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2 Defence: striking the right balance
Gerry Brownlee discusses the New Zealand defence white paper to be produced this year.

4 Facing East Asia’s complexities without a grand vision
Stuart McMillan discusses how East Asia’s great powers relate to one another.

9 Takeshima and the Northern Territories in Japan’s nationalism
Alexander Bukh comments on the dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks.

11 The Otago Foreign Policy School turns 50
Ken Ross recounts early memories and high points in the school’s history.

15 How jihadists think and act
Karim Pourhamzavi discusses Wahhabism as an ideology and tactic in the mid-18th century and present-day Syria and Iraq.

19 Under construction
Brian Easton looks at the state of the European Union in light of his observations during a recent visit.

21 Towards a deeper partnership
Balaji Chandramohan discusses US grand strategy in the Asia–Pacific region and the convergence of US and Indian interests.

25 CONFERENCE REPORTS
China and the Pacific: the view from Oceania
Michael Powles reports on a ground-breaking conference in Samoa.

Antarctica and the Arctic
Peter Kennedy reports on a recent NZIIA symposium.

30 BOOKS
Douglas Newton: Hell-bent: Australia’s leap into the Great War (Ian McGibbon).

32 INSTITUTE NOTES

33 OBITUARY
Professor Gordon Stewart Orr.
Defence: striking the right balance

Gerry Brownlee discusses the New Zealand defence white paper to be produced this year.

This year we mark the centenary of the Gallipoli campaign. While we pay tribute to the men and women who served New Zealand then, we should also remember those current members of the New Zealand Defence Force who draw on their internationally recognised professionalism and expertise to serve New Zealand and her interests today.

In the years since the government last updated its defence policy through the defence white paper 2010, the Defence Force’s utility has been ably demonstrated in the array of tasks it has undertaken. For example, it has been involved in a complex counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, including combat to ensure the security of the wider development and reconstruction mission in that country, and contributed to international missions to maintain stability and peace, as it does in the Sinai, Korea and fractious parts of the Middle East. The Defence Force has provided training to other militaries, lifting the skills and professionalism of the armed forces it comes into contact with, especially those in the Pacific. It will shortly do the same in Iraq.

Meanwhile, it has continued to deliver in and around New Zealand protecting our maritime resources with surveillance flights and ocean patrols, and been a vital cog in New Zealand’s commitment to Antarctic research. The Defence Force has also been called upon to respond to natural and environmental disasters on New Zealand like the Christchurch Earthquake, the grounding of the MV Rena and subsequent oil spill off the coast of Tauranga and numerous calamities in the Pacific ranging from the Pacific tsunami to the recent Cyclone Pam that tore through Vanuatu and other islands.

However, we recognise that changes in the global strategic environment have occurred in the last five years. It is critical that we understand the implications of these changes if the Defence Force is going to have the right mix of people, training, equipment and infrastructure to continue performing the array of roles and tasks New Zealanders expect of it.

Primary objective

Before examining what has changed for us, let us look first at what has not. The primary objective for the New Zealand Defence Force continues to be the preparation and availability of a credible and effective armed force, capable of serving the government’s defence and national security policy objectives. The security horizon is always characterised by high levels of uncertainty.

Having a Defence Force that is well-equipped, well-trained and well-motivated, capable of undertaking a range of tasks independently or in combination with other security partners and capable of contributing to the realisation of New Zealand’s foreign policy and security objectives gives the government greater degrees of freedom as to how to respond, or whether to respond at all, to security challenges, be they close to home or further afield.

Our more ‘traditional’ security responsibilities remain constant. Thus, the protection of our sovereign territory and our constitutional obligations to our Pacific Islands neighbours remain the highest priority for defence. If anything, these responsibilities are becoming more pressing than ever, given increasing regional pressures associated with frequent natural disasters, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and transnational organised crime.

Our alliance with Australia remains steadfast. We watch with interest as Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, where New Zealand has recognised and longstanding interests, become increasingly attractive to a myriad of other states due to their potentially rich resources.

Growing inter-connectedness

While New Zealand’s defence priorities remain focused on our immediate region, we also acknowledge New Zealand’s increasing inter-connectedness with the rest of the world. The growing military and economic significance of certain regions means our fortunes are increasingly tied to those of states well beyond our shores. To take one example, by 2030 Asia is expected to have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power based on gross domestic product, population size, military spending and technological investment. We continue to benefit from the economic opportunities presented by this growth — but, as a nation dependent upon the export of goods, we are also vulnerable to any possible conflict in the region. What might the consequences for New Zealand be were a serious disruption to the flow of trade in the region occur?

The notion that our geographic isolation somehow offers a form of protection from external threats is an attractive one, but it is one that is quickly becoming a fiction on which we can no longer afford to rely.

Recent major security events, while they may have occurred much further afield, have the potential to impact New Zealanders here at home. Our national identity is firmly grounded in the Western liberal traditions of democracy, human rights and state sovereignty. This has, for quite some time now, placed us squarely and visibly alongside a number of other countries who share, or are sympathetic, to these values. This may well also make us a

Hon Gerry Brownlee MP is the minister of defence.

The global strategic environment has changed in important ways in the five years since the last defence white paper in 2010. New Zealand must understand and adapt to these realities if we are to advance our security and prosperity. Our immediate region remains the highest priority for defence. However, events that occur much further afield increasingly have the potential to impact New Zealanders and New Zealand interests. While our security interests may have broadened, defence resources are not limitless. Work as part of this year’s defence white paper will need to ensure we continue to strike the right balance between defence policy, military capability and funding.
target to those who disagree with these shared values.

**Immediate decisions**

While we must seek to understand the often complex nature and causes of these issues, and to incorporate this into our longer-term thinking, this does not alter the need to make much more immediate decisions about how and to what extent New Zealand ought to respond in the ‘here and now’.

This year, the government has already had to make some tough decisions in light of this reality, with the deployment to Iraq of a ‘building partner capacity’ contingent to join the international coalition.

Technology, too, presents both challenges and opportunities. We know, for example, that technologies like the internet and social media are being increasingly used by states, terrorists and criminals to further their particular ends. Even the seemingly benign social media is proving to be a useful tool for propagating narratives about an adversary or, worse still, amplifying the reach of terror, through recruitment, fund-raising and enabling those with malign intentions to share ideas and techniques.

In the face of challenges to state sovereignty and individual rights by a range of state and non-state groups with various means at their disposal, New Zealanders need to ask themselves how much we value the existing rules-based system — and, based on this, what role we should play in defending it? To what lengths are we prepared to go and under what circumstances? Where should measures such as diplomacy, aid and longer-term support end and military intervention begin?

New Zealand’s security interests, then, have broadened in recent years, as the rules-based international order from which we benefit comes under increasing pressure. At the same time, the fact remains that our defence and security resources are not limitless, so it is critical we maintain the right balance between policy, capability and funding.

**New assessment**

For these reasons, it is now time to run a ruler over our defence policy settings, and to consider what changes in the global strategic environment might mean for our Defence Force. And, given all of this, what military capabilities — in the broadest meaning of the term, people, training, technology and platforms — should New Zealand be investing in to deliver the armed force that New Zealand requires.

These are not easy questions to answer. Nor are they ones that the government should seek to answer on its own. What is clear is that whatever the answers are, they will have very real implications not just for New Zealand’s defence and security sector but for all New Zealanders.

The government is now developing its next defence white paper which will provide direction on future capability development and investment in defence in light of changes in the strategic environment. But before any decisions are made there needs to be a wider conversation — not just with Defence Force personnel, subject area experts and industry professionals, but also with our communities. I urge New Zealanders to take the opportunity to participate in the public consultation process leading up to the next defence white paper, and help shape the outcome of this important conversation.

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**DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2015**

**Have Your Say**

The New Zealand Government wants your views on the future security challenges facing the nation, the appropriate roles for our armed forces, the capabilities that are most likely to be required to fulfil these; and the environments in which they will be most likely to carry them out.

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New Zealand Government
Facing East Asia’s complexities without a grand vision

Stuart McMillan discusses how East Asia’s great powers relate to one another.

Relations between China, Russia and Japan have the capacity to affect the relationship between China and the United States on which peace in East Asia and the whole of the Pacific depends. This article concentrates on recent developments between China, Russia and Japan and weighs how these developments affect the US–China relationship.

The relationships interlock but for the purposes of clarity I will deal with each pair of countries separately.

Huge potential

Aspects of the relationship between China and Russia have a huge potential to reshape the region.

Xi Jinping’s first foreign visit was to Russia, and President Vladimir Putin has since visited China. Xi Jinping has made many overseas visits since becoming president, but the choice of Russia for his first has considerable significance for energy supplies, defence and strategic reasons.

China wanted access to Siberian energy resources, motivated by its own huge appetite for energy, by its desire to lessen its dependence on other suppliers and by its desire to lessen dependence on its existing supply routes. A second agreement between China and Russia, under which Russia agreed to supply 30 billion cubic metres of gas a year for a 30-year period was signed last November after one had been signed earlier in that year. These moves were in addition to the supply of oil to China by Rosneft, a Russian oil company.

China also wanted to buy the latest Russian surface-to-air missile, the S-400, and a fighter plane. No deals on those have yet been reported. China has an earlier model of the missile.

A further reason for Xi Jinping’s visit was probably that China is concentrating its maritime and other military resources in the South China Sea and it was prudent to make an assessment of the stability of its border with Russia.

Russia also provided China with opportunities in the Arctic. A number of Western firms were withdrawing from Arctic exploration and mining partly to observe their governments’ sanctions on Russia. China was ready to take their place. It has become an observer to the Arctic Council, the body of littoral states that co-operates over Arctic matters. The relationship between China and Russia over the Arctic is, however, not without its tensions. Russia watches China’s vigour in Arctic activity warily.

Political settlement

Xi Jinping stands for resolving the Ukraine crisis through political means. China respects Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, but China did not impose sanctions on Russia because of Ukraine. In fact after Russia refused to buy pork from Smithfield, an American firm, in retaliation to the sanctions, China sold pork to Russia. To replace the pork on the Chinese market, China imported from Smithfield. No doubt this arrangement will tempt someone to write an essay titled ‘The Satisfying Symmetry of Sanctions’.

Russia’s relationship with China is more dictated by external pressures than China’s with Russia. In the period since sanctions were imposed on Russia because of its activities in Ukraine, Russia has followed a distinct ‘look east’ policy. Although Western sanctions did not apply to Russia’s exports of gas to Europe, Russia has sought to increase its exports of energy to Asian countries, particularly to China and Japan. Overall China is Russia’s second largest export market and its largest supplier of imports.

Late in January China and Russia announced a plan to build a high-speed rail link between Beijing and Moscow. The cost is estimated to be $US242 billion. Russia worries about the number of Chinese on the Russian side of the Amur River, which marks part of the border between the two countries. Russia has recently announced a policy of giving land to settlers in Siberia, which looks like an attempt to encourage more Russians to populate Siberia.

Russia and China share an interest in limiting US involve-
ment in the region. They are both members of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation and of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia, which both exclude the United States. Russia is also a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, an ambitious project meant to rival the European Union but which has a long way to go before it becomes seriously influential.

**Military exercises**

China and Russia plan a number of military exercises together, including a maritime one in the Mediterranean this year — an event unlikely to escape notice in Europe and elsewhere.

Sergei Shoigu, the Russian defence minister, has said that Russia and China are intent on forming a collective regional security system. A formal collective defence alliance between China and Russia would have far-reaching significance for the whole region and for US–China and US–Russia relations, but it has not come to that yet. I take up that point later.

There is rivalry between Russia and China for influence within the central Asia states. Both will watch these states carefully because of the possibility of instability. A number of these countries have proved to be recruiting grounds for ISIS.

During September of last year China dispatched 12,000 troops to the border with Russia — a move for which no explanation was offered. It may have been related to Russia conducting nuclear exercises close to the border.

**Immediate threat**

The relationship between Japan and China represents the most immediate threat of militarised conflict whether by deliberate actions, by accident or by miscalculation. The two countries’ disputes are over territory, over history and over competition, and are exacerbated by feelings of nationalism.

The Senkakus, a group of islands known in China as Diaoyu, are controlled by Japan and claimed by China and Taiwan. Japan has extracted an undertaking from the United States that they are covered by the 1951 Security Treaty between the United States and Japan. The dispute came to a head after the Japanese government formally took over the islands in 2012, pre-empting a move by the governor of Tokyo to buy the islands from a private owner. The Japanese government of the time acted in what it thought was good faith because it expected that the Tokyo governor would try to provoke China by building on or peopling the islands. It hoped that the government action would prevent such provocation.

China did not see the Japanese government action in this way and there were complaints from Beijing and anti-Japanese riots in China. In November 2013, China declared an East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone over the islands, which requires all aircraft to file a flight plan and seek permission to enter the zone. It is believed that there are oil reserves in the region. The sovereignty issue is still a major issue between the two countries, and there have been numerous maritime confrontations, including of military craft, between China and Japan. An agreement about the islands was reached between Japan and China late last year. It did not resolve the issue but took some of the heat out of it and indicated that neither Japan nor China wanted the dispute to be a cause of war. During March China talked about a further mechanism to avert maritime clashes, linking it to what it considered Japan’s good behaviour.

**Major concern**

The close relationship between Japan and the United States is a cause of major concern to China, which wants the US presence in the region reduced. The 1954 Mutual Assistance Security Treaty between the United States and Japan actually ensures a major US presence in the region. About 46,000 US troops, 52,000 dependants and 5500 civilian Department of Defense people are stationed in Japan, scattered around 91 facilities. Some of their equipment, including surveillance drones, are intended for use against China and North Korea. Thus Japan is a major barrier to the remaking of East Asia as China would like it.

In the last nine months of 2014 Japan’s Self-Defense Air Force reported that its fighters scrambled 744 times to counter Chinese aircraft in the south and Russian bombers in the north. About half of the scrambling was to counter Chinese aircraft. Depending on what happens in the three months to the end of March, the number of times the aircraft have scrambled might match those of a year at the height of the Cold War. Halfway through January Japan approved a record $US42 billion military budget aimed primarily at countering China’s rise.

The immediate recent cause of the revival of the historical dispute between China and Japan was the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, in December 2013, a year after he had been elected as prime minister. The shrine is said to house the souls of Japanese who died in wars,
but fourteen class A war criminals are among those honoured there. Visits to the shrine by senior members of the Japanese government are interpreted by some of Japan’s neighbours as demonstrating that Japan has not repented for the crimes it committed in various wars. Abe’s visit was condemned by a number of countries, none more virulently than China and none more bitterly than South Korea. It even provoked the United States to express disappointment. The US government’s reaction shocked the Japanese government. Washington was very concerned about the strong reaction from South Korea.

**Constitutional reinterpretation**

The shrine visit was accompanied by a series of other moves by the Japanese government, including a reinterpretation and possible revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the so-called pacifist clause. Other moves include:

- A state secrets law severely limiting what may be reported.
- A review of a 1993 statement about Japan having forced women into sex slavery; in the end the statement was not altered.
- The establishment of a National Security Council based on the United States’ NSA.
- The appointment of a head of NHK, the public broadcaster, of decidedly conservative disposition; he sought to limit any public criticism of the government.
- The appointment of a very conservative historian to revise textbooks.
- The lessening of civilian control over the Self-Defense Forces. Abe is expected during 2015 to make a statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Just what will be said at that time is awaited with interest. Emperor Akihito, in what was clearly a rebuke to the revisionists, said that Japan should reflect on the lessons from the war and the Manchurian Incident of 1931. Emperor Akihito has continued his father’s practice of not visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. His anti-war message and exhortation to learn from history will have considerable influence, but it will be Abe’s responses that will grab the most attention.

In December last year Xi Jinping said that 300,000 Chinese died in the Nanking Massacre, a 1937 event. Japan rebuked Xi Jinping. Japan generally does not deny that a massacre occurred but would place the death toll closer to 20,000 to 40,000. The Nanking massacre figures have long been one of the historical points of dispute between China and Japan. Abe plans to consolidate his defence agenda in ten bills to be introduced in 2015.

The antagonism between the two countries meant that there was little consultation between the diplomatic officials. In November last year China was host to the APEC meeting and Xi could hardly avoid a meeting with Abe, but it was a distinctly glum encounter without any convincing signs of reconciliation.

**Unsurprising competition**

It is not surprising that there is competition between Japan and China. For one thing, despite some years of economic stagnation, Japan was used to being the major economy in East Asia. It has been overtaken by China. That takes some getting used to. Secondly, Japan wants continued and increased presence of the United States in East Asia. China wants to limit the US presence. Even without the territorial dispute and the differing historical narratives, these constitute roots for rivalry. Is there another factor at play here? Is there a hierarchical competition in which one country has to be recognised as top dog in the region? That possibility would certainly complicate a long-term settlement of the relationship.

Nationalism in China and Japan takes rather different forms but the effects are not dissimilar. Both Xi and Abe are nationalistic leaders. China is on a path of righting wrongs it sees as having been imposed in the past, of ensuring that China will not again be in the position of being dictated to by other powers, of ensuring that the world order is one in which China has a prominent place and of insisting on territorial claims.

Abe was elected in 2012 mainly on an economic programme and in the early election conducted in 2014 the main emphasis was also economics, in a programme labelled Abenomics. He has pursued a security and revisionist agenda in parallel to the economic agenda. Based on his background, it is certain that he would have pursued the security and revisionist agenda irrespective of the regional circumstances but a more assertive China has been one justification. Abe used the sickening beheading of a Japanese journalist, Kenji Goto, by ISIS to reinforce his defence agenda.

One of the effects of the nationalistic sentiments is that Chinese and Japanese hold unfavourable views of one another’s country. The survey was conducted by a Japanese think-tank Genron NPO and the China Daily. It found that 92.8 per cent of Chinese respondents held unfavourable views of Japan and 90.1 per cent of Japanese respondents held an unfavourable view of China. The figures in the 2013 survey were higher than in the previous nine years.

**Nationalist agendas**

Abe and Xi are both activists in the pursuit of their nationalistic agendas. There is still some uncertainty about where Xi is going to draw his boundaries, territorial, security and diplomatic. Abe appears to have been consistent for a long time in his beliefs and views of Japan’s security and its past. There is no way in which China will accept a Japan espousing some of the views advanced by Abe and his supporters. China plans to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War with a military parade which may be attended by Vladimir Putin, the Russian president. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s explanation of this event emphasises that it is peaceful and intended to uphold the victory of the Second World War and the post-war international order. The People’s Daily, however, says that ‘Japan is going to take the....
further steps toward amending its pacifist constitution and push- ing toward national normalization’. The article goes on to argue that the only way to stop this ‘insane attempt’ is for China to show its own military might and demonstrate its determination not to allow Japan to change the post-war order.1

Japan has every right to defend its own territory and popula- tion. United States over-stretching of its resources because of its preoccupations in the Middle East reinforce legitimate strategic and security concerns in Japan. What is unfortunate is Abe’s championing of revisionist attitudes in his country. Since the Second World War Japan has been a generous contributor to de- velopment in Asia and a significant force for peace. Some of this is acknowledged, some not. The revisionist agenda arouses old fears and undermines and diverts attention from a heartening and valuable period of Japan’s history.

Russo-Japanese relations
Abe and Putin met eight times from the end of 2012 when Abe was elected until the end of 2014. Putin is expected to visit Japan during 2015. Abe visited Moscow, the first Japanese prime minister to do so for ten years. There was a break in their meetings after Japan imposed sanctions on Russia over Ukraine, but their meet- ings resumed. Japan obviously felt obliged to impose sanctions because the United States and Europe had done so. In fact, Japan’s sanctions were not particularly onerous. Japan restricted weapons sales to Russia and forbade Russian banks from issuing securities in Japan. Russia criticised Japan because of its sanctions and said that Japan should have a more independent foreign policy.

Abe attended the opening ceremony of the winter Olympic Games at Sochi, an occasion boycotted by a number of West- ern leaders, including Barack Obama, because of the restrictions Putin placed on homosexuals. Abe was particularly favoured by Putin at Sochi.

A focus on Japan was part of Putin’s ‘look east’ policy. Russia has pursued Japan as a potential customer for gas and LNG, Japan has greater need of energy fuels since the closing of its nuclear generation plants after the Fukushima disaster. Abe wants to get the nuclear generators going again but faces domestic opposition on safety grounds. There is some co-operation between Japanese and Russian energy companies but no sales on the scale of those between Russia and China have been concluded. Besides the income from the sales, Putin is glad to have Japan take a role in developing Siberian resources, partly to balance the prominent role taken by China.

Some commentators have discerned rivalry between China and Japan over courting Russia’s favour. I would not dismiss this but think it lies within some clearly defined fields. For one thing, Japan would obviously not want Russia to take China’s side over the Senkakus. For another, Japan is probably also motivated by that ancient strategic principle ‘My neighbour is my enemy. My neighbour’s neighbour is my friend.’

Annoying presence
Japan’s hosting of the extensive American presence and base in Okinawa annoys Russia and probably provokes some of Russia’s threatening gestures towards Japan mentioned above. The other obvious point of dissent is that Japan would clearly not share Russia’s aim of limiting United States influence in the region.

A further Japanese motive may have been that the country’s relations with South Korea as well as with China had deterio- rated. On the general principle of taking your friends where you can find them, Japan may have looked to Russia. (Taiwan is one country friendly to Japan despite having once been under Japa- nese occupation.)

Russia and Japan have a territorial dispute which not only has lasted since the end of the Second World War but which has stopped them signing a peace agreement ending hostilities be- tween them. Russia seized four islands in the Southern Kuriles at the end of the war and has since refused to return them to Japan. Japan refers to them as its Northern Territories. Russia has offered to return two, but Japan has turned that down. One of Russia’s strategic fears is that the islands may have a role in monitoring or even restricting passage for Russia’s surface navy and nuclear submarines. Abe clearly hopes that Putin’s visit to Japan in the middle of this year will include the return of all of the islands. What makes him believe that is difficult to fathom. Putin has given no hint that he has that in mind or that he is in any mood to give away territory.

Alliance possibility
Before turning to how the relationships between and among China, Russia and Japan might affect the US–China relation- ship it is worth considering whether the warming of the China– Russia relationship represents a move towards a formal security
alliance. I am arguing that it does not.

First, there is no common enemy despite some rhetoric from Russia about the United States serving that role. Secondly, China is pursuing its own policies in East and South-east Asia in which it sees no role for Russia. Thirdly, China needs its own relationships with Europe and the United States. It would not serve China’s interests to carry Russia’s baggage with it as it pursued these relationships. Fourthly, Russia is in a large part a European country, which China is not. Fifthly, Russia has a long and close relationship with India, a country with which China has an antagonistic relationship and territorial disputes.

A less dramatic interpretation of the warming of relations would be that countries often like to conduct military exercises together for training purposes and China and Russia see their interests served by combining. A maritime exercise in the Mediterranean, for instance, would serve China’s interests by making the point that it does not like the United States and its allies conducting military exercises close to China. For Russia it would serve as a reminder that Russia is a European power and that if the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation can conduct exercises in regions Russia regards as lying in its own sphere of interest, then Russia can do so close to NATO’s heartland. As partners Russia and China do not have to be bothered by the other thumping the table about human rights.

The China–Russia partnership is probably best viewed as a marriage of convenience whose vows are renewed when it suits them both.

**Possible distraction**

A dismissal of the possibility of a formal defence alliance between Russia and China does not rule out the warmed relationship being a distraction for the United States in its relations with China. There may be enough co-operation between Russia and China for some Americans to beat the drum about US enemies uniting. That might suit Russia’s ends, but not China’s. At a time in which the United States and China need to stay focused on learning to adjust to one another, any blurring would be dangerous.

Japan is involved in the other two great power relationships. The Japan–Russia relationship is mostly economic and concentrated on energy supply. If Putin disappoints Abe about the return of the Northern Territories, Japan may step up its rhetoric against Russia and seek some backing from the United States. Domestically, that might help to quieten opposition to some of the security legislation Abe has set his heart on.

One problem for the US–China relationship in Abe’s revisionist and nationalistic agenda is that it provokes nationalism in return, particularly in China but in South Korea as well. The United States is in a bind over Japan. It has to show it is unthreatening on the security treaty with Japan, not just for Japan’s sake but for all its other treaty partners in Asia. It has long encouraged Japan to take a more active defence role. But it did not like the way Abe aroused old tensions by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. It would like Japan and South Korea, both US allies, both democracies, both hosts to large numbers of US troops, to be in accord. The danger for the US–China relationship is that Abe might be pushing his personal agenda too far, too fast, and that this will feed suspicions in China that will sour the relationship with the United States. Avoiding that may come down to US–Japan relations, which already face difficult dilemmas.

The sobering conclusion of the relationships among the great powers of Asia and of the United States itself is that none of them has a grand vision of how they could all exist in peace and that the regional security bodies are inadequate to deal with the complexities of the issues involved.

From time to time questions are raised about whether the United States has the will or the strength to look after itself and its Asian allies as it faces the challenge from China. Much of this speculation may be ill-founded. A more nuanced version of this recently appeared in The Diplomat, an online magazine dealing with Asia and the Pacific. Christine M. Leah, post-doctoral associate in grand strategy at Yale University, argued that there was a case for the United States to give nuclear weapons to its allies, including Japan, Australia and South Korea. She believes that the United States has not hitherto faced up to the complications of using conventional weaponry against a China committed to a course of sea-denial and that nuclear weaponry would make up for this deficiency. As it turns out, the concept is not entirely new. According to declassified documents from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1958 the idea of giving Japan nuclear weapons was canvassed.

To put it mildly, arming US allies with nuclear weapons would not advance sound relations between China and the United States. It would not make the region safer. That approach should be discouraged.

**NOTES**


**NOTE FOR CONTRIBUTORS**

We welcome unsolicited articles, with or without illustrative material photographs, cartoons, etc. Text should be typed double spaced on one side of the sheet only. Emailed files are welcome. Facsimiles are not acceptable. Copy length should not be more than 3000 words though longer pieces will be considered. Footnotes should be kept to a minimum, and only in exceptional circumstances will we print more than 15 with an article.
Takeshima and the Northern Territories in Japan's nationalism

Alexander Bukh comments on the dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks.

In 2005, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture adopted the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance that designated 22 February, the day the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo in Korean, Takeshima in Japanese) were incorporated into Japan in 1905, as a prefectural memorial day. The passage of the ordinance, the Korean reaction and the wide domestic coverage propelled Takeshima to the forefront of Japan’s domestic debates on South Korea. It transformed the previously obscure and unknown to most Japanese dispute into one of the main symbols in Japan’s nationalistic debates.

Commentators in South Korea but also in the English language media and academia elsewhere have interpreted this ordinance as another expression of the rising official and popular nationalism in Japan. The process that culminated in the passage of the ordinance is, however, much more complex than this. The ordinance was adopted against the wish of the government and key members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and, as I will explain below, was directed at Tokyo rather than at Seoul. Furthermore, Japan’s other territorial dispute — the dispute with Russia over the South Kuriles/Northern Territories — has played an important role in bringing about the ordinance.

Shimane Prefecture’s Takeshima-related activism did not start in 2005, but rather dates back to the early post-war years. Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War and the loss of colonies, as well as the Allied occupation, brought about a sudden increase in population and shrinkage in fishing areas available to Japanese fishermen. Spurred by these developments, Shimane Prefecture embarked on a campaign urging the occupation authorities and the Japanese government to return the Liancourt Rocks, which during the occupation were used by US forces as a bombing range and were outside the so-called ‘MacArthur Line’, to Shimane Prefecture. The Japanese government also perceived the rocks as rightfully belonging to Japan and during preparations for the San Francisco Peace Conference lobbied the United States to include the rocks in Japan’s territory. However, the final version of the peace treaty carried no references to the Liancourt Rocks.

By contrast, the dispute over Takeshima was put on the back burner of domestic politics as the government gave priority to co-operation with Seoul. This created a sense of victimhood in Shimane Prefecture, which by passing the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance in 2005 brought the territorial dispute to the fore of the domestic debates on Japan’s relations with South Korea.

The Liancourt Rocks

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to divert domestic nationalism away from the United States towards the Soviet Union.

The campaign involved extensive educational activities, establishment of numerous memorials on Hokkaido and the enactment of a national ‘Northern Territories Day’ in 1981. This extensive campaign has managed to transform the Northern Territories from an issue that was of interest mainly to former residents of the four islands into a national symbol. However, the extensive attention paid by the central government to the Northern Territories from the late 1960s created a visible contradiction in Japan’s policy related to territorial disputes. On one hand, Japan’s official position on both disputes remained identical: both the Li-ancourt Rocks (Takeshima) and the South Kuriles (Northern Territories) were argued to be illegally occupied by South Korea and the Soviet Union respectively. Nevertheless, in terms of domestic policy, the central government has invested heavily in the Northern Territories campaign but, with rare exceptions, has kept silent on Takeshima and has not allocated any resources to it.

**Fishing agreement**

The bilateral fishing agreement that accompanied the 1965 normalisation treaty enabled Japanese fishermen to fish in waters near the rocks and, despite the fact that from the late 1970s the Korean authorities prevented them from entering the 12-mile zone near the rocks, the agreement solved most of Shimane’s fishing-related grievances. Even so, the duplicity in Tokyo’s position has created a sense of victimhood and injustice among Shimane’s prefectural elites and become the main stimulant in Takeshima-related activism. At the same time, Tokyo’s Northern Territories campaign informed and shaped the prefecture’s own campaign and the nature of its demands on the government.

The 2005 ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance was an integral part of Shimane Prefecture’s Takeshima-related campaign. Certain actions of the Korean government, such as the issuance of the second Dokdo memorial stamp in 2004, served as the immediate trigger for Shimane Prefecture’s 2004 Takeshima-related memorandum that became the basis for the ordinance. These actions, however, were interpreted through the lens of victimhood and injustice caused by Tokyo. Thus the memorandum demanded that Tokyo apply certain domestic polices related to the Northern Territories, such as the national day and a governmental body in charge of development and co-ordination-related policies, to the Takeshima issue as well. The prefectural ordinance was a response to Tokyo’s refusal to accommodate Shimane’s demands and was adopted despite requests from the Liberal Democratic Party and the government not to do so.

Today, both the Northern Territories and Takeshima are important symbols in Japan’s nationalism directed at its neighbours. But the processes that led to emergence of these national symbols are quite different. In a somewhat ironic fashion, Tokyo’s successful attempt to raise the visibility of the Northern Territories in the domestic discourse facilitated the emergence of Takeshima as another national symbol — against the desire of the central government.
THE OTAGO FOREIGN POLICY SCHOOL TURNS 50

Ken Ross recounts early memories and high moments in the school’s history.

‘From now on, when we have to deal with new situations, we shall not say, what do the British think about it, or what would the Americans want us to do. Our starting point will be, what do we think about it? What course of action best accords with the fundamental principles of our foreign policy?’ (Norman Kirk, 1973)

‘Concern with foreign affairs in New Zealand tends to be confined, in the first place, to the country’s diplomats and, secondly, to a number of private individuals who take an interest in the world scene but cannot regard it as a main preoccupation — university lecturers, churchmen and a handful of journalists.’ (Alexander MacLeod, 1970)

The Otago Foreign Policy School was one of a quartet of developments that largely constituted the national conversation on New Zealand’s foreign policy between 1966 and 1972. Together they were leading players in improving the quality of the ‘what do we think about it?’ that Kirk so wanted New Zealanders to develop.

The other developments were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ new willingness under George Laking’s leadership to speak in public, the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs’ (NZIIA) boost in profile (from a Ford Foundation grant) and the New Zealand Listener’s increased coverage of world affairs during Alexander MacLeod’s editorship.

The Otago Foreign Policy School began in 1966. I was there. I came again for seven of the next nine schools. These ten were organised by the school’s instigator, Arnold Entwisle, a senior lecturer in the university’s adult education department.

I returned once more — for the only time a prime minister has presented. In 1985, David Lange made the school his platform to make clear to Bob Hawke, Margaret Thatcher, the Americans and his own officials that he was ‘not for turning’. New Zealand would become nuclear-free.

The school was crowded when Lange spoke. In addition to the usual collection of MacLeod’s ‘private individuals’, media and an array of foreigners were present. Primarily they wanted to see Lange — maybe there would be another Oxford Union Debate performance. Instead, taking a leaf from Norman Kirk, he spoke quietly, simply and clearly. This time he allowed for none of his renowned superb ambiguity.

The latter part of this article looks more closely at the importance of Lange’s 1985 presentation. This was a pivotal moment in Lange’s global diplomacy. The case is to be laid out more comprehensively in my presentation at this year’s school.

In drawing attention to the school’s role in Lange’s global diplomacy, I suggest that the 1985 school is the high moment in the school’s 50 years for being on centre court at peak hour, its fifteen minutes of fame — well at least, among other things, appearing in good light on the front page of the Dominion for three successive issues.

Otherwise, the school has been a much appreciated quality journeyman for its 50 years: a steady responsible contributor to what public discussion there has been in New Zealand of our role in world affairs.

The school was an unexpected prospect for becoming such an enduring institution and quite endearing to those who have attended. The structure that Entwisle constructed continues still — the Dunedin wintry weekend residential character with a series of presentations, usually followed by valued discussion. Only missing, it seems, the overnight ‘homework’ required in his early years, which faded when Entwisle accepted that collegial chatting into the night was preferred by his students.

The quality of any particular school gets reflected in its published proceedings. Initially, the NZIIA did that task, until 1976. The next year, the University of Otago took over the task. From 1985 it has been done in conjunction with publishing houses.

My favourites — the most thumbed — are the New Directions
in New Zealand Foreign Policy (1985) and Fifty Years of Foreign Policy Making (1993).

In its half-century the school has not been challenged as the premier slot for officials and MacLeod’s ‘private individuals’ to come together for enlightening discussion and exchanges of views. Impressively, it still has its original name.

**Public paucity**

The paucity of a public conversation on New Zealand’s whereabouts in world affairs prior to the turmoil injected by our military commitment to South Vietnam in May 1965 is well caught by Tom Larkin’s observations in 1962. He edited New Zealand’s External Relations, the proceedings of that year’s Institute of Public Administration conference, which had considered the past, present and future of our external relations: all the contributors were current or former staff of the External Affairs department. The book includes Alister McIntosh’s sole public speech as head of External Affairs before his farewell oration — his acceptance address of an honorary degree from the University of Canterbury in 1965.

As editor of the New Zealand Listener in the constrained environment of the 1950s and the earlier 1960s, Monty Holcroft did sterling, albeit modest, service informing on world affairs with a New Zealand hue; he gives a good account of this in his 1969 memoir Reluctant Editor.

The NZIIA was then a modest endeavour — an enclave of the ‘wise old owls’ — that Walter Nash, Alister McIntosh and Downie Stewart had got started in 1934. The leading lights included Sir Guy Powles, John Beaglehole, Fred Wood, Sir Frank Holmes, Angus Ross and Colin Aikman.

In 1965, New Zealand was hit by rowdy raucous rancour as a high octane moment developed — the Vietnam teach-ins emulating the international phenomenon. Arnold Entwisle was struck by the need for a quieter show, where views could be exchanged without the over-charged atmospherics.

Entwisle would be chuffed (and modest) about the school he created. Angus Ross, Otago’s senior history professor, worked closely with him — Ann Trotter recalls in her obituary of Ross his crucial contribution, making him second only to Entwisle in founding the school. Several of the Department of External Affairs high officials (Tom Larkin, Ralph Mullins and Bryce Harland) wove their way into the school’s start-up in 1966. This ‘gang of five’ then enabled the school to hone a solid presence in New Zealand as the annual place to be for focusing on world affairs from a Kiwi perspective.

**Other components**

When Angus Ross and Entwisle had first sought External Affairs’ interest in the holding of a foreign policy school in 1965, Alister McIntosh, tired after his long tenure from 1943, was preoccupied with his impending retirement. However, Mullins, Harland and the more senior and more liberal Larkin did get his sign-off to be at the first school in May 1966.

George Laking, returning after nearly two decades overseas to take charge of External Affairs in late January 1967, was of a mind to engage more with the public than McIntosh had. In his six years as the Foreign Ministry’s head Laking made at least nine public speeches (reproduced in External Affairs Review). This substantial contribution to public discussion was made knowing that Prime Minister Keith Holyoake (also his own minister) was alert to the initiative and undemonstratively supportive. Laking chose his occasions and topics shrewdly. Holyoake seems to have been satisfied with Laking’s involvement. Consequently, though he never attended a school while head of the Foreign Ministry, Laking was the key player in the ministry by endorsing his senior officials to devote time, energy and some finance to the school — it was a successful investment, not least because it became an informal recruitment spot for new diplomats.

When Kirk became prime minister the Foreign Ministry’s dynamic changed. In December 1972 Laking retired. Mullins died young, at 41. Harland was soon on his way to Beijing to head our new embassy there. Frank Corner, Laking’s successor, had returned from a decade overseas (in New York and Washington) to immediately focus on Kirk. As prime minister-elect, Kirk started work with Corner, who was to take over from Laking on 1 January 1973, on his first prime ministerial foreign policy statement. The statement, released on 22 December, became the manifesto for the Kirk Brand — ‘New Zealand in the World of the 1970s’. From then,
the senior Foreign Ministry staff, Corner’s ‘best and brightest’ (a more liberal bunch than Mullins and Harland), had their jobs extending them until Kirk’s death.9

The NZIIA’s substantial grant from the Ford Foundation enabled a head office to be set up — Bruce Brown was seconded from the Foreign Ministry to be the full-time director for three years (1968 to 1971). Brown directed well: he spoke, wrote and edited smartly.10 The institute quickly had a bustling programme of speakers, new branches and publications that made it the principal agent nationwide for keeping the conversation informed. Brown and Entwisle worked well together. Ken Keith picked up Brown’s baton adeptly in early 1972.

Alexander MacLeod was the editor of the New Zealand Listener from January 1968 until his dismissal in July 1972.11 He added zest with his editorials and coverage of global affairs — of MacLeod’s 240 editorials, 93 featured international developments.12

Absent politicians
The Foreign Policy School was a politician free zone in Entwisle’s decade. Only once, in 1971, did a politician speak: former diplomat Hugh Templeton, then a Southland MP. In Kirk’s time the school also clashed with the annual Labour Party conference, which was always then in Wellington. Laking and Kirk did not meet until Kirk was prime minister-elect. While in New Zealand, other than in parliamentary debates, Kirk shied away from speaking publicly on foreign affairs: the only published pieces are his NZIIA pamphlet New Zealand and its Neighbours (1971) and his lengthy review — ‘Getting along with our neighbours’ — of Bruce Brown (ed), New Zealand and Australia: Foreign Policy in the 1970s (the papers presented to the NZIIA’s 1969 annual conference) in the 11 January 1971 issue of the New Zealand Listener. Kirk spoke occasionally to NZIIA branches.

By contrast, when visiting London in 1968 and 1971, Kirk delivered sharper foreign policy messages; for instance, he made clear while there that he could not countenance a racially-based national South African sports team playing in New Zealand. The importance of Kirk’s OE ahead of his prime ministerial global diplomacy is developed in my next article.

Lange performance
Like Kirk, Lange was turbo-charged when he moved into the Beehive. But Lange was initially, and ultimately, a helter-skelter performer — whereas Kirk was highly disciplined until early 1974, when his health collapsed.

Lange addressed the school on 17 May 1985. By then, he had been prime minister for ten months and already had had three of the five most important defining moments of his global diplomacy — the rejection of the visit of USS Buchanan (in late January); his Oxford Union Debate engagement (on 1 March); and the two-week visit to Africa in April. The fourth of his defining moments was his handling of the Rainbow Warrior sinking, which occurred two months later on 10 July 1985. His final defining moment has to be the Yale speech on Anzac Day 1989.

When Lange, who had accepted the invitation months earlier, turned up in Dunedin he was widely perceived publicly on the nuclear issue as being caught between the rock of the protest movement’s expectations and the hard place of his opponents within New Zealand and the traditional partners. The former still had big doubts that Lange had the courage, or stamina, to commit to their cause. The latter were, as Gerald Hensley shows so well in Friendly Fire (2013), still not comprehending this could be a prime minister determined not to be swayed by them.

But, in fact, as Malcolm Templeton reports, Lange had decided in late April that it was to be full speed ahead, legislating New Zealand nuclear-free. Templeton is the superior forensic detective of this story. His 2005 book Standing Upright Here: New Zealand in the nuclear age 1945–1990 is the masterpiece that sets out the evidence.

Launch pad
The school was to be the public launch pad. It was done by a quietly spoken Lange. The speech has been published in two versions with different titles. In the book of the school’s proceedings it is ‘The Fourth Labour Government: New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy’; in the Foreign Affairs Review it is ‘New
Zealand’s Foreign Policy: New Interests, New Paths’. The book’s text of the speech has a first paragraph that is absent from the Foreign Affairs Review version; other differences are lightly sprinkled through the text.\(^{13}\)

The 1985 school was more than Lange. Helen Clark put her perspective on the non-nuclear stance. Owen Wilkes, the doyen of the protestors, presented his perspective. David McIntyre did his history professor role superbly, guiding us through the previous Labour prime ministers’ global diplomacy. The foreign affairs glamour kids — Chris Laidlaw and Witi Ihimaera — spoke. Jim Mc Lay, in his brief stint as National’s leader, made his contribution, ‘Managing the ANZUS alliance’ — it was to have zero pertinence once National went bipartisan.

The speech’s preparation heralded a new dynamic developing around Lange. In Standing Upright Here, Templeton alerts us to the tussle. The speech’s contested composition was the first between the Foreign Ministry and Lange. Until this time his speech writer, Margaret Pope, had not been involved in his foreign policy speeches. That Lange had turned to her had first become evident with the Oxford Union Debate effort. Then, later that same week, she worked on the statement that Lange made to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, but neither occasion seems to have been a test of pens. The Foreign Affairs Review has the ministry’s version of the Geneva speech, while the ‘as delivered’ version is printed in a limited distribution ministry publication, A selection of recent Foreign Policy Statements by the New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rt Hon. David Lange.\(^{14}\) The two versions sit side by side in a file in Archives New Zealand.

**Crucial rapport**

Following the school no new foreign policy developments occurred for two months, until the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior. A week before the sinking John Henderson arrived at the Beehive; Lange had persuaded him to return from London to be his ‘chief of staff’. Henderson, a foreign policy specialist, had crucial rapport with Lange as well as his confidence, and a new more constructive dynamic soon emerged around Lange. The initial turbo-charged dynamic was throttled back — serious stuff, namely passage of the nuclear-free legislation, was uppermost. For the 19 months from 17 September 1985 to 30 April 1987 Lange made no foreign policy speeches. In that time his most. For the 19 months from 17 September 1985 to 30 April 1987 Lange made no foreign policy speeches. In that time his per-


How jihadists think and act

Karim Pourhamzavi discusses Wahhabism as an ideology and tactic in the mid-18th century and present-day Syria and Iraq.

The violence of puritanical extremist groups in Syria and Iraq focuses attention on their ideology. Many studies, political comments and much media discussion have tried to make sense of the jihadist ideological framework through the broad and extremely diverse concept of Islam. While popular, these approaches have not been very useful as a basis for a clear policy to deal with the jihadist phenomenon.

A variety of experts and scholars have repeatedly noted that the current jihadists in Syria and Iraq are Salafis/Wahhabis. Wahhabism demands careful consideration and should not be viewed through a traditional understanding of Islam. It emerged in the mid-18th century and inspired a movement that performed jihad long before today. What connects the current jihadists to the earlier ones, apart from an ideology that produces a similar agenda and practices?

This article uses two major elements to examine Wahhabism as a doctrine that constitutes a source of conflict. First, the doctrine will be examined through the early Wahhabi movement; this started in the mid-18th century and ended in 1932 with the establishment of a Wahhabi state in Saudi Arabia. This examination will cover the Wahhabi jihadist types of combat, which include imposing restrictive rules in the conquered areas, and its specific antagonism towards the Shi’ah faction of Islam. The second element comprises consideration of the Wahhabi doctrine as adopted by the current jihadists and how it may be seen in their methods and tactics. Research indicates that the notions of exclusivity and zero tolerance that the Wahhabi doctrine holds for ‘Others’ have not undergone a big shift since the mid-18th century.

Compared to other sects within the tradition of Islam, Wahhabism is a fairly modern variant, emerging in 18th century Arabia. Aslan describes the doctrine, founded by Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92), as a ‘puritanical’ approach to who is Muslim and who is not. Purifying Islam and discrediting the ancient Islamic theological schools was first suggested by a fanatic jurist, Ibn Taymiyyah, who lived in the 1300s. However, by building upon Ibn Taymiyyah’s suggestions, it was Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who turned this theoretical approach into an actual movement.

Three principles

Identifying three principles within the Wahhabi doctrine is crucial to understanding its notion of exclusivity. The first is monotheism, tawhid, which is also the title of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s most famous book. This tawhid differs from the way it is usually defined as the oneness of god. Rather, it is about considering as ‘heresy’ any act of worship which is not directed to the god based on the Wahhabi description, and the Wahhabi view of the sacredness of places and religious figures such as the prophets. From this point of view, the annual ceremonies for the birth of Prophet Muhammad by the Sunni faction of Islam, the sacredness of the imams in the Shi’ah division of Islam, the use of music by the Sufi Muslims and many other practices by non-Wahhabi sections of the religion are acts of heresy.

The second principle is associated with spreading the Wahhabi concept of monotheism among Muslims who hitherto were considered as non-monotheist heretics. To do so, the notion of dawa, invitation, was given a new interpretation to mean more than simply inviting non-Muslims to Islam. That is, as described in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s book usul al thalatha [The Three Principles], the Wahhabis must convert the infidels to Wahhabism and either kill or be killed in the process. This interpretation is attributed to the Prophet Muhammad but disregards all the Islamic principles which urge tolerance and not forcing other people to adopt Islam against their will, such as the Quranic verses in 16:125.

The third concept is jihad, which is used to fulfil dawa. Jihad traditionally functioned as a legitimatising cover for the conquests of the Muslim empires. The Islamic scholar Abbas Zaryab notes that the traditional meaning of jihad — the aspect that had been used as an authority for combating non-Muslims — in the jurisprudence of Islam does not refer to Muslims fighting against each other. However, according to Abd al Wahhab, other Muslims are nothing more than heretics, so jihad against them is not only permissible but a divine obligation. In his book kashf al shohbat [Resolving the Doubts], Abd al Wahhab describes the justification for and the characteristics of the Wahhabi version of jihad. He compared Muslims of his time to the ‘heretics at the time of the Prophet’ and said they were ‘even worse than them’. Therefore, jihad must be performed against them and they should be fought against as the Prophet fought the heretics of his time. It is permissible not only to shed the heretics’ blood but also to usurp their properties and wives. Similarly to Ibn Taymiyyah,

The recent actions of the ISIS jihadists in Syria and Iraq has left not only the Middle East but also the global community shocked by the amount of violence. This raises the question of what type of ideology lies behind the tactics adopted by this violent organisation? A comparison of the recent jihadist phenomenon in Syria and Iraq with the Wahhabi movement of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries helps to explain the modern jihadists’ behaviour. Wahhabism, as a doctrine, still constitutes a source of inspiration for a puritanical jihadist conflict. Its zero tolerance for ‘Others’ virtually ensures a high level of violence.

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Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab

Reference:

the concept of jihad is not a marginal Islamic principle to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab; it is one of the pillars of Islam, if not the most important one.

The three core principles of Wahhabism enunciated by its founder seem to support one another in terms of a jihadi type of conflict.

**Traditional tactics**

An alliance was concluded between the founder of Wahhabism and Muhammad ibn Saud in the small village of Dar‘iya, the two leaders agreeing to perform jihad against the non-believers. The latter is the founder of the House of Saud, which has ruled Saudi Arabia since 1932. This alliance resulted in over two centuries of jihadist conflict, out of which the Wahhabi movement succeeded in establishing itself as the dominant religion of Arabia and founded the Saudi Arabian state.

The first group to be subjected to the Wahhabis’ puritanical violence — as heretics — were the Sunnis of Arabia. The dominant pre-Wahhabi religion in Arabia was Sunni-Islam, which follows the theological school of Hanbali. According to the Saudi historian Uthman b. Beshr, known to be sympathetic to Wahhabism, Wahhabi tactics did not exempt civilians walking ‘in the market’ or women and children as targets. The city of Taef is one of several cities in the Hejaz (located in the western part of Arabia where Islam emerged and was consolidated in Mecca and Medina) which was subject to Wahhabi attack. The Wahhabis were not able to conquer the city and therefore besieged it. The people of Taef, who ran out of resources, decided to let in the Wahhabis on condition that they themselves would be safe. However, after the surrender, the Wahhabis subjected the city to a notorious massacre, which included women and children.

Owing to its highly restrictive doctrine, the Wahhabi movement could not have survived without some external support. The British supported the Wahhabis, both financially and with weaponry, against the Ottoman Empire, which controlled Arabia at the time. In 1923, when this empire was abolished and had no control over any part of Arabia, the Wahhabis massacred over a half million people in Mecca when they conquered it. As Tarik Firro notes, all of the Wahhabi atrocities against Muslim populations, from the mid-18th century to the early 20th century, took place under the cover of jihad.

**Restrictive rules**

The other aspect that reflects Wahhabi doctrine in practice is the restrictive rules the Wahhabis implemented in the cities under their control. At the very beginning of this movement, Abd al-Wahhab was prosecuted by an Ottoman court for destroying tombs, cutting sacred trees and stoning a woman to death in the small city in which he was living prior to his arrival in Dar‘iya. The Wahhabis’ destruction of tombs, shrines and sacred places — mostly ancient sites, the history of which goes back to the 7th century and beyond — was driven by their belief that all these buildings are signs of heresy. Accordingly, they destroyed almost every grave and tomb belonging to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, which, in addition to being ancient, were highly respected by Muslims. The Wahhabis also banned smoking and drinking coffee and enforced the wearing of the **burqa**, which is a highly restrictive type of **hijab**.

The way Wahhabism views Shi‘ah, the second largest faction of Islam, along with the 18th century Wahhabis’ relation-ship with Iraq must also be taken into consideration in understanding how their tactics reflect their doctrine. Although the Wahhabi excommunication list includes numerous Islamic sects and other religions, the Shi‘ah seem to be especially anathematised. Wahhabi terminology provides various titles for demonising them, from **rauwafed** (those who refuse to submit to the tradition of the Prophet) to **safawite** (those who by force adopted Shi‘ism which is a fake version of Islam from the Safavid Empire in Iran) to **ahl al beda** (people of innovations which are forbidden by God).

Iraq, which has a Shi‘ah majority, was subject to a Wahhabi invasion in the early 19th century, during which the Wahhabis massacred some 8000 Iraqi Shi‘ah in their shrine city of Karbala. They also destroyed Shi‘ah tombs and looted whatever valuables they could find, including the jewellery within the tombs. The specific targeting of the Shi‘ah did not end with Abd al-Wahhab’s death, but was continued by his successors (who were his descendants) and various books were published by the later Wahhabi Shaykhs on the Shi‘ah ‘heresy’ and ‘idolatry’.

**Today’s ideology**

Various scholars identify al-Qaeda types of groups’ ideology as being driven by Wahhabism. Highlighting the doctrine and actions of the 18th and 19th centuries’ Wahhabi movement, Crooke argues that understanding the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL) is impossible without understanding the Wahhabi history. He also believes that the Wahhabi movement of 18th century Arabia was not very different from the current ISIS in ideology and tactics. Prominent Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan notes that ISIS is a ‘Salafi [Wahhabi] trend’ which ‘has nothing to do with [the tradition of] Islam’. Ramadan suggests furthermore that this type of ideology is supported by some ‘Gulf states’ — presumably Saudi Arabia, the traditional supporter of Wahhabism, and Qatar. In addition to such scholarly opinions, there is other evidence to suggest that Wahhabi ideology is used by ISIS types of groups in Syria and Iraq to justify their particular jihadi type of violence.

The doctrine can be traced, for instance, in the terminol-ogy and religious citations that ISIS use as authority. The group known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which emerged in 2003 in northern Iraq, headed by a Jordanian national, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, bears a title given to it by other people. This group, which, as a result of later developments in Iraq and Syria, changed its title to ISIS, actually called themselves al-tawhid wa al jihad (Monotheism and Jihad). In addition to their Wahhabi...
title, al Zarqawi targeted Iraqi Shi’ah alongside the occupying American troops in order to claim he was protecting Sunni Iraqis, as AQI was using their areas as bases. However, as soon as the Sunni tribes began to reject AQI and established a Sunni police force as part of the Iraqi military institutions, namely sabawat, to control the Sunni area, AQI had no difficulty excommunicating the Sunni resistance and brutally targeting them.

The terminology of excommunication, takfir, is in almost every ISIS-produced video and in their speeches. In a more than one-hour-long video entitled ‘Deterring the Apostates’, radde al mortadhin, a Saudi member of ISIS labels everyone, from Obama to the EU and Middle Eastern leaders, as ‘apostates’.12 The Shi’ah Muslims, unsurprisingly, also have a special share of ISIS takfir when they are referred to as rawafed, rejecters, idolaters and by other negative Wahhabi terminology.

**Differing authorities**

Apart from relying mainly on Muhammad Abd al Wahhab’s writings, Wahhabism has its own religious authorities, which differ from the mainstream jurisprudence of Islam. For instance, it is common to find reference to Al al-Shaykh — descendants of Abd al Wahhab, who took charge of the religious authority in Arabia after his death — in video productions such as salil al savarem, Volume 4. This entire production comprises horrifying images of ‘hunting the rawafed’ [meaning Shi’ah] in Iraq; the victims are both Shi’ah civilians and members of the Iraqi military.

In addition to the many volunteers from Saudi Arabia in jihadist groups like ISIS, the ties between these groups and the Saudi muftis also seem crucial. Muhammad Al Urayfi is one of many Saudi muftis who announced jihad in Syria and asked his followers to fight the infidel Assad and help their ‘Mujahedin brothers’. Other Wahhabi muftis in Saudi Arabia, such as Saad al Durham, even suggested the ‘mujahedin’ in Syria adopt a ‘heavy-handed’ approach by killing Shi’ah women and children, so that rawafed will fear them. As will be discussed below, this advice was taken up by the mujahedin in Syria and Iraq.

That the jihadist groups employ Wahhabi ideology to justify their activities raises the question of how these multinational jihadists came to adopt Wahhabism. According to the *Washington Post*, more than 81 nationalities are fighting in Syria. Not all these fighters, in fact, were indoctrinated by Wahhabism when they arrived in Syria and Iraq; many came from places where Wahhabism has had a presence for decades. The spread of Wahhabism has been a strategy of the Saudi government since the 1950s.13 The means to pursue such a strategy was provided by millions of Saudi oil dollars given to troubled areas such as Somalia, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Chechnya and to relatively poor states such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen, as well as funding missionary type activities in Western countries. Wahhabism was part of the Saudi-built mosques and schools, while acceptance of Wahhabism was a prerequisite for receiving Saudi aid. Most of the above places are currently either troubled by their own jihadist conflict, such as Al Shabab in Somalia, or export jihadists to chaotic places such as Syria and Iraq.

**Wahhabism under-current**

It is important, then, to understand the violence committed by jihadist groups as being based on Wahhabi doctrine. On the eve of ISIS’s capturing Mosul, the United Nations Human Rights Council reported that the group executed 670 Shi’ah Iraqi prisoners.14 This atrocity was accompanied by massacres of hundreds of Yezidi and other minorities. The captured population were forced to convert to the ISIS version of Islam; men who refused to do so were executed while their wives and daughters were taken as sex slaves. This seems to be a practical reflection of what Abd al Wahhab suggested in his book *kash shobahat*: ‘those who would not conform to this [Abd al Wahhab] view should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated’.

Imposing restrictive rules in the conquered areas is another similarity between current and earlier jihadists. Shutting down coffee shops, banning smoking and forcing women into a restrictive and compulsory form of *hijab*, as well as Stoning a man to death in Mosul for committing ‘adultery’, are among the rules and practices that ISIS has imposed in the cities it controls. They have also established a Sharia-court, in which the majority of judges are Saudi nationals, in Ar-Reqqa, the city in Syria which ISIS has made the capital of its self-proclaimed caliphate. This court imposes laws that they seem proud of, such as cutting off hands and beheading for crimes of robbery. The jihadists have also destroyed a large number of places of religious and cultural significance, for example blowing up the tomb of biblical prophets Jonah and Daniel in Mosul.

The current jihadists’ special place for Shi’ah can be seen in the fact that they have made up the largest proportion of vic-

*ISIS crucifies its own members in Syria for corruption*
tims in Iraq since the capture of Mosul and other cities by ISIS. On one occasion, in Tikrit, ISIS fighters massacred at least 1700 unarmed Iraqi trainee soldiers from the Spyker base who were Shi’ah. This ruthless massacre shares some similarity with that of the besieged city of Taef in the 18th century as the trainees had also been promised safe passage if they surrendered.15 ISIS shows its extreme hatred of the Shi’ah ‘heretics’ in numerous video productions, where merely being Shi’ah is sufficient grounds for execution in the Ar-Reqqa public square.

**Doctrinal explanation**

Analysing the Wahhabi doctrine explains not only jihadists such as ISIS and Al Nourah in Syria and Iraq, but also other jihadist movements in other parts of the world, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, where the Shi’ah Hazarah were particularly targeted and massacred and the ancient Buddhist statues destroyed.

Wahhabism is an exclusivist ideology advocating and, wherever it can, imposing a puritanical agenda. What distinguishes it from other Islamic or non-Islamic sects is its zero-tolerance for others. Examining this doctrine through the tactics of the 18th, 19th and early 20th century Wahhabi movement in Arabia, it appears that it provides justification for ruthless tactics and continuous conflict. The Wahhabi version of jihad has encouraged numerous massacres in places such as Taef, Mecca and Karbala (the shrine city for Shi’ah).

Wahhabism seems not to have ended in 1932, when it established its own state of Saudi Arabia. Rather, it still inspires followers to jihad in chaotic places such as Syria and Iraq. Wahhabi ideology is evident in the terminology used by the current jihadists and in their actions. Today, Wahhabi ideology continues to provide justification for massacres, restrictive rules and ‘hunting the Shi’ah’ as a specific category of infidels.

**NOTES**

6. Aslan, op cit.
10. Ibid.
Under construction
Brian Easton looks at the state of the European Union in light of his observations during a recent visit.

There is a bit of a construction shambles around the buildings that house the European Union in Brussels, with new buildings, buildings retrofitted for energy efficiency and improvements to the subway and public surrounds. It is not that the activities of the European Union are necessarily compromised, but it symbolises that the ‘more perfect union’ it seeks is far from complete.

That is well illustrated in its energy union. The EU energy system is not unified; integrating it is one of the priorities of the recently appointed new president, Jean-Claude Juncker. The problem became more acute last year when it was realised how dependent some of the 28 member states were on imported Russian gas. A third of the EU gas comes from Russia, and half of that through Ukraine.

Given a hard winter and a bullying Putin, a cut in the supplies could have left some very cold and vexed EU citizens, especially in the east. Mercifully, the winter was mild and Russia needed to sell gas for foreign exchange. (Its cut-back of supplies to Ukraine could be justified in commercial terms because they got behind in their payments; yeah right.)

There are other sources of gas from overseas, including Australia, but the shipping terminals are limited and it is not currently possible to send the gas from west to all of the east because some of the pumps are not reversible. Terminals are being extended and built and the pumps are being given a reverse capability. The risks will not be as high next winter even if it is more severe and Russia is more belligerent, but the situation is a stark reminder that the EU energy system is not integrated, not even physically, let alone commercially; EU energy policy is under construction.

The European Union’s problem arises because most of its member states have a national monopolist in charge of gas supply, each jealous of its position and unwilling to co-ordinate with the one next door. It is not easy to develop a more perfect union because pipes are infrastructural monopolies (common carriers) so the usual solution of increased competition does not work.

The Poles, for instance, are putting in a gas terminal at Swinoujscie, which will reduce their dependence upon Russian gas.

Brian Easton is an economist and social statistician who also works in public policy. He is currently writing a history of New Zealand from an economic perspective. His previous book, Globalisation and Wealth of Nations (2007), questioned the nature of the nation state in a world of falling costs of distance and increasing economic integration. This article was made possible by a trip to Europe supported by the European Delegation in Wellington and the German and Polish governments, with travel support by Air New Zealand. As grateful as he is for their assistance, none are responsible for any of the views expressed here.

While the European Union was established in 1993 (the European Economic Community began in 1958), its ultimate structure is still not settled, as illustrated by the lack of integration of its energy system and the incomplete nature of its monetary union. Progress to an ever more perfect union is limited by the desires of member states to maintain a maximum of sovereignty. The difficulties of moving forward have been highlighted by the monetary crisis that has enveloped Greece in recent years. This episode has demonstrated once again that the ever more perfect union involves member states giving up chunks of sovereignty.
they could neither repay nor rollover because lenders no longer trusted them.

Most of the focus has been on Greece, but it was not alone, just the most extreme example, so extreme that the usual procedures for sovereign bailout — typically they are applied two or three times a year in the world as a whole — would not work.

**Greek troubles**

Greece got into its difficulties because of generous government spending and a weak tax base (including tax evasion and corruption). Its public accounts were misleading. As a result, it borrowed vast sums to cover the fiscal gap, but this did not become apparent until 2010 when the statistical base of the government accounts was straightened out.

It is well to remember that European banks chose to lend the sums, voluntarily, many would say ‘recklessly’. As a result, and given the poor performance of the Greek economy (as a consequence of the long recession following the global financial crisis as well as the adjustment to a more sustainable fiscal path), its public debt to annual GDP ratio rose from about 100 per cent (which is usually thought to be well above a prudent level) to near 180 per cent. Such a level involves such high interest outgoings that it will continue to rise even if the Greek government runs a fiscal surplus and the economic performance improves. In the jargon, the debt is ‘out of control’. Resolving it is all very complicated.

One complication is the role of Germany. As the largest economy in the European Monetary Union (EMU), it has considerable sway in its decisions, but Germany’s role is limited by its populace being impatient with the spending generosity of the Greek government in contrast to the austerity of (the somewhat richer) German government. A further complication is that there is still deep resentment among the Greeks at the German invasion of Greece during the Second World War.

Greece has improved its fiscal management substantially and now runs a ‘primary surplus’, that is before interest payments. The full deficit, including interest payments, is still large, and debt levels will continue to rise unless there is some sort of bailout.

**Democratic limitation**

The analysis thus far has been largely in terms of the governments as business entities. But in a democracy, their shareholders have quite a different relationship. While they are happy to benefit personally from government spending, they do not really think of any consequential debt incurred as theirs personally.

Greece has had troubling changes of governments. The latest is the leftist party of Syriza (an acronym for the Coalition of the Radical Left in Greek), which became government after the 25 January 2015 election on the promise of easing back the fiscal austerity. Those who hold Greek bonds were not consulted, nor did they vote. As the subsequent negotiations between them and the Syriza minister of finance, Yannis Varoufakis, bear witness, there has been little room for manoeuvre other than delaying decisions.

The public lenders are haunted by the fear that to give concessions to Greece may set precedents for other troubled nations. (Spain is mentioned as next in the queue.) But they must also be haunted by the fear of giving neo-fascists throughout Europe a popular cause. (Greece was ruled by a military junta from 1967 to 1974.) And they are also haunted by the fear that a Grexit — Greek withdrawal — may lead to a collapse of the European Monetary Union, or at least a severe diminution of its size and influence in the long term.

Perhaps this is too much detail, but it highlights the theme of this article: the EMU is still under construction. Some will argue that its whole conception is impossibly flawed; others that it was being built but was in its incomplete state unprepared for the global financial crisis and its aftershocks.

Avoiding a long economic thesis about how monetary unions work, for these purposes note that a monetary union involves giving up a sovereign exchange rate and thereby abandoning one of the tools of economic management. Grexit can be thought of as the Greeks demanding that tool back unless there is some compensating assistance for its loss. (Having an additional tool in the kit will not simply resolve their problems.) It is instructive that Polish economists have shifted from an enthusiasm for Poland joining the EMU to much greater caution.

**Fundamental challenge**

This reflects a fundamental challenge faced by the European Union, which we saw also in its energy system. Many economists would only recommend a monetary union if there was also fiscal (and therefore political) union. Once more, the ever more perfect union involves member states giving up chunks of sovereignty.

The Greek debt crisis suggests that fiscal sovereignty is under threat as the European Union forces Greece to address its economic policies. This is no different from what usually happens when the IMF leads a consortium to sort out a debt crisis anywhere in the world or, indeed, when a bank has to deal with a private borrower that cannot service its debts.

The European Union is likely to be under construction for some time. Could it fall to bits before it is completed, perhaps as the result of it member countries refusing to give up enough sovereignty? Politics being so dependent on the contingent, who can tell? Yet I left the study tour optimistic.

My July stay in Brussels coincided with a meeting of the heads of the member states the purpose of which was, among other things, to elect the new EU president. Before doing so, they made a pilgrimage to Ypres, where the first major battle of the Great War had occurred one hundred years earlier. (Later it would host the Battle of Passchendaele.) They met solemnly at its Menin Gate, the memorial to the British and colonial soldiers who fell there; together and as friends, despite their predecessors being deeply divided a century ago, symbolising their commitment of ‘never again’. It was a war between sovereign states.
Towards a deeper partnership

Balaji Chandramohan discusses US grand strategy in the Asia–Pacific region and the convergence of US and Indian interests.

As the United States comes to terms with the shifting geo-politics of the 21st century, it is looking for strategic partnership or allies in the Asia–Pacific region. As an emerging great power, India provides a counter-weight to both Russia and China. With the second largest population in the world, a growing economy and occupying a strategic crossroad, India provides Washington with a natural partner or even a strategic ally.

The three-day state visit of US President Barack Obama to India, which culminated with India’s Republic Day celebrations in January 2015, was the start of a new chapter in the Indo-United States relationship. Its wider implications across the globe could alter the world order.

To start with, Obama’s visit as chief guest at the India’s Republic Day function was a diplomatic coup for the newly resurgent Indian government headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It was the first time a US president had been invited to attend India's Republic Day ceremony as a chief guest. Obama became the first US president to visit India twice during his presidency.

The visit was in fact a continuation of earlier moves towards a closer relationship between India and the United States. It was an extension of the new vision inked during Modi’s state visit to the United States in September 2014. The rock star welcome accorded to Modi during that visit and his subsequent visits to countries like Australia and Fiji convinced the US establishment of the need to push for a closer diplomatic, economic and military partnership in the newly emerging world order.

Geo-political imperative

After emerging from the Cold War as the pre-eminent superpower, the United States was distracted by two land wars in the hinterlands of Asia. China, which was an ally of Washington for the second part of the Cold War from the 1970s, decided to increase its stature in the international system by actively spreading its influence from the Asia–Pacific region to Africa, Europe and Latin America, thereby challenging Washington’s pre-eminence.

As it stands in 2015, there is no doubt among strategic observers in Washington that US pre-eminence in the global power game depends very much on its ability to control the sea lanes of communication that connect the rest of the world to the western hemisphere and on its ability to prevent any single major power’s rise to dominance in the Eurasian heartland.

During the Cold War, the United States was able to control the world oceans with its unchallenged naval supremacy. With allies such as Germany, Great Britain, Japan and Pakistan within reach of the Eurasian heartland, it was able to box the Soviet Union within the confines of Eurasia.

However, in China’s case Washington has found it difficult to check Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in the wider Asia-Pacific region and also within the inner parameters of Asia, such as in Central Asia or Middle East, where China’s influence is seen at both economics and politico-military levels.

Second, apart from Beijing, it is also true that Washington’s problem is compounded by the increasing closeness of Beijing and Moscow, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Third, existing US allies, both in the northern and southern hemispheres (including countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Japan and even Pakistan) do not have the political clout to challenge either Beijing or Moscow in either the wider

In January 2015 President Obama visited India for the second time, and was a chief guest at India’s Republic Day ceremony. This followed a successful visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the United States in the previous September. These visits reflected the deepening ties between the two countries, as they confront the reality of China’s rising power. India has the reach in both Eurasia and the wider Asia–Pacific region to become Washington’s defining partner or even an ally in the new US strategic calculus. US support for India’s admission to the global nuclear non-proliferation and export control regimes is a further reflection of warming US–India ties.
Eurasian heartland or the Asia–Pacific maritime region. The only country with reach in both Eurasia and the wider Asia–Pacific region is India, which has become the defining partner or even an ally in Washington’s strategic calculus.

**Strategic vision**

The United States, wanting to come out of the confinement of the western hemisphere in the 1940s, reached out to the wider Asia–Pacific region. In doing so it formulated the grand strategic vision that served it well in both the Second World War and the Cold War.

The United States’ geo-strategic approach is also partially based on the concept of the 20th-century Dutch-American geo-strategist and ‘godfather’ of the containment strategy, Nicholas John Spykman. He said that ‘whoever controlled the Rimland rules Eurasia; whoever rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.’ Typically, the rimland refers to the maritime fringes of the Eurasian continent. Spykman emphasised that the United States needed partners in the rimland to counter the rise of the heartland (Soviet Union) and the middle kingdom (China).

Alfred Thayer Mahan advanced another theory of geo-strategy, suggesting that ‘Whoever controls the world oceans controls the world’. Early in the 20th century he predicted the rise of both India and China. Mahan’s vision is amazing. In his work *The Problems of Asia: Its Effect Upon International Politics*, first published in 1901, he predicted that China with its size, mass and population could pose a challenge to the United States. In Mahan’s time there could not have been many who would have put their money on China’s rise. Mahan was also lucky his voice was heard in the US political establishment when he started writing on naval affairs. His friend Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt went on to become the president in 1901. Further, Mahan’s thoughts were understood within the political establishment of Franklin Roosevelt, the great American president during the Second World War, who had also been an assistant secretary of the navy during the First World War under President Woodrow Wilson. The US political establishment understood that for the United States to be a super-power it needed to control all the world’s oceans.

US strategic thinking is still based on this idea, and this is why Washington is reaching out to India as the centre-piece of its 21st century Indian Ocean strategy and has in fact increased co-operation with it within the wider Asia–Pacific region. Washington’s grand strategy needs India in the Indian Ocean as much as it needed the United Kingdom in the 20th century in the Atlantic Ocean. This approach was clearly outlined in the US quadrennial defence reviews of 2010 and 2014.

**Vital cog**

Further, in the US grand strategy of ‘balancing power’ India is the vital cog to contain China in the Indian Ocean and so further in the greater Asia–Pacific region. If Mahan were alive today, he would note that, given its geographic deadlock with India to the south-west and Russia to the north, China will most likely pursue the way of the sea. Therefore, the United States’ grand strategy in the 21st century is clearly seen as aimed at thwarting Beijing’s maritime ambitions.

As an emerging power in the Asia–Pacific region, India has always been interested in a strategic partnership or co-operation, if not an outright alliance, with the United States. After the release of the successive quadrennial defence reviews in 2010 and 2014, the Indian strategic community perceived that the United States would welcome India’s initiatives to expand its military presence across the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and into the South-west Pacific.

One important issue will be whether there is a blueprint for strategic co-operation in the quadrennial defence review — one that includes the United States helping to address India’s immediate national security threats near its borders, from both Paki-
stan and China. India will also want to see whether the 2014 review addresses the issue of US bases or surveillance operations in the Indian Ocean and, if so, under what terms and conditions they will be operated. At present, within the ambit of the strategic partnership, India co-operates with the United States, both with Washington’s Pacific Command based in Hawaii and the Central Command based in Tampa, Florida.

**Increased co-operation**

India is increasing its defence and strategic co-operation with France and Britain — the former, in particular, has a considerable military presence in the Indian Ocean — both of which also share intelligence with the United States and Australia. Greater strategic co-operation between India and the United States and between India and both France and Britain could indirectly bring all these countries together for deeper, more effective strategic co-operation.

Under such an umbrella, India would expand its military presence across the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific Ocean. India currently has no military presence in that area, but that is expected to change in the next five years, as India starts increasing its Eastern Command’s operational capabilities. Given its expanding commercial engagement with South-east Asia and the western Pacific, it seems like a natural evolution for the Indian Navy to participate in maritime patrols along the relevant sea lanes. For that to happen, however, it will have to secure the support of Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the other states of the strategic arc that effectively acts as a containment mechanism on Chinese military ambitions in the region.

On the other hand, apart from the United States, Australia and India have the largest naval forces in the Indo-Pacific region and they share US concerns about Chinese military expansionism in the region. In Australia’s case, this is added to already existing concerns about Chinese blue-water operations in the South-west Pacific. The two oceans carry the vast majority of Australia’s exports and imports and, therefore, are considered national lifelines worthy of priority protection. In light of this, Australia’s strategic re-orientation requires the upgrading and expansion of its navy, as was highlighted in the 2013 defence white paper.

**Major constraint**

One of the main constraints for US strategic policy-makers, in general, is Washington’s desire not to get entangled in any regional conflicts that would force the United States to send in ground forces. From India’s point of view, such a scenario is also viewed negatively, since New Delhi prefers the United States to concentrate on the maritime aspect of its strategy, rather than allowing itself to be dragged into some prolonged, land-based counter-insurgency and/or stabilisation operations. India, too, would be happy to avoid being called upon to send troops to the troubled rimlands of the Indo-Pacific region in the near future.

In a further effort to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and export control regimes, Barack Obama and Narendra Modi committed to continue to work towards India’s phased entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. The president reaffirmed the United
States’ position that India meets MTCR requirements and is ready for NSG membership. Washington supports India’s early application to join and eventual membership of all four regimes. The new government has chosen to shift away from India’s previous stance of keeping a distance on some issues. While India has always been eager to play the role of a security provider in the region, New Delhi is always conscious of the China factor. However, one can see a clear vision emerging out of the new government — that India is ready to play a more active role in the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.

**Indian priority**
Maritime security has always been a priority for New Delhi, but the Modi government is taking initiatives in charting a policy in this field. While conflict in the South China Sea challenges India’s strategic and economic engagements with South-east Asia, an increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is a direct threat to New Delhi’s sphere of strategic influence. Recognising the inter-linked display of power politics in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, India has transformed its ‘Look East Policy’ into the ‘Act East Policy’ — laying the groundwork for an increased Indian presence in South-east Asia.

India’s concern regarding the territorial disputes in the South China Sea has found common ground with US interests. In light of Modi’s direct statements on the need to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, New Delhi has taken a step forward from the general rhetoric on ‘freedom of navigation’ that characterised its earlier approach. This shared concern was reflected during both Modi’s visit to the United States in September 2014 and Obama’s visit to India in January 2015. There is a willingness in Indian political circles to work closely with Washington on security issues in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. The ‘US–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia–Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’, a document released during Obama’s January visit, is an outcome of such an initiative. The adoption of the strategic vision reflects India’s much needed enthusiasm to play a greater leadership role in the region and India’s willingness to step aside from its strict ‘non-alignment’ principle to further this vision.

Also, during President Obama’s visit to India the defence framework agreement that was signed in 2015 was extended for another ten years, signalling the increased geo-strategic co-operation between India and the United States. As both the United States and India have primarily maritime strategic orientations, there is no doubt that they have found consensus in their strategic thinking, the aim being to develop a counter-weight to Beijing’s increased ambitions in the international arena.

**NOTES**
China and the Pacific: the view from Oceania

Michael Powles reports on a ground breaking conference in Samoa.

China’s growing role in the Pacific Islands region is of increasing interest. Over a decade ago, an article published under the alarmist title ‘Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania’ began what became a heated debate. Initially the alarmists held sway and those who pointed to potential opportunities as well as challenges were in a small minority. Early in the debate, the voices most clearly heard were those of Australians, New Zealanders and Americans, usually warning loudly of the dangers for the region that a more powerful China would bring. Gradually discussion became more balanced, and in 2011 Dr Jian Yang published a comprehensive study on the subject.

Surprisingly, in retrospect, these discussions paid little heed to Pacific Islands views. They certainly existed: while debate continued among outside observers on the best way to deal with China in the Pacific, most Pacific Islands governments were quietly developing solid bilateral relations with Beijing or, in some cases, with Taipei. But, reflecting perhaps a paternalism derived from colonial times, no-one thought to give their clear views prominence.

That has now changed. The recent (February) conference held at Fale Samoa on the campus of the National University of Samoa on ‘China and the Pacific: The View from Oceania’ was the brainchild of the New Zealand Contemporary Research Centre based at Victoria University of Wellington. A three-way partnership was formed with National University of Samoa in Apia and Sun Yat-sen University of Guangzhou. It was agreed that National University of Samoa would host the conference, which would be supported by all three universities.

From the outset, it was agreed the conference would break new ground in three respects:

- priority would be given to views from the Pacific Islands
- the conference itself would be held within the Pacific Islands region (in Samoa) and
- it would provide opportunities for perspectives to be exchanged between scholars and officials from the Pacific Islands, on the one hand, and China, on the other.

Increasing influence

While there was no attempt to reach agreed conclusions or positions, impressions which most participants took away with them will have included a clear sense that China is in the Pacific to stay, that its influence is likely to increase and that Pacific Islands countries need to acknowledge and accommodate that. China’s growing role will pose challenges for countries of the region. But Chinese participants were emphatic that China wanted to cooperate with them and they also emphasised the valuable opportunities that China can bring.

Inevitably, co-operation between China and Pacific countries has sometimes been difficult. Concerns were clearly expressed by participants. But overall the clear sense of participants was that Pacific governments increasingly believe co-operation with China can be valuable for them. A positive atmosphere seemed to be developing between Beijing and the capitals of the region—one participant commented that it was attributable at least in part to a growing confidence on the part of Pacific leaders that they had more control over their nations’ destinies than they have had in the past. There was increasing Pacific Island agency, as one participant put it.

Traditional partners of Pacific Islands countries also have no alternative but to adapt to the changes flowing from China’s rise. New Zealand has begun to do so, particularly in the field of development co-operation.

Tone set

The tone for the conference was set by Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuilaepa Lutesolaiia Sailele Malielegaio in his opening address. He agreed that China’s strong and increasing influence in the Pacific warranted the conference’s dedicated examination of the implications. He went on:

The singling out however of a country and its motives sometimes creates an implicit impression that all is not quite what it seems and there are conspiracies afoot. It is a sentiment that would easily attend discussions of ‘what China wants’ with its growing strength, the ubiquity of its diaspora and not least the often relentless pursuit by the media of perceptions of China’s levels of assertiveness in promoting and securing its interests… Objectivity is clearly very important to the exchanges and outcomes of your conference to help inform the policy-makers not just in Beijing and in the Oceania capitals but in those of all the international actors from outside the region presently active or intending to be so in the Pacific.

We read and hear of the views of analysts and observers that point to colliding interests and inevitable rivalry between...
a rising China and the United States… with the worrying prospects of confrontation and even conflict. It would be most interesting to receive the objective scholarly and expert examination that your conference will bring to bear on such gloomy forecasts….

The prime minister went on to speak positively of Samoa’s own economic relationship with China.

An equally clear request was made by the ambassador of China to Samoa, Mme Li Yanduan, in her welcome remarks: Undeniably, the current international studies are dominated by Western literature and theories, whereas the Oriental studies or specifically the Asia studies are far from being adequately represented. So I am happy today to see that many Chinese scholars are invited to this conference, who can offer China’s side of the story and make valuable input.

**New reality**

In his keynote address to the conference, Tony Browne, chair of the China Centre at Victoria University and a former New Zealand ambassador to China (and high commissioner to Vanuatu), reviewed the development of China’s growing role in the region — to the point that it has become a global power, ‘in many ways the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific… China’s role and impact will be a feature of any discussion of the Pacific for the foreseeable future. That is a reality which is here to stay.’

Tony Browne emphasised the importance of the priority accorded the ‘View from Oceania’ in the conference title:

It is not an occasion where we gather with security and strategic experts from that global industry to consider other countries’ views, other ideological perspectives on where the interests of the region would best lie or how they might best be managed. We are here to ensure that views of this region, of its leaders, its scholars and its public, are heard.

He went on to describe China’s approach to diplomatic relations with the countries of the region, particularly its investment of more time and diplomatic energy in the Pacific Islands region than has any other country from outside the Pacific Forum membership:

China’s rhetoric that all diplomacy should be conducted as exchanges between equals, notwithstanding differences in population, military power, geographic size or economic might, has led Presidential and Prime Ministerial doors in Beijing being more readily open to Pacific Island leaders than those in any other major capital. I expect that a diplomatic analyst assessing the political impact of such regular contact would find that it is more profound than many outside the region may want to realise.

**Positive tone**

Tony Browne emphasised one aspect of China’s involvement in the region which can easily be over-looked:

The tone of China’s engagement with South Pacific countries will be important — as important as the economic or physical legacy its presence and growing involvement may leave. This reference to the desirability of a positive ‘tone’ of engagement seemed also to influence discussion at the conference. A clear feature of the conference was its cheerful and positive tone. Privately, one participant wondered whether this up-beat atmosphere might have influenced participants’ positive impressions of China’s developing relations with Pacific Islands countries.

**Changing geo-politics**

It was suggested that over-hanging the discussion on ‘Changing Geopolitics: China and the Pacific’ was the proposition the Lowy Institute argued two years ago that the Pacific was ‘big enough for all of us’. Many who worried more about the consequences of US–China rivalry than other considerations happily endorsed the Lowy suggestion. But it was not at all clear that Pacific Islands participants agreed. One questioned whether increased military involvement in the region by outside powers would be welcome to Pacific Islands countries. This caution was hardly surprising given, on the one hand, the extraordinary history of the Pacific in terms of foreign domination, eventual independence from colonial rule but frustration with on-going constraints on freedom of action and, on the other, Pacific Islanders’ aspirations for the region, best articulated by the late Epeli Hau’ofa in his historic ‘Our Sea of Islands’.

In fact, there was little discussion of the possibility of US–China rivalry impacting on the Pacific Islands region. The focus throughout the conference was on the growing role of China, the likelihood that it would be permanent and the challenges and
opportunities this created for Pacific Islands countries.

One Pacific participant spoke of the need for island countries to ‘feed the dragon, tame it and then ride it’. He said he was confident Pacific Island countries could do this successfully, reflecting a confidence about the future and Pacific Islanders’ likely capacity to achieve their own objectives which was clearly shared by some other Pacific Islands participants.

Another suggested that perhaps islands countries should not so much worry about taming the dragon as instead using ‘the dragon to help tame the kiwi, the kangaroo and the bald eagle’. In this regard, there was discussion of ‘the China alternative’ in terms of geo-politics and aid in particular.

Some felt that deeper issues still needed to be faced. A participant from Melanesia emphasised that Pacific Islands should not be judged according to ‘institutional standards that were not designed by or for us’. Current institutions in the region should be regarded as ‘transitional’. There was a sense that the geo-political change brought about by China’s increased influence and role in the region could make it easier to reconsider aspects of the status quo.

China alternative

The geo-political implications for the countries of the region of the appearance of a ‘China alternative’ were mentioned by several participants and developed by Professor Terence Wesley-Smith, formerly of New Zealand, now with the University of Hawai’i, and one of the region’s most respected commentators. In his paper, ‘Re-ordering Oceania: China’s Rise, Geopolitics, and Security in the Pacific Islands’, he saw little evidence in Beijing’s activities in the Pacific Islands region of a grand strategy driven by hegemonic aspirations. But China did not support ‘the strengthening of the neo-liberal state in island places’ which was ‘the ultimate objective of Australian aid and diplomacy in the region’. Wesley-Smith continued:

The major concern for Australia and other established powers active in the region is that the rise of China will disrupt the extensive structures of regional influence carefully constructed over many years to pre-empt non-traditional security risks. At issue is, first of all, Beijing’s longstanding practice of providing support to its aid partners without political conditions, except adherence to the ‘one China’ policy. This provides Pacific leaders at least the possibility of avoiding some of the unwanted pressure associated with the aid-leveraged Western-led reform agenda. He went on to acknowledge restraint on China’s part:

However, it is worth noting that Beijing’s bilateral agreements do not require island states to modify or relinquish their ties with Western powers, and recent multilateral initiatives appear specifically designed not to replace the existing architecture of regional cooperation. Indeed, Beijing has been careful to work within established Pacific regional organisations, and to avoid any direct challenges to existing patterns of leadership.

Moreover, there is no sense that China has held itself out as representing alternative political or economic policy options that Pacific Island countries should follow. Few of the Pacific Islands participants articulated specific views on the ‘China alternative’, but it was clearly regarded by many to be a significant consequence of the changing geo-politics of the region.

Pacific leadership

Several participants believed increasing confidence on the part of some leaders in the region was emerging. This was reflected in the suggestion that Melanesian leaders, through the Melanesian Spearhead Group, were determined to have a hand in setting the standards by which their governments and institutions should be judged. It remained to be seen how far this would be taken in practice, but it was based on strong belief that a concept of ‘good governance’ that contained no indigenous elements was unacceptable.

Another participant, from the Polynesian Pacific, spoke of the need for Pacific governments to be more assertive in negotiations with aid donors, China included, to ensure that development outcomes truly reflected islands country wishes. To this end, islands governments should more often ‘act collectively’ to achieve their objectives. Mark Brown, Cook Islands minister of finance, spoke of the emphasis donor governments placed on projects making ‘economic sense’, and he argued that it was equally important for projects to make good ‘island sense’ even if that cost more money.

The assistant chief executive of Samoa’s Ministry of Finance, Peseta Noumea Simi, spoke of many years of dealing with China’s aid to Samoa, particularly in negotiating with Chinese officials. She made it clear that Samoans negotiated throughout with confidence and strength — positions that were clearly respected by their interlocutors. Other participants indicated a renewed interest in ensuring that their development objectives were better reflected in projects.

Donor issue

Specifically, participants spoke of the disadvantage for island countries when donors, particularly China, designed projects in their own capitals and then brought in all labour and materials for aid projects from overseas. Clearly these were major concerns. It was suggested that China could be prepared to respond to some of these concerns and modify past policies and practices. A likely consequence of the conference is that China’s development partners will push more strongly for changes in these areas.

The issue of soft loans from China and the burden of indebtedness being assumed by some Pacific Islands countries was discussed at some length. A participant from Samoa indicated determination to push harder for grant rather than loan aid. Tonga’s situation was of particular interest. A former minister of finance from Tonga reminded the conference that nobody made Tonga accept concessional loans from China. And in his paper, Pesi Fonua, editor of Matangi Tonga, Nuku’alofa, spoke of the crisis he believed Tonga was in:

It is clear that the increasing role and influence of China in Tonga today… is a debt collector’s influence, and Tonga has no option but to satisfy the demands of the debt collectors. None of the Chinese present responded to these comments but indicated that these strong views would be reported back to Beijing. Hopefully the same will apply on the issue of conserving the valuable Pacific tuna fishery. Joyce Samuelu Ah Leong, Sa-
moa’s lead fisheries negotiator, spoke of Pacific concerns for the sustainability of the tuna resource and concluded by thanking China for all its generous aid and asking for just one more thing: a more responsible policy on the conservation of the Pacific tuna fishery.

**Strong view**

Other messages conveyed to the Chinese present included the strong view that Beijing needed to understand that what might seem to be very small issues or things in a China context could instead be very big indeed in Pacific Islands contexts.

Overall, the impetus for change in the region was described as being more internally than externally driven. It was certainly not driven by China, but the changes associated with China’s increasing role in the region boosted confidence in change on the part of internal actors.

At the end, the deputy head of mission of the Chinese Embassy in Samoa, Yang Liu, responded to many of the points that had been made in discussion, promising, in the case of many of them, that the viewpoints would be carefully reported. He concluded by taking up the suggestion that the Pacific needed to feed the dragon, tame the dragon and ride the dragon:

Professor Kabutaulaka made a very good metaphor of comparing treating with China as feeding and riding the Dragon, although I would say Dragon as a totem of the Chinese nation is not easy to be tamed. But I want to say that China and the PICs are economically complementary and have great potential for mutually beneficial cooperation… China is a kind and auspicious Dragon flying in full wings, and you do not have to feed or tame the Dragon to live with it. What you need to do is simply to treat the Dragon as a friend rather than a threat or pet, and then you can easily win its heart.

At this conference Pacific views were certainly heard; and expectations were raised that they would be considered constructively in China in this spirit of ‘mutually beneficial co-operation’.

**NOTES**

2. Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (eds), *China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?* (New York, 2010).
The Arctic and Antarctica: differing currents of change

Peter Kennedy reports on a recent NZIIA symposium.

‘The Arctic and Antarctica: Differing Currents of Change’ symposium held on 27 February in Wellington was intended to expose the range of issues related to the northern and southern polar regions, the threats and the challenges, and what the future may hold for these unique environments. After being welcomed by Victoria University of Wellington Vice Chancellor Professor Grant Guilford and MFAT Deputy Secretary Gerard van Bohemen, panel members in the first session tackled the topic of commercialisation versus conservation within differing legal environments. Professor Donald Rothwell, ANU, opened this session, chaired by Peter Kennedy, by looking at how the Law of the Sea Convention interacts — or not — with the distinctive legal regimes of the polar regions. This threw up a number of challenging issues in the Antarctic region, such as whether or not Australia’s whale sanctuary is consistent with the Antarctic Treaty. By contrast in the Arctic, without such a specific treaty, there are very direct jurisdictional and maritime issues between sovereign states. Choke points in the Arctic are potentially getting more problematic as the ice melts. A key conclusion was that in the Arctic at least the Law of the Sea Convention will prove pivotal in regulating and managing the area.

By contrast in Antarctica it is the Antarctic Treaty system that has greater impact. Stuart Prior opened up the issue of access to resources and the regions by suggesting a much more open and transparent approach than currently exists. Colin Keating argued that in the absence of sovereign jurisdiction wherever there is conflict, be it military or commercial, conservation values suffer. Negotiations are difficult and time consuming, but in adapting to the future do we push for the ‘perfect’ solution, which may be unrealisable, or accept an outcome that may not be perfect but actually works?

Territorial claims

In session two, chaired by Bill Mansfield, geographic and political differences between the two polar regions featured. Ambassador Tucker Scully (United States) pointed out that engagements in the Arctic have been based on consultative mechanisms rather than on a treaty designed around earlier territorial claims, as in Antarctica. Moreover, there is a huge significance in the non-military character of the Antarctic, which gives the treaty extra value. Professor Anne-Marie Brady from Canterbury University argued, nevertheless, that the Antarctic Treaty in its present form is not well suited to dealing with increased demands for exploitation of oil and gas.

Associate Professor Alan Hemmings (Gateway Antarctica) had some robust comments to make about cutting away the gentrified rationales about similarities and differences and seeing the

Arctic and Antarctica as hitherto peripheral spaces that have been appropriated by ‘The West’ since the end of the 19th century. This brought the symposium to the telling point that most territorial claims are by Western Europeans, North Americans and countries like Australia and New Zealand. Hemmings doubted that the position these countries have in the driving seat of policy decisions can remain forever within a changing global order.

The future

In the final session chaired by Neil Gilbert, Professor Klaus Dodds, from Royal Holloway University of London, noted that there is a lengthy tradition of imagining the future of the Arctic and Antarctica — in literary, cartographic, visual, and aural terms. If one looks to polar futures within popular geo-politics, a range of future developments have already been imagined, including an ice-free Arctic Ocean, mining in the Antarctic, territorial conflict in the Arctic and Antarctic, ice cap melting leading to global catastrophe and Chinese take-over of polar regions. Not all these imaginary scenarios will come to pass, depending upon our ability to pre-empt unthinkable futures, but in one area at least it is happening already. Professor Tim Naish (Antarctic Research Centre) reminded the audience of the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, the imperilment of the ice shelf of the Thwaites Glacier and all the other very real concerns that exist at both poles because of climate change and humanity’s insensitivity to the impact of their actions. This is of particular concern because the polar regions are warming at twice the global rate.

It was left to Professor Karen Scott, Canterbury University, to give the final word on what the polar regions, particularly Antarctica, might look like in 100 years. Her first prediction was that Antarctica will continue to be subject to an international regime — and we will not see a return to government by means of 19th century notions of sovereignty — but the form of international governance in Antarctica is less certain. The whole issue of bioprospecting will keep lawyers employed for decades. And at the end of 100 years we will have one of two possible scenarios: one where the Antarctic Treaty system is weaker and playing a reduced role within a myriad of other international institutions and systems or one where that system not only operates as the primary regime for the management and protection of Antarctica but also is fully engaged internationally on behalf of the region. The symposium closed with her provocative question: would the necessary cost of the latter be relinquishing of territorial claims?

Peter Kennedy is the NZIIA’s executive director.
HELL-BENT
Australia’s leap into the Great War

Author: Douglas Newton
Published by: Scribe, Melbourne, 2014, 344pp, A$32.99.

Last August we commemorated the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War. As self-governing Dominions of the British Empire, Australia and New Zealand were involved in this conflict by King George V’s declaration of war on Germany late on 4 August 1914 (UK time, but 5 August in the Antipodes). Neither had any say in the decision for war, which was made by the King’s ministers in London. Like New Zealand, Australia had no problem with this situation, accepting that the foreign policy of the empire was in the hands of the British government. They responded with patriotic fervour. Within weeks both had expeditionary forces ready to take part in the fighting on the Western Front, or wherever else the British authorities decided. After concentrating at Albany, Western Australia, the combined forces left in a 38-ship convoy on 1 November 1914, heading across the Indian Ocean for the Suez Canal. The expectation of many that the war would be short was sadly misplaced. Before the guns fell silent four years later, 18 million would die, an average of 11,000 a day. More than 60,000 Australians would fall — along with 18,000 New Zealanders.

With the outbreak of war, Australia pledged its support to the last man and the last shilling, and its contribution to the defeat of Germany and its allies would be immense. But was it an entirely innocent party in the proceedings that led to the war that the commemoration last August portrayed? And was its offer of assistance the reactive and duty-bound response to the empire’s embroilment in a continental war that underpinned that commemoration? In Hell-bent, Australia’s leap into the Great War, Australian historian Douglas Newton seeks to answer these questions. ‘All is not simple and straightforward’, he suggests. Focusing on the days leading up to the outbreak of war between Britain and Germany, he puts the events surrounding Australia’s involvement in the war under a microscope and comes up with a different interpretation to that prevailing in Australia today.

Essentially Newton argues that most Australians’ perception of what happened in August 1914 is flawed. Far from answering the call patriotically, he maintains, Australia jumped the gun, offering a 20,000-man expeditionary force, to be at the ‘complete disposal of the Home Government’, even before war began. Australia’s offer was not a reaction to the outbreak of war, as is generally supposed (partly because of an egregious error in the official history prepared by Charles Bean, which placed the German invasion of Belgium on 2 August, two days before it occurred and thus a day before Australia’s offer). The offer in fact was made 40 hours before the declaration of war. Nor was it the result of a call for assistance from London or of a requirement under imperial defence plans. It was a purely Australian initiative. ‘The Cook cabinet simply hurried ahead of events.’ Far from being admirably noble and calculated, Newton argues, Australia’s ‘tumble into the Great War was impulsive, recklessly unlimited, and driven by low political calculation’.

Coming at a time when British Cabinet was split on the question of whether to become involved in the war that had erupted between the Central Powers and France and Russia, Australia’s offer — and those of Canada and New Zealand earlier — bolstered the faction in London that favoured doing so. ‘It thrilled those in London pushing for Britain’s instant intervention.’ Unlike most historians who have written on these events, Newton pays close attention to the time line, bearing in mind the ten-hour difference between London and Melbourne. He seeks to place the Australian offer in the context of the complex politics leading up to the decision to issue an ultimatum to Germany on 4 August. He contrasts the deep division in London, which made the decision to intervene ‘a very close-run thing’, with the eagerness for action in Australia. On the question of whether Australia helped or hindered the rush to war, however, Newton is commendably cautious. ‘Probably she did neither, as she counted for so little.’ He suggests that Australia’s actions were just one small factor among many that influenced the responsible politicians in the last few days of peace.

To provide context for the Australian decision-making in August 1914, Newton examines the military planning in Australia prior to the war, looking in particular at the development of an expeditionary force approach. He also provides a useful exposition of the political situation in Australia in the period leading up to the outbreak of the war. He accepts that Australian involvement in the war was inevitable. Economic reasons alone ensured involvement, but Australia was ‘emotionally incapable of any other response’. The war was ‘Australia’s war’. His criticism focuses on Australia’s ‘reckless descent into an incalculable ocean of bereavement and misery’.

Hell-bent contains much of interest to the New Zealand reader, not least because New Zealand largely replicated the Australian approach — but jumped the gun even earlier. Newton notes Prime Minister William Massey’s offer of assistance in Parliament on 31 July 1914 and outlines its impact on Australian opin-

Notes on reviewers

Dr Ian McGibbon, the managing editor of the NZIR, is preparing a history of New Zealand’s involvement on the Western Front during the First World War. Dr Anthony Smith is in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent DPMC or the New Zealand government.
ion. He points out that it came before the general mobilisation by any of the major players in the drama unfolding in Europe. He also outlines pre-war planning meetings between New Zealand and Australian military authorities, in particular the three-day talks General Godley had with his Australian counterpart in 1912. These laid the basis of the two countries’ eventual response to the outbreak of war.

Newton, who taught for some years at Victoria University of Wellington in the 1980s, has produced an excellent book. *Hell bent* is a very readable work of scholarship. Based on impeccable research, it provides an interpretation of events that challenges the received perception, and will be read with much interest by anyone interested in the role of Australia, and New Zealand, in the first great war of the 20th century. It is a strong antidote to the celebratory tone of much of the centenary commemoration discourse on both sides of the Tasman.

IAN McGIBBON

**THE NEW EMPERORS: Power and the Princelings in China**

*Author: Kerry Brown

This interesting book begins with the wholly remarkable 2011 story of Gu Kailai, the wife of Bo Xilai, party secretary of Chongqing and then rising political star in China. Gu was convicted of the murder of Neil Haywood, a British businessman. She would later claim that Haywood had threatened the safety of her child. Gu Kailai is alleged to have met Haywood in a hotel room, poisoned his drink with cyanide, left him ailing in his room and instructed the hotel staff not to enter his room. Haywood’s body was not discovered until days later. Bo Xilai also faced his own serious accusations of corruption. Whatever the facts of the matter are, Bo very quickly found his career was over when it had once looked like he was destined for higher honours.

It is an instructive thought experiment to consider what the New Zealand public knows about the leadership of our largest trading partner. People are likely aware of Xi Jinping as China’s president, but would likely struggle to name the premier (Li Keqiang). Would they know how the roles of president and premier differed? (The premier position is largely a crisis management role, according to Brown.) Would they be able to appreciate the difference between the Standing Committee and the Politburo? Addressing a lot of this and more, Kerry Brown, Australian based academic and former British diplomat, offers some intriguing conclusions on the nature of power in the Chinese system.

When it comes to assessing the Chinese leadership, without access to the primary and secondary sources that form the usual raw material for historians and political scientists, how does an author cast judgments? (Domestic attempts in China to comment on Chinese leaders can come badly unstuck.) Brown recounts the story of the commentator Yu Jie, who was put under house arrest and eventually went into exile in the United States for writing a critical story on a previous Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, and flippantly calling him ‘China’s Best Actor.’ A bit like the shadows in a cave, in Plato’s famous analogy, a lot has to be inferred from key events; such as the story of Gu Kailai above.

Brown looks at one of the prevailing views of Chinese politics, which is to divide the elites into ‘factions’. Both Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping are the children of Communist Party leaders, as are indeed many other members of the current Chinese elite. These are the so-called ‘princelings’, a term that now finds itself coming into a lot of media commentary, and also the title of the book under review. But Brown questions whether this ‘aristocracy’ forms a faction in any meaningful sense of that term. Other factions that have been mooted over the years are ‘Shanghai’ (often associated with Jiang Zemin), the China Youth League, the oil faction and graduates of Qinghua University. Brown prefers to view power in China as revolving much more around particular personality networks, which some Chinese leaders have been more successful in harnessing than others. Echoing Michel Foucault, Brown notes that ‘power is akin to a force or kind of energy in the world’, and the Communist Party is a coalition of interests.

Brown also offers some reflections on how much the backgrounds of Chinese leaders have changed over time. Setting aside the princeling issue, there has been a noted change in the backgrounds of Standing Committee and Politburo members. First and second generation leaders were revolutionary and military figures, who eventually made way for engineers and those who had studied hard sciences. The current (fifth generation) leadership is the most educated in the history of the People’s Republic; it is also a leadership that has had a lot of exposure to the outside world. (As an aside, Xi Jinping’s ‘return trip’ in 2012 to his host family in Iowa was a public relations master stroke, if the sort of media attention it garnered in the United States is any measure.) The Standing Committee members all have quite interesting backgrounds. Li Keqiang, the first lawyer to make the Standing Committee, is a fan of some of the lesser known works of the likes of Adam Smith and de Tocqueville. Wang Qishan is the standing committee’s first formally trained historian. Brown also emphasises how determined the more recent generations of Chinese leaders have been to avoid the ‘Maoist utopianism’ of the Cultural Revolution.

Brown offers some reflections on how leaders are identified and how they ascend. There is also a comparison to the Vatican’s process that Brown makes in explaining leadership selection. Brown notes the ‘multiple ironies’ in this given the tensions that exist between the Chinese Communist Party and the Vatican (which recognises Taiwan). Is it really an irony that two institutions that may have some similarity of selection process are at odds with each other? We could also reflect on the limitations of such an analogy in the first place.

This is a well-written and fascinating account of the structures and personalities that run China. The strength of this book is that it is very accessible, which one senses is exactly the intention of the author.

ANTHONY SMITH
Institute Notes

National Office and branch activities.

On 9 March Rose Gottemoeller, the US under-secretary for arms control and international security, delivered the 2015 Foreign Policy Lecture at Victoria University of Wellington. Her topic was ‘The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at 45: Where to Next?’

The NZIIA notes with regret the passing of its former president Professor Gordon Orr at Waikanae on 16 March.

Christchurch

The AGM was held on 23 February. The following officers were elected:

Chair — Dr Chris Jones FRHistS
Secretary — Dr Sally Carlton
Treasurer and Vice-chair — Margaret Sweet
Committee — Hon Peter Penlington, Dr Angela Woodward, John Richardson

Following the AGM Andrew Sweet (a special adviser in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet) addressed the branch on ‘Science Diplomacy and the “Small Advanced Economies Initiative”’.

On 25 March David Pine, former high commissioner to Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, addressed the branch on ‘Malaysia’s Year in the ASEAN Chair: Why it Should Matter to New Zealand’.

Hawke’s Bay

The following meetings were held:

7 Apr Richard Grant (branch chairman and New Zealand’s ambassador to Germany 1990–94), ‘German reunification: 25 years on: then and now’.

Waikato

On 10 March Michalis Rokas, the chargé d’affaires of the EU Delegation to New Zealand, addressed the branch on ‘The European Union: Moving Beyond Crisis With New Leadership’.

Wairarapa

On 25 March Dr Gill Greer (chief executive officer of Volunteer Service Abroad) addressed the branch on ‘Leaving No-one Behind: How New Zealand Can Contribute to Sustainable Development Goals’.

Wellington

The following meetings were held:

26 Mar HE Andris Teikmanis (ambassador of Latvia to New Zealand), ‘European Challenges: The Baltic Outlook’. (This meeting was held in conjunction with the Delegation of the European Union in New Zealand and the Embassy of Latvia.)
28 Apr Dr Joe Burton (lecturer in international relations and international security, Victoria University of Wellington), ‘Cyber Security in the Asia-Pacific: Conflict of Co-operation’.

Rose Gottemoeller gives the NZIIA’s Foreign Policy Lecture on 9 March and (centre) takes questions with NZIIA President Sir Doug Kidd. At bottom she meets with Ken Ross, at right, watched by Max Bergmann (US Embassy)
Members of the NZIIA were very saddened to learn of the death of Gordon Orr, who served as president from 1964 to 1968, a member of the Standing Committee and a longstanding honorary vice-president. His interest in international affairs had been sparked by the NZIIA’s major international conference in Palmerston North in January 1959, of which he was the organising secretary.

Gordon’s funeral service was at Te Herenga Waka Marae, Victoria University of Wellington. One of his successors as president, I spoke at the funeral and the following tribute consists of extracts from that eulogy and draws on the eulogy given by Sir Edward Taihakurei Durie.

Gordon Orr completed both a BA and an LLM at Victoria University, a most unusual combination 60 plus years ago. In the course of that study he undertook research on social policy legislation for a triumvirate of professors, including R.O. McGechan and F.L.W. Wood. In Shakespeare’s terms, Gordon played many parts, private and public. I will refer to four public parts — as legal practitioner, as public service administrator, as academic and as a member of the Waitangi Tribunal.

Gordon provides an excellent example of the value of those who use and develop their talents across a range of apparently different tasks. The whole, it has often been said, is other than the sum of its parts. Readers will be able to think of others providing such an example. A daughter of one of them, as you may have heard recently, said to her father ‘Dad, can’t you hold down a job?’

As a practitioner, Gordon was first in private practice in a leading Wellington firm, Young, Bennett, Virtue and White. He was then, for twelve years, one of a very strong group of lawyers recruited to the Crown Law Office by Richard Wild, who, as solicitor general, revitalised that office. Others in that group he recruited were Richard Savage and Ivor Richardson, both also sadly no longer with us. Crown Law with that lead-group he recruited were Richard Savage and Ivor Richardson, who, as solicitor general, revitalised that office. Others in that lawyers recruited to the Crown Law Office by Richard Wild.

Gordon brought to the Law Faculty and to the wider university, a most exquisitely way.

OBTURAY

Professor Gordon Stewart Orr

18 January 1926–16 March 2015

Gordon had extensive experience as counsel, as senior Crown counsel, both before a wide range of tribunals, including the Trade Practices Commission, the Licensing Control Commission, the Local Government Commission and numerous Commissions of Inquiry and before the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council, addressing administrative law, criminal appeals, taxation, valuation and mining.

After those 20 years in legal practice, Gordon began to play the second of the four parts, as a senior administrator in the public service. For three years he was a commissioner and deputy chair of the State Services Commission and for four secretary for justice. In the latter position especially, he had major responsibilities for a department with many functions, many more than it has now. I mention first his commitment to the principles of public service. In the words of one of his team at Justice, he gave particular emphasis to the obligation to deliver fearless, free and frank advice to ministers and to the government of the day.

My other matter from Gordon’s days in Justice is law reform. In that work Gordon was greatly helped by his law reform team, notably by Jim Cameron. As Gordon himself has written and I strongly endorse, Jim Cameron was one of New Zealand’s greatest law reformers. Among the important reforms in that period were changes in divorce law and matrimonial property law, the establishment of the Human Rights Commission and the setting up of the Royal Commission on the Courts. It was a time of major change with Maori land and other claims becoming more prominent and the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the resulting oil shock, the 1975 Women’s Convention — some would say that as a result of attending that event, the secretary for justice became an ardent feminist — and the 1975 change of government, with the challenges to the public service presented by the new prime minister.

After those years of public administration and the earlier years of legal practice, Gordon decided that he would like to play a third part and joined the Law Faculty as professor of constitutional law. From 1978 until 1987 Gordon taught and researched constitutional law and legal history, emphasising 19th century Maori land issues. His contribution to the university was marked by his being made a professor emeritus. Gordon brought to the Law Faculty and to the wider university, on the council of which he had served as an elected member for thirteen years, his wide experience of legal practice, both private and public, and of government administration, all being informed by his wider interests.

Next came the fourth public part, as a member of the Waitangi Tribunal, on which he served for more than ten years. He participated in 21 inquiries and presided in five of them, making major contributions to the work of that important body.

Gordon Orr served the law, the public service, the university and New Zealand, more broadly, in an excellent and exemplary way.

Sir Kenneth Keith
AN INVITATION

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