in Europe and in dealing with Russia. Germany’s approach is nuanced, not that of the ‘willing fools’ of General Sir Richard Shirreff’s imaginings.

NOTES

2. For an excellent treatment of shifting attitudes within the German political parties, public opinion and various groups in Germany see www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/ia/INTA92_1_02_Forsberg.pdf.
5. A Wilson Centre article thinks the term ‘hybrid warfare’ is inadequate to cover Russia’s actions (www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf).
Klaus Neumann discusses refugee issues in light of Australia’s and New Zealand’s experience.

I am currently half-way through a fellowship at the National Library of Australia to work on the published recollections of people from non-English speaking backgrounds who came to Australia as immigrants. The National Library alone holds about a thousand relevant books; a comparatively large proportion of them contain the life histories of people who could be classified as refugees.

While reading dozens of memoirs over the past few weeks, I have been struck by three features, in particular, that I believe could be relevant to our discussions of the refugee crisis. The first is that their authors have so little in common. The predicament of the Vietnamese refugee who arrived in Australia in 1979 is different from that of the Chilean who immigrated five years earlier. Even two Estonians who both came to Australia in the late 1940s courtesy of Australia’s agreement with the International Refugee Organisation have very different stories to tell. This is not to remind that refugees are individuals with their very specific biographies; it is to draw attention to the diversity of factors that contribute to displacement. It is to suggest that global statistics — and analyses that draw on such statistics — gloss over crucial differences between the forced displacement of, say, Syrians, Eritreans and Rohingya.

I was further struck by the fact that few of the migrants, and hardly any of the refugees whose life histories I have read, wanted to come to Australia. If they had had the choice, they would have rather remained in their native country or returned there. And those who chose Australia over other possible destinations often did so because it seemed the least undesirable option (at least it was reputed to be not as cold as Canada).

Finally, what has struck me is the fact that so many of the experiences featured in these books do not seem anachronistic. In the mid-20th century, as much as in the early 21st century, people felt compelled to move for a range of factors to do with their lack of human security and their lack of opportunity, and they often moved for more than just one reason. Their trajectories were usually not straight-forward, and Australia was not always their end point. Forced displacement did not automatically result in a severing of ties to the old homeland, and resettlement did not automatically lead to absorption into the social fabric of the new homeland. Creating a new home meant maintaining and establishing relationships — in Australia, in countries of birth and transit, and with others who were part of an international diaspora — and that happened well before the advent of email, Facebook and Skype.

In our preoccupation with the ‘new’ we could easily overlook that the 20-year-old Hungarian who in late 1956 joined the exodus of refugees to Austria because he suspected that his move would open up opportunities he might not otherwise have — and not knowing yet that some months later he would end up in New Zealand — has surprisingly much in common with the West African adventurers trying to enter Europe.

### Misplaced emphasis

I do not wish to deny that there is something qualitatively new about irregular migration in the early 21st century, including the migration of people who have been forcibly displaced. But I am intrigued by the emphasis that policy-makers across the global north put on the supposed novelty of human mobility today, and by the ease with which the histories of past migrations (including those resulting from forced displacement) are discarded as irrelevant. To mention but two ‘new’ features of irregular migration that often come up in public discussion: I would like to suggest that there is little new about either mixed flows — people who are forced to move due to a lack of human security and people who are moving in order to seek better economic opportunities — or the complexity of motivations that compel people to move.

When we consider the world’s refugee population, which in 2014 — the last year for which statistics are available — stood at 19.5 million, then it appears that in many respects history is merely repeating itself. There have been other times in the past...
when the number of refugees worldwide rose dramatically — for reasons that are very similar to those that have led to a dramatic increase of refugee numbers in the past few years: a sustained lack of human security in regions where people have the means and the opportunity to cross borders and reason to believe that by doing so they better their situation. The Syrian refugee crisis has much in common with the refugee crisis sparked by the wars in the former Yugoslavia. By the way, as a proportion of the global population, the number of refugees worldwide was higher between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s than it was in 2014.

Human mobility is not a new phenomenon. Neither are the reasons that compel people to move. By focusing on what is new about human mobility, and by framing human mobility as something that precipitates a crisis — such as the so-called refugee crisis in Europe — we could easily lose sight of what in many respects may not be entirely new, but is changing, often quite dramatically: the response to human mobility in the global north, particularly to mobility as a result of a lack of human security. So let us consider also how responses to human mobility have fluctuated, often significantly — and with significant consequences for refugee and asylum-seeker policies — as a result of social and cultural transformations in migrant-receiving countries.

Comparative response

Importantly, as much as the contexts of forced displacement are very specific, so are the contexts that have shaped the response to mobility resulting from such displacement. Consider, for example, the response to refugees and asylum-seekers in post-war Australia, New Zealand and the Federal Republic of Germany. Obviously I will not have space here to present a comparative analysis of changes in these countries; the following can only provide some pointers. All three are countries of immigration (although some Germans would dispute that, and some New Zealanders would falsely assume that inward migration has long compensated for outward migration): in 2014, Germany had a net migration gain of 550,000 — or one new migrant for every 146 residents, which was slightly below Australia’s rate, but only half of New Zealand’s.

What these three societies have in common is that the integration of migrants — and particularly of humanitarian migrants — has been perceived as a problem issue, and that too little attention has been paid to another longstanding problem: the integration of people who do not want to accept that their societies have changed and are continuing to change in response to immigration and that they themselves need to adapt to these changes, and who then embrace the anti-immigration rhetoric of demagogues such as Frauke Petry, Pauline Hanson or Winston Peters.

In Australia, which has admitted a comparatively large number of refugees since 1947, refugees were initially conceptualised as potentially useful immigrants (provided they met the criteria of the White Australia policy); it was only from the late 1970s that the resettlement of refugees has not been entirely governed by labour market demands. In more recent years, refugees are considered a potential security risk — the fact that thus far Australia has only admitted 187 of the 12,000 Iraqi and Syrian refugees it committed to resettle last year is evidence of the securitisation of refugee migration in Australia, which is both a result of post-9/11 anxieties and of the influence the discourse on asylum-seekers had on discussions about quota refugees.

Humanitarian impulse

In New Zealand, by comparison, perceived labour market needs never played a significant role; since at least the late 1950s, refugees were resettled for humanitarian reasons. But their numbers have always been comparatively small. Unlike Australia, however, New Zealand admits comparatively many migrants who are not refugees or the relatives of refugees as part of its humanitarian programme. Fears that the country could be invaded by irregular migrants arriving from across the seas — particularly the kinds of people who would normally be admitted through New Zealand’s humanitarian programme — are at least as pronounced in New Zealand as they are in Australia.

In the 20th century, Germany experienced both remarkably porous borders (particularly in the first half of the 1920s and in the second half of the 1940s) and tightly-controlled borders (especially between 1961 and 1989); concerns about the unchecked entry of irregular migrants are not nearly as prominent as they are in Australia and New Zealand. The German public’s relaxed attitude towards revelations last year that the government did not know how many asylum-seekers had entered Germany, and how many were still in the country, with widely different estimates being offered by federal and state government agencies, would be unthinkable in either Australia or New Zealand.

In 2015–16, Germany’s response to asylum-seekers and refugees has differed markedly from that of most of its European neighbours. It has also contrasted sharply with Germany’s overwhelmingly hostile response to asylum-seekers in the early 1990s, when the country was last compelled to respond to a significant refugee crisis in Europe and, at the nadir of that crisis in 1992, received about 440,000 asylum applications in one year. When exploring the new features of the current ‘crisis’ in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, we ought to ask what made this change of public sentiment possible.

Interesting discourse

What is also interesting in the German case is the growing importance of a human rights discourse — this is both a result of the emergence of a comparatively robust European human rights framework, and of Germany’s on-going engagement with its past. That discourse is significantly weaker in New Zealand and almost entirely absent in Australia, where refugee advocates tend to appeal to compassion or draw on the arguments advanced by the government between the late 1940s and early 1970s, namely that refugees contribute to Australia’s economy, and where ques-
tions about who is entitled to protection rely, at best, on the 1951 Refugee Convention (which was not designed to help nation states to distinguish between non-citizens entitled to protection and those not entitled to protection), rather than on a human rights legal framework.

The crisis experienced in relation to forced migrants in Australia between 2009 and 2013, and in Germany since last year (and supposedly averted in New Zealand by passing border protection legislation, and by having a miniscule refugee intake) is imagined rather than real. The problem, I suggest, is not caused by new migrations, but by the response to these migrations, which needs to be understood historically.

What is true for 2016 was also true a hundred years ago, when refugees emerged as a problem — for global governance and domestic policy. Then, human mobility was not a new phenomenon either, but it became a problem because nation states introduced identity documents and border controls. Only 103 years ago, a Russian émigré arriving in Brisbane, when asked for his passport, was able to satisfy the customs official by producing a Russian theatre programme. Today, of course, he would have been screened out well before he had the chance to get anywhere near the Australian border.

Overloaded small boats carry refugees attempting to reach Australia

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2. For a good example of this blindsided focus on changes to mobility (and concomitant disregard of changes in how nations respond to mobility), see OECD, Is This Humanitarian Migration Crisis Different?, Migration Policy Debates, no 7 (Sep 2015) (www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf).
**Punching above our weight**

John Key outlines his government’s approach to New Zealand’s role and place in world affairs.

New Zealand’s place in the world is always the focus of much debate. The debate revolves around issues like whether we should join trade agreements, welcome immigration or join international efforts to combat terrorism. Two schools of thought stand out. One is a very defensive position: put up barriers to imports and restrict investment; be suspicious of foreigners, especially those who do not look or sound like us. And they would tell those with the gumption and drive to travel across the world in search of a brighter future here that we are not that interested in having them. Other people think New Zealand’s future is in being an open, outward-facing country, welcoming of people and ideas from other countries, and part of wide-reaching global supply chains. They think we should be a good global citizen and promote ourselves on the world stage.

I am firmly of the latter view. Fortress New Zealand simply does not work. New Zealand has tried it before and it failed. We sought shelter in tariffs and subsidies because we believed that is what we needed to do to survive. We tried to protect our businesses from the full force of international competition and our citizens from such evils as cheap imports. But we did not get ahead. In fact, the result was quite the opposite: we were inefficient, insulated and inward-looking.

Then in the 1980s we were forced to forge our own path. We went through enormous reforms, cutting subsidies, tearing down trade barriers and opening ourselves up to the world. And we emerged as a free trade trailblazer, setting the standard in a variety of industries and helping create the prosperity we enjoy today.

**Stark differences**

The differences between then and now are stark. Some of the wines we made then you would struggle to sell to university students today. Now Marlborough sauvignon and Central Otago pinot are sold and savoured around the world. In 1975 our national sheep flock was 75 million strong. Today, it is less than 30 million, but through investment in research and development and the incredibly hard work of our farmers we produce as much lamb meat now as we did then. Our farmers are world leaders because we forced ourselves to do better, build new markets and find newer, more efficient ways of doing things. And because we forced ourselves to front up, we have gone from producing goods that could never have competed internationally to products that excel on the world stage. We got better because we had to and we are now reaping the rewards.

The same goes for immigration. No-one should fear people who want to come here and contribute, no matter where in the world they are from. There is no worldwide conspiracy to take jobs from New Zealanders or suppress wages or buy all of our houses. Immigrants make an incredible contribution, bringing capital, skills, knowledge and experience. They support existing businesses or start their own. And they bring contacts, expertise and differing views and ideas that contribute to the richness of our communities. They join the tens of thousands of Kiwis moving home because they want to live, work and raise their families in New Zealand. We should embrace that.

They also promote New Zealand to the world — part of the

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Rt Hon John Key is prime minister of New Zealand. This article is the edited text of the address he gave to the NZIIA on 3 May.

New Zealand’s future is in being an open, outward-facing country, welcoming of people and ideas from other countries, and part of wide-reaching global supply chains. Immigration and tourism are bringing people to New Zealand in record numbers. The former bring investment and new ideas, the latter provide increased jobs. We have led the way on free trade, played our role as peacemaker and stood alongside our allies in conflict zones. The TPP is part of the government’s wider programme of building ties across Asia and the Pacific, and when it comes into force it will benefit people throughout the country.
reason we have seen a record 3.2 million tourists arrive in the past year. The equivalent of three-quarters of our entire population travelled all the way down to the bottom of the world because they like what we have to offer. We know how lucky we are in New Zealand and we want to share that. And while our booming tourism industry throws up some capacity issues — yet another problem of success — we are working with the industry and local councils to get on top of those.

Since 2012 we have had an open skies air services policy that places as few restrictions as possible on airlines wanting to fly here. As a result almost all the world’s major airlines now do so. It also means more options and cheaper fares for New Zealanders wanting to travel the world. And immigration supports our tourism industry by ensuring efficient and speedy visa decisions for applicants. We have visa waiver arrangements with more than 50 countries to make it easier and more attractive for people to visit.

Investment sought

We also want people to invest in New Zealand. Almost $100 billion in foreign capital was invested here last year. That creates jobs and businesses and provides funding to get infrastructure projects off the ground. The new $200 million Park Hyatt in Auckland and the $35 million Sofitel in Wellington will create jobs during construction and when the hotels are up and running. They also add to our tourism infrastructure. Christchurch has been chosen as a location for one of only seven international ‘zones’ established by Vodafone. These are purpose built spaces to support startups and encourage innovation. And the Queenstown Resort College is educating young New Zealanders in Otago and Northland. These are just a few examples.

New Zealand has benefited immensely from investment that has come from all around the world. Those investors see our growing economy, booming tourism, strong migration and a large pipeline of construction projects that will continue to stimulate growth. They see our strong track record and growth forecasts of around 3 per cent on average over the next few years. Ultimately these investors chose New Zealand because they see opportunity here. They believe in our future. So do I.

This government knows we can compete and we will succeed. Because history has shown we can. No-one owes us a living; we must earn it. Trade, investment, migration — they make New Zealand a better place. That is why agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership are so important, and why New Zealand pushed so hard for it. The TPP fits into the government’s wider programme of building ties across Asia and the Pacific.
to legislate in the best interest of New Zealanders. No-one dictates to New Zealand. The introduction of the TPP legislation to Parliament in May followed a series of meetings around the country to better inform the public, as well as the release of the TPP text and the opportunity for the public to submit on it.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Bill makes the legislative changes needed to ratify the TPP agreement. This includes applying preferential tariff rates and intellectual property obligations and increasing the investment screening thresholds for significant business assets. The TPP Bill is now proceeding through the standard parliamentary process, including further opportunities for public submissions to the select committee. These amendments will only come into effect once the TPP enters into force for New Zealand, which could be late 2017 or early in 2018.

Other plans
And we will not stop with the TPP. We also hope to upgrade our existing free trade agreement with China and we are in negotiations with the European Union and the Gulf states as well as with the other nations involved in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership talks. It is worth reminding ourselves that 99.9 per cent of our potential customers live overseas — many in the fast-growing Asia-Pacific region. Through the TPP and ASEAN and our bilateral agreements New Zealand is incredibly well placed to take advantage of the opportunities opening up there. Once the TPP is in place our trade agreements will cover almost the entire Pacific Rim — a region of incredible potential.

The Asia-Pacific region will be the major driver of global economic growth for the foreseeable future. It is part of the reason why President Obama is so focused on getting the TPP over the line in the United States, which we remain optimistic he will be able to do. For the United States the TPP is about taking advantage of economic growth as well as maintaining leadership in the region. Everyone wants the United States there, but if they are not the region will not stand still — others will look to fill the vacuum. In my opinion, though, US leadership remains strong and it remains in the United States’ best interest to join the TPP.

The sheer weight of population and the growing middle class in China and other rapidly developing countries are driving innovation and change at rates we have not seen before. That is good for our region and for the world. New Zealand will be part of that if we keep our outward, open focus. That will help us continue to drive economic growth for the benefit of all New Zealanders. Building a first-class economy will mean a first-class health system, education for our young people and modern infrastructure.

Openness preference
Actually I think most New Zealanders are on the side of openness — we are a nation of travellers, curious about the world and driven to see more of it. New Zealand has become more multi-cultural, more global and more diverse and we are much better for it. And just because we promote ourselves and we are welcoming does not mean we have no safeguards or restrictions. Take the Overseas Investment Office process. Foreign buyers of sensitive land must go through a rigorous application process and prove they offer greater benefits to New Zealand than would be obtained through a domestic sale. And for a foreigner to come here they must show they have the skills or the capital or the right attitude to make a difference.

I believe we have the right balance between encouraging investment and ensuring that investment benefits New Zealand. We work so hard to build people, diplomatic and security ties with the world. Many will have been a part of that effort across their working lives. They have helped to build the reputation we have today as a solid, considered and consistent international voice. We might be 4.5 million people at the bottom of the world but we punch above our weight on the international stage.

You do not get onto the UN Security Council on the first ballot if your peers do not hold you in high regard. Or have a former prime minister with a shot at being the next UN secretary-general. Not only is Helen Clark hugely talented and qualified, she stands on a platform burnished by New Zealand’s role and reputation on the international stage. It is why being a New Zealander is such a major part of her pitch. And we know — and much of the world does too — that she would do an incredible job and it is why we will do everything we can to help her get there.

We work hard to build our international connections. We have 56 MFAT posts around the world and diplomatic relations with 132 countries — more than two-thirds of all those represented at the UN — in order to promote our national interests. New Zealand Trade and Enterprise covers all 192 countries we have a trading relationship with, creating new links and opportunities for our businesses. And I have travelled to 45 countries as prime minister to strengthen our relationships, forge new ties and open doors for New Zealand. It is also why we are members of Five Eyes and we are playing our part in the international efforts to degrade and destroy ISIS.

Peacekeeping effort
We send peacekeepers around the world. We currently have Defence Force personnel deployed on fourteen operations across ten countries. We are obliged to pull our weight. And it is not the New Zealand way to shirk our responsibilities or shrink from a challenge. The risks facing the world are many — economic, conflict and terror-related — and they are too great for any one country to face alone. New Zealand has carved out an enviable reputation on the world stage. We have done that through being consistent, fair, principled and ambitious for ourselves and the world. We have led the way on free trade, played our role as peacemaker and stood alongside our allies in conflict zones. We continue to use our seat on the UN Security Council to provide a considered and consistent voice on issues ranging from terror to refugee crises and climate change. And to give a voice to small countries such as our Pacific neighbours where they have otherwise struggled.

Under my government we will continue to promote ourselves and to build our international connections. Our vision for New Zealand is a more open, more confident, more integrated and more prosperous country that plays its part on the international stage. We will continue to look for opportunities that benefit all New Zealanders and we will remain the honest broker. It is important that we grasp those opportunities, whether they are on our backdoor step in Asia and the Pacific or further afield.

The job is far from finished. In many ways, it is just beginning. My government is motivated to continue working hard to ensure we become the more prosperous and ambitious nation I envisaged when I became prime minister. If we do that, I know we can deliver the opportunities New Zealanders deserve.
Diplomatic dancing with Oceania
Ken Ross discusses New Zealand prime ministers’ involvement in Pacific Islands affairs.

Apart from a dash of more or less benevolent colonialism, of interest to only a small number of people, New Zealand and New Zealanders virtually ignored their South Pacific neighbours.’ (Merwyn Norrish, 1993)1

‘New Zealanders in general, they sometimes talk the talk about being a Pacific nation, but it is not clear that they walk the walk.’ (James Belich, 2001)2

The South Pacific provides the foremost measure for how well New Zealand prime ministers do global diplomacy. Wellington needs our closest family — our South Pacific neighbours — on our team willingly when we do high-quality global diplomacy.

How willingly each of our fifteen prime ministers since 1945 has been to diplomatically dance on the global stage with the leaders of the South Pacific Islands states is the story-line here.

There are two parts to New Zealand’s relationship with Oceania, the region that New Zealanders more usually call the South Pacific. The first is how Wellington and the region connect. The second is how Wellington and the region work together pursuing mutual goals beyond the South Pacific. In this article, I am looking only at the latter.

I acknowledge completely the importance of the former – for me story telling on that topic is for another occasion. Thus, I am not here shining light on important developments in the region, such as Bougainville’s secession, the Fiji coups or the democracy debates in Tonga and Samoa; nor on the global warming/climate change scenarios for Oceania or French colonialism or the formation of the South Pacific Forum in 1971 (and its becoming the Pacific Islands Forum in 1999).

I draw on my experience — having been one of Norrish’s ‘small number of people’ and done some of Belich’s ‘walking’ — as a New Zealander who shared much time with our South Pacific neighbours, particularly with Melanesians (Papua New Guineans, Solomon Islanders, ni-Vanuatu and New Caledonia’s Kanaks).

Here, I illustrate, only with quick brush strokes, the four best instances of the mingling New Zealand prime ministers have undertaken with Oceania’s leaders beyond their home shores.

Fraser’s endeavours
Peter Fraser’s long-esteemed endeavours at the United Nation’s creation begin this story. When the Second World War was grinding to its conclusion, Fraser was instrumental in the establishment of the organisation’s Trusteeship Council. But by the time the war ended, on 2 September 1945, Fraser was already fading from further global diplomacy. Fifteen years later Fraser’s endeavours bore ripe ‘home grown’ fruit — it was to be Walter Nash who, in Gerald Hensley’s words, ‘steered Samoa out of UN trusteeship into full independence at a time when this was regarded as a rather radical step.’3 Hensley, Mary Boyd and Jim Davidson have given us the best accounts of Western Samoa gaining independence, including spotlighting Nash’s contribution that it must be ‘unqualified independence’ — that is, no half measure, such as the Tongan solution.4

Independence for Samoa was in itself important enough. In making it possible New Zealand faced off the other Pacific colonial administrations, which were more than piqued by Wellington’s going solo. The credit due Nash has been scarcely acknowledged — even his biographer Keith Sinclair is quiet on this one. Nash’s striding out on behalf of the Samoans was the influential trend-setter for the near-peaceful decolonisation of Oceania. The leaders of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and the former United States trust territories (Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and Marshall Islands) all became indebted to the New Zealanders — Fraser and Nash and their key lieutenants, Sir Guy Powles, Alister McIntosh, Frank Corner and then working level officials such as Hensley.

Kirk appearance
Norman Kirk’s global diplomacy had been well trumpeted by his actions and announcements before his first international appearance as prime minister — at the April 1973 South Pacific Forum.
in Apia. His final absence from Wellington was attending the late March 1974 forum meeting in the Cook Islands. In between, Kirk soared as he put in place his brand — New Zealand as a progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to our national identity.\(^5\)

At the forefront of the Kirk Brand was the ability of Wellington to be close to the South Pacific Islands states’ leaders. For Kirk, this region was foremost for our offshore engagements — Our Neighbourhood. At the August 1973 Commonwealth leaders gathering in Ottawa, Lee Kuan Yew observed that during the meeting Kirk was already an ‘old friend’ and that Kirk, rather than Gough Whitlam, ‘emerged as the voice of the South Pacific supported by Western Samoa, Tonga and Fiji’.\(^6\)

A fascinating element of Kirk’s performance was his affinity with Papua New Guinea’s emergence as an independent state. When he became prime minister-elect his senior official was George Laking, the secretary of foreign affairs and head of the prime minister’s department. Having already observed Kirk closely, even though he had never met him, Laking was ready for Kirk — on 1 December 1972, while Kirk was prime minister-elect, he sent him a memorandum, ‘Papua New Guinea’, which was a skilled assessment of the territory’s prospects that would have pleased Kirk.\(^7\) Kirk was soon engaged with Papua New Guinea’s chief minister, Michael Somare. Somare visited Wellington from 12–17 April 1973 and then travelled with Kirk to the forum meeting in Apia. Kirk made Papua New Guinea his first stop on his lengthy Asian trip in December 1973–January 1974. Somare’s message when Kirk died, on 31 July 1974, catches the status Kirk had by then with his South Pacific counterparts. Somare recorded that Kirk had shown an outstanding feeling of concern and interest where problems of the Pacific and South-east Asian peoples were involved and more than any other national leader had shown an understanding of the problems of the Papua New Guinean people.\(^3\)

The slipstream of Kirk lasted well in Papua New Guinea. In 1975 the University of Papua New Guinea, with New Zealand government aid, established an undergraduate diploma course in journalism. Many of Oceania’s top journalists and others now prominent in politics, officialdom and business were honed on the course by Ross Stevens and capable successors, including David Robie.\(^8\) This initiative had got underway in early 1974 when I was an administrator at the university. I worked my contacts in the New Zealand foreign ministry, where I had some credibility from my known earlier association with Kirk. We put together the proposal that had New Zealand fund the course, including providing the teaching staff for the initial years.

Again in the spirit of Kirk, a small project that saw major kudos for New Zealand with the emerging regional leadership was initiated — a New Zealand-funded student exchange arrangement between the University of the South Pacific and the University of Papua New Guinea for several students annually to spend an academic year at the other. Several of the early participants became prime ministers, most recently Vanuatu’s Joe Natuman. Paul Grocott had the idea for this scheme and I arranged the deal with foreign ministry people. (Grocott, a recent New Zealand student leader, had lectured at the University of the South Pacific and then was at the University of Papua New Guinea.)

**Lange engagement**

David Lange is the most recent New Zealand prime minister to have engaged particularly well with South Pacific leaders. His mana comes most from his extraordinary role in getting New Caledonia reinscribed on the United Nations’ List of Non Self Governing Territories in 1986. That was the first time regional leaders had sought to go to the global community to plead for the interests of people in their region. This was Lange’s least-known major initiative in his global diplomacy. Yet it was his foremost ‘captain’s call’ — his firm advocacy for the French South Pacific territory of New Caledonia to become the independent Kanaky. It was also one of the two Lange-launched scorpions that stung French President Francois Mitterrand, the other being his pinpointing of the president’s culpability for the bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior*.

Lange had researched the New Caledonia troubles ahead of becoming prime minister. He already had chosen to get involved as quickly as possible. Knowing this was not a concern to New Zealanders, he did not see the need to take the New Zealand public with him — but it was important to him. This story is outlined in my ‘David Lange’s French connection — mais qui’ in this journal’s January/February 2016 issue (vol 41, no 1).

A spinoff of the New Caledonia/Kanaky issue was to mark Lange out for Oceania leaders as being cut from a different cloth to Bob Hawke, his Australian counterpart. Lange’s fractious relationship with Hawke throughout their joint time as prime ministers was well appreciated by South Pacific leaders. The atmospherics were captured in cable traffic, dated 31 December 1984, from the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra reminding Wellington that the Australians have had their reservations about the group
[the South Pacific Forum’s Ministerial Initiative on New Caledonia] from the outset — Our 3346 of 8 October reported this and the comment from one of Mr Hawke’s senior advisers that ‘New Zealand should not expect a lot of Australian interest in this initiative’. These words have been borne out. The Australian Government has not given any support or encouragement to the Forum Group… . Right from Tuvalu the Australians have been puzzled, impressed and disappointed at the speed which New Zealand has taken the initiative and moved with it.10

Standout moments
Two other standout moments of Lange’s prime ministership added to the region’s leaders’ appreciation of him, such that subsequently, for a generation or two of South Pacific leaders, Lange has remained as the most recent New Zealand prime minister to have known them well.

The first was Lange’s travel to Tokelau in January 1985, which is legendary among his critics as his running away holidaying when they reckoned the USS Buchanan decision was due. But he was doing an important assignment, one comprehended by his South Pacific counterparts. Lange was to be the first New Zealand prime minister ever to go ashore on Tokelau since New Zealand took on constitutional obligations for the islands in 1949. He had an important task to undertake — to announce that Frank Corner was standing down after nine years as the New Zealand administrator.

The second was Lange’s in your face to his predecessor, Sir Robert Muldoon, regarding Vanuatu’s prime minister, Walter Lini. By June 1984 Muldoon had taken an intense dislike to Lini. Muldoon’s grievance with Lini was such that his calling, on 14 June 1984, of an early general election stymied Lini’s planned appearance at the ‘Beyond ANZUS’ conference in Wellington on 16–18 June. When Lini was informed of diplomatic ‘protocol’ that foreign leaders do not visit once a general election has been formally got underway, he stayed home. Muldoon’s initial perspective of Lini — ‘eloquent and sincere, should be a valuable addition to our group’ — increasingly soured. A year later his disdain had developed: ‘Lini is a gentle and agreeable man but he does not give the impression of being a strong leader. One wonders how his Cabinet gets its job done’. Finally, after the 1983 forum meeting, he growled on paper that ‘Lini still lacks a feel for the Forum itself — thus tending to be the odd man out’.11 Once he became prime minister, Lange got close and familial with Lini, an action widely applauded by the other islands state leaders.

Bolger’s leadership
Jim Bolger has much regard from many in the South Pacific for his leadership of the region’s protests in 1995 against France’s renewed nuclear testing. But he was not another Lange. Some still smile at how adeptly Bolger performed, particularly upstaging Paul Keating, who simply could not grasp that Bolger could do so well.

The story of the protests following President Chirac’s announcement in May 1995 that France would renew nuclear testing at Moruroa has been well told. The Australians should have led the protests, but Paul Keating, at that time chair of the South Pacific Forum, was slow to act, either as Australia’s prime minister or on behalf of the forum. Don Watson, Keating’s then speech-writer, has given us his insider’s chapter and verse on those shortcomings.12 Bolger, pushed by New Zealanders’ concerns, unexpectedly found he was at the forefront of the protests. The Australians were not pleased, but whatever they then initiated the New Zealanders took further initiatives to force the pace.

Third parties can be good sources for interesting insights: we have John Major’s biographer, Anthony Seldon, in this instance letting us know that ‘the British saw Keating worried about being seen as softer than Bolger’ on the strength of their respective opposition to France’s resumed testing.13 In the days before the mid-November 1995 Auckland Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Seldon noted, Keating had been ‘driven to make some very strong criticisms of Major’. In all this the South Pacific island leadership was striding with Bolger.

Bolger’s leadership of the global protests during the latter
months of 1995 against the renewed French nuclear testing was watched closely in the United States. The result was that in mid-October the Clinton administration chose to join the opposition to France. The White House decided, and announced publicly, that Chirac’s scheduled state visit in early November was postponed — privately they had made clear to the French the state visit was not to proceed until France publicly discontinued the testing. Chirac called off the tests four months early in January 1996, with just six of the eight proposed explosions completed. Only in February 1996 was Chirac able to visit the White House. Clinton made much of the tests’ cessation when he finally welcomed Chirac. The White House announcement preceded by three weeks Bolger’s signature moment in his global diplomacy — his hosting the 1995 Chogm.

**Other leaders**

Helen Clark is the best of the rest. Her quiet track-record with Oceania was below par with her overall impressive global diplomacy record that I have outlined elsewhere. In his *Helen Clark: a political life* (2009), Denis Welch says it well — that in the 1984–87 years Clark ‘stayed sheltered in the offshore playground of foreign affairs’. But neither then nor when Opposition leader or prime minister did she make the South Pacific a region of stand-out importance for her. Neither Welch nor Claudia Pond Eyley and Dan Salmon, with their *Helen Clark: Inside Stories* (2015), record her having engaged with Oceania.

Once prime minister in early December 1975, Robert Muldoon introduced himself to the region’s leadership by an extraordinary U-turn that stung them. He withdrew New Zealand’s advocacy for the UN resolution that sought to make the South Pacific a nuclear free zone. The resolution, an initiative of New Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, had been adopted by the General Assembly as Muldoon was being sworn in as prime minister.

Muldoon was soon engaged with regional leaders. He had quickly grasped that by being au fait with them he would have a smart diplomatic calling-card for when he engaged with government leaders beyond the region. His eight-year prime ministership is a quite mixed record with Oceania. It is heavily marked down by his clashes at forums with Malcolm Fraser and his open disdain for Walter Lini and Solomon Mamaloni (Solomon Islands’ leader in the early 1980s).

Rivalry between the Australian and New Zealand prime ministers has become one of the most enduring dynamics of Oceania’s international diplomacy since the South Pacific Forum first met in August 1971. This trans-Tasman rivalry has been a plus for progressing regional solidarity when pursuing international goals sought by the forum. But it has seen numerous separations of Canberra from Wellington and Oceania in the larger playing-fields of world affairs.

**NOTES**

7. During the 1960s Wellington had taken little interest in the territory. No diplomat from the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra had visited Papua New Guinea between 1961 and September 1971. By then awareness was growing, largely prompted by the Australian Opposition leader Gough Whitlam’s declaration that he would expedite the territory’s independence when he became prime minister. R17723754 at Archives New Zealand has the pertinent material.
Friends with benefits

Stephen Jacobi comments on the vital economic relationship between Australia and New Zealand.

For some years now I have played a role, on behalf of Business-NZ, in helping co-ordinate the annual Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum, which brings together senior government, business and community representatives to foster and advance the relationship. The forum has been meeting for twelve years now and will do so again later this year. It has been described as a symbol of trans-Tasman ‘togetherness’.

That ‘togetherness’ is not just a sentimental thing — although sentiment is certainly part of the Anzac relationship. It is also about business, about the economic value both countries derive from their integration with one another, and increasingly about the way in which both countries, together, can integrate with the rest of the world. That is why the relationship might also be described as ‘friends with benefits’. In this article I will address some of these benefits by focusing on the pillars of that economic togetherness — CER, the Single Economic Market (SEM) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

CER or, to give its proper title, the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations and Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) is more than an acronym. Signed in 1983, it is quite simply the world’s most comprehensive trade agreement. It is hard to remember what the world looked like then, but the trans-Tasman environment was certainly not the space for by and large free movement of goods, services, investment and people it has become today.

CER had a profound impact on New Zealand because it was the first step towards the liberalisation of what had become a fortress economy marked by absurd import licensing, high tariffs and even agricultural subsidies. Of course, not everything was achieved on day one, but the pace quickened notably over the years so that the deadline for the removal of quantitative restrictions and tariffs was achieved five years earlier than scheduled.

And for those who are — quite rightly — concerned that the TPP will not achieve complete free trade by the end of the implementation period, CER at the outset was no different with dairy products excluded at the beginning. What we have seen quite clearly is that the CER agenda has evolved over time. The first decade was taken up with a focus on manufactured goods and agriculture. This included:

- removal of tariffs and import licensing
- elimination of anti-dumping
- establishment of processes and institutions for conformity assessment and quality assurance
- development of customs and quarantine co-operation
- provisions on government procurement.

Deeper integration

The second and third decade moved to a period of deeper integration leading to the development of a concept we now know as the Single Economic Market. This included:

- focus on services, business law harmonisation, regulatory reform, investment (CER Investment Protocol)
- further market opening for goods
- mutual recognition of goods standards (Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement)
- single food safety regime
- new rules of origin (introduced in 2009)
- enhanced co-operation on bio-security and customs.

This period has given rise to a flourishing of the trade and economic relationship and the emergence of a truly trans-Tasman economy and of trans-Tasman enterprises better able to participate in the global supply and value chains and networks that today mark the way business is being done around the world.

The traffic has not all been one way. Australia has been New Zealand’s top trading partner since 1989 (apart from a brief period 1989 Australia has usually been New Zealand’s largest trading partner, but New Zealand is only Australia’s fifth largest partner). Since 1983 New Zealand and Australia have pursued the goal of deeper economic integration. This ‘trans-Tasman togetherness’ has been driven by the CER agenda, which was revolutionary and achieved its immediate goals five years before schedule. CER developed into the Single Economic Market, which has also been pursued vigorously by both governments, although progress is becoming more difficult now the low hanging fruit has been picked. Business leadership will be vital in finding ways of moving forward. Australia and New Zealand are now partners in the TPP, many of whose key ideas have been trialled in CER, wholesaled in APEC and now retailed in the TPP.

Stephen Jacobi is a consultant working in the areas of international trade, government relations and economic development. A former policy analyst, diplomat and industry association CEO, he leads the New Zealand International Business Forum and is an alternate member of the APEC Business Advisory Council. This article is the edited text of an address he gave to a University of Sydney breakfast in Auckland on 13 May.
od in 2014), but New Zealand is Australia’s fifth largest trading partner. Australian companies are our largest foreign investors with a stock of around A$100 billion. New Zealand is the largest source of in-bound visitors to Australia. All this did not happen by accident.

CER has been the result of close collaboration between governments and business and supporting networks. As it has evolved, it is important to note that CER’s model for integration is not based on ‘one size fits all’ — rather than adopting identical and standards on both sides, the objective has been to achieve equality of outcomes so that ultimately it becomes as easy to do business in Auckland as it is in Sydney and vice versa.

It is also true that as CER has evolved and adapted to changing economic circumstances, making progress has become more difficult, not so much because the vision is no longer there, but because as economies become more integrated attention turns to policies and regulations that have a lot to do with national sovereignty — the focus turns from at the border to behind the border. That is essentially the challenge of the SEM agenda.

Natural consequence
SEM is the natural consequence of CER: the goal is to create a seamless environment for business across the Tasman. Closely connected to the SEM goal is the concept, first elaborated by prime ministers Kevin Rudd and John Key, of ‘net trans-Tasman benefit’. This requires a move beyond a narrow calculation of national economic benefit on any single issue to a balanced benefits approach across the range of areas under consideration.

Some notable applications of this principle applied to the SEM include:

- signature of the Closer Economic Relations Investment Protocol (February 2011) — an important advance in the bilateral economic relationship aligning CER with other modern high quality free trade agreements and facilitating investment by reducing compliance costs for investors
- steps aimed at making travel across the Tasman a more ‘domestic-like’ experience, including: smartGate for arrivals and departures at Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch international airports; bio-security direct exit lanes at New Zealand international airports; the transfer of x-ray images of checked in baggage from Australian airports to MAF in New Zealand; joint studies looking at further streamlining of trans-Tasman travel.

One important issue which is raised regularly in the Leadership Forum but which thus far, shall we say, has ‘failed to capture the imagination of Australian officialdom’ is the mutual recognition of imputation and franking credits. This could provide a further boost to trans-Tasman investment well beyond the short-term fiscal costs of implementation. This one issue would do more to move the dial in the trans-Tasman economy than any other currently before us.

Joint commitment
Both governments remain committed to maintaining the momentum in the SEM and the broader integration project. A report by the Joint Productivity Commissions in 2012 made some useful suggestions. At their joint meeting earlier this year prime ministers Malcolm Turnbull and Key urged business leaders to come up with some practical ideas. Turnbull said they were looking for ideas to ‘help scrape the barnacles from the bottom of the boat’.

The Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum has collaboration underway in a number of sectoral areas — tourism, infrastructure, health technology, innovation and agri-business. The aim is to come up with a series of recommendations which can be presented to the Leadership Forum later this year.
Certainly the future of CER and the SEM is likely to be as much around practically focused business collaboration in areas like innovation, infrastructure and investment as in a continuing series of improvements to policy and regulation. It is also increasingly apparent that the opportunity lies as much in third markets as it does between the two economies. That is where the TPP comes in.

Realising opportunities

New Zealand and Australia have been for a generation close partners in APEC established at the initiative of Prime Minister Hawke in 1989. New Zealand and Australia are partners with ten other economies in the TPP, which was signed in Auckland in February and is now undergoing ratification. New Zealand played an instrumental role in getting the TPP concept off the ground through the earlier P4 agreement concluded with Singapore, Brunei and Chile.

Australia and New Zealand had earlier explored a P5 concept with the United States, Singapore and Chile, which was overshadowed by the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round in 1993. Australia and New Zealand are also working together with Asian economies in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Whether through APEC, the TPP, P4, P5 or the RCEP, both countries are seeking to develop learnings from the CER experience that can be applied more widely.

It is not an exaggeration to suggest that goal of economic integration has been trialled in CER, wholesaled in APEC and retailed in the TPP. The TPP contains many CER innovations, including the concept of regulatory coherence, but develops them further and applies them in a wider setting. Like CER over 30 years ago the TPP is trying to address the needs of a new economy and of businesses operating in a new environment. The goal is for a seamless economic space across the twelve, designed to lead to a broader vision of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) linking all 21 members of APEC.

The TPP goes beyond trade in goods to trade in services, investment, innovation, the digital economy, SME concerns and even into labour and the environment. It is a future-facing agreement, which sets a new framework for trade and investment — that is, if it can be successfully ratified by the twelve members. The TPP can come into force only if it is ratified by economies representing 85 per cent of the GDP of the members.

High stakes

For New Zealand the stakes are incredibly high — just as they were when we signed the CER agreement. The TPP represents 36 per cent of global GDP and over 40 per cent of our exports. It will deliver free trade arrangements with the United States, Japan, Canada, Mexico and Peru, with whom we do not have free trade agreements, and extend our relationships with existing partners Malaysia and Vietnam. The TPP has little direct impact on our existing relationships with Australia, Chile, Singapore or Brunei but adds some new commitments in specific areas.

All New Zealand export sectors stand to benefit from the TPP — the impact on the beef, wine, horticulture, dairy, seafood and wood sectors is perhaps the greatest. To implement the TPP New Zealand has to make very few policy changes. Only in the area of copyright are we required to make a major change — from 50 years after death of the author to 75 years — but this change brings us into line with Australia. As in most other free trade agreements, New Zealand will provide commitments to foreign investors, including investor state dispute settlement, but these will not apply to Australia where the CER Investment Protocol will be the instrument governing investment between us.

In signing and hopefully ratifying the TPP all members are faced with a fundamental choice. The choice is for regional economic integration, a seamless economic space and greater togetherness — which is good for business, good for security and good for development. In CER New Zealanders and Australians have been able to see the benefits of that togetherness for over 30 years now.

CER was revolutionary at the outset but has been more evolutionary in successive stages, particularly as we move to the SEM. The TPP is also revolutionary but will doubtless also in time adopt a more evolutionary path. In that sense each new trade agreement builds on the last and makes way for the next as the economy expands and evolves under the changing nature of business. There is something very positive about our CER togetherness. Friends with benefits — who could want anything more?
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**A NEW BOOK FROM THE NEW ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**New Zealand and the United Nations: 70th Anniversary**

**Edited by Brian Lynch**

The book draws on a collection of chapters from presenters to a seminar to mark the 70th anniversary of the United Nations founding conference in San Francisco and was held on 20 November 2015 in Wellington. It was to be expected of this anniversary occasion that a substantial element of reflection and review would be involved. The first three of the programme’s four sessions provided a retrospective account of key aspects of New Zealand’s experience over the past seven decades in the multilateral environment, flowing on from its feting days as a founding member present ‘at the creation’ in 1945 at the San Francisco conference. The seminar’s fourth session provided a shift of emphasis. It introduced a ‘where to from here’ dimension from media and independent observer standpoints, and included a presentation with the enigmatic title will there be a 100th anniversary’. Read the introduction here or at www.nziia.org.nz/books.aspx

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Moving out of comfort zones

Terence O’Brien reflects on the approach that a small, isolated Pacific state needs to adopt in a rapidly changing international climate.

The image of New Zealand in the modern world is by and large a positive and constructive one. There are several reasons. One basic explanation lies with its people. There are by world standards not many New Zealanders on this planet, and most of the world’s inhabitants will never encounter a New Zealander or, if they do, perhaps only one or two. As a New Zealand diplomat serving at the United Nations, which is the window through which most countries observe New Zealand, it was striking how often I met delegates from other countries who had formed positive impressions about this country based simply upon a one-off encounter with a New Zealander somewhere, at some time. During the campaign to get New Zealand elected to the UN Security Council, for example, African foreign ministers would recall their agreeable formative experience of being taught by a New Zealand missionary or other teacher in their remote homeland village, and promise readily their support for the New Zealand cause.

Legacies like this come in all shapes and sizes. The ready support for New Zealand’s Security Council seat bid offered by communist Albania, for example, was explained to me by its UN ambassador in terms of his rewarding experience with a small group of New Zealand academic teachers sent as a gesture of brotherhood by the New Zealand Communist Party to his country at the height of the Cold War. I recall the impassive gaze of our own National Party foreign minister when I later explained to him that we owed this particular vote to the generosity of the New Zealand Communist Party!

Image and identity are obviously connected but they are different. New Zealand’s identity is something which, as a rule, is fashioned by governments through, for example, the sort of tourist publicity they disseminate abroad; but more substantively through the picture they paint of New Zealand politically when seeking to influence other governments in order to gain advantages for this country through trade, through investment or their political support for particular New Zealand initiatives like, for example, fisheries conservation. The New Zealand image and identity internationally is projected directly by the activities of its embassies and diplomatic representation overseas.

New Zealand is a trading nation. A glance at official New Zealand statistics reveal that our entrepreneurs are active in more than 120 markets in the world, which is quite a remarkable profile for a country of 4.5 million inhabitants situated in the remote South-west Pacific. Trade depends, however, upon more than just entrepreneurial flare or skilful government trade negotiators, of which New Zealand has its share.

Experience confirms, most particularly in Asia, that reliable, dependable and rewarding trade ties evolve on the bedrock of political relationships with other governments. They depend as well upon New Zealand sharing the burden of ‘keeping the world safe for trade’. In other words, there is the obligation upon New Zealand along with others to play a role, within its means, in helping sustain international peace and stability, especially in these present times in the Middle East. But the obligation extends well beyond a simple direct connection to trade — values, interests and history also command a New Zealand response with others, when threats or risks appear. The overall lesson here is that New Zealand prosperity and the well-being of its people depend vitally upon a New Zealand record of being a ‘good global citizen’, which supplies the warrant, if you like, for New Zealand to be a global trader.

**Global citizenship**

The modern inter-dependent world, with its globalising economy and freedom of movement across borders for ideas, trade, travellers and money as well as risks like crime, terrorism, people smuggling and illegitimate weapons transfers, presents a kaleidoscope of opportunity and threat. Rules-based international behaviour by governments, great and small, is vital for stability in international relations. Good global citizenship requires, too, that countries like New Zealand be generous with aid to less privileged countries, likewise extend decent safe haven to refugees and contribute to solutions for climate change and environmental threats and for protections of human rights. Accepting such responsi-
Climate change affects every living creature, not just people

bilities serves to establish New Zealand’s international reputation and identity; at the same time it constitutes the basic elements for New Zealand foreign policy and its overall aim of ensuring security, safety and prosperity for the country and its people. The various aspects of good global citizenship for New Zealand amount to a completely rounded virtuous circle. All New Zealand foreign policy is not just trade — as one New Zealand prime minister of not so fond memory used to proclaim.

Small countries
Modern world experience suggests it is not necessarily more dangerous to be a small country. Terrorism and radical violence are as likely, indeed more likely, to strike the large and powerful as they are the smaller countries. Surrounded by its large moat of the South Pacific New Zealand enjoys greater protection but not immunity from modern external threat, while it retains the shared responsibility as a genuine global player to contribute to peace and stability in the wider world.

Small countries are, of course, incapable of shaping the world they live in; they react and respond to influences, pressures and currents that wash over them from abroad. They can and do seek out other smaller like-minded countries in an attempt collectively to promote interests, or as coalitions against the designs of larger powerful nations intent upon privileging their own interests. The UN system, which provides the only universal framework that this world possesses, is particularly important, therefore, for the opportunity it provides to smaller countries to participate in rules-making that is based upon a founding UN principle of sovereign equality between nations, irrespective of size or power.

The mandate extended by its members means the United Nations and related systems embrace just about every dimension of international relationships between countries in the modern world — from food labelling to nuclear weapons, from climate change to tariff barriers to trade, from human rights and security of the individual citizen to rules for navigation at sea, from health pandemics to natural disasters and so on. It embodies the very extent of real inter-dependence between countries, between their interests and between the risks they confront in the modern world. Barely a week passes where a New Zealand delegate somewhere out there does not take the microphone at one of the profuse, incessant international conferences to explain, defend, promote or bargain New Zealand interests on the subject at issue. Some of this constant peddling occurs behind closed doors, but much of it is transparent. Yet the media, particularly the New Zealand media, do not capture it, obsessed as they are with sensation, the private lives of celebrities and consumer appetites.

After 70 years of existence the UN system desperately requires substantial reform and improvement if it is to serve the needs of the modern world. Member states need also to reform their own attitudes to the United Nations. The idea that we might, on the other hand, dispense with the system and invent something entirely new is, given the realities of contemporary existence, a pipe dream. The United Nations is only as good, however, as its member states allow it, and endow it, to be. Duplication of effort, inefficiencies, incompetence and lack of imagination and energy are all faults to be laid at the feet of the UN bureaucracy. But the failure of member governments to agree on which are the priorities for reform lies also directly at the heart of the problem. The crucial question is how far the member states, especially the powerful, are in fact willing to pool their individual sovereignties to agree common action to prevent or solve modern world problems.

Big powers
That question concerns both the traditional powers that founded the UN system and the newer powers, especially the large fast growth economies led by China, whose support for a rule of international law is vital. America's position remains central to an effective international system. Over the years, however, a sense of so-called US 'exceptionalism' has blossomed, according to which the United States self-exempts itself from international rules that it judges do not sufficiently privilege its interests or infringe its sovereignty. There are currently some 40 international treaties covering multiple spheres of law (including disarmament, justice and human rights) that the United States has not signed or ratified. Nonetheless, Washington resolutely urges acceptance of international law and codes of behaviour upon other nations, especially larger newly emergent economies, even involving some treaties it has not itself endorsed. There is here a real danger of a sense of US 'exceptionalism' has blossomed, according to which the United States self-exempts itself from international rules that it judges do not sufficiently privilege its interests or infringe its sovereignty. There are currently some 40 international treaties covering multiple spheres of law (including disarmament, justice and human rights) that the United States has not signed or ratified. Nonetheless, Washington resolutely urges acceptance of international law and codes of behaviour upon other nations, especially larger newly emergent economies, even involving some treaties it has not itself endorsed. There is here a real danger of a double standard multiplying that promises to defeat an equitable evenhanded international system that for smaller countries like New Zealand is imperative.

Big powers are diverted, too, from global responsibility by domestic distraction, as we witness right now with a Europe that is confounded by a staggering problem of refugee and migrant pressure from the Middle East and the hundreds of thousands fleeing conflict there. Serious internal differences about how to respond now threaten European co-operation and unity. On top of this, British doubts about a future inside Europe and the exceptionalism that it seeks for itself compound dangers to Europe’s cohesion. None of this is in New Zealand’s interests for, quite apart from uncertainties about important trade and investment...
ties which we retain in Europe, the world will suffer from a distracted, discordant Europe unable to play a full part in reforming the international system. Twice in the 20th century, of course, European quarrels and misjudgments provoked world war.

Every generation is tempted to believe that is living at a time of great change. Certainly right now there are changes occurring internationally which suggest that we are at the sharp end of history in the making. The rise of China as well as a group of other large fast developing countries — like India or Indonesia — is shifting the centre of gravity in the world economy and in international politics. This has direct impact upon New Zealand. The vast economic opportunities closer at hand in Asia deflect New Zealand’s geographical situation into a strategic advantage.

In the past New Zealand bemoaned the tyranny of distance from its sources of trade, of investment and of European culture. It must now seize the new valuable advantages of proximity. This is the long haul task for New Zealand foreign policy because relationships in Asia must, as emphasised above, be cultivated upon foundations of serious political connections that extend beyond just trade and include, for example, defence relationships. While New Zealand defence policy is formally committed to identifying and prioritising those defence relationships that add value to New Zealand, this does not yet extend to expanding operational possibilities with, say, China, which is now New Zealand’s largest trade partner.

**Reconciliation heart**

The repercussions of present global and regional change include the whole area of values and ideals. Modern New Zealand is itself, of course, very much a product of the Western democratic tradition (the enlightenment), although New Zealand’s particular originality resides in the challenge provided by the Waitangi Treaty, which places reconciliation at the heart of our democracy, while the country strives to blend Maori and European contributions to building a cohesive nation. This is complex and demanding, but the challenge indeed distinguishes New Zealand from other English-speaking democracies. At the same time New Zealand must adjust seriously to a multicultural future exemplified by Asian success and influence, and more directly by the changing migration patterns and demographics of its own society. The lesson that Asia teaches, above all, is that being Western and democratic is not necessarily the indispensable requirement for success in the modern world. In the past New Zealand’s traditional friendships lay extensively with Western, English-speaking democracies, where ties of history, culture, kith and kin were important. Two world wars in the 20th century reinforced that New Zealand predisposition. It supplied a distinctive ‘comfort zone’ for New Zealand in international relations. In the modern world now, however, New Zealand is required for its own good to operate steadfastly well beyond that traditional comfort zone. New Zealand’s maturity in the modern world depends upon it, to operate steadfastly well beyond that traditional comfort zone.

The 2016 referendum about a new flag certainly stirred the issues of New Zealand identity. The outcome does not seem to have settled that matter once and for all; indeed, in some ways it may furnish a new beginning for the ‘New Zealand identity’ debate against the background of significant change globally where, as suggested here, old hierarchies, categories and the order of things are transforming. A sense of self-confidence and courage of conviction that a small modern internationally minded democracy is indeed perfectly capable of operating effectively and gainfully below or beyond the radar screens of the powerful is entirely rational for New Zealand. The 25 years that ensued under successive National and Labour governments after the introduction of the New Zealand non-nuclear policy, with its unfortunate estrangement from the United States (that is now in the past), proves the point emphatically; even now as we witness greater political disposition to submerge New Zealand in greater dependency on the United States as a powerful patron.

The idea that in a globalising world led by powerful Western governments all countries will grow the same is misguided. Diversity will remain as ever the dominating feature of international relations, and the collective task is to devise habits and customs of respect for diversity along with toleration of difference, whilst defending resolutely and collectively against malign action that threatens peace and the dignity of the human individual. The challenge here for modern New Zealand of deepening and widening external relationships will provide a test of its foreign policy that exceeds all its 20th century experience.

**Good terms**

Relations between the big powers have always shaped international relations. In the present century relations between China and the United States will influence the changing context in which New Zealand pursues its interests. Small countries should always seek to remain on good terms with the powerful and, as a rule of thumb, avoid taking sides to the extent they can, whenever the large and powerful disagree with one another.

In today’s world the United States remains the confirmed leader politically, militarily and economically. The question is, however, whether Washington can or will accommodate China’s emergence, or re-emergence, as a global influence. The jury is still out on the issue of whether both countries actually see one another as implacable, inevitable and perpetual rivals; or alternatively as two powerful countries destined to co-exist in a situation of mutual respect in order to serve their overall prosperity and indeed security interests. That does not mean, of course, there will be no substantive differences of view. It is noteworthy that in respect to the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, much in our news at present following New Zealand signature of the negotiated text, the United States has pursued an initiative with the express intention of excluding China. It is reluctant, at the same time, to concede China a greater role in international financial and economic institutions to which China’s importance in the global economy surely entitles it. These are not necessarily hope-
ful signs for Chinese–American harmony.

The likelihood of straight out warfare between China and the United States remains remote. But enduring tensions and friction could produce an atmosphere globally and regionally fraught with difficulties. Over a period of some 40 years since opening an embassy in Beijing in 1973, New Zealand has striven to cultivate a relationship with China (as well as other countries in Asia) so that today China ranks as New Zealand’s largest trade partner. New Zealand has in the process put significant runs on the board that cannot be thoughtlessly subtracted from its scorecard because large powers disagree. A country, indeed a civilisation, vastly larger than New Zealand with very different history, culture and political system now commands closest New Zealand attention.

The process of New Zealand’s cultivation of the Chinese relationship is, therefore, unceasing just as the task is of nourishing ties with traditional friends and partners, who are themselves, of course, deeply influenced by China’s importance. As already suggested, the United States remains strongly committed to world leadership and its expectations of others for their support of that role could complicate matters if or when the United States disagrees with China and rallies others to its cause. New Zealand must be nimble, suitably independent in its judgments and firm in the courage of its convictions as it pursues relationships with the United States, with China and with the rest of Asia and beyond.

Relationship building

In this modern world, technology in all its forms undeniably influences the role of governments in international relationship building. Multinational corporations, special interest groups, media, the professions, wealthy individuals, pop stars as well as malign influences of radicalised extremism all challenge government authority in one way or another, including those of small and remote countries.

The cross-boundary nature of non-military threats to our collective well-being becomes a fact of international life — environmental pollution, climate change, natural disasters, depletion of resources like fisheries and forestry, health pandemics, people smuggling and much else all point to the stark fact that no one country or group of countries, no matter how powerful, can alone provide solutions or impose upon others their versions of a solution. This very inter-dependence of the connections between countries and between the dangers they confront defines, therefore, the modern world and international relations to an extent unparalleled in history. As suggested earlier, the requirement for fresh commitment to rules-based international behaviour in such circumstances grows evermore crucial.

Thanks to modern science and technology the human capacity today to collect, if not absorb, ever increasing amounts of information has never been greater, and yet we remain prone to great surprise. The emergence of radicalised religion as a disruptive force in international relations was unforeseen even by the most prominent concerned. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, based upon fabricated intelligence about the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, is a prime case in point. It is by no means unique. As the most junior partner in an intelligence sharing arrangement involving major powers (so-called Five Eyes) it is vitally important for New Zealand, as a non-threatening player, to cultivate and sustain through its own efforts authentic capacity for independent objective judgment.

Absolute confusion

The current picture in the Middle East is one of absolute confusion, involving pervasive conflict in which it is impossible to distinguish friend from foe. For outsiders to take sides, especially where religious conflict is involved, is folly fraught with danger.

New Zealand has currently extended a modest contingent of non-combat personnel for military training of Iraqis. The reality is that New Zealand, as a small conscientious contributor to peace in the Middle East, now stands alongside forces from governments that are confirmed human rights abusers and that have actually funded those jihadist fighters whose cause they favour and whose overthrow is a basic reason for New Zealand involvement.

On reflection it is quite remarkable how New Zealand’s international identity has actually been influenced by experience of distant warfare, given that New Zealand possesses itself a low sense of direct military threat to its own physical existence. It is paradoxical, too, that the Middle East, a region very distant from New Zealand, continues to figure so prominently amongst New Zealand external preoccupations dating right back to Gallipoli and Palestine a hundred years ago. The explanation resides, of course, in that traditional New Zealand wish to display loyalty and dependability towards traditional northern hemisphere friends and partners that have contrived interests in that region. As suggested earlier, such fidelity is the product of our 20th century international relations comfort zone, although that zone no longer provides on its own the same consolations for New Zealand prosperity and well-being.

There remains, too, a certain irony about the traditional New Zealand comfort zone, given the absence of reciprocity of concern amongst powerful partners about New Zealand’s own security, comprehensively defined. The northern hemisphere friends and partners chose over the second part of the 20th century to pursue trade and economic policies that closed trans-Atlantic markets to New Zealand’s traditional farm trade, while employing subsidies or their equivalent to threaten the alternative export markets into which New Zealand was obliged to diversify its trade. This abruptly endangered New Zealand well-being and economic security. The consequences endure to this day. Britain’s entry into the European Community in 1973 was a watershed that aroused some grievous New Zealand sentiment. It was, above all else, a sharp lesson for New Zealand in international power politics. The crucial need to diversify trade nonetheless has had the invigorating effect of magnifying the dimensions of the New Zealand international comfort zone, and the substance, therefore, of independent New Zealand foreign policy interests.
Who knew that ten years before New Zealand Australia quarrelled with the United States over the meaning and value of ANZUS to the point where both sides occasionally wondered if the treaty was worth preserving? And furthermore, that where the Australian prime minister, Gough Whitlam, was the focus of President Nixon's fury, the New Zealand prime minister, Norman Kirk, found himself upheld in Washington as a model of calm sense.

The row, to be sure, was more verbal than active. Like a dog-fight there was much angry snarling and "unholy fury" but some care was taken to avoid sinking the teeth in. But there was a change. As with New Zealand, Australia had come to see ANZUS as not so much a treaty as 'a template for the relationship as a whole'. When the row subsided, ANZUS was still important but not the measure of the whole relationship. Washington understood Australian nationalism better and Canberra took more care not to tread on American toes where its regional interests were concerned.

In 1972 a 'beamingly confident' government under the ebullient Gough Whitlam came to power in Australia at a time when the Vietnam War was ending, Australia was feeling a 'new nationalism' and America was uncertain of its future role in East Asia. Handling such a bubbling mixture meant that frictions would inevitably arise and tempers shorten. This well-researched and even-tempered book chronicles their course.

Whitlam, an able lawyer, was witty and outspoken, sometimes like David Lange saying rather more than he wished. Though on the left, he was not anti-American and frequently stressed the importance of the relationship. But he grasped that the Cold War regimentation was over and that a new Asia was forming to which Australian foreign policy had to respond. Formally almost warmly to Kirk's letter. Heartened perhaps by Kirk's comment that US intelligence installations in Australia. But the relationship had immediate after coming to power, he said that 'for all its enduring importance, adherence to ANZUS does not constitute a foreign policy'. Other comments, however, about American cultural imperialism and economic policies did not sound to Washington like Australian prime ministers of the past.

Matters came to a head with the 'Christmas bombings' of 1972. Impatient with Hanoi's delays over negotiations to end the Vietnam War Nixon decided to resume the bombing of targets in that city, a decision he later said was the most difficult he took on the war. It caused a wave of criticism in the United States and around the world. Both Australia and New Zealand wrote letters of protest to the president, but it was only Whitlam's letter which gave offence, perhaps because it was also accompanied by some heated comments from one or two of his ministerial colleagues about the 'thugs' and 'maniacs' in the White House.

Nixon, beset by the beginnings of Watergate, was very angry and Australia, it was said, went on to Nixon's 'shit list'. He refused for six months to receive Whitlam at the White House — then as in New Zealand an important mark of electoral validation — and he refused to reply to Whitlam's letter. He did, however, reply almost warmly to Kirk's letter. Heartened perhaps by Kirk's comment to them that Whitlam 'was prone to take black and white approaches', Kissinger and others wondered whether Kirk could be a 'restraining influence' on the wayward Australian.

The Christmas bombing affair persuaded Nixon that this 'great, staunch ally' had opted out when Labor came to power in Canberra and as always in quarrels between friends his resentment was the greater for his disillusion. Whitlam in fact was no leftist radical and firmly rebutted calls to close the American intelligence installations in Australia. But the relationship had come adrift and, like David Lange later, anything he said came under nervous scrutiny in Washington.

His call for a zone of neutrality in the Indian Ocean looked like an attempt to hedge in American naval power. His talk of a regional grouping in East Asia, though as vague as Kirk's, came out of nowhere (even Lee Kuan Yew complained of a lack of consultation) and seemed to exclude America. The election of the more left-wing Jim Cairns as his deputy raised anxieties about the intelligence installations. And there was always, as with Lange, the descent of funny and tactless comments to the press, most notably when he suggested that alarm about the Arab–Israeli War in 1973 was raised for purely 'American domestic con-
AUSTRALIA AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Author: Peter Edwards

This book provides a reflective overview of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War by Peter Edwards, who was general editor of the nine-volume *Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975*. Drawing on that series, Edwards offers a succinct introduction to the Vietnam imbroglio to readers for whom the controversies ignited by the conflict in Australia are largely unknown or receding in collective national memory.

Edwards’s early chapters trace the dramatic convulsions after the Second World War, which reshaped the political order in South-east Asia as the Cold War intersected with the tide of nationalist decolonisation sweeping over declining European power. At the time, like New Zealand, Australia was reconciling itself to its regional location and identity, leading to a shift from the United Kingdom to the United States as its principal security guarantor. The combination of Cold War apprehensions and related alliance considerations drew Australia into military involvement in several South-east Asian conflicts: the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60, the Indonesian Confrontation of 1963–66 and the Vietnam conflict from 1962 to 1972. While the first two ended satisfactorily from a Western perspective, the third proved far more prolonged and problematical.

The core of the book recounts Australia’s political and military entanglement in the ill-fated American effort to prop up successive anti-communist regimes in Saigon from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. Australia’s centre-right government was initially a more energetic supporter of Washington’s military escalation than its New Zealand counterpart. However, as the quagmire of Vietnam deepened, enthusiasm waned in Canberra too. On the ground, Australian forces served capably, but with little effect in what became a lost cause. At home, the conflict increasingly divided Australians, with a minority of dissenters swelling to a majority wanting withdrawal by the early 1970s — a position eventually adopted by the Labor Opposition. As President Richard Nixon grasped the fig leaf of ‘Vietnamisation’ to pursue a phased withdrawal and an elusive ‘peace with honor’, the Australian government followed suit. By late 1972, only military training teams remained and Gough Whitlam’s new Labor government withdrew them within a week of taking office, ending Australia’s most divisive war experience.

The Vietnam conflict was a shared Anzac experience, especially on the battlefield, as most of New Zealand’s carefully calculated contribution was as part of the Australian Task Force. Yet references in the book to New Zealand are conspicuous by their absence in both military and political matters. While American unilateralism rankled in Canberra, Australia too paid little heed to its smaller ally. Ironically, Edwards notes in his conclusion that this was a crucial failing, as the trans-Tasman neighbours might have avoided the whole costly enterprise if Australian policy-makers had echoed the reservations of Keith Holyoake’s government about a combat commitment. Instead, New Zealand would also be drawn in, albeit in the role of the ‘most dovish of the hawks’, as one official put it at the time.

This book adds little to the official histories, but it complements that series by offering a lucid summary of the totality of Australia’s Vietnam experience: diplomatic, political, military and social. Moreover, Edwards’s concluding reflections put the conflict in fitting historical perspective. His essential argument is that Australian involvement was poorly conceived and executed. While the Vietnam commitment was mediated through the lens of the American alliance in the context of Cold War fears, Edwards does not accept that it was simply a case of Australia fighting other people’s wars, because policy-makers in Canberra acted in line with national interests as they perceived them. But their fatal error was to pay insufficient heed to local circumstances in Vietnam and to place excessive faith in their great and powerful ally. Australian soldiers generally fought well notwithstanding some tactical errors, such as laying a...
minefield which would be responsible for a number of Australian casualties. Their military performance, however, mattered little. Like New Zealand’s forces, their presence was driven primarily by political purposes to signal alliance solidarity. Nor did the Australian government anticipate the depth of protest spurred by the commitment, which was lent a sharper edge than in New Zealand because of the use of conscripts.

In assessing the longer term impact of the conflict, Edwards presents a balanced assessment. Few so-called dominoes fell after Saigon’s collapse as Cold Warriors had feared, but Edwards suggests that that was partly due to Western intervention helping to stabilise other parts of South-east Asia, especially between 1965 and 1968. In general, though, the Vietnam episode was a troubling time in Australian history characterised by social discord at home, the fraying of a bipartisan consensus on Cold War issues and strained relations with Washington. Ultimately, perhaps the most residing lesson for Australia (and New Zealand) to be drawn from Edward’s elegant retelling of the tragic experience is the need to engage with South-east Asian countries on the basis of a nuanced understanding of local political, social and economic dynamics rather than through the application of abstract world views.

ROBERTO RABEL

RELENTLESS STRIKE: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command

Author: Sean Naylor

Like credible intelligence non-fiction, probing into the sensitive world of Special Forces provides numerous, often impenetrable, challenges to those authors attempting to write factually accurate portrayals of such military forces. However, from time to time, good writers with good access, good sources and a little luck are able to piece together intricate and disparate sources to penetrate the veils of secrecy and operational security; Sean Naylor’s Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command is one such publication.

The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is the coordinating body for America’s premier Special Forces units; it includes the Army’s Delta Force, the Navy’s SEALs and the Air Force’s Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Naylor takes the reader on a journey that chronologically maps the evolutionary history of the command, from the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980 to the invasion of Grenada in 1983 to Panama and Manuel Noriega’s capture in 1989 to Desert Storm, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq. Naylor intricately weaves lesser known rescues, renditions and other direct action operations throughout the volume, in addition to the most well-known of all, the death of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2011.

The author’s research comes from a variety of sources, including official documents, open-source/publicly available material — as well as a significant number of interviews with JSOC operators and commanders. A decade earlier, Naylor had penned Not A Good Day to Die, which chronicled his experiences as a reporter for the United States Army Times — where he was ‘embedded’ with US forces during key periods of Operation Anaconda, the first largescale military action to involve large numbers of US conventional forces as well as Special Forces. During this deployment, Naylor was able to interview a number of Special Forces participants, and clearly these relationships developed and expanded and have assisted immeasurably in Relentless Strike.

Relentless Strike is a dense text, but it is not an academic volume. It captures the rise and evolution of the JSOC without considering the overall strategic considerations that may have seen this expansion come about. The successful evolution of the JSOC has much to do with operational successes following the failed hostage rescue in 1980 (Operation Eagle Claw), as well as the strengths of personalities in command of these forces, especially those who have demonstrated the very necessary political–strategic savvy to be able to influence policy-makers. Naylor clearly illustrates strength of personality in the shape of William McRaven, Mike Flynn and Stanley McChrystal, who are at the forefront of the JSOC’s progression. In Relentless Strike, Naylor shows us that the JSOC, having always regarded itself as much more than a specialised, precision ‘blunt-force’ tool used to crack especially ‘hard-nuts’, now appears to have successfully convinced policy-makers of this also.

So might the same Special Forces–national security nexus be presenting itself in the United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand? While Naylor’s book does not mention our own Special Air Service (SAS), Relentless Strike may in fact give us a glimpse of how New Zealand’s JSOC equivalent has evolved. Naylor specifically considers the expansion of SEAL TEAM 6 and how in the space of ten years the unit grew from less than 500 to more than 1500, of whom only about 300 were SEALs, with the rest consisting of roughly 800 other uniformed Navy personnel and about 400 civilians who together provided administration, intelligence, logistics, communications, and other support. To date, there has been a dearth of material that critically examines New Zealand’s Special Forces in a truly strategic sense, which is curious because over the last ten years these forces have quietly expanded their capabilities, roles, functions and, one might suggest, influence. Not only is there now a New Zealand SAS Regiment, a development that less than 30 years earlier was regarded as a ‘pipe-dream’ aspiration by one former senior SAS officer but also the New Zealand Defence Force’s Special Operations Command now co-ordinates New Zealand’s Special Forces up to the highest levels of government, directly linked to the wider national security command authority. Given that that evolution has undoubtedly come from significant effort — operationally successful campaigns, a higher public profile (think Corporal Apiai VC) and the strength of personality from a succession of influential commanders — it in many ways mirrors Naylor’s description of the rise of the JSOC. And when the New Zealand prime minister publicly describes...
the SAS as ‘the Ferrari of the New Zealand military’, then we can perhaps deduce the perceived political value that such a force generates, as demonstrated by Naylor, which indeed appears to have spread beyond US national security policy and strategic thinking.

For those interested in the evolution of Special Forces and military intelligence — both collection and analysis — Relentless Strike offers insights into how this has begun to be transformed in the 21st century. From the use of Predator drones’ ‘unblinking eye’ constant surveillance to the clandestine installation of cyber café keystroke recognition software, the startling array of intelligence capability now possessed by JSOC units tells us something of the importance of intelligence and the desire to have an independent capability rather than be reliant on traditional partner agencies for such support. In light of Naylor’s book, one could argue that the JSOC’s solution to the intelligence challenges has been to create its very own collection and analysis capability; signals intelligence, human intelligence and surveillance expertise that was once the sole preserve of the likes of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency is now firmly part of the US Special Forces machinery.

This particular evolution begs the question, how might the rest of a national security infrastructure feel about such developments? There are a number of examples within Relentless Strike where the CIA clearly relied on the JSOC to assist with operations, particularly in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. If there is indeed political support for such an evolution of force in the United States, then is this development being mirrored around the world in other countries? One wonders whether the New Zealand SAS Regiment has similarly followed suit and established a dedicated intelligence capability beyond that which the New Zealand intelligence community provides.

Relentless Strike offers an opportunity to understand the genesis of US 21st century special operations, and as such gives us some insight into the key operational deliverables available to American national security policy-makers, and even those a little closer to home perhaps. The painstaking detail and multiple, cross-referenced sourcing is commendable, and makes for a considerable, and thoroughly enjoyable, volume.

RHYS BALL
Sir,

The March/April 2016 NZIR (vol 41, no 2) includes Ken Ross’s paper about ANZUS and NZ/US relations. This has plenty of interesting observations but it is unclear that his eclectic selection of events and players supports his broad conclusions.

One of these is the view that since 1965 Wellington has seldom had a ‘comfortable relationship’ with Washington and that from then, with the exception of the Bolger years, the relationship has been ‘either strained… or essentially non-existent’.

We can all have our potted histories of this. At the beginning of the period Lyndon Johnson was president and Keith Holyoake prime minister and the record suggests that they and the rest of the NZ/US establishment had a very warm relationship. Johnson made a rare and hugely popular visit to New Zealand in 1966 and Holyoake responded to a reciprocal invitation, visiting Washington DC in 1968. There was an intimate ANZUS Council meeting in Washington in 1968 and on a more continuous basis extremely close co-operation over the Vietnam War. The United States for a while wished that New Zealand would increase its commitment to that war, but it then accepted that what was there was all there was going to be, and no noticeable dent was made in the relationship over that. Johnson frequently referred to his ‘seven fighting allies’, of which we were one, and the Economist wrote an article around 1968 complaining that New Zealand and Australia exercised more influence in Washington than Britain.

In the 1970s the positive and close relationship remained for all practical purposes. Not even Muldoon’s peanut farmer comments early in Carter’s presidency seriously dented this. It was overcome in about six months with Carter inviting Muldoon to the White House for exceptionally cordial meetings. That same year, 1977, New Zealand hosted a highly successful ANZUS Council meeting, which in part reflected the warmth of the relationship between Foreign Minister Talboys and Under-Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Ross’s article covers Lange and the nuclear ships ban but puzzlingly attributes the ‘non-existent’ years to Shipley and Key. But Clinton invited Shipley to Washington and the stories are legion about how he kept his appointment with her even though it coincided with a crucial day in his impeachment over the Lewinsky affair. He came to New Zealand for the APEC summit in Shipley’s time. Key’s and New Zealand’s record with Obama, his first secretary of state and others, during which time military ship visits resumed, would seem even apart from golf to deserve a more positive descriptor.

The article notes that in the 1971 Brown and Angus book, Asia and the Pacific in the 1970s, the authors suggest ‘the intellectual lights for ANZUS were already dimming in New Zealand’. There was no doubt in the lead up to this time a growing ambivalence over the Vietnam War; it is a gap that the article contains no reference at all to the effects of Vietnam on ANZUS or NZ/US relations in this period.

Another theme is that while Australia saw the Pentagon as the focus of its relationship with the United States, our ‘smartest primary account… when we get our act together, has been the White House, most particularly the National Security Council’. Perhaps, at times, but the observation overlooks the continuing significance of the State Department in the relationship, and the warm links between successive New Zealand ministers and secretaries of foreign affairs and influential secretaries of state such as Cyrus Vance, Condoleezza Rice and others.

NEIL PLIMMER
Wellington

Sir,

‘Making a case for a defence U-turn’. REALLY? I read with some interest Hugh Steadman’s article ‘Making a case for a defence U-turn’ in the NZIR’s November/December 2015 issue (vol 40, no 6). In my view, a number of his assertions are mistaken.

To state that ‘As the world fills with refugees from states failing due to climate change, proxy resource wars being waged by the great powers and poverty trapped population growth, unrestrained by a growing wealth factor, New Zealand’s defence forces should be deployed for home defence’ is to miss some key realities. Most refugees are leaving their home states because of civil wars, failed governments or economic reasons. Syria, Libya and other North African states are but a few examples. It is a long straw to then state that the NZDF should be deployed for home defence. It also begs the question, defence against what threat?

The NZDF needs a basket of capabilities to meet our national interest needs. Recent deployments prove their value from nation-building in Afghanistan to a plethora of peace and stability operations in the Middle East, Africa and East Timor. These have more often than not been in support of United Nations mandates or indeed as part of UN operations.

I cannot allow the statement ‘one of the best ways to avoid making enemies is to ensure that armed New Zealanders are not sent overseas to kill citizens of other nations’ to go unchallenged. I am shocked that a graduate of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, would make such a statement. New Zealand defence personnel are not sent overseas to kill other nations’ citizens. They are sent to promote peace and, as the examples above refer, to assist in nation-building and making the world a safer place.

Similarly, ‘long-range naval missions, such as patrolling the Strait of Hormuz or containing piracy off the Somali coast, represent… an ever-present risk of involvement in more serious conflicts that do not require New Zealand’s involvement’ also begs the question of how piracy should be prevented (noting our global trading economy). Also the linkage from combating piracy to more serious conflicts is tenuous at best. Mr Steadman then goes on to ask ‘why should New Zealand with its puny military budget… take responsibility for protecting shipping… New Zealand’s feeble contribution will not make any noticeable difference’. The answer is simple: we are a trading nation and need to protect our mercantile interests (naturally in conjunction with others). If all nations were to adopt a ‘head in the sand’ approach to security and leave it to others, the world, I am sure, would be in a sorrier state than it is today. Additionally, I doubt pirates would consider a New Zealand frigate feeble.

I am equally sure that our Australian friends would have views on Mr Steadman’s assertion that Australia’s foreign policy is aggravating its Islamic neighbours and surrendering its sovereignty to the Pentagon.

To propose that New Zealand should supply hostile fleets (in response to a resource/land grab in Antarctica) ‘with a transport café and service centre’ is preposterous.

But then maybe I have missed the point and Hugh was just having a laugh.

PETER NICHOLS
Wellington

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INSTITUTE NOTES

National Office and branch activities.

On 3 May the prime minister, John Key, addressed a meeting at Parliament on ‘New Zealand and the World’. (The edited text of his address is to be found elsewhere in this issue.) Green Party co-leader James Shaw, who is also spokesperson for climate change and economic development, spoke on the same subject at Victoria University on the 31st.

The NZIIA’s Annual Dinner was held on 7 June, with the US ambassador to New Zealand, HE Mark Gilbert, as guest speaker. The National Council meeting was held next day at the Wellington Club in Wellington. Sir Douglas Kidd was re-elected as president. A full report on both events will be included in the next issue.

Christchurch
The following meetings were held:
19 Apr Associate Prof Amy Fletcher (University of Canterbury), ‘U.S. Foreign Policy after the 2016 Presidential Election: Moving Forward or Breaking Apart?’
31 May Prof Martin Holland (director of the National Centre for Research on Europe/EU Centres Network New Zealand), ‘Two Referendums and Whose Funeral? 40 Years of British Prevarication and Ambivalence Towards European Integration’.

Hawke’s Bay
On 12 May the French ambassador in New Zealand, HE Florence Jeanblanc-Risler, addressed the branch on ‘Current Perspectives in Europe from a French Viewpoint’.

Nelson
The following meetings were held:
9 Feb Daryl Copeland (Toronto University), ‘The Results of the Recent General Election in Canada’.
4 Mar HE Rob Zagmann (Netherlands ambassador), ‘The Three Rs of Concern to the European Union — Refugees, Referenda and Russia’.
5 Apr Stephen Jacobi (trade and economic consultant), ‘The Results of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations’.
21 Apr HE Mikalis Rokas (head of the EU Delegation in Wellington), ‘Recent Developments in the European Union and the EU–New Zealand Discussions on a Free Trade Agreement’.
27 Apr Simon Draper (MFAT), ‘The Campaign to Win a Seat for New Zealand on the UN Security Council’.
14 Jun Maty Nikkou-O’Brien (NZIIA executive director), ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’.

Waikato
The following meetings were held:
18 May Prof Dov Bing (University of Waikato), ‘The Foreign Policy of Israel, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia: Radical Changes, New Dimensions’.
25 May Simon Gray (PhD candidate in the University of Waikato’s Political Science and Public Policy Programme and a visiting research associate with both Nanyang Technological University’s International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore), ‘The Evolution of Boko Haram: From Salafist Missionary Activism in North-eastern Nigeria to Transnational Extremism’.
1 Jun Soroush Milani (PhD candidate in international relations and strategic studies at Victoria University of Wellington’s Centre for Strategic Studies), ‘Chaos in Equation: Instability in the US–Russian Bilateral Nuclear Deterrence Regime’.

Tauranga
Jen Scoular has resigned as chair of the branch.

Wairarapa
On 18 May Ken Ross (former analyst with the External Assessments Bureau, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet), addressed the branch on ‘Prime Ministerial Postcards from the White House’.

Wellington
On 2 May the minister of foreign affairs, Murray McCully, launched New Zealand and the United Nations: 70th Anniversary. Edited by Brian Lynch, this volume contains the papers delivered at a well-attended seminar organised by the branch in Wellington late last year.

On 22 June the branch held a function at which VUW’s assistant vice chancellor (Pasifika), Associate Professor Hon Luamanuvao Winnie Laban, launched the second edition of Pacific Ways, Government and Politics in the Pacific Islands, edited by Stephen Levine. Contributors to the book took part in a panel discussion.

On 17 May Molly Kennedy (general manager, multicultural learning and support services), addressed a meeting on ‘Refugee Resettlement: New Zealand and the Global Context’.

From left to right: Brian Lynch, Murray McCully and Prof Graham Hassall, president of the United Nations Association of New Zealand
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