SPORTS DIPLOMACY

- Commonwealth meeting
- US relationship
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- High Commission for Malaysia
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- High Commission of India
- New Zealand Red Cross Inc
- NZ China Friendship Society
- NZ Horticulture Export Authority
- New Zealand Institute of Economic Research
- Papua New Guinea High Commission
- Political Studies Department, University of Auckland
- School of Linguistics & Applied Language Studies, VUW
- Singapore High Commission
- Soka Gakkai International of NZ
- South African High Commission
- Taipei Economic & Cultural Office
- The Innovative Travel Co. Ltd
- United Nations Association of NZ
- Volunteer Service Abroad (Inc)
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Sports diplomacy: New Zealand’s hardest soft power?

On 5 November a panel discussion on ‘Sports Diplomacy: New Zealand’s Hardest Soft Power?’ was held in the Backbencher Pub, Wellington. Patrick Gower, political editor of TV3 News, chaired a lively session before an audience of 200. The panelists were Chris Laidlaw, broadcaster, author, sports commentator and former high commissioner, All Black and member of Parliament; Michalis Rokas, chargé d’affaires of the embassy of the European Union Delegation to New Zealand and professional basketball player; Professor Steve Jackson of Otago University’s School of Physical Education; Hon Sir Jim McLay, New Zealand’s permanent representative to the United Nations (2009–15) and former deputy prime minister; and HE Mark Gilbert, US ambassador to New Zealand and Samoa and former major league baseball player.

Steve Jackson offers a cautionary note and Mark Gilbert and Sir Jim McLay provide further perspectives.

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**STEVE JACKSON**

Sport continues to occupy an ambiguous position within the context of politics, foreign policy and diplomatic relations. While there is much speculation concerning why this is the case, one potential reason is the rather schizophrenic way in which sport, as a cultural site and practice, is viewed within society. “The term “schizophrenic” is used to highlight the conflicting and contradictory ways in which sport is considered both serious and important but insignificant and trivial at different times, in different contexts and by people representing different interest groups.”

More recently, scholars across the social and political sciences have recognised the increasing role or at least potential of sport as a tool of diplomacy. This raises some immediate questions, not the least of which is: is ‘sports diplomacy’ New Zealand’s most effective form of soft power? The answer is quite simple: yes, no, and maybe — it is all a matter of perspective. However, there is perhaps a more important set of questions that need to be asked: who is using ‘sport’ as an instrument of diplomacy, what type of diplomacy, in whose interests and at what risk?

Arguably, it is sports’ strategic location at the intersection of key sectors of society, including health, education, culture and heritage, and increasingly tourism and economics, that highlights its potential, its limits and its risks as a form of diplomacy. In this contribution I briefly discuss the potential exploitation of sport as a form of ‘corporate’ diplomacy or, stated another way, how sport is increasingly being used to advance a range of neoliberal corporate and state agenda by referring to three examples:

- the All Blacks jersey sponsorship
- the economics and corporate diplomacy of sport mega-events and
The 2014 Soccer World Cup.

Jersey issue

The All Blacks jersey is, at its core, a national team jersey. However, as one of sports’ most enduring, iconic and revered team uniforms, it also represents at least four major brands: the New Zealand nation, the All Blacks, Adidas and American International Group Inc (AIG). Here I will focus on American corporate sponsor AIG. If New Zealand sport is to serve as a legitimate and effective form of soft power, should we not consider some of the risks involved in being associated with a morally/ethically questionable sponsor?

AIG is a massive global company with 64,000 employees and 88 million clients across 130 countries. In 2014 it had revenues of $68.7 billion. Clearly AIG is a highly successful company, but it is one of several American corporations that, in 2008, received a financial bailout by the US government — a total of $182 billion. Strikingly, one year later, this near bankrupt company offered its executives bonuses totalling $165 million. Moreover, in 2013, after yet another bailout, AIG’s chief executive initiated a national advertising campaign called ‘Thank You America’, in appreciation of US taxpayer support. Only weeks later, AIG’s board agreed to join a lawsuit against the United States government because the bailout they received was deemed unfair to their investors.

Some have argued that AIG was one of many victims of the 2008 world financial crisis. Yet, others have questioned AIG’s due diligence in its approach, which ultimately impacted on the financial assets of its clients — everyday citizens who, ironically, later bailed them out. Do three little letters A-I-G matter in the big and complex world of diplomacy? Well, if a national team whose jersey features these letters is intended to represent the essence of a nation’s values, principles, morals and ethics in the form of diplomacy, then perhaps they should.

Sport mega-events

A second example of how sport is exploited in the process of state and corporate diplomacy is through the hosting of sport mega-events as a form of nation branding and as a vehicle for political/economic trade negotiations. The hosting of sport mega-events, such as the Rugby World Cup, Olympics and FIFA World Cup, offers a wide range of opportunities and benefits including infrastructure development, economic spinoffs through tourism, nation branding and the enhancement of civic pride and national identity.

However, for each of these possible benefits there are an equal number of risks and negative impacts including the risk of debt. For example, the most comprehensive, yet rarely cited study of the economic impact of hosting the Olympics conducted in 2012 by Bent Flyvbjerg and Allison Stewart of Oxford University’s Said Business School, documented that all events hosted between 1960 and 2012 were over budget with an average cost overrun of 179 per cent. Flyvbjerg’s and Stewart’s conclusion was that: “The data thus show that for a city and nation to decide to host the Olympic Games is to take on one of the most financially risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril.”

At this point it is worth commenting on a slightly different aspect of the exploitation of the Olympics in relation to state and corporate diplomacy by drawing upon some research on the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Consider the following findings from a study by Professor Susan Brownell. It is no surprise to learn that there were 100 national diplomats, including 85 heads of state, in attendance at the Beijing Olympics. However, in addition to these official delegates, there were over 400,000 local and international government employees visiting Beijing during the overall planning and event stages. Moreover, it is estimated that more than 180,000 people, about 50 per cent of all foreign visitors to the Beijing Olympics, were hosted through corporate hospitality programmes, including Coca-Cola.

The use of sport for political and economic negotiations is nothing new. However, the nature and scope of the strategic use of sport mega-events for diplomatic purposes is worthy of critical investigation. Consider the appeal of sport mega-events for conducting serious and sensitive corporate and state business — an internationally sanctioned ‘cultural’ event, featuring unprecedented security, that, despite being the focus of billions of people, raises few suspicions. After all, it is just sport!

Soccer danger

Let me conclude with one final example which represents the power and the danger of the new corporate diplomacy. In 2003 the Brazilian government banned alcohol sales and consumption from all stadia in the interests of its citizens and their public safety. However, after awarding Brazil the rights to host the 2014 World Cup, the world body, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), lobbied on behalf of their premier sponsor, American beer company Anheuser-Busch, to ensure that their product would be sold.

Consider the 2012 public statement made by then FIFA General Secretary Jerome Valcke:

“Alcoholic drinks are part of the FIFA World Cup, so we’re going to have them. Excuse me if I sound a bit arrogant but that’s something we won’t negotiate. The fact that we have the right to sell beer has to be part of the law.”

As a result of what became known as the ‘Budweiser Bill’, a global sport organisation and its primary corporate sponsor changed a democratically enacted national law put in place for the benefit of the people. If this example foreshadows the future of diplomacy within the neo-liberal, TPP era, sport faces an enormous challenge, and so do nation-states and their citizens.

MARK GILBERT

I have always used sports diplomacy. I just did not know it.

When I finished my playing career 30 years ago I seldom talked about baseball. I loved playing and actually could not believe that someone paid me to do it! To me baseball was a game, a great game, a game I really enjoyed playing. It was not until I was preparing to assume my post in New Zealand that our ‘sports diplomacy’ team suggested that Kiwis would want to talk about my career — and how right they were.

As we have traveled around this magnificent country, we have met everyone from ministers to mayors, entrepreneurs to engineers. We have talked about everything. Inevitably I am asked about lessons learned from my time playing baseball. I believe
that these lessons resonate with people across the spectrum because the lessons of sports are essential lessons of life — and especially of diplomacy.

I would think most people in New Zealand remember the Springboks’ overtime victory in the 1995 Rugby World Cup, but there may be details that are not remembered. President Nelson Mandela believed that he could unite his country through sports, and he came onto the field in a Springboks jersey and cap, probably the most recognised symbols of the Afrikaner’s sport and of apartheid. Then Springbok captain Francois Pienaar told the predominately white crowd how the Springboks played ‘for all of South Africa’. That one sporting event — and that one moment in time — changed South Africa, and did what generations before could not.

On 22 February 1980 US hockey coach Herb Brooks said to his players ‘You were born to be a player. You were meant to be here. This moment is yours.’ What coach Brooks did not realise was that it was the moment that would change America. Only three and a half months earlier, the Iran hostage crises had begun. The United States — and the world — was mired in an energy crisis and the mood in the country was grim. But on that day all changed. In the Olympic semi-final hockey game — a game that was predicted to be so one-sided that it was not broadcast live in the United States, even though it was being played there — the young college kids from the United States beat the unbeatable team from the Soviet Union 4-3 in a game now known as the ‘Miracle on Ice’. The crowd broke out singing ‘God Bless America’. American flags were being waved everywhere and the mood of an entire country changed.

Public diplomacy is about enhancing the image of the state and improving relations with other states through influencing opinions of audiences, foreign and domestic. If public diplomacy is based on exchanging cultural values, sports play an important role in this process. Sports have the power to bring different cultures and people together way beyond their boundaries. And that is really what diplomacy is all about — bringing people together, regardless of where they come from. Sports can be a mirror on the social values we all hold dear, such as fairness and a level playing field; healthy competition and teamwork; playing by the rules and equal opportunities for all to succeed. I will conclude with a quote from Nelson Mandela:

Sports have the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire — the power to unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they understand. Sports can create hope — where there was once only despair. It is more powerful than governments in breaking down racial barriers. It laughs in the face of all types of discrimination.

Sports can lift us up. It can change our lives and, more importantly, it can help us re-imagine what is possible.

**SIR JIM McLAY**

Let me first make one quick, preliminary comment: namely, that I am going to avoid the semantics of defining hard and soft power. Suffice to say that hard power is the pursuit of interests by military and economic means in order to influence the behaviour or interests of others; whereas soft power (particularly as developed by Joseph Nye) is the non-coercive use of culture, political values and foreign policies to appeal to, attract and co-opt action or support. There is no doubt that, for all its ambiguity, and the odd occasion when it has even fueled a conflict, sport uniquely falls into the soft category (although there was nothing ‘soft’ about those 90 minutes of the Rugby World Cup final at Twickenham!).

I have three points. First, New Zealand made good use of sports diplomacy. The *Huffington Post* recently observed that ‘New Zealand has used its love of rugby and the international success of the All Blacks to engage in rugby diplomacy’. In our campaign to win a Security Council seat, for example, we hosted a number of ambassadors at the Philadelphia match between the Maori All Blacks and the US Eagles — and I can report that a late-night bus full of rugby supporters is the same the world over.

We also took advantage of the All Blacks’ partnership with UNICEF, bringing together two global brands to raise awareness and funds for vulnerable children. This included particularly the presence in New York of Victor Vito and Ryan Crotty to host diplomats and their families to an event on the United Nations’ north lawn (several ambassadors told me it was the first time ever they had been invited to bring their children to a diplomatic event).

And, to promote the 2015 Cricket World Cup, Prime Minister John Key played cricket with Sir Richard Hadlee on that same lawn. (Ambassadors were invited to bowl to the prime minister — with some actions that would have won approval from the Chappell brothers.)

Frankly, it was hard to find a better way of showcasing our country and its skills. Our posts worldwide do that all the time (formalised, for example, by our pilot sports diplomacy programme in Fiji); but it was unusual at the United Nations, where countries celebrate their national days but not their sporting prowess. Some other countries’ diplomats might have snippily disapproved, but it worked for us.

Which leads me to my second point: sports diplomacy is an increasingly important part of standard diplomatic practice, even for those also capable of deploying hard as well as soft power (as witness Ambassador Gilbert’s baseball initiatives and, of course, Henry Kissinger’s fabled use of ping-pong diplomacy to open up relations with China). And, although less publicised, in 2012 we arranged a successful visit by two New Zealand rugby coaches to Israel and the Palestinian territory, where they ran clinics for Israeli coaches and players and a training camp for Palestinian players and aspiring coaches. Initiatives like that can create trust, and can connect people and institutions — and maybe, one day, can even connect governments.

So do we really get value from sports diplomacy? The evidence is that we do benefit, whether it be in Security Council votes, greater trust (the rugby coaches) or improved relations (everywhere) or the image of our prime minister being greeted by a rugby haka when visiting a Chinese university. China may not be rugby-mad but it is worth reflecting for a moment on the possible impact of an All Black visit, including exhibition games.

My concluding comment (more correctly, perhaps, someone else’s comment) is that New Zealand’s most enduring diplomatic
relationship is, of course, with Australia — and it is trite to say it is also our sharpest sporting rivalry (remember the football world cup teeshirt declaring ‘I support New Zealand — and any team playing Australia’?).

But it is much more than a diplomatic or a sporting relationship; it is history, it is family, it is trade; it is everything; all brought home to me by an op-ed piece in London’s Daily Telegraph just days before the final at Twickenham:

Anybody buying too deeply into the pantomime conflict of their Bledsoe Cup battles should have paused to witness this year’s moving ceremonies before each match to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Gallipoli, where the Anzac soldiers fought and suffered appalling losses as one.

Each year, a dawn service on that desolate strip of Turkish coastline unfolds in a mournful silence to render any sporting duel a mere frippery.

Much as the adversaries at Twickenham might seek to persuade us otherwise, theirs is a phony war, rooted far more in laughs than loathing.

Some might think that puts sport in its place; but it also emphasises that it does not really matter whether the diplomacy is hard or soft; all that matters is that sport can transcend differences; and that it can forge and reinforce bonds so deep that they generate a trust and understanding that even the most skilled diplomats might struggle to achieve. What more could we ask?

NOTES

1. See Lincoln Allison, The changing politics of sport (Manchester, 1993); Steven J. Jackson and Stephen Haigh, Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalising World (London, 2009); Simon Kuper, Soccer against the enemy: How the world’s most popular sport starts and fuels revolutions and keeps dictators in power, 2nd ed (New York, 2006); Roger Levermore and Adrian Budd (eds), Sport and International Relations: An Emerging Relationship (London, 2004).


4. Susan Brownell, ‘Why We Need Social Theory to Understand Sport Mega-Events’, keynote address at the 2014 World Congress of Sociology of Sport, Beijing, 9–12 July 2014.


6. This is an allusion to the 1981 underarm bowling incident during a one-day cricket international between New Zealand and Australia, involving Australian players Greg and Trevor Chappell.
ANZUS: ‘our richest prize’ or ‘that scrap of paper’?

Ken Ross examines the intellectual underpinnings of New Zealand’s search for a comfortable relationship with the United States.

‘Some of the most valuable research consists in creative thinking about facts which are tolerably well known’ (Fred Wood, 1949)1

‘[Fred Wood] devoted meticulous scholarly care towards tracing every small move towards self-determination as exemplified by New Zealand’s quest for an independent foreign policy’ (Peter Munz, 1969)2

It is 46 years since our fine intellects last sat with their counterparts in Washington and Canberra mulling the ANZUS triangle. February 1970 had them in Canberra at a conference to ‘consider Australian–New Zealand–United States relations and the common problems which the three ANZUS countries might expect to face’. The resultant book, Asia and the Pacific in the 1970s (1971), is still an important read as it canvasses the core issues today of that complex of the three bilateral relationships plus the triangular one.

That Canberra get-together was fourteen years prior to David Lange, Helen Clark and their friends taking charge in Wellington. And, nearly three years before Norman Kirk became prime minister. At the conference Bruce Brown, then the NZIIA’s director, examined ‘the question of nuclear weapons, which most worries the critics of New Zealand’s alignment, in the context of the ANZUS treaty and especially of New Zealand–Australian relations’.3 Alexander MacLeod, then the editor of the New Zealand Listener, warned ‘I do not think we can too readily assume that New Zealand’s commitment to ANZUS is entirely without restraints and inhibitions’.4

Brown and MacLeod suggest credibly that in early 1970 the intellectual lights for ANZUS were already dimming in New Zealand, well before Bob Hawke pulled stumps in March 1985 on that year’s ANZUS Council meeting, which he was to host mid-year.

This article arises from my recent research which attempts to throw light on the question: was the ANZUS treaty ‘our richest prize’5, or just ‘that scrap of paper’, in the triangular relationship. I found that Fred Wood emerges as our most astute ‘home-grown’ scholar of ANZUS and his brightest-ever student, Frank Corner, to be the smartest Kiwi ball-player on the ANZUS playground. Most of the facts are in Wood’s phrase ‘tolerably well known’. Several new books have washed up from far-away shores containing new insights worth mention here.

Important scholarship

Wood was the senior history professor at Victoria University in Wellington from 1936 to 1969. His ANZUS scholarship began with his 1953 International Affairs article — ‘The ANZAC dilemma’ — and concluded with book chapters in 1972 and 1977, which tidied up his ANZUS story-telling.6 His 1967 lecture, ‘New Zealand and the Big Powers: Can a Small Nation Have a Mind of its Own?’, is the gold standard for understanding ANZUS’ symbolic status for New Zealanders of the Second World War generation. Wood explained:

That scrap of paper, ANZUS, is important not because of detailed promises written upon it, but because it marked

Maybe 2016 will prompt a ‘high noon’ moment for the old ANZUS triangle between the United States, Australia and New Zealand which dominated New Zealand’s approach to national security for four decades. Several episodes illustrate a search that has been nearly as elusive as that for Lewis Carroll’s Snark — New Zealand’s ‘comfortable relationship’ with Washington. Victoria University of Wellington history professor Fred Wood’s impressive scholarship was important in framing the relationship intellectually, as was Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner’s adroit diplomacy. Norman Kirk’s, David Lange’s and Helen Clark’s prime ministerial diplomacy with the United States played a significant role in the evolution of the relationship.
success of persistent efforts, during and after the war, to build up ‘a relationship of confidence and common purpose between the United States, Australia and New Zealand’.7

Wood told us then:

If we need American protection, it will be found not by insistence on the terms of ANZUS but by fostering that ‘relationship of confidence and common purpose’. In terms of diplomacy, that means that the main security for New Zealand lies in continuous, active, knowledgeable, cooperative but independent minded association with the United States aimed, in classical phrase, about good diplomacy, ‘to harmonise the real interests of the parties concerned’.8

Incidentally, the most exquisite value of Wood’s 1967 lecture, which was a presentation before National Party luminaries, is that he sets out the intellectual basis for what was to become the Kirk Brand that I have highlighted in earlier articles.

Wood’s scholarship is made starker by the subsequent near dearth of high calibre successors in this field. New Zealanders’ appreciation of their prime ministers’ performance in pursuit of an independent foreign policy has been little nurtured for the past quarter-century.

Astute theoretician

At Frank Corner’s funeral in 2014, Gerald Hensley reflected:

above all, he argued that the American relationship had become key to our security. All his life, through times when it was both fashionable and unfashionable, he held firmly to the view that New Zealand’s foreign policy required a comfortable relationship with the United States.9

Corner was spot on with the theory — that New Zealand’s foreign policy needs ‘a comfortable relationship’ with the United States. He was also astute: resisting chasing Wood’s promotion of Alan Watt’s vision of an ANZUS ‘relationship of confidence and common purpose’ — that was a goal too far.

Corner has been the most talented of our mandarins in accomplishing Wood’s ‘comfortable relationship’, particularly, when paired with Norman Kirk. They turned in a creditable performance when engaging the Nixon White House in 1973, impressing Nixon and his top national security offside, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft.

Corner’s accomplishments were, however, exceptional. For, in practice since 1965, Wellington has seldom had a ‘comfortable relationship’ with Washington (or Canberra, a story-line for separate future scribbling). The most recent ‘comfortable relationship’ period occurred when Jim Bolger was prime minister. Otherwise, since 1965, the relationship has been either strained, as when Kirk, Muldoon, Lange and Clark were prime minister, or essentially non-existent, as for the Shipley and Key prime ministerships.

High noon

Maybe, this year will see a ‘high noon’ moment for the old ANZUS triangle? If so, it may prompt the emergence of the first home-grown successor to Wood. Robert Ayson has published important ‘building blocks’ for his expected major analysis of where now for the ANZUS triangle.10 With that in mind, I invoke Harold Wilson’s quip: ‘always try to write the first draft. They mess it around a lot later, but something of your ideas will survive.’11

Since 1965, we and Canberra have not been seeking the same host in Washington. Greg Sheridan, the Australian newspaper’s foreign affairs editor, reminded Australians recently that ‘in Washington, the primary Australian account is held at the Pentagon’. He wrote ‘the thing that commands attention is our status as a military ally and the many joint operations and joint exercises we participate in’.12

Sheridan is right for Australia. His perspective is underscored by Michael Cooney’s The Gillard Project (2015). Cooney, a Gillard speech-writer, gives his on-the-spot account of Gillard’s visit to Washington in March 2011 and Obama’s visit to Australia eight months later. To Cooney, the dominance of Canberra’s security heavyweights is palpable in toning Gillard’s presence in Washington to their needs, including highlighting the pair celebrating the 60th anniversary of the signing of the ANZUS treaty. Malcolm Turnbull was at the White House on 19 January this year for three hours, including a working lunch, to, in his host’s perspective, ‘highlight the extraordinary breadth of the U.S.–Australian alliance’.

In a stark contrast that so pleased Corner, Wellington’s smartest primary account in Washington has, however, not been the Pentagon. Ours, when we get our act together, is the White House, most particularly the National Security Council, which until almost the present-day was a lean and influential operation for presidents from Kennedy on.

Our best moments of influence have been when mixing with the Kennedy intellectuals (well described in David Halberstam’s
David Lange’s global diplomacy with Washington has been so well raked over that that literature fills a library shelf. Yet I am discovering fresh material that may be telling for nuancing inflexions of various perspectives.

Last year, Robert Service, a fine Cold War historian, finally gave us a world-class bird’s-eye view of what it was about David Lange’s nuclear-free New Zealand that prompted global interest: America’s network of alliances, including NATO, required dynamic management as military, political and economic problems arose. Even the most far-off countries could unsettle the situation. In Australasia there was little fuss until 1984, when New Zealand’s newly elected Labour government under Prime Minister David Lange announce a ban on nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels in its waters. This challenged the assumptions about American leadership of the worldwide resistance to the USSR and communism worldwide. Lange did something unparalleled by any West European, North American or Asian allied leader. There would have been an angrier reaction from Washington if those islands in the south-west Pacific had been a bigger power and Wellington [not] half a globe away and outside the USSR’s scope of pretensions. When all was said and done, the New Zealand case demonstrated the looseness and flexibility of the ‘West’ in dealing with the tasks of defence against the Soviet Union.14

Lange’s ANZUS game-play is now considerably more public from six documents at Archives New Zealand. The documents help to better appreciate Lange’s intense preparation for being on top of the ANZUS issue throughout his prime ministership.15 The first is an undated six-page memorandum, ‘The ANZUS Relationship’, signed by Merv Norrish, that Lange received during the first day (Sunday, 15 July 1984) he was prime minister-elect.

The second, dated 25 July 1984, is a file note from the New Zealand embassy in Washington, which, in part, reads as a close account of Paul Wolfowitz’s record of the Shultz–Lange meeting a week earlier, an encounter that Lange, then not yet prime minister, professed publicly to be one ‘not to negotiate but to establish a working personal relationship’. But he must have mentioned the Norwegian formula as the note makes clear the Americans were determined that the embassy kill that thought now that Lange was sworn in.

The third is a nine-page American ‘informal document’, dated August 1984, ‘United States Views on ANZUS and Port Access’. The fourth is a cable, dated 21 August 1984, from the New Zealand High Commission, Canberra, titled ‘ANZUS: Entry of Nuclear Ships’, which sets out the problems Lange was causing Hawke and seeks Wellington’s guidance.

The fifth, is a personal note, dated 30 October 1984, from Frank O’Flynn (as defence minister) to the prime minister that includes the comment:

“Jamieson [O’Flynn’s top military adviser] thinks the Americans may be able to come up, however reluctantly, with some compromise, like making special visits here with conventionally powered ships that are obviously not capable of carrying nuclear arms. He gave the impression that this is what [Pearl Harbor-based US Admiral] Crowe and his HQ are working on and reporting to Washington.

The sixth is from Lange’s final throes as prime minister. In the immediate aftermath of the Yale speech (on Anzac Day 1989) he sought his Cabinet’s clearance for an initiative to engage with the new US president, George H.W. Bush. Other material at Archives New Zealand shows that the Cabinet hand-braked Lange by killing the initiative (a letter from Lange to President Bush that was to be personally delivered by the Canadian prime minister, Brian Mulroney, when he was at the White House on 3 May). It exhibits Lange at his most substantial but, more so,
his talent for being diplomatically dumb (at least with his Cabinet). If he had played this initiative more astutely he may have garnered a more impressive legacy, at least on the diplomatic side of his prime ministership. In early May 1989, the about-to-begin spell-binding rapidity of developments that ended the Cold War had yet to seriously commence to snow-ball, though Lange’s Yale speech may yet be seen as one of the early melting snowflakes in that process.

Reagan retreads

President George W. Bush initially fielded the Reagan Retreads as his national security team. Most prominent were the front-of-house sextet of James Mann’s The Rise of the Vulcans (2004) — Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Armitage. Some of them had been bruised career-wise during the Reagan presidency because New Zealand went nuclear-free. As well, several of Bush’s mid-level national security officials had been entangled by the New Zealand ‘show’ that to them had seen David Lange led by Helen Clark. James Kelly, Lewis (‘Scooter’) Libby, David Addington and Doug Paal are prominent of those.

Books published in the United States as recently as late 2015 enable us to more fully sense the kind of revengeful determination these Retreads intended Helen Clark face during Bush’s presidency. But, through the vagaries of Bush reshuffling his national security team, the Retreads were largely taken out of play as his second term proceeded. This story shows how uncomfortable the bilateral relationship can get without great public histrionics in either capital.

Signing off

This article has selected several episodes in the story of a search that has been nearly as elusive as that for Lewis Carroll’s Snark — New Zealand’s ‘comfortable relationship’ with Washington. There is much else that can be drawn in further writings. For example, the down-the-road value of Richard Nixon’s Pacific war service, serving under the New Zealander Major-General Harold Barrowclough, and how that played into Kirk’s visit to Washington in September 1973. An other illustration may be from a quarter-century later. How did rejigged ‘scraps of paper’, which may have lain low in a Washington bureaucrat’s computer from the late Bolger prime ministerial years through the Bush presidency until a new president was insistent on showing some friendship to New Zealand, come to be re-invented by the Obama White House as the Washington and Wellington Declarations.

The crunch themes facing John Key, and inevitably his successors, are the very same as his fourteen prime ministerial predecessors have faced since 1945.

NOTES

5. Roberto Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy (Wellington, 2004), p.367, note 20. The quote — ‘I regard an American guarantee of our security as the richest prize of New Zealand diplomacy’ — was made on 9 May 1950 by Frederick Doidge, the New Zealand minister of external affairs.
13. Hensley, op cit.
15. Norrish’s memorandum is in Archives New Zealand file R22499599. The file note is in R17722439. The American document and the cable from Canberra are in R17722440. O’Flynn’s note is in R17722441. The post-Yale initiative is in R22499606, R22498980 and R22499599.

Helen Clark

New Zealand International Review
CHOGM 2015: the invisible summit holds out promise for rejuvenation

W. David McIntyre reviews the recent Commonwealth gathering in Malta.

The Commonwealth summit in Malta in November 2015 went unnoticed by the media. Paris dominated the news after the terrorist outrages of 13 November and in the light of the world climate conference that started on 20 November. In the same month the Valletta EU–Africa Migration Summit, 11–12 November, and the Antalya G20 meetings, 15–16 November, attracted more column inches than the Commonwealth. Yet the second Chogm in a decade to be held at Valletta, during the last weekend of November 2015, offered great promise for the rejuvenation of the Commonwealth.

With the election, for the first time, of a UK citizen as the next secretary-general, and the choice of Britain to host the next Chogm in 2018; with the longest reigning monarch in British history reflecting proudly on her six decades as head of the Commonwealth while complimenting Prince Charles on his support; and with Eurosceptics re-discovering the Commonwealth in the run up to the referendum on EU membership, we may expect the British to repeat their performance the last time they hosted Chogm, in 1997.

At Edinburgh that year they inaugurated the Tri-sector Commonwealth. They held the first Youth Forum, Business Forum, and People’s Forum (then titled ‘Commonwealth Centre’) ahead of the heads of government meetings. And, for the first time, they invited the Queen, as head of the Commonwealth, to attend the opening ceremony, make a speech and formally open the proceedings. Intended as a one-off compliment on the occasion of her golden wedding anniversary, this event started a new tradition, which has continued until now, with the exception of Colombo 2013. Testimony to the evolving Tri-sector Commonwealth was re-affirmed in the ‘Leaders Statement’ prefacing the Malta Communiqué dated 29 November 2015 with their dedication to renewal of the Commonwealth ‘as an association of governments and peoples, and a rich diversity of organisations that support them’. How Britain fulfils this promise must be watched with interest.

Because of the growing frequency of international summity, Commonwealth heads of government meetings have been pared down to two-and-a-half days — virtually an opening ceremony, short executive sessions and the leaders’ Retreat. But a full ‘Chogm week’ remains to embrace other significant activities involving the three sectors — governmental, voluntary, and business Commonwealths. In Malta there were four ‘Parallel Meetings’, the Youth Forum, Women’s Forum, People’s Forum and Business Forum, and four ministerial meetings — the pre-Chogm Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, CMAG, the Open-ended Ministerial Working Group on Small States and a meeting with the head of Rotary International and the UN secretary-general on polio eradication. Heads of government in their communiqué recognised the contribution of ‘Commonwealth organisations and individual citizens’ in the pursuit of the association’s ‘values, principles, goals and priorities’.

Significant innovation

Great interest focused on the significant innovation of Valletta — the first Women’s Forum, 22–24 November 2015, in the International Hotel, St Julians. With over 400 delegates the forum was opened by the president of Malta, Marie Coleiro Preca, and addressed by Joseph Muscat, the host prime minister. The forum looked to advancing women’s representation in all spheres although overshadowed by global crises, the 2015 Valletta Chogm saw some innovations that augur well for the future. The ‘Parallel Meetings’ of the voluntary and business Commonwealths included a new Women’s Forum. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans- and inter-sexual issues were raised for the first time. Prince Charles advocated a green finance facility for islands states. The first UK secretary-general was elected in the person of Dominican-born Baroness Scotland, who was the first women UK attorney-general. Britain will contribute to a new unit in the Secretariat to counter extremists’ radicalisation and will host the next Chogm in 2018, its first for 21 years.
including parliaments, corporate board rooms and the judiciary. Working panels covered leadership, the media and technology, education and health, child and forced marriage, youth and entrepreneurship. Strategies to deal with gender-based violence were considered including harassment, stalking, rape, prostitution, trafficking, pornography, female genital mutilation, domestic violence and forced and early marriage. The recommendation from the forum that it should have an integral part in future Chogms was agreed by heads of government and the communique stressed gender equality, girls’ education, and efforts to eliminate child and forced marriage.

The Youth Forum, 21–25 November 2015, in the San Antonio Hotel, Bugibba, provided the opening event of Chogm week. Prime Minister Muscat urged the 600 delegates to be ambitious and come up with inspiring ideas. Emphasising that about 60 per cent of the populations of the Commonwealth were under the age of 30, there was condemnation of youth unemployment and recognition of the need for universal access to quality education; a demand that the voices of young people be heard in all planning for development, and that children be treated with dignity. The heads of government took up the role of youth in countering extremism.

The People’s Forum has become a major opportunity for the voluntary sector. Representatives of 80 pan-Commonwealth civil society organisations can make submissions to the governmental Commonwealth, but the forum’s 400 delegates fell short of the total attending some recent Chogms. The theme ‘What makes societies resilient?’ gave emphasis to the problems of small island states. The forum’s 59-paragraph outcome document, ‘Malta Declaration on Governance for Resilience’, was the most pretentious of the pre-Chogm documents.

It suggested that civil society organisations offered ‘invaluable opportunities to re-think hegemonic and oppressive structures that hindered societal resilience…. Marginalized and unheard voices need to be part of the dialogue.’ Resilience was seen as a ‘complex, multifaceted construct which must be shaped by unheard voices and narratives, responding to all forms of vulnerability’. Culture played a big role in resilience of indigenous peoples: the importance of intergenerational correctness, the supremacy of collective benefit rather than individual benefit, the need to pursue close affinity to the earth its gifts and resources…. We call for a new programme of Commonwealth analysis research and inquiry to uncover, examine, celebrate and share unheard critical voices on resilience…. Measure of progress should not be by GDP but such tests as the ‘Happy Planet Index’, the ‘Health per Acre’ approach, and ‘Gross National Happiness’. On climate a functioning ‘polluter pays’ policy was called for. Here too, for the first time at a Chogm, there was also debate on lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans- and inter-sexual (LGBTI) issues and demands that laws relating to criminalisation of homosexuality (often dating from colonial times) in some 40 member states should be addressed by heads of government. Representatives of the People’s Forum met with the foreign ministers to pass on their submissions.

Parallel meetings
As usual the largest of the parallel meetings was the Business Forum, organised for the first time by the Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council (which took over the task of helping governments to attract investment after the demise of the Business Council in 2014), the forum had the customary generous corporate sponsorship. The meetings, in the Hilton Hotel, St Julians, 24–26 November 2015, attracted 1300 delegates from 75 countries, who were offered over a hundred presentations including fifteen by heads of government. Lord Marland, chairman of the CWEIC, concluded with a call for doubling
intra-Commonwealth trade to US$1 trillion by 2020. There was emphasis on the ‘Blue Economy’ so vital to the small island states. Prince Charles, arguing for sustainability, commended the creation of a ‘Green Finance Facility’ to provide credit for sustainable infrastructure projects in island states. Australia and New Zealand will be represented on the working group to develop the facility. In his concluding address the Prince of Wales said ‘we do not have the right to steal our children’s and grandchildren’s inheritance’.

After the routine business of the Commonwealth — budgets, strategic plans of the Commonwealth Foundation, the Commonwealth of Learning and the Commonwealth youth programme — were handled in the pre-Chogm Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, and CMAG considered an emergency in Maldives following an assassination attempt on the president, leaders assembled on 27 November 2015 for Chogm-proper. The opening ceremony, at the historic Mediterranean Conference Centre (in the former Hospital of the Order of St John), was preceded by a time-consuming procession of leaders and spouses being welcomed by the secretary-general, the outgoing chair-in-office (the president of Sri Lanka) and his Maltese successor. In this John Key was the only head accorded a hug by the prime minister of Malta. Following their executive session in the Radisson Golden Sands Hotel, the leaders went to Fort St Angelo, Vittoriosa, for the Retreat, which was their major event.

The most eagerly awaited outcome of the Chogm was the choice of the next secretary-general, made on 27 November 2015. This matter had been the subject of unusual debate over the past few years, partly because of the damage to the Commonwealth’s credibility caused by the 2013 Chogm in Sri Lanka. Also, because of the low profile maintained by Kamalesh Sharma, the Indian diplomat chosen as secretary-general in 2007, there had been a lot of somewhat academic speculation about the secretary-general’s job description. Five candidates eventually emerged. The initial favourite was Mmasekgoa Masire-Mwamba (daughter of a former president of Botswana), who was deputy secretary-general in 2008–14. There was an attempt by the Commonwealth Caribbean community to reach consensus on a candidate in the belief that it was ‘the Caribbean’s turn’. When this proved impossible three West Indians were offered. Dominica nominated Patricia Scotland (Baroness Scotland of Asthal), who had been born in Dominica but whose upbringing and career had been in Britain. Her chances were discounted as many felt that it was unlikely that a UK citizen would be chosen. Antigua nominated Guyana-born Sir Ronald Sanders, who had been their high commissioner in London (and is now ambassador to the United States). As a writer and son-in-law of Sonny Ramphal, Sanders had longstanding Commonwealth credibility and had been the rapporteur for the Eminent Persons Group, 2010–11, that produced an authoritative report and helped draft the Charter finalised in 2012. Following the 2013 Colombo Chogm he had emerged as the most trenchant critic of Commonwealth lack of dynamism. The third Caribbean candidate was Senator Bhoe Tewairie, Trinidad’s minister of planning. From Africa Tanzania’s former Foreign Minister Bernard Membe was nominated. On the eve of the conference Alexander Downer, former Australia foreign minister, was talked of as a possible compromise candidate. In the event, the last two candidates withdrew. There was a debate by the three candidates in the Malta House of Representatives organised by the Commonwealth Foundation as part of the People’s Forum. On the opening day of Chogm Sanders was eliminated on a first ballot, and Baroness Scotland was elected.

New secretary-general
The first secretary-general from Britain, Patricia Scotland, was the first black women QC and the first women attorney-general. She had previously served as parliamentary under-secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and minister of state in the Home Office. She is the chancellor of Greenwich University and president of Chatham House. In a comprehensive manifesto published in the October 2015 number of The Round Table she wrote: ‘The Commonwealth can either be left to wither on the vine as an irrelevant relic of a colonial past, or be rejuvenated as a unique family of nations where diversity is strength, understanding builds tolerance, and partnerships create platforms for all our citizens to prosper’. As part of a migrant family that grew up in Britain, she declares herself ‘a proud child of the Commonwealth’. Her priorities were listed as

- reforming Commonwealth institutions and processes,
- focusing actions on outcomes,
- building lasting partnerships,
- championing the Commonwealth across the world, and
- unifying the Commonwealth.

Responding to concerns raised in the civil society meetings she intends to pursue LGBTI issues with many member states.

Turning to the main conference, it focused on four outstanding global issues on which heads took a particular Commonwealth stance. Firstly, on the problems of radicalisation and
terrorism (so recently highlighted by the Paris outrages), heads reaffirmed the ‘relevance of Commonwealth solutions’, especially the 2007 recommendations of the study group under Amartya Sen that produced Civil Paths to Peace. The role of young people who make up the majority of members’ populations was emphasised. To counter violent extremist evangelisation a new unit will be established within the Secretariat for which Britain is to contribute £1 million per year for five years.

Secondly, on sustainable development, heads reiterated the global 2030 Agenda for eradicating poverty over fifteen years. They stressed the role of ‘the full family of Commonwealth intergovernmental and accredited organizations’, and the particular needs of small states. They welcomed the Small States Centre of Excellence established in Malta.

**Climate change**

Thirdly, their discussions of climate change focused on the session of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change taking place in Paris. On this President Hollande of France and Ban Ki Moon, the UN secretary-general, addressed a special Chogm meeting, ‘The Statement of Climate Change’, on 28 November 2015, recognised that ‘least developed countries and small islands developing states are bearing a disproportionate burden from the impacts of climate change’.

Fourthly, on migration the stance taken avoided the sort of hysteria building up in Europe. Recognising that the world was ‘facing exceptional levels of displaced people’, heads agreed to address the causes of ‘irregular migration’. With the whole history of the Commonwealth behind them, they accepted that, ‘if properly harnessed and managed’, migration had economic and social benefits.

Finally, the two most popular aspects of the Commonwealth — the Commonwealth Games and the head of the Commonwealth — were also covered in various ways. The Games Federation hosted the usual ‘Sports Breakfast’ on the last day presided over by Louise Martin, the federation’s first women president. In the communiqué heads encouraged the Commonwealth Advisory Body on Sport and the Secretariat to collaborate in harnessing the Games as an instrument to sustain development, community cohesion and shared values among young people. The 21st Commonwealth Games are scheduled for the Australian Gold Coast in 2018.

**Headship issues**

The Commonwealth’s symbolic headship, and especially the matter of succession, was treated for years as a taboo subject and little was written about it. King George VI became head of the Commonwealth when the concept of ‘common allegiance to the Crown’ was dropped in 1949, since it was decided that India would remain as a member after it became a republic. From 1964 republics or indigenous monarchies made up the majority of the members. Although there appears to have been no discussion about the succession when King George VI died in 1952, Pandit Nehru, prime minister of the only republic at the time, sent a telegram of condolence to the Queen, published in The Times, in which he welcomed her as the new head of the Commonwealth and this style was included in the accession proclamation so that India could endorse it along with the other members.

Yet over the years various writers, journalists and academics developed the notion that the headship was personal to the monarch of the day, not hereditary. The precise origin of this notion has never been made clear. When Don McKinnon was asked, on becoming secretary-general, about the succession he said it would be a matter for decision by heads of government at the time of the Queen’s demise. How the mechanics of consulting 53 heads would be achieved was not divulged.

The question has been actively discussed more recently because of the Queen’s decision to curtail long distance travel. For the Sri Lanka Chogm in 2013 Prince Charles was sent to represent her. She went to Malta in 2015 no doubt for sentimental reasons as she had lived there earlier in her marriage when the Duke of Edinburgh was stationed there in the navy. The next Chogm will be in Britain in 2018, not in 2017 after the customary two-year interval, because when Vanuatu (the chosen venue) had to withdraw because cyclone damage to its infrastructure it was decided at Valletta that the closing months of a year become too crowded with international events and a date in the first part of 2018 will be more appropriate. Thus it is likely that the Queen will attend. But the succession remains undecided and this was a question talked about in Malta. John Key was reported in the London Daily Telegraph as saying: ‘I’m not sure why there’s even a question about it. The title should just go with the Crown, I know the Prince of Wales may be keen to tread carefully, but he’d be great.’ This is a viewpoint now frequently aired. An alternative view is that the headship is unnecessary, and in a paper from the Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the University of London the idea was recently floated that the position should lapse when Elizabeth II’s reign ends. As against this is the view that the non-constitutional, symbolic headship is one of those things that marks the Commonwealth as ‘different’ and it also provides a useful pillar of continuity. It is one of those untidy elements of uncertainly that should be cleared up.

Although Chogm 2015 Malta may be remembered as the ‘invisible summit’, overshadowed as it was by a surfeit of dramatic global events, it offered considerable promise for the future. All 53 member states were present, though only 31 were represented by heads of government. With the election of a British secretary-general, who is a proud ‘child of the Commonwealth’; with Britain again to be Chogm venue after an interval of 21 years; with the Queen and the Prince of Wales maintaining their active interest; and the many civil society and sporting organisations always giving the association the largest citizen input of any international association, we may look forward to some fruitful developments.
Strategic liberalism and Kiwi maximalism

Reuben Steff suggests a new paradigm as a basis for New Zealand foreign policy.

In 2001 Prime Minister Helen Clark declared that New Zealand was ‘the most strategically secure country in the world’.1 Upon that basis, and hearkening back to the foreign policy approach of prior Labour administrations, she pursued an approach to international affairs known as liberal internationalism. This emphasised the promotion of human rights and democracy; support for international institutions; the encouragement of disarmament and the promotion of free trade. In fact, her foreign policy was arguably the most liberal internationalist of any New Zealand government ever.

The current National government has developed a less sanguine view of the security environment and the threats it poses to New Zealand. Instead, and true to its ideological heritage, it has sought to re-focus New Zealand’s foreign policy efforts upon core national interests, perceived to be trade and strengthening alliances. This approach to international affairs is captured by the foreign affairs theory of realism, which is less concerned with the promotion of ideals than liberalism.

Although every New Zealand foreign policy contains a mix of realist and liberal elements, these two paradigms have been engaged in a struggle over the general course of New Zealand foreign policy since the 1930s.2 However, realism and liberalism, when theoretically and practically isolated from one another, operate akin to ideologies: they simplify the complexity of the world — thus systematically distorting it — and attract passionate adherents to their side, with practical consequences for foreign policy. In this article I contend that neither position is sufficient for present international configuration. Therefore, the essential contention at the core of my argument is that it is strategic liberalism that should form the foundational underpinning of New Zealand’s foreign policy.3 This paradigm provides a wellspring for visionary objectives that could provide a major contribution to the common security of the Asia–Pacific region and could help transcend major regional security issues. These efforts would be strengthened by an approach we could dub ‘Kiwi maximalism’ — a conscious political decision to frame our objectives as more far-reaching than appears currently plausible.

Contemporary system

‘Globalisation’ refers to the expansion of integrated economic structures, diffusion of communications and technology. Prior to 1991, ‘security’ was defined by the national struggle in Cold War parameters for power, whether military, economic or ideological. Since then, new security threats have emerged that threaten both national and international security. Additionally, the tighter the integrated components of the system become, the more likely destabilising events abroad will cause systemic reverberations throughout the system and affect geographically remote states, such as New Zealand.4

In this situation many threats can only be combated by a view of security that requires states to work together. Traditional realist ‘self-help’ notions of security become counter-productive — all states that seek security in the modern international environment are dependent on one another. Moreover, since New Zealand’s interests are bound up in the security of the international economic system, it has a stake in stabilising the system as a whole, and especially its wider region, the Asia–Pacific.

Alongside the deepening process of globalisation, realism has undergone its own transformation since the end of the Cold War. It has separated into ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ schools of thought. Offensive realists believe that states are greedy ‘power-maximisers’, whereby achieving hegemony over other states is the only means to guarantee a state’s security. Aggression and coercion become the inevitable recourse in an offensive realist world. In contrast, defensive realists hold that states are ‘security seekers’ and moderate their behaviour towards this end. Since security is indivisible in a globalised international system, states can only improve their security positions by working with one another.

In recent decades a new international structure has emerged, dramatically increasing the incentives for co-operation. New Zealand should capitalise on this by adopting a new foreign policy paradigm. It should consider a new approach — strategic liberalism — as the foundational underpinning of New Zealand’s foreign policy. Bonded to ‘Kiwi maximalism’, it would provide a wellspring for visionary objectives that New Zealand could adopt. It might aim to transcend major regional security issues through a reinvigorated push for disarmament across the Asia–Pacific region and by acting as a catalyst for improved United States–China relations.
Owing to their assumptions, offensive and defensive realists have very different views of the ‘security dilemma’. This dilemma refers to a situation whereby a state, intending to improve its security position by increasing its military strength or through an alliance, leads other states to respond in similar fashion, heightening tension and the chance of conflict between them even when neither state desires it; a net decrease in security occurs. For offensive realists, there is no dilemma since states are inherently greedy — it is a zero-sum situation. For defensive realists the dilemma is real and a tragic misunderstanding. Fortunately, as long as both sides recognise this, it can be overcome through programmatic steps to reassure one another and transform either state’s view of the other’s intention; peace and rapprochement are possible.

**Transformed system**

Shiping Tang has convincingly shown that the international system has transformed from one comprised primarily of offensive realist states to one comprised today chiefly of defensive realist states. In a defensive world, states that pursue offensive strategies are punished for their behaviour. The two most recent cases of powerful states pursuing their interests in an overtly offensive manner lends support to this position. The Bush administration in 2003 operated as an offensive state when it invaded Iraq, and more recently Russia acted offensively in Eastern Europe. Both operated out of step with the current defensive realist international environment and were, predictably, punished.

Because expansionism no longer pays, defensive/co-operative strategies become the norm. As a consequence, a majority of states today have been socialised into perceiving the use of military force to settle most disputes as illegitimate. Even though tensions do exist, this view is held by most states in the Asia–Pacific region, evident in the proliferation of state-to-state contacts and multilateral forums and in the fact that they all have a common interest in ensuring economic growth is not derailed. Tang’s thesis is supported by the fact that general deterrence between states, rather than conflict, has become internalised, while nuclear realities are supported by the fact that general deterrence between states involved in the endeavour, thus recognising their national interests, and liberal in that it requires and strengthens co-operation amongst them. The two proposals below represent a maximalist approach: they may be more far-reaching than appears currently plausible or possible. This ‘Kiwi maximalism’ is conscious and aligns naturally with the ethos and other principles that underpin strategic liberalism.

Taking a cue from the international relations approach known as constructivism, strategic liberalism asserts that our reality is socially constructed, and thus what we make of it. Although human nature will remain unchangeable for the foreseeable future, its energy can be directed towards its better self and concerned with the welfare of others. It also assumes that strategic futures are inherently indeterminate and that we need not repeat the tragic mistakes of the past. This approach also requires New Zealand to emphasise ‘open polyilateralism’: commitment to permanent partnerships in international affairs and open multilateral architectures that do not exclude other states. This consciously runs counter to the traditional realist notion that states only have interests, not permanent friends of allies. This is not an academic point: closed multilateral and security architectures generate feelings of insecurity amongst others, generating pressures to form countervailing alliances. This brings us back to the system-transcendent goals of strategic liberalism, which, initially, could be directed towards overcoming security dilemmas in the Asia–Pacific region.

New Zealand’s embrace of strategic liberal principles would be greatly facilitated if it was buttressed by dedicated institutional support. This could come in the form of a world-class think tank — let us call it the Centre for Asia-Pacific Strategic Co-operation — whose primary objective was research into and promotion of ambitious international security and peace initiatives. It would make an intellectual and material contribution towards this end. Leading conceptual collaboration with actors around the region would be paramount, as would be emphasising the need for avant garde ideas and dissimulation of best practices. Incentives would be needed to bring to New Zealand the best and brightest intellectuals from across the Asia–Pacific.

**Strategic Liberalism — Core Principles and Assumptions**

- Anti-determinism; strategic futures are indeterminate
- Global interest; common interest; human interest
- Polyilateralism; emphasise permanent partnerships
- Non-exclusionary; open and transparent activities
- Avant-garde; encouragement and utilisation of new thinking
- Best practice; dissimulation of expertise and knowledge
- System-transcendent; approaches that seek to overcome security dilemmas
- Maximalism; strive for ambitious goals that maximise common interests.
Advancing disarmament

As a maximalist objective New Zealand should work to forge an Asia–Pacific compact that pauses current military acquisition processes, prevents new acquisition programmes and eliminates existing stockpiles of conventional and non-conventional weapons.

This first vector of research and advocacy of New Zealand’s strategic liberal portfolio would be a focus on contemporary disarmament issues and a re-invigorated push for conventional and non-conventional arms control. This would include arms control accords to curb research into new weaponry, which could destabilise political relations. After all, an arms race is driven not just by the need for greater quantities of weapons but by perpetual advances in weapons research in order to ensure a state’s capabilities remain equal, if not superior, to the those of others. Once developed, pressures emerge from the military-industrial system to purchase and deploy new weaponry, creating a spiral of incentives that may not be driven by the needs of strategy or reflect the level of objective threat posed to the country. Furthermore, identifying cutting-edge technologies that may prove beneficial to the domestic economy but have dual-use military applications will also need to be taken into account (such as genetic weaponry, robotics, space-based weapons and artificial intelligence programmes).

Significant conceptual work is required on the link between conventional and non-conventional (nuclear) arms. New Zealand cannot just say the world would be safer in the absence of nuclear weapons because there is a case to be made that state-to-state conflict has been greatly restrained since the dawn of the nuclear age. Nor should we charge that nuclear arms are ‘useless’ since they have not been used since the end of the Second World War. This misses the strategic-functional utility that comes from holding nuclear weapons and how they have been utilised indirectly on numerous occasions. For example, during the Cold War nuclear weapons facilitated conventional power projection by the super-powers. It allowed either state to intervene with impunity within their ‘sphere of influence’ and throughout parts of the Third World, secure in the knowledge that the other side would not directly intervene against its conventional forces in the field. Nuclear forces thus underpinned either super-power’s freedom of action. This was clearly understood by US officials. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated before Congress in 1980 that ‘our strategic nuclear capabilities provide the foundation on which our security rests. With them, our other forces become meaningful instruments of military and political power’.7 After the Cold War, an official 1995 document produced by the Policy Subcommittee of the Strategic Advisory Group of the US Strategic Command on the ‘essentials’ of post-Cold War deterrence explained that ‘nuclear weapons always cast a shadow over any crisis or conflict in which the US is engaged’.8 As recently as 2009 Major-General Donald Alston, assistant chief of staff for strategic deterrence, stated that ‘Nuclear deterrence underpins all of our freedom of movement everywhere.’9 For Russia’s part, Vladimir Putin surely felt safe in the knowledge that US and NATO forces could not come to the aid of their partners in Georgia during Russia’s invasion in 2008, and the same appears to apply vis-à-vis its activities in the east of Ukraine today. Indeed, in a recent documentary on Russian television called ‘World Order’, Putin said ‘Russia will continue perfecting its [nuclear] weapons. The nuclear triad forms the basis of our security policy.’10 Russia has also not been beyond issuing veiled nuclear threats in recent years or preparing to put its nuclear arms on standby during times of crisis.

The above arguments need to be engaged squarely, especially as most of the nuclear powers are upgrading and transforming their arsenals today. Furthermore, the prospects for this objective will be greatly strengthened if they are pursued alongside an effort in the Asia–Pacific region to programmatically improve the overall tenor of relations between the United States and China.

Promoting rapprochement

New Zealand should, as another maximalist objective, play an instrumental role to ensure a security dilemma does not emerge between the United States and China in the Asia–Pacific region, and make it an explicit foreign policy objective to forge an alliance with China at the same time that it sustains and deepens its relationship with the United States.

There is no more urgent task for global diplomats and international relations scholars than creating the conditions for China’s rise to take place peacefully. Applying strategic liberalism and ‘Kiwi maximalism’ opens up a horizon of far-sighted and ambitious strategic objectives regarding the US–China relationship and the role New Zealand could conceivably play in their promotion. New Zealand can utilise its unique geographic position, and excellent relations with both states, to promote co-operation and confidence-building between them in the Asia–Pacific region. New Zealand could act as a conduit, identifying trilateral and multilateral opportunities for joint military exercises, as well as related counter-transnational organised crime, counter-terror, humanitarian and disaster-relief exercises. In fact, military-to-military interaction has already taken place under New Zealand auspices. For example, in Christchurch in August 2013 the three countries conducted disaster response and humanitarian exercises together during Phoenix Spirit. During Operation Southern Katipo, held in the South Island in October–November 2015, New Zealand brought together nine countries. Although China did not formally join the exercise, it attended in an observer capacity.

New Zealand is deepening its defence relations with the United States and China simultaneously, a fact that will enhance our ability to pursue additional co-operative activities with them. Indeed, in November 2015 Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee gave a speech to China’s National Defence University, where he complimented China for its role in disaster relief and humanitarian missions, describing it as ‘having demonstrated its capacity as a responsible world actor’, and called China a ‘true Strategic Partner’ for New Zealand. Brownlee also announced a new five-year engagement plan between the People’s Liberation Army and the New Zealand Defence Force, the first between China and a Western military.11 These are positive steps but a maximalist approach would take them further by framing them as steps on
the way towards forging an alliance with China, akin to the relationship New Zealand currently has with its Western partners and allies.

Track II forums and workshops would complement the above efforts. A strategic liberal framework would ensure an ‘outside the box’ and ‘no issues off the table’ conceptual approach. This is critical. Day to day, week to week, month to month and year to year, an inexorable change in the global — and regional — balance of power is taking place between China and the United States, and it is the thousands of small decisions and changes in interpretation of the other state’s intentions that will determine the future stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and whether a co-operative mode of behaviour prevails. Therefore, conceptual alignment between the United States and China over the makeup of the future multilateral and institutional architecture in the Asia-Pacific is required, and it is currently lacking. Without this the ongoing US ‘rebalance’, or ‘pivot’, to Asia will only encourage China to believe that Washington is pursuing a neo-containment strategy by bolstering domestic elements in China that view security relations in zero-sum terms, thereby generating an acute security dilemma.

New Zealand could construct an explicit reassurance programme to promote between the United States and China. It would involve incremental step-by-step efforts in the military and non-military realms, centred on reciprocal restraint, in an effort to build trust and create a cycle of co-operation. Initial signals act as feelers and require a corresponding reaction to induce further steps. The most significant signals involve a state opting to unilaterally decrease its forces and engage in joint arms control efforts to modify military postures and capabilities in a way that decreases the ability of states to challenge the status quo.

Ultimately, reciprocal concessions must reach a point that makes it clear that neither state is considering attack or aggression; in other words, to take steps that a greedy offensive realist state will not. Of critical importance is Charles Kupchan’s recognition that co-operation between democracies and non-democracies is possible. Kupchan holds that assuming otherwise not only decreases the chance for immediate collaboration but also ‘discourages non-democracies from remaining open to mutual accommodation and the exchange of concessions — steps critical to advancing reconciliation and programmatic cooperation’. An approach to American–Chinese relations that emphasises ideological differences all but guarantees that deep forms of co-operation will remain out of reach.

National approach

The Key government should not be discouraged from adopting a strategic liberal foreign policy. After all, a number of conservative statesmen, from Henry Kissinger to George H.W. Bush, are remembered for making visionary decisions that were more far-sighted than most realised at the time. Admittedly, the present National government has inherited a functionalist approach to governance, which views governing as an end in itself, and virtue rests in stability, prudence and the management of state affairs. Speeches announcing ambitious foreign policy goals and outlining visionary regional proposals are not its cup of tea.

I can also attest from my time in government that policy-making and implementation is generally a conservative process that seeks to iteratively build upon past practice and apply/adjust it to new challenges, opportunities or crises. There are, inevitably, numerous compromises that occur throughout the process as multiple individuals, institutions and political actors inject themselves and moderate the final outcome. This process has a consistent result: risk-aversion. Operators in this context might readily dismiss the ideas outlined above as too ambitious and unrealistic as a basis for policy-making. But embracing the outlined approach would be a courageous political act in the truest sense of the word, as one that occurs when politicians make the seemingly impossible possible.

NOTES

2. See articles by David J. McCraw.
3. Gregory D. Foster used the term strategic idealism. While strategic liberalism has some similarities to Foster’s concept, the content and intellectual case made for it in this article are tailored to New Zealand and the contemporary international system. See Gregory D. Foster, ‘Transforming US National Security: A Call for Strategic Idealism’, Defense & Security Analysis, vol 26, no 2 (2002), pp.129–42.
The ‘beautiful island’ speaks

Stuart Vogel discusses the recent Taiwanese presidential election.

For many New Zealanders, Taiwan is a place that rarely enters their consciousness. It is a small island far, far away in the North Pacific. There was little coverage in the New Zealand media of the elections for the Taiwanese president and legislature, which were held on 16 January 2016. At first sight, this lack of coverage is not surprising. New Zealand does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, because of the People’s Republic of China’s longstanding ‘One-China policy’. This policy requires us to choose to recognise diplomatically either ‘Mainland China’ or Taiwan, the Republic of China.

Nevertheless, the peaceful transition in Taiwan from a single party dictatorship and martial law in 1986 through to this election result in 2016 is remarkable and demands a response. For only the second time since 1996, when elections began, the KMT, or Kuomintang Party, has lost the campaign for the presidency. Moreover, for the first time, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has an absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan. Tsai’s presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, won with 56 per cent of the vote. Tsai, who holds a doctorate from the London School of Economics, is the island’s first woman president. Unlike President Park Geun-hye in South Korea, she has risen to the presidency without connections to a powerful male dynasty.

Despite the lack of media coverage and apparent interest, Taiwan is becoming increasingly significant to New Zealand. It is New Zealand’s twelfth largest export partner. Total trade in goods amounts to $1.8 billion. The island is New Zealand’s third largest overseas market for beef and the fourth largest for fruit. The signing of the recent free trade agreement in 2013 has meant that trade volumes are increasing in what is acknowledged as a stable and reliable market. New Zealand honey, to take one example, has established itself in Taiwan as a high quality, prized product. With the reduction of import duties on honey from 35 per cent to zero, the popularity of the product on the island can only increase. Similarly, apple exports increased $13 million to $39 million in value between 2013 and 2014. Taiwan is also an important source of tourists.

Population growth

Domestically, the Taiwanese community has become a significant proportion of the New Zealand population. Taiwanese migrants have acquired a sound knowledge of New Zealand, it products and potential, and know the Taiwanese market. The success of the New Zealand Wine Trade Fair in Taipei in October 2015 indicates the growth of interest and potential of wine and the ability of wine producers to understand and access the market there. The ‘New Zealand Superdiversity Stocktake Report’ issued in December 2015 specifically noted the important role of business investors, ethnic businesses and migrant entrepreneurs in New Zealand’s economic developments in Asia. The report was issued by the Superdiversity Centre for Law, Policy and Business based in Auckland. The centre’s chair is Mai Chen, a prominent lawyer in this country, whose family immigrated from Taiwan.

Taiwanese migrants naturally have their own continuing concerns about their country of origin. Their concerns should be taken seriously by New Zealand politicians and New Zealand media. It is the essence of democracy that the citizens of a country like New Zealand should be able to raise and discuss matters that they deem important. The lack of coverage in the media was a failure to understand the significance of this event and to serve a significant part of the New Zealand population.

The development of economic relations and the results of the elections arguably challenge New Zealand to review its policies in relation to Taiwan. The Track II discussions between the Asia Foundation and Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation held in November 2015 noted that a change of government in Taiwan might lead to cross-strait tensions. It might mean a return to ‘cheque book diplomacy’ or struggle for influence, which would be an especially undesirable outcome for the small nations of the South Pacific. However, President-elect Tsai has repeatedly said, and again after the election:

We will work towards maintaining the status quo for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait in order to bring the greatest benefits to the Taiwanese people. Both sides of the strait have a responsibility to find mutually acceptable means of interaction.

New Zealand needs to be clear in its policy towards both Taiwan and China and also to understand the underlying issues. The report of the Track II meeting last year stated that Taiwan’s relations with China were the ‘best in 60 years’. However, that is a matter of perspective. Taiwan’s growing economic ties with China are causing concern among the island’s population and this has in part led to the rejection of the KMT. Twenty-five per cent of Taiwan’s exports go to China and a further 13 per cent to Hong Kong. Fully one half of tourists arriving in Taiwan are from China. However, economic growth is still only 1 per cent. Tsai’s stated policy is one of diversification and away from economic reliance on China.

New Zealanders are also aware of the issues relating to an economic dependency on China. Diversification and expansion of eco-

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The significance of the recent elections for the president and Legislative Yuan in Taiwan was lost on the New Zealand media. Taiwan has undergone a peaceful transition from dictatorship to an effective democracy. Taiwan is a stable trading partner and the Taiwanese community is an important sector in the New Zealand population. The cooling of the Chinese economy has meant that diversification and expansion of economic relationships are common interests, as is the need for the strengthening of international law for peaceful resolution of territorial claims. The tangata whenua of Aotearoa/New Zealand are related to some of the indigenous tribes of Taiwan. The development of the relationships of our indigenous peoples is vital for their self-identity.

Rev Dr Stuart Vogel is a Presbyterian minister who has worked with the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan and currently works with multi-ethnic communities in central Auckland. His PhD thesis (University of Auckland) analysed issues relating to the translation of the Bible into Southern Min (the vernacular of Fujian and Taiwan) by missionaries in the 19th century.
nomic relationships are in the interests of both. The cooling of the Chinese economy are a matter of great concern for both countries.

Several effects
The results of the Taiwanese elections affect New Zealand in several ways. First, when a stable and reliable economy is seeking to diversify, as is the case with both Taiwan and New Zealand, it is in New Zealand’s interests to be more pro-active in building a variety of relationships and in finding ways for Taiwan to relate to partnerships such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Moreover, especially as a member of the UN Security Council, New Zealand must be seen to support stable and peaceful developments and transitions. Certainly, the process in Taiwan has not been entirely smooth. Even this year, the *Taipei Times* reported that there were more than 1044 cases of vote-buying and campaign violence in New Taipei City and Pingtung County alone. But at least the electoral system is orderly and no one doubts the fairness of the result. Taiwan is a model for political transition that we would hope to see in other countries. To ignore this transition, for fear of offending the China, would be a failure of courage.

We do, of course, have long established trading relationships with the China. We have also migrants from China. No-one suggests a lessening of relationships with China. Nevertheless, the Taiwanese election results do require New Zealand to shift focus slightly. While New Zealand should not ‘interfere’ in the relationships between other ‘political entities’, we can ask and expect that there will be respect for the legally and fairly made decisions of each side. This is especially the case when the people have expressed themselves as clearly as is the case in these elections. It is also reasonable to ask that both sides renounce the use of force in order to impose a particular viewpoint. This is not to say that New Zealand should now support Taiwanese independence. It simply notes that the circumstances around which negotiations between China and Taiwan take place have changed.

Academic scrutiny
Second, and more broadly, we can legitimately take the view that the claim that Taiwan is ‘an inalienable part of China’ should be open to debate from academic scrutiny and discussion. This would also apply to the islands around China, Japan and Taiwan. Again, this is not to make a judgment about any particular claim. New Zealand should support a wider programme of strengthening the credibility and definition of powers given to international law by which these claims can be scrutinised, debated and decided with some finality. The point that China may not agree with such a position does not mean that we cannot hold and promote such a view.

Lastly, Taiwan and New Zealand have a unique relationship through their indigenous peoples. It is now certain that our Maori people set out from Taiwan thousands of years ago. The tangata whenua of Aotearoa are related to some of the indigenous tribes of Taiwan. To be consistent with our bicultural stance here, part of New Zealand’s conversation with Taiwan, at all levels, must include the development of relationships with those indigenous peoples.

The Taiwanese elections have shown that the communities of peoples who populate the Pacific grow and change. So, too, must our policies in response to those changes, including over time towards China itself. Such changes should be positive and affirming.

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Assessing New Zealand’s climate target ambition

Catherine Leining, Brian Fallows and James Renwick provide perspectives on New Zealand’s climate change approach, as revealed at a recent seminar.

On 4 December a panel discussion was held at VUW on ‘New Zealand at Paris Climate Talks: Leader, Follower or… Laggard?’ NZIIA President Hon Sir Douglas Kidd chaired it, and the speakers were Dr Tim Naish, director of Victoria University of Wellington’s Antarctic Research Centre, Dr James Renwick, professor of physical geography at the same university, Catherine Leining, policy fellow, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, Brian Fallows, a former economics editor for the New Zealand Herald and Paul Young, researcher and campaigner, Generation Zero. The following are several of the presentations made during the discussion.

CATHERINE LEINING

Leading up to the 2015 Paris climate change conference, countries tabled proposed climate change mitigation targets for 2021–30, called intended nationally determined contributions. In July 2015 the global Climate Action Tracker (CAT) published an assessment of New Zealand’s intended contributions — a reduction of 11 per cent below 1990 levels — and gave it the lowest rating of ‘inadequate’. What was the basis for this determination, and how should we judge whether New Zealand’s 2030 target is fair and ambitious enough?

Throughout the climate change negotiations, countries have struggled to define what constitutes fair and ambitious targets for reducing emissions. The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change enshrined the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ and countries have been arguing about how to apply it ever since. There is no agreed international standard for assessing target fairness and ambition. The approach used by CAT is one of many produced internationally to support the negotiations.

Based on an analysis of New Zealand’s emission projections and mitigation policies, CAT’s assessment highlighted three findings:

- New Zealand’s intended nationally determined contribution is not in line with global pathways to achieve the 2°C Celsius temperature goal or its own 2050 target.
- New Zealand does not have effective domestic policies in place to meet its target, and will instead be relying heavily on credits from the forestry sector and the carry-over of surplus Kyoto units.
- New Zealand’s intended nationally determined contribution is conditional on future international rules for forestry and use of carbon markets, which creates uncertainty.

Three judgments

In rating New Zealand’s target as ‘inadequate’, CAT makes three debatable judgments in particular. First, CAT is critical of using forest sinks to offset rising carbon dioxide emissions in other sectors; CAT would prefer a focus on reducing key drivers of emissions. However, the international community has broadly accepted that forest carbon sequestration constitutes a legitimate contribution to global mitigation effort provided it is subject to appropriate monitoring, reporting and verification, and New Zealand’s methodology aligns with established norms.

Second, CAT does not evaluate New Zealand’s cost of mitigation relative to that of other countries due to a lack of data. In my view, this is a legitimate consideration in target setting.

Third, CAT focuses on projected growth in domestic emissions assuming the on-going carry-over of surplus mitigation from earlier periods, and does not assess New Zealand’s potential to support more ambitious global mitigation through a combination of domestic effort and participation in new — and hopefully sound — market mechanisms (now supported by the Paris Agreement). It should be noted that CAT’s quantitative assessment of emissions, sinks and surplus Kyoto units pre-dates the government’s 2020 net position report released in December 2015. Despite differences between data sets, the government’s projections over 2013–20 fell within the overall range assumed by CAT and the direction of CAT’s findings remains valid.

While CAT’s assessment is useful, in the absence of internationally agreed standards, our own judgment of the fairness and ambition of New Zealand’s 2030 target depends on our choice of target objectives. I can suggest three possibilities.

First target

A first target objective could be to achieve a level of mitigation investment that is comparable to that of other developed countries and therefore sufficient to secure approval by key allies on which we are dependent for diplomatic and trade support. Given its national circumstances, under its intended nationally determined contribution New Zealand would actually be paying more for mitigation than countries like the United States and the European Union. By this reasoning, New Zealand’s contribution could be considered ‘fair’ even if its target number appears relatively less ambitious.

One challenge with this argument is the lack of transparent and comparable data on mitigation costs across countries, and
the limited extent of domestic cost-benefit analysis for New Zealand’s target. During the intended nationally determined contribution consultation, the government commissioned modelling by Infometrics which showed negligible differences in domestic GDP growth across 2030 targets ranging from 5 per cent to 40 per cent below 1990 levels. This was a conservative assessment which excluded the effects of future innovation, forestry and mitigation benefits. This suggests a more stringent target could be adopted without significant incremental loss of GDP.

A second target objective could be to align New Zealand’s mitigation effort with the global least-cost pathway to achieve the 2°C goal as documented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). All countries are inter-dependent in seeking to achieve a safe climate system. In this context, New Zealand’s 2030 target falls short; if other countries chose targets like ours, temperatures would rise by three to four degrees. The global pathway allows for differentiation among countries’ mitigation efforts. How much latitude should apply to New Zealand in this regard merits further consideration; to the extent that we do less, then others must do more.

Strategic transition
A third target objective could be to support New Zealand’s strategic transition to a low-emission economy. We can set domestic policy independently of other countries. Stabilising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases requires a global transition to zero net annual emissions by the end of the century. In this context, all countries need not just ambitious targets for supporting global mitigation but also pathways for domestic decarbonisation. This is where New Zealand’s is lagging the most severely in my view. Other countries’ intended nationally determined contributions submissions included domestic strategies to meet their targets. New Zealand’s submission explained that little domestic action is feasible before 2030 because new technologies for agriculture and transport are needed, and therefore New Zealand will need to rely on carbon market mechanisms that have yet to be developed.

For the past two years, Motu has run a low-emission future dialogue with participants across government, business, non-governmental organisations and academia to explore these issues. Our work suggests that multiple pathways could support New Zealand’s transition to a successful zero-net-emission economy, and mitigation investment could prepare our economy strategically for the very different future that lies ahead. In setting meaningful targets with credible domestic policies for meeting them, New Zealand would benefit from cross-party support for domestic decarbonisation and a shared understanding of the economic case for accelerating that process. Effective carbon pricing through reform of the New Zealand emissions trading scheme needs to be part of the solution but will not be sufficient; new cross-stakeholder processes and new policies will be needed to steer the country through this sea change.

Target fairness and ambition lie in the eye of the beholder. Relying solely on the choices, relativities and approval of other countries to chart our course on climate change mitigation would place us in a position of co-dependence. Raising our contribution to the global effort to help meet the 2°C goal would reflect our inter-dependence. Investing in ambitious domestic mitigation because it makes strategic sense for New Zealand would harness the power of independence. Co-dependence, inter-dependence or independence — the choice is ours.

BRIAN FALLOWS
Let us look at the offer New Zealand tabled for the Paris climate talks. Put aside the big question — is this a respectable contribution to an adequate global effort to combat climate change? No it is not. My question is rather what is the plan to achieve the responsibility target of emissions 11 per cent below 1990 levels? There are two elements to the plan: to buy carbon credits from the rest of the world and to resurrect a domestic emissions trading scheme which in recent years has been worse than useless.

New Zealand’s emissions are running more than 20 per cent above 1990 levels and rising, unconstrained by any effective policy to rein them in. Officials estimate that by 2030 gross emissions will be about half as large again as the Paris target. So while the target may fall far short of what scientists say is needed, it is still a stretch from the standpoint of where we are starting from and heading on current policy settings. Especially so as nearly half New Zealand’s emissions are methane or nitrous oxide arising from the bodily functions of livestock and we do not at this stage have any means of reducing them. So cutting total emissions by a third would mean reducing carbon dioxide emissions by two-thirds over the next fifteen years. This is not going to happen. Modelling by Infometrics concluded that at a carbon price of $50 a tonne about 80 per cent of the targeted reduction would have to be imported. That is fine in principle. The planet does not care where emission reductions occur or who pays for them. So New Zealand’s intended nationally determined commitment is conditional on ‘unrestricted access to global carbon markets’. And, though the language is veiled, the Paris Agreement does countenance international carbon trading.

Two lessons
But two lessons are clear from the unhappy experience of the trading mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol: it is essential to ensure the environmental integrity of the units traded, and to avoid a glut that sends carbon prices crashing. On the latter point, while any number of countries may be interested in participating on the supply side of a multilateral carbon market akin to Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism, it is not so clear where the demand would come from. Not from the European Union and not from the United States, both of which declared in
their intended nationally determined commitments that they do not intend to use international trading in meeting their commitments. Japan has its own system embodied in a string of bilateral agreements.

Indeed, of the G20 countries, which represent around 85 per cent of the global economy, only three — Canada, South Korea and Turkey — have indicated that they expect to be buyers in an international carbon market. That may not be enough support to ensure the development of the kind of credible and liquid multilateral carbon market New Zealand’s pledge is conditional on. And if not, where does that leave us?

So what about domestic action? What is the government’s plan there? It is to review the emissions trading scheme, get it out of the induced coma it has been in for the past three years anyway and hopefully render it fit for purpose. But the consultation document released in late November does not radiate any sense of urgency. It asks the right questions:

- Should protection for the emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sector (not including agriculture) be whittled down, after 2020? Should there be a price floor as well as a price cap?
- Should the government auction New Zealand units instead of, or as well as, just doling them out gratis?
- If the scheme is reopened to imported carbon what restrictions would be appropriate?

Get these things right and we might just have an emissions trading scheme that works properly — in time for the 20th anniversary of New Zealand ratifying Kyoto! Leader or laggard? Clearly the latter.

JAMES RENWICK

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in their fifth assessment report published in 2013–14. Recent data confirm that message, with 2015 coming in as the warmest year (in the global mean) by far in the instrumental record going back to the late 19th century. Yes, the big El Niño has helped, but the background temperature trend is upwards regardless of El Niño and La Niña. As the World Meteorological Organisation shows, El Niño years are becoming successively warmer, as are La Niña years.

Clear choices

The last IPCC report also demonstrated that we have some very clear choices to make about future climate change. Global warming can be reined in below 2°C with rapid and significant action, but unabated fossil fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions will see global mean temperatures rise by 4°C or more this century, taking us to a climate not seen for many millions of years. Because carbon dioxide has such a long lifetime in the atmosphere (a significant fraction of today’s emissions will still be in the air in hundreds to thousands of years), emissions accumulate. We have a budget of carbon emissions that we must not exceed if we are to keep warming below the 2°C limit. We are already two-thirds of the way through that budget and twenty more years of emissions at today’s rates will see the rest spent.

How will the world look after a couple of degrees of global warming? The Arctic will be more like 4–5 degrees warmer, with the likely loss of most sea ice in summer, and a large fraction of the seasonal snow pack on the northern continents. Rainfalls may decrease by over 10 per cent in sub-tropical regions, leading to much more frequent and severe droughts in many places. One such region is the Mediterranean, where drought, combined with armed conflict, has already fuelled unrest and forced migration. Such changes in rainfall (with similar magnitude increases in other regions) will be associated with crop failures, decreases in global food security and the potential for political instability and armed conflict.

It is important to remember that climate change will not stop at 2100, but may go on for many centuries into the future, depending on how much more carbon dioxide we put into the atmosphere. Our decisions over the next decade can determine the course the climate system takes for many lifetimes into the future. Unmitigated emissions will lead to an ice-free planet, while strong mitigation could keep global temperature rise below 2°C. No amount of climate change is ‘safe’ for everyone, but the smaller the magnitude of change, the lower the chance of truly catastrophic changes.
Brian Lynch reports on a seminar held in Wellington late last year to commemorate the world body’s significant anniversary.

A seminar to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations was held in Wellington on 20 November 2015. It was jointly hosted by the NZIIA’s National Office, the NZIIA’s Wellington branch and the UN Association of New Zealand (UNANZ). The half-day event attracted an audience of 140, including a pleasing number of young persons. Valuable sponsorship support was provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Defence, the New Zealand Defence Force and Victoria University of Wellington.

It was to be expected for this anniversary occasion that a substantial element of reflection and review would be involved. The first three of the programme’s four sessions provided a retrospective account of key aspects of New Zealand’s experience over the past seven decades in the multilateral environment, flowing on from its fledging days as a founding member ‘present at the creation’ in 1945 at the San Francisco Conference. The look backwards did not centre on the way issues have been handled at the UN head office in New York, where for 70 years political and security themes, threats to peace and often actual hostilities have dominated the agenda. It also took some notice of New Zealand’s involvement, frequently very ‘hands-on’, with the economic, social and trade work of the family of specialised agencies located in cities such as Geneva and Vienna.

The seminar’s fourth session provided a shift of emphasis. It introduced a ‘where to from here’ dimension from media and independent observer standpoints, and included a presentation with the enigmatic title ‘Will there be a 100th anniversary?’ In this final session it was fitting that the concluding address was given by the director of the Canberra-based United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), which was also a co-sponsor of the seminar.

The NZIIA and UNANZ have hosted many functions with a multilateral or specifically UN focus. There has been no precedent for the wealth of New Zealand experience and active engagement offered by the speakers and panellists assembled for this event. They included six previous New Zealand permanent representatives to the United Nations, in New York or Geneva, and others who had worked in New Zealand missions in those centres. They were joined by a former New Zealand member of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, by several long-standing members of the UNANZ, and a journalist.

**Notable feature**

While it was appropriate that the primary focus of the event was on the United Nations and its agencies, there was another notable feature of the occasion. It was taken as an opportunity to acknowledge the distinguished contributions of three special men: Tom Larkin, Merwyn (Merv) Norrish and Malcolm Templeton. Together they had formed part of the early generation of New Zealand diplomats. Their entire working lives had been dedicated, at increasingly senior levels, to the formulation and execution of an independent New Zealand foreign policy through formidably challenging years, not least in UN contexts.

Following a welcome from Sir Douglas Kidd, the NZIIA’s national president, the opening session of the seminar was chaired by UNANZ President Graham Hassall. In introductory remarks he presented the idea of ‘three UNs’. One being the United Nations of member countries and their representatives, the second being the United Nations of the international civil servants who work for the organisation rather than at it and a third being the world of civil society, which had grown immensely to represent community voices and participation with the United Nations. One such organisation in the New Zealand context is the UNANZ, which exists to promote the United Nation’s values to evaluate the effectiveness of its work and to explore perspectives concerning its future direction.

The theme of the first session was ‘New Zealand and the United Nations, the on-going dynamic and why it matters’. From different vantage points three former permanent representatives to the United Nations in New York addressed that topic. David McDowell had served in New York in the mid-1960s and been heavily involved, along with Frank Corner, when the momentum behind the decolonisation movement in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific had been at its peak. He returned as permanent representative from 1985–88, after being responsible at home for overseas development assistance and head of mission in Fiji and India. He cited qualified observers who described New Zealand’s contribution to the UN Charter provisions on decolonisation and the subsequent achievement by New Zealand non-self-governing territories of independence or self-government in free association with New Zealand as the country’s finest foreign policy accomplishments.

**Incomplete process**

McDowell observed that the decolonisation process in the South Pacific was still incomplete and regretted that impetus and commitment had waned. In this region of closest proximity and resonance to New Zealand, key milestones in the UN Millennium Development Goals had not been reached and most of New Zea-
land’s Pacific neighbours languished in the bottom half of the United Nation’s human development index. McDowell observed that hard tasks and tough decisions lay ahead, if regional governments hoped to promote economic sustainability and environmental survivability, especially in the area of climate change. Beyond the need for New Zealand to do much better in curbing greenhouse gas emissions, it was not too soon to be preparing plans for providing a haven in this country for Pacific Islands people already impacted on by sea level rises and more severe weather events.

Terence O’Brien was permanent representative from 1990 to 1993, which included time leading the delegation when New Zealand was on the Security Council. Prior to New York he had regional diplomatic experience in Asia, Europe and the Pacific, and after New York became the founding director of the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) at Victoria University of Wellington. O’Brien’s remarks to the seminar pursued a theme that has been prominent in his prolific writing and many public addresses in recent years. In brief, the manifold challenges faced by New Zealand in maintaining a credible independent profile and exerting serious influence in a rapidly changing regional and global environment.

O’Brien argued that New Zealand and other established powers had to accept that newly emergent economies must be given a greater role in the governance of multilateral agencies. He saw the G20 as no substitute for the broad-based institutional reform required. Of particular concern, global terrorism combined with massive refugee migration now posed a severe test for international co-operation; were the relevant multilateral bodies up to the task? In this volatile external setting skilful stewardship of New Zealand’s external relations was hugely important. There would be no greater measure of the sagacity of New Zealand’s statecraft than in effective management of the country’s bilateral linkages with China and the United States, which will have direct bearing on New Zealand’s positioning on key issues at the United Nations and related institutions.

Institutional failure
The failure of multilateral institutions to keep pace with shifts in the disposition of global power and population was also a theme in Michael Powles’s presentation. It drew upon his head of mission experience in China, Fiji and Indonesia and later as UN permanent representative from 1996 to 2001. His assessment was that the UN electoral system had become increasingly undemocratic and this weakened the organisation’s standing and influence. While there had been a significant increase in UN members, none of the new entrants had joined the ‘Western European and Others Group’ (WEOG), whose members as a result could look forward to more frequent election to UN organs like the Security Council. Clearly there were serious issues of imbalance and inequity to be resolved.

Reform of the UN electoral system would provide a context in which New Zealand could seek to resolve the dilemma it faced of a particular foreign policy ‘disjunction’. This was how to reconcile its membership since the mid-1960s of the WEOG for UN electoral purposes and its professed desire to be treated as an Asia–Pacific country intent on extracting advantage from closer political and economic integration in that now dominant region. Powles’s firm view was that New Zealand should actively promote a revised approach to UN regional electoral group membership that would enable it to move from the WEOG, where it was located only as ‘an accident of history’, to the Asia–Pacific group.

Session two of the seminar, chaired by NZIIA Executive Director Maty Nikkhou-O’Brien, featured the contribution of Sir Jim McLay. His period as UN permanent representative (2009–15) was the longest of any New Zealand diplomat serving in that top role. For McLay, the overwhelming preoccupation of his time in New York had been to manage at UN headquarters New Zealand’s bid to gain election to the Security Council as a non-permanent member in 2015–16. To that campaign he brought skills and experience acquired as deputy prime minister and a senior Cabinet minister. Why had the campaign been so important to New Zealand and how was success to be explained? He advanced two main reasons. First, Security Council membership was not merely a case of New Zealand ‘taking its turn’; while useful work could be done through the UN General Assembly, unarguably the council was the ‘high table’ for consideration of vexing international issues.

Second, it was essential that in its deliberations the council was informed by the input of a small state with a distinctive independent voice, and that was acutely conscious of the benefits it and others gained from a rules-based international system. McLay acknowledged that there was scope for reform of the cluster of UN institutions to better reflect modern-day international power realities. However, that process had to ensure that the place of small states and their ability to contribute and be listened to was protected.

Case studies
The seminar’s third session brought to centre-stage five case studies of significant UN activity over the past three decades where New Zealand could fairly claim to have provided leadership and influenced outcomes beyond the limits normally expected of a...
small player. Colin Keating was UN permanent representative from 1993 to 1996. He had succeeded Terence O’Brien and also led the New Zealand team during New Zealand’s 1993–94 term on the Security Council. His seminar remarks described the evolving role of the United Nations from an organisation focused primarily on issues of peace and security to a body with wider responsibilities in the fields of economic and social matters, decolonisation, human rights and environmental protection.

Keating discussed the performance of the Security Council over time and recalled the importance of New Zealand’s opposition in 1945 to the veto. During the Cold War the veto had often rendered the Security Council impotent and continued to undermine the council’s efforts to foster the peaceful settlement of disputes. Even after the Cold War, the national interests of permanent members almost always took precedence over what might have been seen as the common global good. A notable example during New Zealand’s term in the 1990s was the council’s failure, despite strong New Zealand advocacy, to intervene over the genocide in Rwanda. Keating told the seminar that the situation had become even more difficult at the present time, with current elected members like New Zealand facing increased challenges.

The address by Sir Kenneth Keith about the working of the International Court of Justice was enriched by his recent nine years of experience on the court. He recalled that the court’s predecessor agency had been set up in the early days of the League of Nations. There was decided reluctance at that time on the part of the New Zealand government to accept the concept of the old court having compulsory jurisdiction. Fortunately that attitude had altered by 1945, as had New Zealand’s approach to international organisations in general. It took time for the court to consolidate its position and even as late as the 1970s in a series of cases its role was disputed.

**Changed dynamics**

Keith said circumstances changed after the end of the Cold War, different political dynamics were in play, and the last fifteen years have been the court’s busiest. It had heard cases from all regions of the world and across a wide range of subject matter. In high profile cases the court has been successful in settling disputes that might otherwise have led to conflict. Therefore, it was curious that despite being one of the five principal organs of the United Nations and widely supported, with its judgments achieving nearly complete compliance, much of the constructive work of the court escapes public notice. For its part, in cases as disparate as nuclear tests, nuclear weapons and whaling, New Zealand has good reason to staunchly maintain its long-standing commitment to the court.

Bill Mansfield highlighted the importance and impact of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He brought to the topic his extensive experience of international maritime law and a five-year term as a member of the UN International Law Commission. While often taken for granted and assumed to have been in place forever, UNCLOS is in fact a relatively new piece of international law. It contributed greatly to international peace and security by settling many previously contested issues. Through the creation of the concept of the exclusive economic zone it bestowed huge benefits on New Zealand, which has one of the world’s largest exclusive economic zones.

But we need to remember New Zealand has obligations as well as rights in our zone and we must remain committed to UNCLOS as we grapple with current issues, such as the on-going decline in fish stocks. New Zealand’s sponsorship of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation and the recent announcement of the Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary are important examples of that commitment. The distinction of having been New Zealand’s permanent representative to the principal UN offices in both New York (2001–05) and Geneva (2006–08) is held to date by Don MacKay. He had a major role in the negotiation of several multilateral legal instruments and for this seminar chose to concentrate upon the demanding process that led finally to approval of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The convention was adopted in December 2006 and recognised as the first human rights convention of the 21st century.

Previously, while six core human rights treaties already existed there had been no specific convention to guarantee the rights of those suffering serious physical or mental disability. Work began on drafting such a convention in 2002, as a Latin American initiative. Slow progress led to formation of a special ‘expert working group’ chaired by New Zealand. The provisional text that emerged went in turn to an ad hoc committee, which duly founded, and New Zealand was again asked to assume leadership of the process. Under Don MacKay’s astute shepherding (not his personal claim) this led to a successful conclusion and acceptance of a final text. On the day of its adoption the convention had the highest number of signatories of any new UN treaty.

**Peacekeeping focus**

Lieutenant-General Tim Keating was appointed chief of New Zealand Defence Force in 2014, having risen steadily through the ranks in a military career spanning more than 30 years. His observations on New Zealand’s approach to and experience of UN peacekeeping was an excellent note on which to close the review of five practical case studies. Keating made the opening point that in the 21st century the biggest source of regional and local instability is conflict and its associated violence. Success, therefore, is represented by ‘stability’, but this is not easily achieved or lasting solutions found. Stabilisation missions are among the most challenging interventions to deliver, and increasingly there is an expectation that peacekeepers will when necessary step into harm’s way.

For that reason the New Zealand government closely monitors the rationale for its UN deployments when these are requested. From the United Nations’ perspective the proven professionalism of New Zealand peacekeepers is greatly appreciated. However, the NZDF is well aware that keeping the peace is not a job just for soldiers. It is necessary for the military to work collec-
tively with civil society in all its forms to protect sovereignty, ease human suffering and assure the systemic stability of the international order.

The final formal session was an eclectic mix. Tracy Watkins is the political editor for Fairfax Media and contributes a widely read weekly political column to the Fairfax newspapers, including Wellington’s DominionPost. She has covered many visits to UN headquarters in New York by New Zealand prime ministers; one was in 2004 when Prime Minister Helen Clark launched the ultimately successful bid for current Security Council non-permanent membership. Watkins was in New York twice in an observer capacity in 2015, including for a time in July during New Zealand’s month as president of the Security Council.

Watkins contrasted the preoccupations of diplomats, for whom things are never simply black and white and invariably nuanced, with those of journalists, whose behavioural patterns and subject preferences are driven by the urgency and immediacy required of news coverage. On-the-spot interviews with a variety of sources in New York had persuaded her that New Zealand’s voice was being heard and was an encouragement to other states in the same league that they, too, could make a difference. New Zealand was said to be breathing ‘some fresh life’ into the Security Council proceedings, but she was left with the impression that fundamental reform of that particular UN organ would be ‘a long time coming’.

Future prospects
Charlotte Darlow is unit manager of the United Nations, Human Rights and Commonwealth Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. In fifteen years as a career diplomat she has built a solid background in multilateral diplomacy, including work in all the major UN centres of New York, Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi. Her presentation under the heading ‘Will Ministerial Ambitions and the UN实现 Agenda 2030’ began with a quote from the Spectator in 1979: ‘The United Nations has been sufficiently impotent to survive 25 years, and now begins to look harmless enough to last another 50’.

There was a four-fold thrust to Darlow’s remarks. First, the UN system is not perfect and it inadequately reflects today’s international political realities; nevertheless, by virtue of its universality it fulfils a function that no other grouping of nations can equate.

Second, the United Nations and its agencies provide an unmatched setting within which present-day challenges can be addressed through old-fashioned face-to-face diplomacy, as illustrated by the Iran nuclear deal and negotiation of UN Agenda 2030. Third, the United Nations is only as good as its members allow it to be; increasingly inclusive practices (involving civil society, academia and private partnerships) are fostering innovative collaborations in areas such as cluster munitions and finding new ways to tackle the issues facing small island developing states. Fourth, while the practice of ‘one state, one vote’ may lead to some chaos and frustration, it can also be the pathway to building momentum and achieving results that might be considered impossible to accomplish by any other means.

There are very few New Zealand academics who could claim their careers would parallel the deep involvement Dr Roderic (Rod) Alley has had over many years in the analysis and portrayal of New Zealand foreign policy and external relations. The United Nations has been a major point of focus in his studies, so Dr Alley was well qualified to discuss the degree of progress made in the past decade and to assess where ‘the course of United Nations reform’ is headed. In respect of the Security Council regrettably there has been little forward movement against the weight of vested interest. So that critical organ in its size, composition, working methods and relationship with the General Assembly does not yet mirror new and emerging spheres of global power and influence.

No comfort could be drawn from Alley’s comment that the glacial pace of UN reform was in step with the multilateral system’s failings elsewhere, painfully exposed by the global financial crisis and by the challenge of balancing the interests of nation-state sovereignty with the need to combat the scourge of cross-border afflictions like climate change, people smuggling and resource depletion. To be fair, there had been measurable advances in parts of the UN architecture with better monitoring and expanded outreach and information-sharing with non-governmental and private sector interests. However, short of major reform the system risked a gradual but inexorable decline in its relevance.

Contrary opinion
A contrary opinion to that sombre conclusion was given by the following and final speaker in the programme. Christopher Woodthorpe is director of the UN Information Centre in Canberra with ‘outreach’ responsibility also as the secretary-general’s representative to New Zealand and several South Pacific countries. He noted that the 70th anniversary coincided with a number of important reviews of the functioning of the UN system that would help shape the future of global governance. There were as well major new initiatives to ensure that in their substantive activities the United Nations and its agencies remained ‘fit for purpose’. Here the recently agreed 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) was a prime example. Building on the Millennium Development Goals, the SDG offered an agenda that was ‘integrated, universal and transformative’, had at its core the challenge to eradicate poverty and embodied a commitment to ‘make sure no-one is left behind’.

The seminar closed with the gracious tribute that Neil Walter gave to Tom Larkin, Merv Norrish and Malcom Templeton. Himself a previous MFAT chief executive, Walter was well-placed to offer in simulated form a ‘performance review’ of his three former colleagues. It was not overdone but sufficiently comprehensive to leave the audience with a firm grasp of the signal achievements and influence.

The presentation was finely crafted, and enlivened by the compassion, humour and lightness of touch for which Walter is admired in all his professional and personal interaction. This was a moving note on which to draw the curtain on a memorable occasion.
With the Trans-Pacific Partnership signed (although far from ratified or in effect), the attention of trade officials and analysts is turning to the next ‘mega-PTA’ (large-scale preferential trade agreement): the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

Abbreviated TTIP, this negotiation between the European Union and the United States began quietly in July 2013 with leaders’ ambitious statements of intent, and was then delegated to officials to conduct feasibility studies, clarify positions, and assess offers. As at November 2015 they appear to be in a pause mode for several reasons, among them European preoccupation with the Greece and Euro crises, Britain’s possible exit, the rise of Eurosceptic parties and not least the wish of officials to study the lessons from the TPP before moving forward.

But moving forward is problematic, according to this academic survey, the first published book-length evaluation of the TTIP’s attractions, political obstacles and plausible consequences. Not only are unprecedented standards and scales of trade liberalisation on the table but also questions about the geo-political unity of ‘the West’ and the fragility of the European Union have emerged.

For free-traders the benefits are familiar: elimination of tariffs and quotas, lower compliance costs for traders and investors, dismantling of behind-the-border barriers, extension of national treatment to all participants, protection of real and intellectual property and wider consumer choice.

The costs are also familiar: the undermining of long-held EU protections of uncompetitive producers, workers and farmers, and threats to cherished national priorities and cultural icons.

The contributors also point out less visible costs, such as the erosion of member states’ influence over the European Commission bureaucrats, into whose hands the authority to negotiate with the United States will inevitably pass. Third World countries, principally former colonies of Britain and France, now enjoying privileges in the European Union may find themselves marginalised. From China’s and Russia’s points of view the coalescing of the world’s two biggest economies may appear to be a foreshadowing of ‘the West against the rest’ syndrome, provoking greater assertiveness by Beijing in East and South Asia and by Moscow in Eastern Europe, the Trans-Caucasus, and the Middle East. And the World Trade Organisation process itself may also become a casualty, bypassed in preference by selective regional preferential trade agreements.

The chapter by Hartmut Mayer is a case study in European ambivalence. Whereas Berlin’s leaders are committed to the TTIP negotiations, the German public are deeply sceptical, fearful not only of compromise by Eurocrats of the successful German social model but also of the imposition of standards decided by Washington. The revelation of US espionage on German leaders drove favourable opinion of the United States to a low of 38 per cent in 2014 and ‘President Obama and Chancellor Merkel had lost significant trust in one another’. The STOP TTIP movement has reportedly recruited 200 civil society groups.

Emotional backlash aside, the substantive doubts by Europeans are similar to those of the anti-TPP movement: too much protection for investors, banks and capitalists generally, too little health, environmental and privacy protection, not enough transparency and erosion of sovereignty under US pressure.

Nor are commercial leaders unified across the Atlantic. US agricultural and food industry leaders are wary of strict European technical regulations and standards, whereas European leaders are chary of US-style financial service regulations and investor protections.

The TPP experience has taught Europeans one political lesson already: secrecy jeopardises trust. The European Union in mid-2015 pledged maximum disclosure of negotiating positions. What this will mean in practice, and in detail, and whether the United States is comfortable with a European level of disclosure, is yet to become clear.

In sum, this book’s chapters, arising from a conference convened by the Institute for European Studies at the Free University of Brussels in October 2013, offer fifteen scholarly analyses of what promises to be the most extensive and complex trade liberalisation deal in history — if it can be concluded. They are a good place to start to understand what, if anything, might be accomplished by a TTIP agreement.
The cover of Jonathan Holslag’s latest book *China’s Coming War with Asia* depicts a doomsday clock ticking towards an unfortunate denouement for China’s rejuvenation. To justify his somewhat sensational choice of title, Holslag presents a well-researched and measured proposition—that notwithstanding all the economic, communication, multilateral and organisational links built up with it over recent decades, China’s drive to maximise its geo-political and economic security will eventually cause a large enough power shift to cause conflict in the region.

Holslag’s argument takes a structural approach, based upon the premise of the zero-sum security dilemma. He argues that China’s rise follows a normal trajectory—with all of the problems that other great powers have faced during their own ascendance. As such, China should be viewed in relative terms: against its own domestic situation and problems, as well as how it is performing with its neighbours and competitors. Moreover, it is the international environment that shapes China’s preferences and behaviour. Therefore, the United States (in a bid to retain its leading super-power position) is equally to blame for increasing tensions. Smaller countries are left with the predicament of which side to choose.

Various authors have been captivated by this enigmatic topic. For example, in *Collision Course: America and East Asia in the Past and the Future* (St Martin’s Press, 1996), Bryce Harland also examined similar themes: who would China’s neighbours and trade partners support in a regional fracas? Given their respective historical tendencies and traditional power arrangements, would they align with the United States or China? Or might they prefer to seek unity and strength amongst themselves instead?

Although twenty years have passed since Harland’s speculations, the same comundrum is strikingly pertinent today—given the increased tensions stirred up by China’s assertive maritime activity and buildup of military facilities in the South China Sea over the past few years. As reviewed in the July/August 2015 edition of this journal (vol 40, no 4), Bill Hayton, in *The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia* (Yale University Press, 2014), also considers war in the region a likelihood, but concludes that the high level of inter-dependency amongst the relevant actors may serve to restrain conflict. More importantly, it is how Beijing decides to enforce its claim over the ‘nine-dash line’ that will determine whether or not war is waged.

It is on this theme that Holslag makes a definitive assessment. He depicts China as an uncompromising revisionist power; its territorial claims as non-negotiable; and the outcome inevitably being violent. He refers to findings from numerous field visits and interviews, Chinese language media and policy documents, as well as a wealth of historical evidence. The first half of his book tracks China’s behaviour after 1949, charting and assessing the high and lows of its international relations in chronological fashion. Each chapter makes a thorough survey of the diplomatic, military, economic and trade issues throughout the region in the context of a larger super-power struggle between Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. The effect is to progressively build up convincing sets of examples to reinforce his argument.

Holslag begins by citing Mao’s Four Aspirations in a bid to seek power and primacy in Asia. This involved asserting party leadership and control over China’s populace, ensuring China’s sovereignty was recognised, securing control over its frontiers and reclaiming lost and disputed territories. Moreover, Holslag notes that revisionism (or at least undermining the dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union) was a common feature of Beijing’s foreign policy during that early period. At the same time, China was careful not to overtly appear a regional power—constantly denying having any hegemonic interest and instead claiming it stood for mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. This is a key point: that what is portrayed is not necessarily an indication of Beijing’s true objectives—true both then and now.

In line with other China watchers such as Alistair Ian Johnston, Holslag argues that although China may demonstrate an embrace and peaceful integration with the rest of the world, this is in no way a genuine change of its grand strategy. There are a socialised few within its diplomatic ranks, but not in the state itself. While China’s neighbours may seek to encourage it to participate in the global economy, Beijing remains very selective in its co-operative efforts.

In fact, Beijing fully expects its growth and power trajectory to clash with regional interests. Hence it aims to manage the situation by either shelving disputes or even postponing an inevitable war and instead slowly gain the upper hand through quiet but effective revisionism.

In the 21st century, China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ often comes into question. It can no longer keep a low profile. Employing attractive platforms of trade expectations, leveraging multilateral organisations and participating in increased dialogue, Beijing has successfully gained position and soothed tensions. China’s successful charm offensive of presenting itself as a lucrative market has allowed it to reorient trade flows through domination, volume and control of supply—thereby crushing those who are unable to develop their industries in order to compete, or leaving others to be stuck with exporting low value-added product. China has embarked on developing its own unique style of economic nationalism by shaping globalisation to its own requirements and advantage.

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unbending stance over the East and South China Sea territorial disputes, and suggests that primacy in Asia is actually the real goal — coming at the expense of its neighbours. This is revisionism using economic power politics, and reserving threat of military force as a last resort.

Beijing, however, feels that these are legitimate objectives. My own discussions with mainland officials lead me to concur with Holslag’s findings: that Chinese policy-makers and diplomats genuinely believe that China is working for the region by creating more economic opportunities and providing assistance. Critics must be mistaken or attempting to demonise it. China does not see itself to blame for regional tensions — rather it feels that it is the other powers that are raising the ante.

In his penultimate chapter headed ‘The Contest for the Pacific’, Holslag again uses a zero-sum assessment to analyse maritime and territorial contentions — employing comparative statistics about military hardware and capability, and how the Asian region is realigning. The focus is on China’s challenge to American influence — and not how Pacific nations may be reacting, as the title might suggest. This section of the book is all about hard power, and carries no mention of other forms of competition. For Holslag, the ‘contest’ is all about China’s quest for blue-water supremacy, and not seeking diplomatic support from islands nations, cheque-book diplomacy or soft power rivalry. Thus, for readers interested in the complexities of our own regional political situation, these pages are somewhat of a disappointment.

New Zealand is given brief mention for its role in ANZUS, and the economic windfall from its free trade agreement with China. While the latter example of a successful commercial relationship may appear positive for us, it simply reinforces Holslag’s very point — that Beijing is making small sacrifices while securing access to commodities and raw materials. Moreover, it will continue to diversify its options for managing tensions, while diffusing and dividing resistance in order to realise its strategic objectives. China will push to become a polar power to exploit more resources, and actively build up its arsenal for not only the Asia-Pacific theatre but also outer-space and cyber-space as well.

Holslag posits that in the face of these advances, China’s re-ascension — coupled with unbalanced trade relations and geo-political rivalry — will only further drive nationalistic tendencies throughout the region, and thereby ultimately result in war. In making this grim prediction, he does not offer any solutions or recommendations — only regretfully spelling out the certainty of this dire ending.

China’s Coming War with Asia highlights an undesirable prospect and details all of the warning signs; this is a first step in acknowledging the issues at hand, and that we still have much work to do in preventing such a tragedy. Upon final reflection, and despite all of his pessimistic assertions, Holslag does let slip some hints of optimism — by placing hope in China’s new generation of leaders to provide an alternative narrative; and having the clock on the cover page show plenty of time left for them to do so.

JAMES TO

A SPY’S SON: The True Story of the Highest Ranking CIA Officer Ever Convicted of Espionage and the Son He Trained to Spy for Russia

Author: Bryan Denson

The same things that motivate an individual to spy for their country can be the very things that motivate them to betray the same. Recruitment and running of intelligence agents versus counter-intelligence and the discovery of spies in our midst has fascinated, and repulsed, those both within and without the business for centuries. They present extremes — often the ultimate acts of bravery or treachery depending on, once again, from whichever viewpoint one sits.

In mid-1994, only two months after CIA counter-intelligence officer Aldrich Ames was sentenced to life in prison for betraying many of the most closely guarded secrets of US intelligence operations against the Soviet Union, another CIA operations officer, Harold James (‘Jim’) Nicholson, was offering his services to the recently emerged Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR): the newly renamed First Chief Directorate of the KGB.

A very good case officer, Nicholson had had a number of overseas postings and deployments during his career with the CIA. Much of his case work, as explained in the book, was focused on transnational threat issues, including counter-terrorism and organised crime, but one of his more recent postings at home was as a senior instructor at the CIA’s training facility in Virginia — colloquially known as ‘The Farm.’ It was here that Nicholson would be responsible for training the next generation of CIA case officers; he would know those who would be posted overseas in diplomatic roles, and he would know those being considered for ‘non-official cover’ (or NOC) roles. Nicholson would have, of course, known the Ames story and surmised that the Russians might ‘be in the market for another highly placed mole inside the CIA’. He might not have direct access to the ‘crown jewels’ in espionage parlance — how the Americans might have penetrated Russian intelligence — in the way that Ames and FBI mole Robert Hanssen would, but he would have the next best thing: the names of the next crop of American spies lining up to participate in ‘the Great Game’.

Fifteen years after Ames’s conviction, author Bryan Denson, an investigative reporter with the Oregonian, first came across Nicholson as he was about to be charged with espionage crimes for the second time. Nicholson’s youngest child, Nathan, was also in the courthouse that day. Thanks largely to the 20-year-old’s evidence, which would also see him convicted of similar offences, Nicholson senior would become not just the highest-ranking CIA officer ever convicted of espionage, but also the only US intelligence officer caught betraying his country on two separate occasions, and the only American discovered and convicted of engaging in
espionage activities with a foreign government from within the confines of an American federal prison.

The result of that chance encounter saw Denson spend the next five years investigating the circumstances that led to this extraordinary situation, and A Spy’s Son tells what he discovered. Denson would initially discover that Nicholson had first been sentenced to nearly 24 years for spying for the SVR in 1997. As with nearly all espionage or intelligence cases like this one, much of the story was in the public record, but a lot was not. It is believed that former KGB/SVR counter-intelligence officer — and CIA source — Alexander Zaporozhsky was responsible for pointing the Americans in the direction of Nicholson. ‘The Soviet spy was to the CIA what Nicholson was to the KGB/SVR and, as Denson suggests, ‘Jim and Zaporozhsky weren’t all that different. They climbed to the higher rungs of their nations’ respective spy services, and picked their nation’s pockets to sell secrets to their competitors.’

The author pieces the more familiar background together with a selection of first-hand accounts from sources close to both cases. Members of the family, including Nathan — who spent some 200 hours being interviewed — provide further depth of background and context which enables Denson to examine the intertwined layers of betrayal and treachery. He describes how Nicholson was able to manipulate his son, and exploit Nathan’s desperate and unconditional love and loyalty, in order to re-establish contact with the SVR. Nathan was soon his father’s enthusiastic agent, but in less than two years he had been arrested by the FBI. How he was discovered, why he confessed and what happened to both after they were convicted are described by Denson in a dispassionate, but genuinely sympathetic, narrative that places a more human face on what many will still regard, particularly after reading this book, as a most sordid profession.

The story of Jim Nicholson’s treachery is not particularly well-known, compared with those of other Cold War and post-Cold War traitors: Ames, Hanssen and the most famous ‘Harold’ of them all — Harold Adrian (‘Kim’) Philby. But what makes Nicholson’s act of betrayal all the more significant, and something that Denson draws out particularly well, is that his psychopathy seemingly knows no bounds. We ultimately see that Nicholson senior is of sufficient moral reprehensibility that he convinces his youngest son Nathan to do exactly the same. The quality of tradecraft demonstrated by Nicholson senior, impressive though it is, must stand to one side as the author weaves a sorry tail of destroyed ego, egomania, betrayal and self-aggrandisement of epic proportions; an individual described in the book as a ‘cunning, self-centred, self-righteous, and evil… master manipulator’.

A worthwhile addition to any intelligence studies enthusiast’s library.

RHYS BALL

CORRESPONDENCE

Sir,
I read your Review with great interest as it usually provides independent and thought-provoking coverage of world affairs. I was rather concerned by the article on Jeremy Corbyn by Rita Ricketts, however (vol 41, no 1). Whilst appreciating most of the article as providing an alternative view on Mr Corbyn’s election compared to most of the UK media I was dismayed to read her last paragraph, which was so obviously factually incorrect that it made me doubt the value to be placed on the rest of the review. Jeremy Corbyn set up the ‘Momentum’ group himself after becoming leader with the specific aim of promoting his own views within the Labour Party, which very definitely include an anti-austerity approach to the economy and which are definitely not for going along with Chancellor Osborne’s austerity programme!

He will have no difficulty whatsoever with Momentum, which is comprised mainly of Labour members outside of Parliament and supports him to the hilt! His difficulties are with many Labour MPs who disagree with his very radical views on most things. I do think this fundamental misunderstanding on Ms Ricketts’s part casts considerable doubt on the validity (or perhaps bias) in the rest of the article.

ROGER CORNELIUS
Shrewsbury, United Kingdom

Rita Ricketts responds: There is no misunderstanding; Corbyn’s Achilles Heel will indeed, as I argued, be the Parliamentary Labour Party. It is limbering-up: almost a third of Labour MPs (66 out of 232) defied him, voting with the government in favour of airstrikes against Islamic State militants. Members of ‘Momentum’, the successor to the ‘Jeremy Corbyn for Labour Leader’ campaign, but independent of the Labour Party’s leadership, will also hold Corbyn to account if he fails to heed Gandhi’s advice: to be the change you wish for! The electorate is fickle too; Michael Foot suffered humiliating defeat at their hands. Corbyn is between a rock and a hard place. Living up to expectations burdened David Lange, as indeed it does President Obama, the beleaguered left-wing Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and the Socialist President of France Francois Hollande. Seeming to promise too much is also being devilling Prime Minister David Cameron, in his bid to reform the European Union. Leaders only succeed while they keep their parliamentary colleagues happy. David Lange’s downfall was testament to this maxim, as was Margaret Thatcher’s; remember her verbal assassination by Geoffrey Howe in the House of Commons? Politicians, like states, have no eternal allies.

RHYS BALL
National Office and branch activities.

On 25 November Robert Wade, professor of political economy and development at the London School of Economics, addressed a meeting at VUW on ‘Western States and “Emerging States” in Global Governance: Multipolarity without Multilateralism?’

On 4 December a panel discussion was held at VUW on ‘New Zealand at Paris Climate Talks: Leader, Follower or… Laggard?’ NZIIA President Hon Sir Douglas Kidd chaired it, and the speakers were Dr Tim Naish, director of the VUW’s Antarctic Research Centre, Dr James Renwick, professor of physical geography, VUW, Catherine Leining, policy fellow, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, Brian Fallows, a former economics editor for the New Zealand Herald, and Paul Young, researcher and campaigner, Generation Zero. (Some of the presentations from this seminar can be found elsewhere in this issue.)

The NZIIA co-hosted a meeting with the New Zealand India Research Institute on 26 February. Dr Srinath Raghavan, a senior fellow at Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, spoke on ‘India’s Long Rise as an Asian Power: The Second World War and After’.

Auckland

On 3 December Zbigniew Gniatkowski (Polish ambassador to New Zealand) addressed the branch on ‘Poland’s Present: From Communism to Democratic Prosperity to European Crises’.

Christchurch

On 26 November Brian Lockstone (a writer on aviation and military history with a particular interest in the Western Front) addressed the branch on ‘New Zealand and the Western Front, 1916–19’.

The branch AGM was held on 11 February. The following officers were elected:

Chair — Chris Jones
Secretary — Sally Carlton
Treasurer and Vice Chair — Margaret Sweet
Committee — Hon Peter Penlington, Angela Woodward, John Richardson, Becci Louise

Following the AGM, Rosemary Banks, the recently retired New Zealand ambassador to France, Portugal and Senegal and former deputy secretary of foreign affairs, spoke on ‘An Eye, an Ear and a Voice: Reflections from 40 Years of Diplomacy’.

Waikato

The branch was saddened by the passing of stalwart member Jim Holdom in December. The following meetings were held:

9 Dec Dr Colin Robinson (specialist in post-conflict army reconstruction and defence reform), ‘Somalia: A Better Way Forward’

10 Dec Lyndon Burford (Auckland University PhD candidate and an official adviser on the New Zealand delegation to the five-yearly Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at UN Headquarters in New York in April–May 2015), ‘New Zealand National Identity and Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy’. This meeting was held in conjunction with the University of Waikato’s Political Science and Public Policy Programme.

CORRECTION

In the last issue (vol 41, no 1, p.16) the person in the photograph captioned ‘Jean-Bernard Raimond’ was in fact the former French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur.
OBITUARY

Harold Huyton (‘Tim’) Francis

1 May 1928–2 January 2016

Public coverage of the death of Harold Huyton Francis, known as ‘Tim’, aged 87, has celebrated his distinguished diplomatic career. Early postings took him to London and Washington. He was high commissioner to Singapore (1970–73), permanent representative at the United Nations (1978–82) and ambassador to the United States (1988–92). Born in England, Tim came to New Zealand at the age of two with his solo mother. Against the odds, she must have nurtured his love of literature and learning. Emerging as a promising scholar, he refused a PhD place at Oxford University and joined New Zealand’s Department of External Affairs in 1954.

Tim Francis, reared by a generation of great foreign policy operators, such as Carl Berendsen, Frank Corner and Alister McIntosh, was an adherent of the old-fashioned tradition of anonymity. It was in his nature to be self-effacing and to eschew the limelight. Although skilled in the art of the possible, he was not a man to be thwarted, even when facing the American government. We can see the background to this. He had been versed in the United States/New Zealand relationship by McIntosh, who, after the blockade of Berlin in 1948–49, conceded that New Zealand had to be at one with Western democracies standing up to Soviet Union. McIntosh reluctantly accepted the need for the ANZUS treaty (1951), later growing to acknowledge its importance.

In 1965, probably against his inclination, McIntosh advised Prime Minister Keith Holyoake — who was himself against participation — to ‘deploy a token combat force’ to assist the Americans in Vietnam, largely on the grounds that not to do so would jeopardise the ANZUS alliance.1 As one of the doves in the department, Tim Francis warned against deployment. There appear to be no official records to support this, but his former boss Tom Larkin remembers Francis’s finely penned drafts, full of ‘clarity, candour, wit and grace’, pressing non-intervention.2 Although New Zealand in the end agreed to limited participation, the mould was broken.3 After Vietnam, there was no longer consensus in New Zealand that America had to be followed come hell or high water.

When the rift came with the United States over the anti-nuclear legislation (passed in 1987), denying access for nuclear powered or armed war ships, Tim Francis was well prepared to go into bat for New Zealand. At his funeral, a eulogy, written by former Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, honoured him for the crucial role he played in finding a way through with the United States during and after the passing of the nuclear free legislation. But for Tom Larkin, ‘such tribute did not begin to reveal the extent of his multi-dimensional character’.4 Tim’s knowledge of New Zealand’s literature and arts alone made him a Francis Bacon ‘full man’; or, as he became, a New Zealand ‘full man’. His appointment as administrator of Tokelau (1984–88) had fitted with his belief in New Zealand’s Pacific destiny.5 But at the same time, he strove to draw attention to New Zealand’s unique heritage and culture, far beyond its backyard.6 This pursuit of foreign policy by a different, subtler, means had no use for a megaphone. New Zealand’s distinctiveness could be demonstrated, visibly, in literature, music and fine art.

Underlying everything Tim Frances did, according to Tom Larkin, was ‘his deep religious faith, which no doubt helped him to hold to his convictions, not bend in the wind as successive political masters came and went’. Circumspect, steadfast and dedicated to New Zealand, he fought hard to change elements of policy he felt were wrong. But once a policy had been adopted, even if it still offended him, he was scrupulous in obeying instructions to proclaim and implement it. Fittingly, Larkin recalled the parable of the talents: ‘Well-done, good and faithful servant. You were faithful with a few things; I will put you in charge of many things’.

Rita Ricketts

NOTES

2. Oral interviews by Rita Ricketts with Tim Francis, Chris Beeby and, recently, Tom Larkin.
3. See, for example, Roberto Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War (Auckland, 1993).
4. Larkin has said much the same about Berendsen; perhaps its because the audience for what goes on in the background is so small?
5. See, for example, the way Francis reordered New Zealand’s foreign policy focus, in favour of the South Pacific, in NZ Foreign Affairs Review, vol 38, no 2 (1988), pp.27–31.
6. This was a line brewing in from the early days when foreign affairs were part of the Prime Minister’s Department.
The family of the New Zealand Customs Service were shocked and saddened by the sudden loss of trade specialist, Roger Weston, aged 61. Roger started with Customs on 4 December 1972 and made an enormous contribution over his more than 40 years’ service.

Roger's funeral service was held on 26 November 2015 at the Greek Orthodox Church in Wellington. The following tributes are extracts from the eulogies and include messages from Roger's Customs and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) colleagues, as well as his counterparts from other countries.

Roger was a Customs expert in international trade issues ranging from matters of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Customs Organisation and Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation. His intricate knowledge of technical subjects such as the tariff, valuation, rules of origin, non-tariff measures, customs legislation and international best practices and standards was immeasurable. This included a substantial contribution to forming New Zealand’s negotiating position on the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation concluded in 2013.

Over the last decade or so, Roger has been providing Customs input to the negotiation of free trade agreements. This has included negotiations with Singapore, China, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership involving seventeen other countries. This was tiring and demanding work that involved many trips abroad and much time away from his family. Roger was a fine ambassador for New Zealand on each of these occasions.

Officials at Customs and other agencies relied on Roger extensively for technical input on trade policy issues. His personal charisma ensured that working relationships with our negotiating partners were maintained even in the most difficult circumstances. There is no doubt that officials on the other side of the negotiating table recognised his conscientious and fair minded character, and responded to his positive approach.

To his MFAT colleagues, Roger was the complete professional and regarded as part of the MFAT family. Roger’s recent contribution to the achievement of New Zealand’s trade targets under the WTO environmental goods agreement and the successful delivery of key global trade initiatives were significant advancements.

Roger’s negotiation of customs and origin rules made a genuine difference, not just for New Zealand Customs, and brought real economic benefits to New Zealand. He served New Zealand’s trade interests honourably and leaves a lasting legacy. Personally, he was a gentleman of the highest order and will be deeply missed. His passing is a loss not only to Customs but also to the international trade community.

Carolyn Tremain
Chief Executive
New Zealand Customs Service
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