CHINA

- Australian defence
- Diplomatic practice
### Corporate Members
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- Asia New Zealand Foundation
- Australian High Commission
- Beef + Lamb New Zealand Ltd
- Business New Zealand
- Catalyst IT Ltd
- Centre for Defence & Security Studies, Massey University
- Department of Conservation
- Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
- European Union Centres Network
- Fonterra Co-operative Group
- HQ New Zealand Defence Force
- Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment
- Ministry for Primary Industries
- Ministry for the Environment
- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Social Development
- Ministry of Transport
- National Centre for Research on Europe
- University of Canterbury
- New Zealand Customs Service
- New Zealand Police
- New Zealand United States Council
- Reserve Bank of New Zealand
- Saunders Unsworth
- Science New Zealand Inc
- Statistics New Zealand
- The Treasury
- Victoria University of Wellington
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### Institutional Members
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- British High Commission
- Canadian High Commission
- Centre for Strategic Studies
- Cook Islands High Commission
- Council for International Development
- Delegation of the European Union in NZ
- Development Office & Foundation, VUW
- Embassy of Brazil
- Embassy of Cuba
- Embassy of France
- Embassy of Israel
- Embassy of Italy
- Embassy of Japan
- Embassy of Mexico
- Embassy of Spain
- Embassy of Switzerland
- Embassy of the Argentine Republic
- Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
- Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
- Embassy of the People's Republic of China
- Embassy of the Philippines
- Embassy of the Republic of Chile
- Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia
- Embassy of the Republic of Korea
- Embassy of the Republic of Poland
- Embassy of the Republic of Turkey
- Embassy of the Russian Federation
- Embassy of the United States of America
- High Commission for Malaysia
- High Commission for Pakistan
- High Commission of India
- New Zealand Red Cross Inc
- NZ China Friendship Society
- NZ Horticulture Export Authority
- New Zealand Institute of Economic Research
- Papua New Guinea High Commission
- Political Studies Department, University of Auckland
- School of Linguistics & Applied Language Studies, VUW
- Singapore High Commission
- Soka Gakkai International of NZ
- South African High Commission
- Taipei Economic & Cultural Office
- The Innovative Travel Co. Ltd
- United Nations Association of NZ
- Volunteer Service Abroad (Inc)
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33 INSTITUTE NOTES
The Chinese are certainly clever — their young children earn laurels at overseas universities, and four of them will soon take up Rhodes scholarships at Oxford, the first for China. China’s diplomatic activity has been energetic: intensive dialogue with the United States and Russia, red carpet welcomes in Africa and Europe and a state visit to the United Kingdom. The impact of the financial turmoil cannot be gainsaid, but the government’s quick thinking and opportunism has arrested slowdown. Its shopping spree, it is predicted, will lead to $1 billion of overseas investment in the next five years, making China the second largest outward investor after the United States (it is currently fourth). At home, cars fast replace concrete as the government furthers high-tech innovation and higher wages fuel yet more consumption; the two-child policy will deliver another 30 million workers qua consumers.

But monkey-like China is also mischievous — Machiavellian even. Its display of military muscle at last year’s Tiananmen Square parade and island-building in the South China Sea have rattled its Asian neighbours as much as the Americans; Australia, in response, is increasing its military budget. An offloading of surplus steel at knockdown prices (along with Russia) risks trade war. And there is plenty of other monkey business. In the name of stability the government cracks down on social media, Christian churches, minority groups, human rights lawyers, journalists, non-governmental organisations and intellectuals. The continued disappearance of three Hong Kong booksellers, known to be critical of the mainland government, might remind the government that Sun Yat-sen, kidnapped in London, lured to Chinese Embassy and detained, returned to China to be revered as a symbol of modernisation. Given the paradoxes that typify modern China, students of international politics can only try to interpret the diverse whisperings of financial and political analysts. But what they hear may not be what they see.

In the gardens of Beijing’s Temple of Heaven, there may not be a thousand flowers in bloom but people of all ages are twirling, swaying, gyrating to traditional dance music, practicing tai chi or placidly kneading meditation balls. Others sit on the old wall outside the sacrifice stables click clacking mahjong counters, shuffling cards and counting their trumps. Shopping malls pulsate with life. Billboards illuminated in splendid calligraphy encourage the mood of optimism with their slogans of equality, fraternity (nationalism and patriotism), peace and solidarity (working together qua democracy?). Stylish passers-by have no doubt that they will come up trumps. They feel at home in their shoes, able once more to follow Chinese tradition that venerates state, family and ancestors. At Chinese New Year they flock to family reunions and to the temples, as they will later at Qing Ming. They appear to see no contradiction between the Confucian idea of moderation and their avid consumption. A child’s university education, discounting the expense, is almost every parent’s aspiration. Overseas, in New Zealand, Australian, British and American universities for example, as the folk song reminds, ‘the Good Children of China’ are gaining the know-how to move their country into the vanguard of the next technical and scientific revolution. They alone are enough to give China a great comparative advantage.

While China goes out to the world, foreign investors, busi-

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nessmen, consulate officials, political and economic journalists and academics flock to China. They come to build bridges, but have to unravel truth entwined with enigmas. Those familiar with the party game of Chinese whispers know that either you do not hear what was said, and inadvertently pass on a different message, or you hear correctly but choose to pass on your own interpretation. To see Chinese consumers is to doubt the stories of repression and economic downturn. Venture into poor rural areas, where the people are equally industrious, and conspicuous consumption is much less apparent. Their situation is making some commentators nervous. They fear, or perhaps hope, that history could repeat itself. The founder of the Ming Empire, Hongwu, came from peasant stock, as did Mao Zedong. Those familiar with more recent history may reflect on the May the Fourth uprising in 1919. Triggered by the ceding of German-held Chinese territory to the Japanese under the Treaty of Versailles, it was also a quest for self-determination and socio-political reform and it nourished the rise of communism. Sixty years later, the communist government, perceiving a threat to its power and running scared of its own liberalism, crushed the Tiananmen Square demonstration. Today the quest for self-determination is seemingly taking a different form.

Style revolution
The latest movement in China is not overtly political. It is a style revolution. Students cause a stir in designer coffee bars, yuppies discuss deals over China’s own brand of beer, shoppers are beguiled by adverts for Apple, Porsche or Gucci, some 600 million have smart phones, the government is making it easier for them to own their own home and six million cars whizz past should they be in Beijing. Millions have been pulled out of poverty and they are hitting the consumption button hard, taking advantage of phenomenal choice; long gone are the days when only one brand was available and Chinese blue the only available colour. And the good news is passed on via social media. Given that the government is avowedly communist, China watchers puzzle at its very visible open market policies. But, taking advantage of an army of creative, innovative, entrepreneurs and an abundant supply of labour, the government is allowing capitalism and socialism to co-exist. Perhaps China’s leaders have read J.K. Galbraith’s The Culture of Contentment? They seem prepared to address issues that may give rise to discontent: the lack of a social security net (and the not uncommon sight of beggars sleeping under arches), the demand from second- and third-tier cities to have a bigger say in their affairs, the income gap between rich and poor and the differences between urban and rural development.

The government is seeking the co-operation of the private sector to provide corporate pensions and health insurance. Poverty and under-development in rural areas is going some way to resolve itself as higher wages in the cities increase demand for fresh produce from the countryside and quality goods using updated, but traditional, skills. As designer pigs join designer bags, a new breed of agricultural entrepreneurs is emerging.1 Needing to keep the job-growth engine firing on all cylinders, the government pushes on with its Great Western Area Development Strategy, infrastructure projects for the new Silk Road, and the South-North Water Division project. The China Development Bank, a driving force behind many domestic projects, has brokered deals with Africa and South America to generate trade and overseas jobs for Chinese labour.

This outreach is a Chinese tradition. In the 16th century technological and scientific innovation came via the Silk Route and Western scientists like the astronomer Jesuit Verbiest. Now
the collaboration is worldwide. But while workers are putting on
the style, China’s economic elite is feeling more vulnerable. Presi-
dent Xi’s crack down on corruption may be unnerving them,
but their biggest worry is the uncertainty created by the world’s
bankers and financial analysts, who play verbal ping pong with
the economy. George Soros warns of the ‘war of the Yuan’ — that
if capital flight intensifies the momentum may be unstoppable. Scholars, like Stephen Roach, Yale academic and former chair
of Morgan Stanley, Asia, beg to differ. China’s huge exchange
reserves of US$3.3 trillion are enough to cover more than four
times its short-term external debt, and it runs a large current
account surplus.

Consumer wakens
The South China Morning Post exhorted its readers to ‘ignore
Soros’s prophecy of doom’. There are problems with financial
management and growth expectations, but the economy and
stock market are not the same — the US economy has been in a
poor state since 2008 but the stock market is continuously rising,
whereas China has the opposite problem. Soros’s real target, the
paper suggests, is to raise the alarm about other Asian currencies.
Yet Soros admits that scaremongering has led to capital flight and
downward pressure on the renminbi. The Asia–Pacific scholar
Tom Plate argues that such pessimism inclines China to mistrust
Western financial advice.

To counter the Asian crises in 1997, China sheltered its cur-
cy. Its stimulus to the domestic economy in 2008 was in re-
sponse to America’s financial earthquake. Analysts agree that
China’s ‘wild card remains the scale of capital flight’. But the
dollar spike is over, the oil dividend is coming through and ‘the
consumer wakens to save China’. By 2020 the number of affluent
households is set to double and venture capitalists are jetting in to
China’s cities to be in the vanguard. In airport lounges, en route
to Beijing, they whisper to each other that all is well. The Chinese
government’s policy of structural readjustment, shifting from an
economy driven by manufacturing and infrastructural invest-
ment to services, high value technology and capital-intensive
production, augurs well. This view was confirmed by the G20 in
Shanghai. Why then, asks Roger Bootle, executive chair of Capi-
tal Economics, ‘aren’t people banging on about Eurozone weak-
ness, rather than China’s, as the reason for the current gloom in
world markets?’

Long memories
China, as President Xi likes to explain, now has ‘medium high-
speed growth’ — at just under 7 per cent (latest prediction at
around 6.5 per cent) ‘a new normal’ but still very high compared
with growth rates elsewhere.’ Perhaps President Xi’s emphasis on
‘sustainable and healthy growth’ comes from a Confucian prov-
erb: if the tree falls the monkeys scatter? Chinese memories are
long; the tree fell in the 1830s when, as a result of excessive capi-
talist activity, opium flooded the black market and war ensued.
President Xi has no desire for war. He has been at pains to explain
to world leaders that China needs and wants peace. Then why did
the government mount such a magnificent display of military
might at last year’s parade in Tiananmen Square, which ironi-
cally means gate of heavenly peace? Was it showing Japan, and
other Asian powers, that China is number one?

Diplomats in Beijing, who endured the four-hour specta-
cle, judged it an unnecessary show of muscle: China knows it
is strong in the outside world. Japan, for instance, is under no
illusions about its place in the pecking order. Perhaps, one offi-
cial suggested, the government should remember that the wall
(in all its parts and stages) was never useful, just ‘ingenious and
cruel’; the Mongols posed very little threat, for the greatest dan-
ger came from the south — from Japan — and the money and
energy could have been spent on better things, like the economy.
Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s
Congress Fu Ying avows that ‘there will not be another Opium War or Japanese military aggression against us’. The government
may, however, have been warning the Americans not to under-
take further excursions in Chinese territorial waters.

Some commentators suggest that the government’s display of
might could be an indication of its underlying insecurity? Ameri-
can presidents, for example, as Sir Harold Macmillan pointed
out, often appear powerful to the outside world when they are
politically weak at home. President Xi’s recent diplomatic offen-
sive is seen as a huge personal success for both him and First La-
dy Peng Liyuan. David Shambaugh, writing in the South China
Morning Post, comments that ‘rarely, if ever, has China had a
more active year in diplomacy’, taking in Europe, Africa, Asia,
the United States and (particularly important for ameliorating
tensions there) the United Kingdom, where the president was ac-
corded the honour of a state visit. He also seemed attuned to
the post-national way of the modern world, where international
trading treaties bind nations together in ever-increasingly large
conglomerations.

This outreach also extended to international forums, most
notably Beijing’s sponsorship of the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank and its constructive engagement at the climate talks
in Paris. The World Bank’s recent decision to include the renmin-

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Counter indications

Despite the success of President Xi’s charm offensive, particularly the improved dialogue with Presidents Obama and Putin and the proliferation of new investment deals, there are counter indications that cannot be ignored. The British, and many Hong Kong residents, accuse China offlouting the Basic Law, while the United States accuses it of international violations. Beijing’s artificial island building in the South China Sea and its refusal to comply with the Court of Arbitration in The Hague, where the Philippines is contesting Chinese sovereignty, is viewed as aggressive. The conversion of the rocks and reefs of the Spratlys into islands and the moving of an oil-rig into waters claimed by Vietnam are seen as inflammatory. China argues that the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia can work together through ASEAN to settle disputed claims. There are whispers that by sending its warships into the territorial waters of China’s Xisha Islands (within 12 nautical miles of Zhongjian Island in the Xisha archipelago) the United States is trying to divide and rule: to revive its trans-Pacific friends, through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, New Zealand might have to choose between the United States and China. Clearly both matter, and many value chains incorporate China and the United States.15 Detractors argue that the TPP’s plethora of rules will inhibit trade.16 On the bright side, it is predicted that the TPP will play an important part in the evolution of a Trans-Pacific Free Trade Area (FTAAP), involving not just twelve but the entire 21 members of APEC and, eventually, China. But whatever the outcome, trade with China will continue to grow. For more and more people in China, meat has ceased to be a luxury item and a passion for flat whites and ice cream tops New Zealand’s. An English-speaking cleaner, aka artist, on his bike showing tourists the way to the Temple of Heaven, spotting an Auckland newspaper bearer, flashed a smiling ‘New Zealand: good, milk powder!’

Relationships art

Delivering education, in New Zealand, to the aspirational Chinese is a fast growing invisible export as more of them become middle class, currently only around 14 per cent of the population. And tourism also stands to benefit. Around 70,000 Chinese visitors flocked to New Zealand over Chinese New Year, a 34 per
cent increase in 2015 over 2014. China is New Zealand’s second biggest tourist market behind Australia, and Tourism New Zealand predicts that it will be hosting more than a million Chinese within 4–5 years. Wealthy Chinese, coming to buy real estate and squeezed by currency controls, may, however, have to ‘buy 1 house not three’. Business people, farmers and the many families who have Chinese, or part-Chinese, relatives have no doubts about China’s importance. In her new book *China: Behind the Miracle*, Sumita Dawra predicts that it will endure as a superpower, with the confidence and investment necessary to generate massive wealth across the globe. Critics argue that there could be a clash of cultures: Western, Buddhist, Confucian and, of course, Muslim. Containing

Currency controls may slow Chinese purchases in New Zealand

it, Chris Patten wrote, will be a challenge for the ruling elite. Perversely, dissidence has led to an infusion of creativity and a high profile on the world stage — the queues for the Ai Wei Wei exhibition in London were so long that the doors were opened all night. Exploring China’s towns and villages, historian Michael Wood concludes that the Chinese are drawn together by their age-old values. Temples are full of worshipers, and the sheer energy and diversity of Chinese culture outshines the ‘glitz of upmarket shopping’. This is what makes China tick. China is an old wise monkey, and with a population of 1.3 billion it knows its power is in its people. It is *guanxi* (the art of relationships), Chinese students whisper.

NOTES

2. George Soros, speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos. See, for example, comment in *Corriere della Sera*, 28 Jan 2016, p.27.
4. Tom Plate, at Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, is working on a book on President Xi.
8. Ibid.
10. See *Financial Times*, 4 Feb 2016, p.15.
14. *The Truth about the Apple iPad* is available on You Tube. It is the subject of research by Oxford academic Jenny Chan (Jenny.Chan@area.ox.ac.uk).
16. Auckland lawyer and academic Jane Kelsey singles out the effect on dairy and the US Department of Agriculture predicts only a 0.1 per cent increase by 2023.
20. Art historian and educationalist Sophie McKinnon sees no restrictions on creativity, even if there are official constraints. ‘All around factories morph into pop-up art galleries amid urban regeneration’. See Sophie McKinnon, *Dancing on Shifting Ground: Change and Urban Development in China*, Christchurch Art Gallery Publication B182, 2015.
21. Michael Wood’s *The Story of China* is a joint BBC2 (UK) and PSB (US) programme, Feb 2016, but it has not yet been shown in China.
22. See the work of Oxford University research student Pu-Yan (pu-yan@oii.ox.ac.uk).
New Zealand has no more important partner than Australia. It is New Zealand's largest economic partner. New Zealand audiences know why Australia matters, but I suspect the significance of the New Zealand market is not fully recognised in Australia. That reflects the reality that New Zealand is ‘only’ Australia’s fifth largest export destination. Yet it should be appreciated that we are especially important to some big sectors of the Australian economy. Seventeen thousand Australian businesses export to New Zealand each year. That compares to 8000 exporting to the United States and 5000 exporting to China. New Zealand is Australia’s single largest export market. What that indicates is that New Zealand is especially important to Australia’s small- and medium-sized enterprises, across all states and all sectors.

Tourism is booming in Australia, just as it is in New Zealand. Most visitors are coming from New Zealand. New Zealanders are the largest source of inbound visitors to Australia, with more than 1.2 million visiting every year.

Australian businesses and shareholders have roughly A$100 billion invested in New Zealand. New Zealand has A$55 billion invested in Australia. This is a product of the single economic market that governments on both sides of the Tasman have worked to progress for more than three decades.

There are around 550,000 New Zealanders living in Australia. We can argue over who owns Crowded House, Russell Crowe and Quade Cooper. But we think of the chief executives of three of Australia’s four big banks as New Zealanders. It is not only the New Zealanders at the big end of town who are making a difference. Most New Zealanders in Australia are pulling their weight. For instance, they earn more than the average Australian — and therefore pay more tax. It may surprise to know that more people are currently moving to New Zealand from Australia than going the other way. The movement of people reflects the free-flow of goods, services and capital, and is good for both our countries.

We are both Asia–Pacific nations, with regionally focused outlooks — and for good reason. Some of our major exports, such as dairy, wine and meat, are in high demand in Asian economies. To put it plainly, we sell the products that the emerging ‘middle classes’ in Asia want. By 2020 the number of ‘middle-class’ consumers in Asia is expected to triple to 1.75 billion people. This presents a massive opportunity for both New Zealand exporters and also our tourism operators.

But our focus on the Asia–Pacific region goes beyond trade and extends to political and security considerations. Instability in the region now affects New Zealand’s interests more directly than ever before. The regional organisations designed to build political, security and economic co-operation, such as APEC and the East Asia Summit, are vital for New Zealand. These organisations build the region’s collective sense of well-being, trust, and resolve to address challenges to regional stability and prosperity.

### Increased strain

Heightened tensions in the South China Sea highlight the intersection between economic and security interests in the region. A particular cause of increased strain has been reclamation and construction activity and deployment of military assets in disputed areas. We regard all of these activities as unhelpful regardless of the party responsible. We were pleased to hear President Xi Jinping’s commitment last year that China would not militarise new features. We would like to see all claimants move further to

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New Zealand’s relationship with Australia is vital to its economic prosperity. Ties between the two countries, both at a governmental level and people-to-people, are close. They face similar opportunities in the Asia–Pacific region — and similar challenges. New Zealand and Australia have much to gain from peace and stability in this region. In the wider world New Zealand is playing its part as an elected member of the Security Council, and has worked assiduously to make the council more effective. It has also continued to work with its partners in the Pacific to make the region more resilient and sustainable.
de-militarise disputed areas.

While New Zealand does not take a position on the various territorial disputes, we do have a stake in how these disputes are managed. It directly affects our interests. As a country with one of the largest exclusive economic zones in the world, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is particularly important to us. So are the international legal principles of freedom of navigation and over-flight. They are vital for New Zealand’s livelihood. We regret that some of those with interests in this process are not yet parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and others have taken a narrow view of how the convention applies.

We support the role arbitration can play in resolving complex disputes and we support states’ rights to access dispute settlement mechanisms. The Philippines has taken this route with its case before the Arbitral Tribunal and a ruling is expected shortly. We expect all parties to respect the result of the tribunal’s ruling.

A great deal of focus has been placed on the role and aspirations of China as the major economic power in the region and emerging world power. In that respect I am both a realist and an optimist: a realist because the emergence of a huge economic power was always going to come with ambitions and aspirations to match, and some of these inevitably compete with established players and interests. Managing that process is the great challenge facing ASEAN regional diplomacy. But I remain an optimist because China has huge domestic challenges to meet. Sustained economic growth is critical to bringing about the internal transformation that is their key goal. And that sustained economic growth can occur only in an environment of peace and stability in this region.

**Council role**

At the centre of the international rules-based system sits the United Nations Security Council, of which New Zealand is currently a non-permanent member, following in the footsteps of Australia’s two-year term. There are some things that only the council can do, like giving formal effect to the Iran nuclear deal. While much work remains to build the sustained trust between Iran and the international community over time, getting an agreement at all represents a huge achievement, and reflects great credit on those most directly involved. But sadly the divisions in the council today make this a rare achievement.

The Security Council is not dealing with the most pressing global security issues of our time. Take the example of Syria: a slow motion train wreck that has resulted in over a quarter of a million deaths, a huge humanitarian disaster and a refugee crisis that has now engulfed Europe, not to mention the rise of ISIS and the widespread recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters. For five long years the Security Council has been paralysed. Now, finally, we are seeing some positive movement. But the current truce is fragile. Some will no doubt point to the work the council does in relation to Syria, Yemen and other trouble-spots in asserting the case for humanitarian access. Whilst those efforts are valuable and constructive, they are not a substitute for the council carrying out its responsibility to stop the conflict. Anything less represents failure. We want to see a council that is able to put its political weight behind a permanent ceasefire in Syria.

We also want to see the Security Council shoulder its responsibilities on the Middle East peace process. It has been seven years since the council has even passed a resolution on this question. We keep being told that ‘the time is not right’ and ‘the parties are not ready’. But while we wait, the situation on the ground gets
worse, violence has escalated, and the viability of the two-state solution is disappearing as a consequence of Israeli settlement activity. This question now looms as a serious challenge to the credibility of the council.

We recognise that as elected members we all have to play our part. That is why, last year, frustrated by the council’s lack of resolve, New Zealand circulated a draft resolution to try to find a pathway to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. Faced with the reality that a resolution would not succeed, we agreed to wait. Now the situation on the ground has deteriorated and the settlement activity has continued. As an elected member of the council, we have a responsibility to make contributions. So we are again looking at draft text for a resolution, and we are talking to parties more closely engaged in the issue to encourage them to act. For the council to do nothing while the scope for a two-state solution is completely undermined would be a total abrogation of its responsibilities.

Sharper focus

We are also using our term to encourage a sharper focus on conflict prevention. There is something seriously wrong when we are spending $8 billion a year on peacekeeping and a further $10.5 billion providing humanitarian support for victims of conflict, but virtually nothing on the prevention of conflict. There is always, of course, the debate as to when the international community is justified in intervening in the affairs of sovereign nations. But it would be my observation that there is significant scope for the United Nations and the international community to engage earlier and more effectively to head off conflicts before they start.

During our term on the council we are making contributions to improving the council’s day-to-day working methods, and the use of the veto. The veto’s impact today far exceeds what was envisaged in the UN Charter — to the huge detriment of the council’s effectiveness and credibility. New Zealand has long opposed the veto. We are working to support initiatives calling for restraint in the exercise of the veto and for more effort to be applied within the council to avoid its use.

That is why New Zealand is using its two-year term to demonstrate that we are more effective when we work as a council of fifteen, rather than an elite group of five. It is in all our interests to have a stronger and more relevant council, capable of fulfilling its intended purpose, and we will continue to play our part in realising this goal.

Pacific nation

In New Zealand’s diplomatic and development work in the Pacific, we greatly appreciate the excellent co-operation that exists with Australia. With large populations of Pacific peoples resident in New Zealand, and with extensive connections with the islands, we consider ourselves a Pacific nation. Added to that, the inhabitants of three separate territories in the Pacific — Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau — are passport carrying New Zealand citizens. It is a no-brainer then that New Zealand has an extensive network of diplomatic missions across the region, and that the majority of our development assistance is spent there. I have consistently encouraged my ministry to aspire to be the world’s centre of excellence in Pacific affairs. It is the greatest comparative advantage that New Zealand offers in the international space: our close relationship with the Pacific.

We have recently sought to leverage our experience in the region by applying our skills in small islands developing states outside the region, in the Caribbean and Indian Ocean. We used our presidency month last July in the Security Council to hold an event on the security challenges faced by small islands developing states to give such states, which constitute nearly a quarter of the UN membership, a chance to have their voices heard in the council. New Zealand and Australia have a significant stake in the peace and security of the small islands developing states in our region. By their very size, isolation and nature, our smaller neighbours often walk a thin line between success and failure. But in my view there is no reason why we cannot increase this margin with targeted support that plays to the region’s strengths.

New Zealand and Australia work together in the Pacific to generate development outcomes, respond to crises and seek solutions to the challenges we collectively face. Our overarching objective is to help build prosperity and stability in the Pacific. Many Pacific nations do not have the economic diversity to handle major shocks. Today we are still counting the cost of the damage inflicted on Fiji by Cyclone Winston. Events such as cyclones can have disproportionate impacts on the smaller states in the region.

Regional challenges

And you do not have to go too far back in time to see the impact of man-made shocks such as the tensions in the Solomon Islands and Bougainville or violence in Tonga. These security and development challenges can have regional consequences. The most obvious is that New Zealand and Australian troops, military assets,
police and funding get called upon to help pick up the pieces. And more importantly, the aspirations and quality of life of Pacific peoples are seriously curtailed. This said, it is in my view too easy to get caught up in the narrative of long-term dependence and failure in relation to the Pacific. The region has some natural assets that are capable of making a much greater contribution to the sustainable economic development of the region, provided partners make targeted investments in areas that will maximise the income from these assets and reduce costs.

For the small island states in the region, reliance on fossil fuels for electricity generation is economically and environmentally unsustainable, with diesel costs at around 10 per cent of the region’s GDP and up to 30 per cent of their total import bill. For this reason New Zealand has chosen to make major investments in renewable energy in the Pacific and we are also encouraging other major development players, such as the European Union and the World Bank, to get involved in this area. In March 2013 New Zealand and the European Union co-hosted the Pacific Energy Summit to address these energy issues and match donors with the action plans developed by Pacific governments. The summit resulted in a funding envelope of $635 million and kick-started over 50 renewable projects across the region.

For our part, New Zealand’s Pacific energy portfolio is now in excess of $120 million in seven countries. In Tokelau, all three atolls — previously wholly dependent upon fossil fuels for electricity — are now effectively 100 per cent renewable solar generation. The Northern Cooks became effectively 100 per cent renewable last year, as did all but one island in Tuvalu. We are supporting further progress in the larger islands in the Cooks, Tuvalu and Samoa and we have renewable energy projects underway in Tonga, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea.

Another emerging focus for New Zealand’s investments in the Pacific is information and communications technology. We are working with our Pacific Islands partners to bring new submarine cable connectivity to the region. World-class internet is the key, not just to a successful business environment for sectors like tourism, but also in improving health and education outcomes.

**Largest asset**

In terms of economic viability, along with tourism, increasing revenue streams from fisheries is essential if we want to move the Pacific away from a reliance on development assistance. The Pacific’s largest asset is the schools of tuna swimming in its oceans, which should be used to make their owners more economically sustainable than they are today. Currently the Pacific owners of the tuna fisheries receive around 14 per cent of the total market value. Many other players clip the ticket along the way, and illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing is a major drag on the potential of the resource.

If we want the Pacific to be truly economically sustainable, we need the international community to co-operate to ensure that they receive a fair return from fisheries. While there has been an increase in the amount of fish caught since 2012, the value of key fisheries has fallen by just over 20 per cent. The current system does not reflect the true value of the resource. This has led Pacific governments to look for new approaches to lift returns and safeguard fisheries for future generations. At last year’s Pacific Forum, Pacific leaders endorsed a move towards a catch-based management system for tuna by 2025. This is an area where New Zealand has extensive experience and, in addition to sharing our expertise, we have set aside $50 million to support the development of a catch-based management system in the Pacific. If we can get this right and make it work, another block will be added to the foundation underpinning the Pacific’s economic sustainability.

I recognise that practical support to countries must be based on innovative thinking, and I have high regard for research think tanks like the Lowy Institute and the role they play in providing analysis and ideas. They say imitation is the sincerest form of flattery and we launched the New Zealand Institute for Pacific Research through a consortium led by the University of Auckland. Our aim is for the institute to build a world-class research programme focused specifically on Pacific issues. It will inform solutions for Pacific development, governance, security and other public policy issues.

In pursuing New Zealand’s international priorities for 2016, we are focused on the economic opportunities and security challenges the Asia-Pacific region faces. We want to continue to push for meaningful action from the Security Council on a range of global issues and improve the way in which the council works. And we want to continue working with our partners in the Pacific to make the region more resilient and sustainable. These are areas we work closely with Australia on and we look forward to our close co-operation continuing over the coming year.
Australia’s strategic outlook: a paradigm shift

Balaji Chandramohan reviews the recently issued Australian defence white paper.

In February Australia released its much awaited 2016 Defence White Paper setting out its geo-political perspective and geo-orientation as well as outlining its priorities in dealing with the growing strategic uncertainty and complex situation facing Australia. Policy-makers and the defence strategic community in countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region will view the document with great interest. This will be especially so in India and New Zealand because they share a strategic convergence. The white paper comes at a time when the geo-strategic term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has gained attention as a strategic zone of competition between China and the United States.

Much work has gone into producing the Australian white paper. Politically, most of its substance was prepared by the Tony Abbott government. The change of premiership in Australia last September caused some delays, but Abbott’s successor as prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, made sure that the review was brought to completion relatively quickly, though not before the new Australian minister of defence, Marise Payne, apparently changed some of the important formulations around, especially, Australia’s relationship with China. She has received much praise from both her Liberal Party colleagues and the Australian media for her presentation of the paper.

**Increased funding**

As envisaged in the white paper, the Australian government’s defence strategy is supported by increased defence funding, which will grow to 2 per cent of Australia’s gross domestic product by 2020–21, three years ahead of the Liberal Party’s 2013 election commitment. The government’s funding plan provides A$29.9 billion more to Defence over the period to 2025–26 than previously planned, enabling approximately $195 billion to be invested in Defence capabilities in the next ten years.1

Furthermore, with this white paper the government has released for the first time a ten-year integrated investment programme, a detailed capability investment plan for the future force covering all of its major elements. It includes major acquisitions of new weapons, platforms and systems and investment in information and communications technology, infrastructure and the enabling workforce.

In terms of strategic purpose, the white paper provides an analysis of Australia’s geo-political and security environment. It identifies the main drivers that will shape the country’s security requirements until 2035. These were all fairly predictable: the US–China relationship, the on-going military modernisation and state rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region, the threat of terror attacks emanating from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and, finally, cyber-attacks. The United States, and to a lesser degree Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, are all identified as Australia’s most important security partners in the region.

**Naval attention**

Reflecting Australia’s position as predominantly a maritime power, the white paper gives much attention to the Royal Australian Navy. As expected, Australia envisages acquiring twelve new submarines, twelve new major surface ships, three air warfare destroyers and nine future frigates, as well as replenishment vessels. This statement of intended acquisitions is a marked departure from the earlier defence white papers released in 2009, 2012 and 2013. These were generally conservative on issues related to procurements, which in many ways led to questions related to Canberra’s strategic orientation or even its active posture.

The plan to acquire six additional submarines has attracted a lot of attention. As expected, the submarine programme, which could cost US$114 billion by the middle of the century, is the centrepiece of the massive military modernisation programme envisaged in the white paper, which the Turnbull government says is needed to maintain Australia’s edge over rapidly evolving defence forces across Asia.

Although the submarine programme is predominantly an operational level matter, it has strategic connotations as well, for the submarines are expected to become part of the RAN’s West-

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**The 2016 Australian defence white paper is a curtain-raiser for the strategic path that Canberra is set to undertake in the next two decades. That path will include enhancing the alliance with the United States, including facilitating a greater US military presence in the South-west Pacific and increasing maritime strategic co-operation with Japan, France, India, Indonesia and New Zealand. This posture is a marked departure from the earlier defence white papers released in 2009, 2012 and 2013, which were reticent about greater strategic manoeuvring against Beijing’s maritime expansion. The geo-strategic Indo-Pacific orientation has helped in bringing about the grand strategic alliance.**
ern Fleet based in Perth. That fleet’s orientation is towards the Indian Ocean with an additional responsibility overlooking the South-west Pacific, in contrast to the Eastern Fleet, which is stationed in Sydney and oriented towards the South Pacific. This is a significant change of strategic posture on Canberra’s part, signalling its strategic orientation.

Australia’s submarine acquisition has been made with China’s future submarine force in mind. Already fairly dynamic, that Chinese programme will provide a mix of advanced conventional-powered boats and improved nuclear-powered vessels. According to the US Department of Defense, China currently possesses 53 diesel attack submarines, five nuclear attack submarines and four nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

**Chinese expansion**

In the next decade, China is expected to continue to increase both the number of its submarines and the capability of its nuclear attack submarines, introduce a new class of guided-missile attack submarines and commission up to twenty Yuan-class air-independent propulsion submarines. All up, this represents a formidable mix of conventional and nuclear capability, one that will continue to be the largest submarine force in Asia. It is a force that will increasingly become more capable of long-range operations, not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the South Pacific. A reading of 2016 Defence White Paper within this context makes it clear that Australia has shifted its strategy and approach on the importance of anti-submarine warfare capability.

Further, at the operational level, much focus has gone on to the issue of amphibious operations, including enhancing the Australian Defence Force’s capability to conduct air lift operations in the littorals of the Indo-Pacific region and in the South Pacific. As an extension, such an approach will demand greater co-operation among the three armed services within Australia.

To further increase Canberra’s operational reach, the Royal Australian Air Force will be receiving 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, which will begin to enter service by the early 2020s. These will apparently be equipped with the experimental, Norwegian-developed Naval Strike Missile and Joint Strike Missile. Again, these are more anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities than force projection capabilities (although the Joint Strike Missile is primarily intended for use against vehicles, which would have some utility against an enemy such as ISIS). In addition, Australian Special Forces are receiving new helicopters for conducting special operations. On the other hand, the RAAF is also adding twelve E/A-18 Growlers and two C-17 Globemasters. The former are suitable for fighting enemy aircraft and the latter are useful for out-of-area operations.

Although receiving the least attention, the Australian Army also stands to receive benefits from the programme outlined in 2016 Defence White Paper. These include the addition of two infantry brigades — six battalions in all.

**Strategic co-operation**

At the geo-strategic level, much of the focus of the white paper is on the importance given to the evolving geo-political term ‘Indo-Pacific’. The white paper has in fact done justice to the expectation that Canberra will reinforce its traditional loyalty towards Washington, especially in light of the latter’s maritime pivot to Asia from 2011.²

The white paper addresses Australia’s primary concern with Beijing’s second and third island chain. As part of the hedge against China’s maritime ambitions, Australia is ready to play the role of hub around which the spokes of US power projection are extended through South-east Asia into the South-west Pacific and Indian Ocean. Australia is Washington’s major ally in the southern hemisphere and also an important player in the American forward policy or pivot in the expanded Indo-Pacific geo-strategic realm. At present, the United States has a permanent military presence in Australia. The 2500-strong US Marine Task Force is based in Darwin in northern Australia.³

Australia’s core security interests lie in the South-west Pacific and Indian Ocean. These overlap with but are not identical to those of its major strategic allies and partners, such as the United States, Indonesia, Japan and India. Canberra began to pursue its self-reliance policy in defence following the Guam Doctrine announced by the United States in 1969 during the Nixon administration. This doctrine emphasised the need for US allies, Australia in particular, to be as self-reliant on defence and security matters as possible, all the while continuing to strengthen bilateral military-to-military ties with the United States. Every Australian defence white paper since 1976 has adhered to that vision, though the 2016 version proposes a closer strategic alliance. Australia’s pursuit of strategic self-sufficiency following the

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1. Australia is seeking quotes for twelve new submarines expected to cost $114 billion to replace their aging Collins-class submarines.

2. The white paper addresses Australia’s primary concern with Beijing’s second and third island chain.

3. Australia’s core security interests lie in the South-west Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Guam Doctrine allowed the United States to encourage Canberra’s rise as an allied regional power in Asia–Pacific region.

The primary security threat to Australia is expected to come from the west (the Indian Ocean). Deterring it requires a primarily defensive strategy. One way of extending the defensive orientation is to build alliances before any armed attack on Australia is undertaken. Australia is taking steps to build such alliances, one example being the agreement to a US marine presence in Darwin. To add an offensive strategic aspect to Australia’s strategic re-orientation the RAN needs to be upgraded and expanded.

**Important base**

Australia plan to improve its naval capabilities includes strengthening HMAS *Stirling*, also known as Fleet Base West, which is the largest base for the Royal Australian Navy. Providing Australia’s Indian Ocean presence, the base is located on Garden Island, south of Perth in Western Australia. Eleven fleet units are based at *Stirling* at present, including the headquarters of the Australian Submarine Squadron. The expectation is that in future the US Navy will also have on-going access to *Stirling*. (US aircraft-carriers currently make regular port calls at Garden Island.)

Australia also has a forward presence in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean. Consisting of two atolls and 27 islands, some 2950 kilometres north-west of Perth and 1272 kilometres south-west of Jakarta, the Cocos serve as a refuelling stop and forward base for the RAAF’s P-3 Orion surveillance fleet.

**Trans-Tasman perspective**

With increased Chinese maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, the new white paper’s proposals to increase the operational capability of the RAN’s Western Fleet should be of interest to the New Zealand strategic community with Wellington soon to release its own defence white paper, the second by the National government. Apart from that, the white paper has reinforced Australia’s commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which naturally reinforces its strategic orientation and commitment to the South-east Asia region and the tricky issues related to South China Sea. It will be interesting to see what New Zealand has to say about the FPDA when it issues its own defence white paper. With Australia’s focus covering the Indian Ocean. The base is to be upgraded to support the latest generation P8-A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and the world’s largest drone, the US-built Global Hawk.

In sum, *2016 Defence White Paper* has reinforced the Canberra–Washington strategic alliance, which continues to provide insurance against Beijing’s maritime ambitions, especially in the South-west Pacific. Australia’s Eastern and Western Fleets will co-operate more with the United States Seventh Fleet.
shifting to the Indo-Pacific region, New Zealand will be forced to upgrade its own naval capabilities, especially its amphibious capabilities if it envisages conducting operations on its own. Interestingly, Beijing has criticised the Australian defence white paper, observing that Canberra’s focus on increased closeness to Washington is evidence of a Cold War mentality.

Since the white paper rates a secure maritime South-east Asia and South Pacific as Australia’s second strategic defence interest (after the overall security and resilience of Australia), the identification of France as a South Pacific partner is important. But there is no mention of co-operation in the Indian Ocean, where France has the Reunion and Mayotte Islands.

**French capacity**

Although France retains modest military resources in the South Pacific (around 2500 personnel, two surveillance frigates, three patrol boats, four surveillance and four tactical transport aircraft and six helicopters), it has the capacity to draw speedily on other military assets from metropolitan France. While the future status of New Caledonia is currently under discussion, France retains military assets in French Polynesia, which is the headquarters of its Pacific Ocean fleet.

It is expected that New Zealand will also follow the path of Australia when it comes to closer defence co-operation with France in the South Pacific. It is likely to seek strategic partnership with Japan, Indonesia and India. However, the big and hard questions remain, will New Zealand’s defence white paper also signal a radical change in its informal alliance with Washington or will it be wary of an arrangement that may cause discomfort in its dealings with Beijing, especially in light of the trade relations that it has with China?

In conclusion, *2016 Defence White Paper* has signalled an important intent on Canberra’s part in the strategic discourse. The programme it is set to undertake in the next twenty years may include an expansion of part of its maritime alliance architecture to include countries such as Japan, India, New Zealand, United States and Indonesia as a barrier to China’s maritime ambitions in the wider Asia–Pacific region.

**NOTES**

‘originally lukewarm on the anti-nuclear policy... Lange came to be its principal champion and advocate.’ (Russell Marshall, 2005)  

Marshall’s obituary buries Lange superbly. But actually Helen Clark was more vital to New Zealand going nuclear free. It was not until 1990 that Lange gave her the credit due for her securing the passage of the legislation that made New Zealand nuclear free on 9 June 1987.  

Helen Clark’s significance in beating Lange into shape then and the consequences for her when she was prime minister are the focus of this article. I offer just a sliver of the whole story. It is an aspect that has been short-changed in the scholarship of two outstanding moments in New Zealand’s diplomatic history since 1945 — going nuclear free and saying no to joining the ‘coalition of the willing’ against Iraq in March 2003.

For the first nine months of his prime ministership Lange vacillated on whether he would ensure his country became the first ever nuclear-free state. During those months he and Clark tussled on this goal, deeply complicated by the dreadful dynamics between the parliamentary leadership and the Labour Party hierarchy (at the time, Clark, though an MP, aligned with the party hierarchy). The personal antipathies and loyalties around the former party president, Jim Anderton, saw the Lange government cementing the nuclear free status while sidelining him.

The back-story to New Zealand’s nuclear free status ranks among the most tumultuous episodes in the Labour Party’s first century, now being celebrated. A fierce debate within the party stretched through the first half of the 1980s. Clark was determined-ly engaged, stiffening the stance. Bill Rowling, while losing the party leadership, skilfully formulated a compromise stance (‘qualified alignment’) that had Labour impressing most New Zealanders with its conviction that once in government it could enable their country to become nuclear free. (The US Embassy in Wellington, like many other watchers, pondered this turmoil’s implications for New Zealand’s ANZUS obligations.)

The foremost complication was the new leader, David Lange. Just weeks into the job, in March 1983, he ruminated aloud to an American Chamber of Commerce in New Zealand lunch that he saw things differently from his party. For him, nuclear power could be separated from nuclear weapons. But not by the Labour Party he soon had to ruefully acknowledge! Even after Labour became the government, still the prime minister dithered. Not until late April 1985 did Lange commit his government to cementing in New Zealand’s nuclear free standing. This story, and Lange’s emergence as the champion of the nuclear free New Zealand, is elaborated in a chapter in a forthcoming book, *New Zealand and the World.*

Helen Clark was in her prime educating Lange on the political realities of the Labour Party. But retribution came early to her. Following the July 1984 election victory, the Labour caucus heeded the parliamentary leadership, which had put the word out that they did not require her in the Cabinet — it was extraordinary for a New Zealand MP of such high calibre to be so side-lined. Had she then gone into the Cabinet the nuclear

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Helen Clark’s December 1984 days in Washington DC promoting New Zealand going nuclear free had ramifications when she became prime minister fifteen years later. Several of the crucial players — New Zealanders and American — she had tangled with in Washington in December 1984 were combatants when as prime minister she made her generation-defining ‘No’ choice to membership of the military coalition that invaded Iraq in March 2003. Her performance vis-à-vis the Reagan Retreads illustrates how an uncomfortable bilateral relationship can be managed without public histrionics in either capital.
free stance may have been less assured: her preoccupation in a domestic portfolio (as she showed in Labour’s second term) would have left the nuclear free cause with a less impressive leadership within the parliamentary party.

Clark’s consolation prize, chairing Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, left her free to promote Labour’s ‘qualified alignment’ policy. In fact, chairing that committee became more a first prize than a consolation — she turned it into a ticket to ride the globe to push the nuclear free New Zealand case. Being outside cabinet gave Clark the wriggle room to ensure this.

American venture

Soon after Labour’s election victory, Clark was approached by Cora Weiss, prominent in the United States’ National Nuclear Freeze Movement, to go there to tell Americans of New Zealand’s nuclear free aspiration. Clark accepted the invitation: she was there for the first half of December 1984. The media highlight was a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington on 10 December. The Washington Post and National Public Radio gave her considerable coverage. Clark’s own subsequent comments, supplemented by cable traffic from the New Zealand Embassy, give us a good appreciation of how searing was her time in Washington.

Clark was the first of the Labourites to appear in Washington — she was feisty and classy in her public appearances. Clark made clear that New Zealanders would not serve as mere side-kicks to the Australians. Her dance card was marked indelibly by this fortnight in the United States.

Clark probably passed the ‘splutter test’ — when senior government officials spill their breakfast coffee reacting to unexpectedly reading or hearing news that riles their intellectual livers. Throughout the Reagan administration’s national security circles her Washington exposure became a moment not forgotten, let alone ever forgiven. To them, she was who blocked Lange from becoming another Bob Hawke. She has recently allowed it to be known that when there

I also went to the New Zealand Embassy in Washington DC…. I sat with a group of long-faced officials, and the bottom had fallen out of their world because of New Zealand Labour. I carried on my merry way and met US congressmen. When I came back to New Zealand I was told that my presence was seen as rather damaging to public relations with the US. It was a hard time!

Difficult moments

Clark had already spoken of how she had ‘felt very vulnerable after visiting Washington’. She referred to having ‘had some very difficult moments with antagonistic officials, and one of them lost his temper which I understand resulted in adverse cables about me’. She has some public validation. Bob Woodward mentions in his 1987 book *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987* that Admiral Bobby Inman, the director of the National Security Agency (NSA), was found by Ronald Reagan’s transition team at one of NSA’s ‘listening posts’ in New Zealand (they were wanting to discuss a new job for him). Twenty minutes into the 2007 movie *Charlie Wilson’s War*, the central character, a maverick CIA official, Gust Avrakotos (played by Philip Seymour Hoffman in an Oscar nomination performance), is chatting sometime in 1981 with a colleague in a staff cafeteria at the agency’s Langley headquarters, explaining ‘he is reading the transcripts of phone conversations between French and German generals arguing over office space at NATO headquarters and analysing wiretaps out of Mercury Bay, New Zealand. You know, historically a hot-bed of anti-American activity’.

Clark had an appointment at the State Department. The director of the Australia and New Zealand office, Jon Glassman, met her — quite possibly it is him who Clark is referring to as the official who lost his temper with her. Glassman had been ‘parked’ on the New Zealand desk shortly before, following adverse publicity of a white paper he authored as a White House official that ‘proved’ Salvadoran rebels were actually Cubans and Soviets. In 1994 the Clinton administration withdrew him as the US ambassador in Paraguay, reportedly because of his abrasive style.

Before arriving in Washington, Clark had already riled the Reagan administration. Stuart McMillan records that the administration protested her action a month earlier when she was reportedly one of the 5000 New Zealanders named in advertisements in the Washington Post on 5 November (the day before the US presidential election) that asserted New Zealand’s right to go nuclear free. The New Zealanders had paid for a full page in the national (weekly) edition and a quarter-page in the daily Washington DC edition. But, her name was not there — Clark confirmed that at the time. Whatever, it seems that it was seen as a Clark inspired initiative! The advertisements named many Labour Party branches, numerous future Labour MPs and the spouse of a leading minister (John Hercus, who was also on the party’s national executive) — all of which must have raised the blood pressure in and around the White House. This is evident from New Zealand Embassy reporting.

Reagan retreats

When George W. Bush became president in January 2001 Clark, now New Zealand’s prime minister, saw her Lange-era ‘foes’ re-emerge. Bush initially rolled out the Reagan Retreats as his national security team. Most prominent were four of the front-of-house sextet of James Mann’s *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (2004) — Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Armitage. (Powell and Rice were the two
non-retreads.) Wolfowitz and Armitage were bruised career-wise during the Reagan presidency because New Zealand went nuclear free. As well, several of Bush’s mid-level national security officials had been entangled in the New Zealand show in the mid-1980s, certainly James Kelly, Doug Feith, Eric Adelman and Doug Paal.

The retreads included some young bloods who considered George Shultz had let Lange off too lightly, for instance by his determination that no trade sanctions be instituted. In the late 1980s, when Dick Cheney was a congressman from Wyoming, he introduced New Zealand trade ban legislation, though he did give Bill Rowling, New Zealand’s ambassador in Washington, an assurance that the legislation would not proceed — ‘I will put it into one end of the churn, I won’t seek any co-sponsors and it won’t come out the other end’.10

Not so well known was that two of Cheney’s most controversial national security aides when he was vice president were also in play on the New Zealand issue in the mid-1980s — ‘Scooter’ Libby and, when he was charged with national security violations, his successor as chief of staff, David Addington. Bush, at the beginning of his presidency, appointed James Kelly assistant secretary of state (East Asia and the Pacific), the most crucial day-to-day official for Wellington (and Canberra) in every American administration since 1949. Kelly had been bruised by Lange even before Lange became prime minister. In January 1984, as the Opposition leader, Lange visited Washington. Kelly, then Armitage’s deputy at Defense, chaired a meeting and hosted a lunch for Lange. The Americans, and a Washington-based New Zealand defence official, subsequently contended that Lange made commitments to the Americans during those engagements that he never honoured. Kelly became an enduring trouble-spot for the Lange government: he went to the White House in 1986, joining the National Security Council as the Asia specialist, which meant he retained his interest in New Zealand.

**Brilliant performance**

When Christopher Hill replaced Kelly in early 2005, dramatically New Zealand was no longer being squired in Washington by a Reagan Retread. Hill is most known for his brilliant performance as Richard Holbrooke’s chief lieutenant in securing the Dayton Accords, which in late 1995 wound down the Balkans as a major conflict zone. In To End a War (1998) Holbrooke heaps praise on Hill. Career-wise, by 2005, Hill had been out of Washington for eight years, handling ambassadorial stints in the Balkans and, since early 2004, in Seoul.

Hill’s major preoccupation was to be North Korea, but he also absorbed the New Zealand ‘file’. The bilateral dynamics quietly altered. Hill’s memoir Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy (2014) does New Zealand in five pages — he is light, deft and too cute by far, with delightful insights on Helen Clark (particularly, her skilled multi-tasking), Winston Peters and John McKinnon. His memoir is essential reading in the context of Bush and his Reagan Retreads turning on each other in their respective memoirs. James Mann’s George W. Bush (2015) is the master guide through the battleground of their books. The kind of ‘hard ball’ that Helen Clark likely faced during the first half of Bush’s presidency comes alive here. Hill’s excoriation of the Reagan Retreads is a wonderful performance.

As his second term proceeded, Bush shuffled his national security team, with the Retreads largely taken out of play, or in Cheney’s case grounded by the president to do diplomatic ‘home detention’ until their terms ended.

**Critical roles**

Revisiting Clark’s room of ‘long-faced’ New Zealand diplomats in Washington in December 1984 — who they were, seems not to be public. But some of the most likely re-appear in critical roles when Helen Clark was prime minister. By then the ambassador, Lance Adams-Schneider, had died. A former Muldoon Cabinet minister, he had toned the embassy’s image when two months prior to Clark’s appearance at the embassy he had made his final
call on Reagan’s defense secretary, Caspar Weinberger, causing a furor for Lange. The ambassador told Weinberger not to worry as the Lange government would come into line, a comment he relayed to Wellington in a cable that sent the defense minister, Frank O’Flynn, ballistic. O’Flynn’s personal note to Lange protesting Adams-Schneider’s suitability to see out his term is a humdinger. The deputy head of mission, John Wood, features in Gerald Hensley’s *Friendly Fire* (2013) as a rock-solid ANZUS loyalist. Wood was later to serve twice as the ambassador in Washington: in 1993–98 and 2002–06. His second appointment was during Helen Clark’s prime ministership. Also, likely in the room was Simon Murdoch, then the embassy’s senior political officer — he also gets good references from Hensley. Murdoch headed the foreign ministry for seven years from mid-2002, becoming Clark’s principal foreign policy adviser. Murdoch deftly protected his prime minister from the Reagan Retreads and then worked well with Hill.

Murdoch and Hill were like-minded. They waltzed and tangoed their way through a crowded and rowdy diplomatic ‘dancehall’. Their ultimate revenge on Clark’s foes was to out-manoeuvre the remnants of the Reagan Retreads trying to initiate a final offensive — humiliating Clark with a visit to New Zealand by Bush during his last year as president. The episode became public in 2010, when WikiLeaks spat out an American diplomatic cable showing Hill and Murdoch deflecting the visit.11

In early 2006, Roy Ferguson became Clark’s message to Washington that she expected to sit out Bush. Intended as a diplomatic ‘night watchman’, Ferguson became a ‘local hero’ (recognised as such by Hill in his memoir). As the bilateral dynamics went into top-gear, with Hill determined to improve Washington’s connection to the Kiwis, Ferguson turned in a close to stunning performance. Hill’s boss, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, was supportive and Winston Peters turned in an Oscar-nominee level performance for best supporting foreign minister.

Ahead of her iconic global diplomacy moment as prime minister, when she said no to the ‘coalition of the willing’ in March 2003, Clark was in New York in December 2002. New Zealanders learnt that she was there to promote the country as Peter Jackson’s *Two Towers* premiered and a Travel Channel documentary *New Zealand: The Royal Tour* first aired. But she had another specific task as the United Nations sought to inspect Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and forestall any military invasion not authorised by a second UN resolution. The prime minister called on Kofi Annan and Hans Blix to align herself with the UN’s weapons inspectors. Blix has noted that she was the only prime minister to stand publicly with him then.12 It did not endanger her to the Reagan Retreads, but it did spotlight her perspective that ‘even wild horses wouldn’t have dragged this old Vietnam War protestor like myself [sic] there [Iraq].’13

**Clark’s reflections**

In June 1997, when Clark reflected to an Auckland University seminar on New Zealand’s first decade of being nuclear free she set out her stall:

Conversely, I have had feedback from others who felt a secret pleasure that the years of lickspittling and subservience were gone and that New Zealand could stand tall for its own beliefs. That was certainly very much the way I viewed it.

As the 30th anniversary of becoming nuclear free approaches another of Clark’s June 1997 reflections seems particularly prescient now:

avoid complacency about our nuclear free status and our present relative detachment from great power alliances. The positioning New Zealand achieved has never had acceptance in the defence establishment, and with its encouragement the National Party in government has worked assiduously to revive American interest in New Zealand’s defence arrangements.14

**NOTES**

4. Archives New Zealand file R17722442 contains the Washington embassy cable, number 5266 of 11 December 1984, which reports the press conference and the immediate press coverage in the United States as well as detailing more of Clark’s time there. The United States Information Service and the Department of State reports of the press conference and subsequent coverage of Clark’s comments are in the same file. Gerald Hensley, *Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS*, 1984–1987 (Auckland, 2013), p.92, provides other details of Clark’s visit, highlighting the Reagan administration’s public contestation of her perspectives — that they did so added to her lustre.
11. Audrey Young, ‘Bush visit to NZ was rejected by Labour: Wikileaks’, *NZ Herald*, 4 May 2011. The cable, dated 30 October 2007, was 07WELLINGTON785 ‘A/S Hill reviews regional and bilateral issues with New Zealand MFAT secretary Murdoch’. The *NZ Herald* placed this cable on its website on 23 December 2010.
13. Eley and Salmon, p.156.
John Goodman reflects on the observations of an 18th century Frenchman on the art of diplomacy.

Paintings may serve to illuminate history but the process is reversible, following Pierre Bonnard’s view that art is not a matter of painting life but of making paintings live. The adage is cautionary for historians keen to use paintings as evidence for historical themes. Paintings can bring history alive but history may retaliate, giving the lie to the painting.

Holbein’s *The Ambassadors* (www.nationalgallery.com), a popular image of Renaissance diplomacy, may be a case in point. Historians can see portraits as a category of art in the service of political power as individuals shape images to further personal and social prestige. At first blush, Holbein’s picture may seem a good example of the genre. Two manicured and sveltely accoutered diplomats are set against an array of objects pertaining to contemporary arts, earth sciences and cosmography. Their Latinate eyes are impassive — just the hint of a smile in the spirit of Machiavelli, Holbein’s near contemporary. Stance, clothing and finery symbolise a range of courtly values — pride, power, intellectual, moral and perhaps spiritual superiority — as well as courtly aesthetic tastes. The charmed circle likely to view such paintings enjoyed looking at miscellaneous objects culled from the ever-widening horizons of the times, and would have correctly understood the shimmering anamorphic death skull spread across the foreground. Despite the reminder of *vita brevia*, however, the picture presents a thematic image of courtly values and norms, a privileged and cosseted existence of consumption supported by imperial masters. But was that true?

The practical diplomat, more accustomed to looking at the reverse side of images got up for display, may give more credence to contemporary documents on the professional circumstances of Renaissance diplomats. These reveal a messier situation. They are, to be sure, variable and incomplete but efforts to survey them have been made. Garrett Mattingly’s *Renaissance Diplomacy* is a classic, which conveniently reviews the history and the most famous historical ‘texts’ on diplomatic values and principles from Vittoria to Grotius. A book sharper than any is François de Callières’s *De la Manière de Négocier avec des Souverains* (translated as The Art of Diplomacy). This book, published in 1716, sums up the old texts and, drawing on de Callières’s own experience as a diplomat, covers most everything of a general nature that can be said on the subject. Even later books by practitioners, such as Harold Nicolson’s 1950 *Diplomacy* or Henry Kissinger’s 2014 *World Order*, or modern schools for diplomats find it hard to say more in general terms

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**Holbein’s mistake: The Ambassadors**

Henry Kissinger’s recent *World Order*, like Holbein’s popular Renaissance painting, expresses the realpolitik perhaps demanded of world powers, while Harold Nicolson’s older *Diplomacy* favours British pragmatism, at least for former world powers. Neither book finds it easy to say much of a general nature about what diplomacy is and how diplomats do it. In this regard François de Callières’s 18th century book *The Art of Diplomacy* arguably says it all for countries of all sizes, including New Zealand and other Pacific states. The book, a common sense work by a practical diplomat, is a forgotten gem and deserves revival; comparison with Holbein’s polished image shows why.
than de Callières. These historical sources, which enable the ordinary observer to make a few comments on Holbein, will likely come as a disappointment to those looking for corroboration of impressions perhaps given by Holbein.

**Dubious support**

First, did imperial masters support? By the 16th century an ambassadorship had become a good career move at court but not all career courtiers were interested: the job appealed to those with curiosity about the world and inquiring minds. These qualities they had to have, for their royal masters or mistresses under-paid, paid in arrears or did not pay them at all. M.F.S. Hervey’s book on Holbein, unsurpassed despite floods of monographs, sets out factual background to the two men, showing it was far from a bed of roses, even for them. Mattingly does not cover the two Frenchmen specifically but he does review many others from the period, whom he regards as typical. He mentions, for example, De Vera, a Spanish ambassador in London for over twenty years but unrewarded for his unremitting efforts to further Philip II’s ambitions: he died a bankrupt, still owed most of the emoluments Philip had agreed to pay him. Mattingly claims that, over the period he covers, only one ambassador anywhere came out on the positive side of the ledger. Ambassadors could also become severely indebted. One in London, for example, narrowly avoided debtor’s prison through a grace of the English Queen alone. As for Machiavelli en mission, Burchhardt describes him as looking ‘shabby’. Yet, paid or not, in debt or out of it, the fact is ambassadors continued to do their job, sending out despatches come what may. Mattingly’s assessment of their reports shows that the work was done, if it could be done at all, despite arrears and failures of pay. This quality is normally called ‘diligence’, a dull but professional virtue possessed, according to Mattingly’s evidence, by the diplomats but seemingly not shared by feeble rulers faced with paying up.

De Callières provides correlative background on the need for diplomats of former centuries to have independent resources, albeit guardedly, concluding in a roundabout way that, after all, it might just be a good idea to pay to get the right sort of person:

It is proper that with all these qualities, a minister, and especially he who has the title of ambassador, should be a man of a plentiful fortune, that he may be able to support the expences that necessarily attend that employment, for the right discharge of it. But a judicious Prince ought not to fall into a fault that is common enough to many Princes, which is: to look upon this quality as the most necessary one in an ambassador.2

**Contrary case**

Lorenzo de Medici proves the point a contrario. Scion of a banking family, he knew something about meeting business objectives: he paid for what he needed and, further to Florentine policy of waging ‘total diplomacy’ (Denys Hay’s expression), had what seems to have been the finest diplomatic network of the times. Holbein’s painting draws a discreet veil over known major backstage sordidness on pay and rations. This misleads the viewer.

It gets worse. As foreign policy was royal, personal and closely guarded, decisions were taken by the ruler alone, rarely by the ‘councils’ of wise men occasionally set up. This freedom allowed the ruler to issue conflicting instructions to ambassadors, tardy instructions or none at all, suggesting values closely associated with mistrust, excessive imagination and emblematic deception. De Callières points out, however, what ambassadors had long known: realism, trust and honesty are the only values that work on a permanent basis:

In all these different ways of negotiating, he ought to found chiefly the success of his negotiations on the uprightness and integrity of his own proceeding. If he pretend to succeed by subtleties, and by the superiority of genius which he may fancy he has over those with whom he treats, he may be very readily deceived. There is no Prince, or State, which has not a council able enough to know his true interests.3

The need to maintain trust is a mundane fact of life of such widely understood importance that it at once validates de Callières and casts doubt over the ‘rational’ politics counselled by Machiavelli. The latter’s reality guide to politics may have ‘worked’ at times for François at Fontainebleau or Philip back in Madrid, but would not have done for de Dinteville and de Selves stuck on their own with Henry at Greenwich. Kissinger’s book identifies trust issues as somehow new but de Callières’s treatise shows both the problem and its answer are old. Perhaps, like today’s self-help books, The Prince works better in theory than it does practice.

**Imperfect knowledge**

Again, Holbein’s picture is full of contemporary objects and instruments. The power elite may have liked looking at these things but is Holbein implying ambassadors were provided with all the latest gear? If so, the picture is open to question. Mattingly reports disturbing facts. Some diplomats were known to have private ad hoc collections but the latest books, discoveries and instruments were not in fact necessarily known to diplomats at all, many of whom were much frustrated by the inadequacy of background materials given to them for their assignments, if they were given any at all. He cites examples of ambassadors supplied with utterly outdated geography texts, showing most had at best an imperfect idea of what the post-1492 world actually looked like, let alone knowledge of recent advances in science and technology. Given this, one has to ask who actually owned the objets divers in Holbein’s painting? De Dinteville or de Selves? Were they borrowed? If the latter, Holbein surely casts a rose-tinted glow over things,
though of course, if objects were lent by or through Henry’s good offices, this controversial monarch might for once come up looking good.

Were the attitudes and values of rulers receiving envoys an improvement? Unlike today, where host countries have obligations not to frustrate diplomatic missions, Renaissance ambassadors had to contend with much outright interference. They faced practical difficulties in getting despatches back home; their couriers were liable to be delayed, intercepted or imprisoned by the host ruler, or all three. The England of Henry VIII provides instances. It may be that de Dinteville, who looks a bit peaked from the London winter, and de Selves turned up to their appointments with Holbein after mornings wasted trying to get their diplomatic pouch back from Henry’s agents. If so, it would nevertheless be unfair to conclude Henry was unusually at fault or that values — ‘fair play’ or ‘honour’ — had been specially breached. Other rulers conducted themselves in much the same way but no record shows any ever felt less than honourable. Holbein’s focus on courtly dress-ups suggests, however, that an ambassador’s life was one of ease. This is wrong.

For all that, Holbein’s painting should not be completely set aside. His scintillating illumination of details symbolises the sheer modernity of diplomacy as a policy instrument in days not too far along from times when, blessed by the Church, warfare had been considered the main occupation for rulers and men alike. While violence and cunning may have remained prominent, warfare itself seems to have waned as the idea spread in Italy, if not (at that time) in France, that diplomacy may offer better value for money than war. And perceptions among rulers that it might be had on easy financial terms may have helped.

**Diplomatic finery**

Holbein also indirectly shows the subtle but vital attention to protocol required of those involved in diplomacy in pridelful and turbulent times. The finery worn by the two ambassadors seems glossy but is, if anything, prudent, just a fur or two enough to keep up one’s court cred and no more. The ambassadors would have had good reason to think in this way. A quick glance at Holbein’s several portraits of Henry VIII shows that for finery, few or none excelled Henry. A king thus given to vanity and display would have been vastly more interested in vanity and display. While perched on a throne, a helper called into an arena where the secular power reigned, Holbein’s focus on courtly dress-ups suggests, however, that an ambassador’s life was one of ease. This is wrong.

Likely enough, Henry was confident his visitors knew the unspoken rules. The latter are older even than sumptuary laws and, if not actually composed in France, were certainly honed there. A most famous historical example of disregarding these common advantages, and of making them, is unlikely to have welcomed two courtiers crossing the Channel to upstage him.

A most famous historical example of disregarding them comes in the next century when Fouquet, Louis XIV’s finance minister, seeking to bolster what he perceived as his declining stock at court, threw a magnificent party for the king. Alas, too magnificent. The Sun King took it as an effort to outshine him. Fouquet was arrested on charges of embezzling state finances, convicted and imprisoned. Louis then awarded the Treasury, and predictably, state honours, to Colbert, a notoriously lacklustre partier. After that, to the delight of some modern students of history, the record shows the super-magnificent opulence of Versailles rising on the back of funds referred by Colbert from the Treasury to the king.

By 1533, moreover, business life had largely come to steer by secular values. Holbein’s picture captures this change. True, the visit to England may have been another half-cocked effort by François to reconcile Henry and Rome: as well as the *memento mori*, there is a crucifix (top left) and one ambassador, de Selves, is a cleric. A comparison with the previous century’s art, however, shows where the true balance of judgment lies: the *vita brevia* theme is classical as much as Christian; the miniature crucifix is barely visible and de Selves is shown left as de Dinteville’s side-kick, a helper called into an arena where the secular power of princes had effectively replaced that of priests in the old *publica christiana*. His presence emphasises rather than contradicts how laicised the world of elites had become. (By the time de Retz came to write *Mémoires*, a century later, the church was distinctly a back door way into politics, even though, like his enemy Richelieu, de Retz himself had made it through the church ranks.) Historians may be apt to regard the broken lute string and Lutheran Bible details as symbols of religious disharmony. This may be so, and one also recalls the fascination of the times with mystic themes of numerology and the like. But this seems an over-interpretation here. One has to look hard to spot them; those hunting for melancholia and *vita brevia* need to scramble past much epidictic and ostentatio.

**Secular values**

De Callières’s compendium of practice shows how much secular values had come to shape and underpin the conduct of early diplomacy. Perhaps the first contemporary writer to do so, he makes it clear that ‘*intérêts*’, or interests of state, are the central concerns of diplomacy:

> It is the saying of an ancient philosopher [Aristotle], that the friendship which is between men, is only a commerce wherein everyone seeks his own interest. The same thing may be said with much greater reason of the agreements and treaties which are made between sovereign princes. There are none of them but what are founded on their mutual advantages; and when both sides do not find their advantage by the treaties they do not subsist long and they fall of themselves. So that the great secret of negotiation is to find out the means of reconciling these common advantages, and of making them, if it is possible, keep even pace together.⁴

Lest this remark be rated forerunner to Palmerston’s quotable cynicism, ‘Britain has no friends, only interests’, it should be pointed out that de Callières meant something quite different. Basing himself on a wealth of well-analysed evidence, he makes it clear that efforts towards genuine friendship must be made and that firm and lasting agreements can be achieved only by taking into account the core interests of both sides, weak or strong. This seems like the approach taken by today’s honest brokers in diplomacy *avant la lettre*.

Against this background, the details of Holbein’s picture may seem open to positive interpretation. Do they not show practical values that lie at the very basis of diplomacy? Forces of optimism and a calm presence in turbulent times may connote a solid self-belief that harmony may yet be found, a hope and belief that words can solve, even if only partially, deep human and political divisions? Among men and women today faced with similar circumstances, does one not still see the same quiet play of a smile and does this not reflect confidence the world can be shaped to decent human policy ends? The utility, and perhaps charm, of diplomacy rest in putting such optimism to practical effect. Like lute strings, true, diplomatic efforts do not always work or last. Success can never be taken for granted. But armchair cynics of-

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ten fail to appreciate that success can never be ruled out either. Without belief in such values and qualities, de Callières asserts, diplomacy has nowhere to stand.

**Objective listening**

Calmness with a smile denotes a kind of impersonal openness, a necessary professional style captured well by Holbein. Diplomats navigate in uncharted waters; the rocks may be unrecognizable, but the first job of an ambassador is to listen objectively:

One of the more necessary qualities in a good minister, is to know how to listen with attention, and with reflection, to everything that one has mind to say to him, and then to give a just and pertinent answer to the things that have been proposed to him; instead of being over hasty to declare all he knows, and all he desires.\(^5\) Diplomats navigate in uncharted waters; the rocks may be unrecognizable — and, as shown on maps of the time, there may be monsters. States cannot ‘command’ information from one another; for the daily business, it must be listened for face to face and carefully interpreted.

Unfortunately, Holbein’s success in representing impersonality works against the emotional impact of the painting, making it arguably one of his worst. His skill in creating what art historian Susan Foister has called the ‘illusion of presence’ is not in question.\(^6\) But if portraiture is an art aiming to capture human personality, the liveliest thing in this painting is the iridescent skull in the foreground. A glance at Holbein’s other portraits shows just how keen his powers of psychological observation were: his Luther, for example, shows with fine insight an overearnest and vaguely obtuse individual one might ordinarily hesitate to take seriously while his Henry portraits show a vain and self-centred egotist one would be foolish not to take seriously. But having seen de Dinteville and de Selves, is one much the wiser? Does his painting live? For Holbein, portraitist, the mistake may have lain in painting ambassadors in the first place. Back in the loggias at Fontainebleau or on his horse down-country at Chambord, though, François I would likely have approved.

**NOTES**

2. François de Callières, De la Manière de Négocier avec des Souverains (Amsterdam, 1716), ch IV, p.94. This and the other quotations are taken from the English translation H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer (eds), François de Callières, The Art of Diplomacy (New York, 1983).
3. Ibid., ch VIII, p.118.
5. Ibid., ch XVI, p.162.

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The United States values its strong relationship with New Zealand, and it appreciates the role New Zealand plays in the multilateral system, where New Zealand’s voice has great credibility.

From 31 October to 2 November, in Niue, I led the US delegation to the 45th annual meeting of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations. My delegation benefited from close cooperation with New Zealand on the host of issues we discussed, including organisational development and governance issues, the budget and the organisation’s membership policy.

The United States strongly supports the Asia–Pacific region’s multilateral institutions, including through our membership in the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme and our growing partnership with the Pacific Islands Forum.

We draw on New Zealand’s deep experience and unique connection with the Pacific Islands region and its strong and longstanding relationship with these institutions — New Zealand’s role in initiating the first meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum in 1971 and in joining us as a founding member of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community stand out.

Within the region, we also collaborate with New Zealand in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. We applaud New Zealand’s efforts to deepen connections with ASEAN countries via the Joint Declaration on the ASEAN–New Zealand Comprehensive Partnership, through which New Zealand has made great strides to deepen political, security, economic and socio-cultural ties, including through a young business leaders exchange and disaster risk management and agricultural diplomacy programme. In addition, the 2009 agreement establishing the ASEAN–Australia and New Zealand Free Trade Area has brought immense benefits to the region.

The United States has been a steady force for and contributor to social, economic and political development throughout the Pacific region. Indeed, the United States is a Pacific nation, and we strive always to be good neighbours.

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rights and more. The United States is dedicated to a vision of the United Nations as the centre of the international system for decades to come.

There should be no under-estimating the need for an effective UN system. Pressing trans-national challenges are only growing in scope, scale and variety. Climate change, food security, pandemic health challenges such as Ebola, the threat of violent extremism and displaced persons are just a few. And in many ways every day, the United Nations is working to address those very challenges. There are many examples. The UN Human Rights Council is illuminating human rights crises in Syria, North Korea, Iran and elsewhere, while promoting universal human rights such as the freedoms of expression and assembly.

**Crucial role**

UN peacekeepers are a visible reminder of the crucial role the United Nations plays in peace and security. Today, United Nations blue helmets constitute sixteen missions and over 130,000 deployed military personnel around the world.

Despite its limitations, the UN Security Council remains the most important world body for collective action to promote global peace and security. In recent years, the council has been active on combatting the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, on substantive actions to counter terrorism and piracy, on robust non-proliferation regimes targeting Iran and North Korea and on authorising peacekeeping missions in Mali and South Sudan, among other places.

Technical agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons serve crucial roles advancing global security. Similarly, organisations such as the World Health Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation represent the collective will of the international community to share burdens and collaborate on issues of global concern.

Of course, the UN system is not without real flaws. Mismanagement and inefficiencies persist. An anti-Israel bias continues to permeate the system. Persistent voting blocs stymie important actions. But at the end of the day, the United Nations remains the most important multilateral forum to which nations bring their most pressing issues, and through which the global community works toward common solutions to the world’s challenges.

The United States enjoys a strong partnership with New Zealand at the United Nations. We appreciate the support New Zealand provides in advancing common positions within the UN system. As a member of the Security Council, we applaud New Zealand’s efforts to support the principles of the charter, contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of the council and uphold the council’s role in maintaining international peace and security.

We have seen the respect held for New Zealand’s views in many UN bodies, including in the defence of universal rights and values. We greatly appreciate New Zealand’s support for UN General Assembly action highlighting egregious human rights environments, such as in Iran, North Korea and Syria. A continued spotlight on these extreme cases of human rights abuses both in New York and Geneva is the key to ultimately holding these governments accountable.

**Four priorities**

During the 70th Session of the General Assembly, the United States worked to advance four topline priorities:

- strengthening multilateral peace operations;
- counter-terrorism, including countering ISIS and violent extremism;
- development; and
- climate change.

I would like to highlight a few of these priorities, along with the ways in which we have engaged with New Zealand to make progress towards fulfilling our objectives.

The demand for UN peacekeeping operations is at an all-time high, with nearly 130,000 peacekeepers carrying out sixteen missions across the globe. At the same time, peacekeepers are being asked to take on greater responsibilities in more difficult environments than ever before.

It is vital that we provide UN peacekeepers with the capacity to meet these 21st century challenges. This means, first and foremost, expanding the base of troop and police contributing countries and ensuring that the most capable militaries are doing their share. Last September, more than 30 countries attended the peacekeeping summit co-hosted by Vice President Joe Biden, taking meaningful steps forward in bolstering peacekeeping capacity. President Obama co-hosted a high-level summit on the margins of the General Assembly in September 2015, taking forward this initiative by convening the leaders of countries that were prepared to make significant, new and concrete commitments to peacekeeping.

We remain committed to working with these and new partners to help the UN address gaps facing current and future missions. The United Nations’ goals are to close persistent military
and police gaps in current peacekeeping operations; rapidly deploy specified units for a defined period of time; and make available specified units that could be generally called upon to deploy to an expanded or new operation, or to backfill units withdrawing from current operations.

**Global initiatives**

The United States also continued to strengthen multilateral counter-terrorism co-operation and capacity-building efforts during the last UN General Assembly, with particular emphasis on our global initiatives to counter ISIS, foreign terrorist fighters and violent extremism.

President Barack Obama hosted a Leaders’ Summit on Countering ISIS and Violent Extremism on 29 September on the margins of the General Assembly. The summit highlighted the strides made against ISIS, preventing the travel of foreign terrorist fighters and countering violent extremism. The United States established and is leading a coalition of more than 60 partners, including New Zealand, committed to degrading and ultimately destroying ISIS.

As one of our partners in the coalition, New Zealand has provided substantial humanitarian assistance to Iraq and Syria, in addition to contributing New Zealand Defence Force personnel to a building partner capacity training mission in Iraq.

We value the contributions and efforts of all partners in the mission as we work together on a multifaceted and long-term strategy to degrade and defeat ISIS, including through actions at the United Nations.

In addition, we have been focused on the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We were deeply gratified to see the new Sustainable Development Goals adopted in New York in October, and we appreciate the investment New Zealand made to participate in the development of the goals. The challenge with the Sustainable Development Goals will be implementation. We saw with the Millennium Development Goals that setting priorities and specific targets helped direct the world’s attention and resources to eradicating extreme poverty, and much progress has been made globally.

We can achieve quite a lot when we work together, and one area where we have made great progress is on oceans. We applaud New Zealand’s leadership on ensuring oceans were a stand-alone Sustainable Development Goal and we will work with New Zealand and other partners towards implementation of this goal.

**Big year**

2015 was a big year at the United Nations when it comes to climate change. We anticipated a positive outcome of the climate change talks and New Zealand’s engagement here was very important. There is perhaps no other issue on which Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands have been more widely heard or appreciated. As President Obama said during his trip to Alaska last September, ‘few things will disrupt our lives as profoundly as climate change’. This is why we were pleased to see New Zealand bring this issue to the forefront at the Security Council last July.

The United States has greatly appreciated New Zealand’s leadership on small island developing states (SIDS) issues, both in the lead-up to the successful SIDS conference in Samoa in 2014 and in its raising of the issue of the security concerns of SIDS at the Security Council last July. Our governments continue to collaborate together on SIDS issues to ensure that the international community is not ignoring the unique needs of islands, including those in the Pacific.

The United States–New Zealand relationship within the multilateral sphere is strong and vital. The United States remains committed to strong co-operation with partners throughout the world within both regional organisations and the UN framework to tackle current challenges and collectively work to ensure a more peaceful, productive and prosperous world. We enjoy strong collaboration with New Zealand as we seek to advance these objectives.
**ISIS attacks Tunisia**

Tawfik Jelassi discusses the significance of the armed attack on the Tunisian border town of Ben Gardane in March.

Were you surprised by the attack on Ben Gardane?

Absolutely. 2015 was a bloody year for Tunisia. We had three major attacks: on the Bardo national museum in March, on a major hotel in Sousse in June, and on the presidential guard in Tunis 100 metres from the interior ministry in November. The latest attack of 7 March 2016 cannot really be classified as being just a terrorist act. It was actually an attempt to take control of a Tunisian city to establish an outpost for ISIS in the country! This is unprecedented and deeply troubling.

Does this mean Tunisia is not in control of security in that border region?

Tunisia is still on top of the issue. Luckily, the security forces were able to defend the city from the attack. There were around 50 casualties among the terrorists, who were suspected to number over 100. But they managed to assassinate some members of the security forces at home, which means they had co-operation from inside Tunisia, possibly dormant ISIS cells that were activated for the attack. All of the identified ISIS casualties so far have turned out to be Tunisians. This raises a lot of questions about what is ahead. Are there more dormant terrorist cells in the country? Will there be other ISIS attempts to take territorial control?

What should the European Union do?

Tunisia was already de-stabilised by the insecurity in Libya. The latest attack is a symptom of problems that go beyond its borders and concern the entire international community. Tunisia is often forgotten until there is a terrorist attack, but it has very strong ties to Europe. The international community has recognised Tunisia by granting the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian Quartet that facilitated our National Dialogue in the fall of 2013. But beyond that there has not been much support for Tunisia, the ‘Democracy Start-up’. The country was the only ray of hope that came out of the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011, but now the country faces economic problems that need to be addressed and major security challenges as well. The European Union and the international community at large are in a position to help Tunisia on the security, economic and social levels.

What can be done by the European Union for Tunisia’s security?

Tunisia needs security equipment: it lacks advanced attack helicopters, night vision military capabilities and more to face the threat that the radical groups pose to the country. It would benefit from more intelligence sharing as well. There have been some partial intelligence failures, and Tunisia is sometimes in a reactive mode. Becoming more proactive would help combat the terrorist threat more effectively. On the economic side, certain regions are lagging behind; they do not have sufficient factories or development projects that can create new job opportunities for the unemployed youth. If nothing is done, and if there is no foreign investment, unemployment will continue to rise, purchasing power will keep dropping and social problems will grow.

At the G8 summit of 2011, several billion dollars were pledged to Tunisia, but the country has yet to receive any of it. Tunisia’s problems are well known but it has not gotten assistance from its allies in the West. We need a Marshall Plan for Tunisia. We cannot forget that Tunisia is the last buffer zone for Europe against the terrorist threat that is growing in the Middle East and North Africa. If this area becomes completely unstable, southern Europe will have a lot more to worry about.

Why are Tunisia’s youth attracted to radical groups?

In some of the far-flung regions of the country, the state is not sufficiently active economically and socially, and some extremist groups are taking advantage of this situation. They have been appealing to the unemployed youth, luring them with money or promising them a ‘better life’ and thus tempting them to join their ranks. Some of the youngsters are also brainwashed by being told that the extremists are fighting for a ‘noble cause’ to establish true Islam and Sharia law in the country, which gives them a sense of purpose. Some of the less stable youth succumb to these promises and end up crossing the line to join these extremist groups.

What is life like for average Tunisians?

Many Tunisians think that it is all well and good that the country was recognised with the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize and that since the 2011 revolution they have a democratic society as well as more liberty and freedom than ever before, but those are not cheques they can cash at the bank. Their day-to-day lives are actually not improving, economically speaking. We have to tackle the roots of the problem and put in place the right solutions that will improve the lives of average Tunisians. This will require more time and continuous effort but also help from the international community.

Where is Tunisia headed?

Making a democratic transition takes time. The most difficult part is changing people’s mind-sets. We need to have more continuity of direction and policies, and also to swiftly implement some reforms that the country badly needs. What the people want to see is more action on the ground and fewer empty promises. Any government in power has to deliver results-wise in order to enable citizens to reap the benefits of a post-revolution, democratic Tunisia.
BOOKS

WATCHING THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS 2014

Editor: Ulla Fionna

THE YUDHOYONO PRESIDENCY: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation

Editors: Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, Dirk Tomsa
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2015, 359pp, US$38.90(hb), US$29.90(pb).

Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies has published two important books on democratic consolidation in Indonesia.

Ulla Fionna’s edited volume is a collection of previously published essays that survey the 2014 election that brought the current Indonesian president, Joko Widodo (aka ‘Jokowi’), to office. Most of these essays were originally published in the run up to the election itself. Several features of Indonesian politics come through quite strongly. First is the rise of political ‘sosok’ (prominent figures with strong name recognition), over and above parties and policies. These include military figures (like Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi’s main challenger), tycoons (like current Vice President Jusuf Kalla) and mavericks that have emerged from local politics (Jokowi). Second, the book advances the argument that government in Indonesia should be seen in terms of cartel arrangements rather than more Western conceptions of divisions between ‘government and opposition’. There are certainly political rivalries, but it is a shifting cast of allegiances where it is difficult to find a permanent bloc that might be termed a long-term opposition. Third, since the advent of democracy in Indonesia, the legislature has remained very divided, without much consolidation. Former President Megawati’s PDI-P, which is also the nominating political vehicle for the current president, is Parliament’s largest party with just 20 per cent of seats. Fourth, the commonly reported surge of Islamic parties to 32 per cent of the vote overlooks the fact that there is no sense in which the parties that constitute this vote form any kind of bloc. In fact the harder edged Islamist PKS, which had a surprising surge in 2009, took a hammering in 2014 after a series of leadership scandals. Overall, this is a volume full of insights as to how Jokowi, the erstwhile local body politician with a strong reputation for clean government, successfully obtained the presidency. Jokowi defined retail politics, using small meeting and door-to-door campaigning to promote his image. But in the end, Jokowi’s victory was by a smaller margin than many were expecting. General Prabowo Subianto, the former son-in-law of the dictator Soeharto, made a strong challenge — some in Indonesia think he represents a return to the order of a previous time.

The Yudhoyono Presidency is a volume that strongly complements the first. It is a thorough examination of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s two five-year terms as president. That decade largely defined Indonesia’s consolidation of democracy, and Yudhoyono has been lauded internationally for that transition and a perception of moderation in the world’s largest Muslim country. This presidency also drew a number of internal conflicts to a close, including the long running insurgency in Aceh. This all points to the ‘stability’ noted in the book’s subtitle, but contributors are equally concerned with ‘stagnation’.

What were the lost opportunities of the Yudhoyono years? The authors believe that Yudhoyono was an inherently cautious politician who allowed others to debate policy detail — Sidney Jones calls him the opposite of a micro-manager. Despite the political capital he accumulated, Yudhoyono as-

Notes on reviewers

Dr Anthony Smith is in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The views expressed here and do not represent the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet or the New Zealand government.

Dr Roderic Alley was previously associate professor in political science and international relations at Victoria University of Wellington.

Dr Jennifer Curtin is an associate professor in politics and international relations at the University of Auckland. She has published widely on gender politics and women and political leadership.

Dr Stephen Hoadley is an associate professor of politics and international relations at the University of Auckland, NZIIA life member and corresponding editor of the NZIR.

Dr John Tonkin-Covell is a senior fellow at the NZDF Command and Staff College, and a former senior lecturer in military history and strategic studies as a Defence civilian.

Dr Ian McGibbon, the NZIR’s managing editor, is the author of the centenary history of New Zealand’s involvement in the First World War’s Western Front to be published later this year.
Assembled various Rainbow Cabinets that represented no less than three-quarters of the legislature at any one time — again with no clear distinction between government and opposition. The president carefully avoided conflict, saw himself as the political conciliator and often sought a middle way between policy arguments. Yudhoyono, who was interviewed by the editors of this volume, represented these traits as virtues in an Indonesian context, and in contrast to the zero-sum politics that he observed in authoritarian times.

The two most controversial developments during Yudhoyono’s presidency were the growth of intolerance during his tenure and his failure to get Indonesia back into high growth rates. He allowed some of his ministers to pave the way for not only the harassment of heterodox sects of Islam, with his minister of religion declaring that Shia were not Muslims and should be forcibly converted, but also the circumventing of attempts by the Christian community to build new churches. The minister of home affairs publicly supported gangs who attacked bars and churches. The book presents evidence that Yudhoyono remained deeply traditional in his own outlook, which may have had an impact on notions of free speech and expression. It concludes that he failed to wrestle with tough issues like fuel subsidies (which divert money away from infrastructure and promote motor vehicle use) and reform of the investment environment, which has meant that Indonesia has largely now missed much of the development that one might associate with the East Asian growth model.

Some of the contributions take a pretty deep look at Yudhoyono’s character, including attempts to assess his psychology. Yudhoyono is compared with a number of other figures in political transition in South-east Asia, who are often from the military and usually represent a compromise choice between status quo forces and political transition. Yudhoyono was a significant military figure in the Soeharto years, as well as a leading member of Megawati’s Cabinet. Taking criticism from the public was something to which he may have reacted very badly: it is noted that he appears to have carefully trawled through social media, even stopping to respond personally to critics.

These books are quite thought provoking, and highlight a number of controversial elements of governance in Indonesia. It is fair for commentators to note these issues and to expect more from political leadership. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge, as these volumes do, the significant transition that Indonesia has undergone.

**Regionalism, Security and Cooperation in Oceania**

*Editors: Rouben Azizian and Carleton Cramer*  
*Published by: Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, 2015, 172pp.*

This collection comprises presentations delivered by government officials, non-governmental representatives and academics to a 2014 security conference held in Vanuatu. In an opening chapter giving a cogent *tour d’horizon*, Richard Herr identifies a recurring dilemma: the continuing divergence evident between orthodox state protection formulations and those focusing on non-traditional, so-called ‘human’ security demands. Difficulties in accommodating this divergence, Herr rightly claims, has refracted differently across a range of Oceania’s relationships — not least at regional, institutional levels.

It has resulted in ambivalence as to whether Oceania can or should achieve a durable consensus as to what it seeks to protect, by whom and through what measures. In some form or other, that difficulty repeats throughout this collection’s presentations, which broadly comprise two categories. The first deals with those actors projecting security influence into the Pacific — China, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The second considers more localised reactions, adjustments or retaliations towards these influences, be that over maritime resource management, climate change or reconfigured regional institutional arrangements.

Over China, Michael Powles and Jian Zhang offer complementary but differing appraisals, the former seeing Beijing’s highest priority as one of attaining major power status across the wider Asia-Pacific region; the latter concentrating on the growing diversity of opportunities now available through constructive engagement. Both regard relations with China as manageable notwithstanding some Chinese private sector criminality and unaccountable resource extraction.

Regarding the United States, Eric Shibuya is blunt: while Washington’s lack of interest in Pacific Islands countries is not new, it is now increasingly a mistake. A pace back from Washington’s complex compact arrangements in Micronesia, Shibuya wants greater American cultural understanding of, and better rather than more quality engagement in, Oceania.

Jenny Hayward Jones unreservedly asserts that Australia has been the dominant power in the Pacific Islands region for at least three decades. Yet for her Canberra could do more to help the region by assisting with mitigation and adaptation climate change strategies, disaster impact management and fisheries sustainability. The A$2.6 billion Australia spent over a decade’s support of the Regional Support Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) she deems expensive but worth it. Unmentioned by this former foreign ministry staff officer is either the controversy surrounding Canberra’s use of Pacific locations for asylum-seeker relocations or the impact that this has had on Australia’s standing in the region.

Anna Powles considers New Zealand’s role in this setting as one of being both within and at its periphery. Wellington understandably seeks co-operative relations with Canberra, Beijing and Washington, but their agendas in the region have not always been attuned to the cultural and local sensitivities New Zealand considers operative in the region. Powles believes New Zealand needs to do more to build regional security resilience, including relevant force co-operation through training and education.
From a second, more localised perspective, Jim Elmslie offers fresh insights into the Indonesian manoeuvring that was designed to prevent West Papuan representation in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The 2014 Foreign Ministerial Mission, mounted by the MSG and visiting West Papua to investigate this possibility, is considered a farce due to a total lack of co-operation from Jakarta. Vanuatu is judged the strongest supporter of West Papuan MSG membership, with others among its members more lukewarm.

Somewhat ambitiously, Sousa Santos sketches a full role for future East Timor engagement in Oceania. Considered positive has been East Timor’s role in the G7+ group of countries recuperating from conflict, its possible bridging functions connecting South-east Asia and the Pacific and a more questionable claim that it has ‘large, and well equipped policing and paramilitary units’ that could serve in regional peacekeeping operations.

Just as ambitiously perhaps, Russell Parkin proposes a regional Pacific civilian policing and international peacekeeping training establishment that could disseminate relevant expertise, build disaster relief capability and foster best professional standards. But could this work given a companion recommendation that it mirror the Australian Defence Force’s Peace Operations Centre? Yet as Parkin notes, in certain complex emergencies (Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, for example) military action, or even a conventional military presence, is not appropriate. Quoted with relevance by Parkin is Eisenhower’s aphorism that ‘plans are worthless but planning is everything’. Preceding institutional arrangements for regional security cooperation, it would seem, is the need to imbue security agencies with a hunger to learn, to adapt and to constantly expect the unexpected.

Yoichiro Sato’s discussion of Oceania’s key fisheries resources fails to acknowledge the problems islands states have encountered with Western and Central Pacific Tuna Commission members refusing to restrict their take of tuna catches. Rightly criticised, however, is Tonga’s poorly governed regulatory environment for seabed mining, this allowing foreign criminality and unaccountable conduct by its ruling elites.

Finally, Scott Hauger’s contribution on climate change impacts calls for stronger regional collaboration over mitigation and adaptation, and better public dissemination of the information needed to support these strategies. The rhetoric required has been supplied by the 2013 Majuro Declaration, but national implementation has been less forthcoming. Appropriately queried is why the impact of several hundred millions of dollars of climate-related aid to the Pacific Islands in recent decades has been so slight.

While individual chapters touch on corruption, defective justice and rule of law, or illegal transnational corporate transactions, these shortcomings deserved dedicated attention as drivers of insecurity. Likewise the continuing militarisation of the wider Pacific or, within island states, the destabilising impacts of internal migration, unemployment, food and gender insecurity. Some, including this reviewer, may not take kindly to the use of executive summaries that risk short changing a full reading, and which appear in ten of the twelve chapters. (The book is accessible online at www.apcss.org.)

RODERIC ALLEY

A FIGHTING CHANCE

Author: Elizabeth Warren

Watching Hilary Clinton’s and Bernie Sanders’s battle for the Democratic Party presidential nomination is a reminder that, for more than a moment, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s name was also in the mix. In January 2015 the Atlantic Monthly quoted Warren as saying that she would not run, but then set about arguing for why she should. Over the course of 2015, the senator’s supporters organised a campaign called ‘Ready for Warren’. According to The Hill website, when Warren remained unmoved, the organisation’s top officials went on to endorse Sanders. By Super Tuesday, 8 March 2016, Warren was still to reveal who she would support, although it was Clinton who narrowly won Warren’s state of Massachusetts.

So what is it about Elizabeth Warren that makes her politics so appealing that speculation on her position continues to matter to the media? Her biopic A Fighting Chance provides us with some answers. Warren was born into a family of limited means, and had three elder brothers; she grew up assuming her family as ‘middle class’ although later came to learn that they were closer to being poor. Nevertheless, her parents were determined to provide their children with a better life, including a higher education. Warren acknowledges their role, but also recognises that her opportunities were structured by a state system of support for wage-earners, students and beneficiaries. Franklin Roosevelt’s policy reforms had given all Americans a ‘fighting chance’, she argued, but over time the system’s foundations shifted, making life more difficult for average citizens and more lucrative for the moneyed elites.

The book begins with a personal history that sketches Warren’s pathway to politicisation, before tracking in more detail the five key battles she has taken on to change policy and people’s lives. In a number of ways Warren’s rise to political fame is unorthodox; she is known as the Harvard professor but her academic qualifications are from public universities; her track to tenure was preceded by a number of short-term teaching contracts in different cities, and she juggled these with motherhood in a time that was less welcoming of women in the profession. For her, the personal is political, not just in the feminist sense. Rather, her own experiences, and those of whom she documents in short vignettes, are stories of working people worried about their economic security and their children’s future. Some are very moving, drawing readers into this story of ‘David versus Goliath’. Cumulatively these experiences fuel Warren’s decision to enter politics, first as a public servant, then as a legislator.

It is as a law professor
that Warren first becomes intrigued by the complexities of bankruptcy law and its implications for families. She became a champion of empirical evidence over theoretical argument — seldom an academically wise decision but necessary to influence the minds of politicians and policy-makers. Warren’s first foray into formal politics was through her appointment to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. The battle to protect families from predatory practices through stronger regulation was one she did not win and her story reveals the complexities of seeking policy change within the US political system. In this chapter, and those that follow, Warren documents the sometimes confounding impact of shifting partisanship, the pursuit of donations, the realities of political separation of powers in practice and the influence of the banking industry and other well-resourced lobbyists on Congress. She does this in a style that is accessible to a variety of readers. Her involvement in the Congressional Oversight Panel on bank bailouts reminds the reader that key alliances with the media, activists and legislators matter in politics and small wins are worth celebrating.

However, it was her research and promulgation of the need for consumer protection from large financial agencies that is her signature project; it resulted in the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, which she was not allowed to lead, but which cemented her future in Democratic Party politics. By 2011 several progressives and 70,000 supporters on the internet were urging her to contest Ted Kennedy’s former Senate seat, won by popular Republican Scott Brown in 2010. Warren recounts both the ordinary and extraordinary aspects of this campaign. She undersells the impact of her resounding speech introducing Obama at the 2012 Democratic Convention, but acknowledges the enormity of her win (54:46) and the turnout rate of 73 per cent.

This is where the book ends. In the epilogue Warren tells readers there is still much to do, more battles to be had, but on how this might happen in a Republican-majority House and Senate, Warren remains silent. Those around her have not been silent, however. Some speculate that ‘Heather Dunbar’ in Series 3 of House of Cards is modelled in part on Elizabeth Warren, while others are suggesting she would make an excellent vice president to Clinton’s presidential nomination. Irrespective of the outcome in 2016, this book indicates that Warren’s career as a legislator of import remains far from over.

While each is unique, the stories are linked by a journalist’s-eye-view of unfolding situations of distress, whether his or those for whom he has friendship or empathy. They are vignettes about victims of armed conflict, religious intolerance, illness, destitution or callousness whose verisimilitude touched this reviewer. But the author’s stoicism, irony and perceptiveness, expressed in crisp economical phrases, prevent the narratives from descending into sentimentality, and engender admiration for the capacity of his subjects to carry on even as they suffer or perish.

The title story portrays the journalist staying with an imam in Yemen in a district recently torn by battles between the Houthis and the government forces. The black dog was leader of a pack that scavenged on the bodies of fallen fighters in the hills and acquired such a taste for human blood that they began attacking villagers. The imam and his followers meet to plan a hunt to kill the black dog. But a venerable mujahedeen — a veteran of Afghanistan — named Khadun objected that the dog was a devil sent by God to punish those guilty of transgression against His laws, so cleansing and strict adherence, not guns, was the proper course of action. Eventually the imam prevails in a tense debate, the hunt proceeds and the black dog and his pack are shot. Then plague descends on the village and strikes down the imam’s two daughters. The journalist, realising that he, as a non-believer, was no longer welcome among the devout villagers, quietly departs.

Other stories depict the tribulations of journalists, aid workers and soldiers in desolate, corrupt and violent places, some of whom lose their innocence, their moral balance or their lives.

Whether these stories are ‘true’ seems to this reviewer less important than that, as ‘portraits of humanity behind the headlines’, they are engaging, insightful and credible.

JENNIFER CURTIN

THE DEVIL IS A BLACK DOG: Stories from the Middle East and Beyond

Author: Sándor Jászberényi

This collection blurs the distinction between reportage and fiction, but felicitously and informatively. Each of the stories emerges not only from Jászberényi’s experiences as a senior war correspondent in the Middle East, Africa and the Ukraine but also from his humanity.

Stephen Loveridge has written an interesting, combative and quite absorbing analysis of the commitment of New Zealand society to the Great War. At times quite controversial, the social history depicted therein considers the cultural complexity of a young country faced with the challenges posed...
by a world-wide conflict, in which large numbers of men (and some women) depart to distant theatres in the Middle East and the Western Front, many of whom never return.

While one might expect from this kind of examination a fairly one-sided account opposing such a dire venture in the imperial interest, Loveridge commendably takes a carefully measured, rounded view. Instead of an outright one-dimensional interpretation of the subject, he provides a sympathetic and understanding view of why the substantive and wide-ranging war effort was supported at large across society for considerable periods of time, while taking into account the cumulative opposition to that commitment that arose as the war went on, and the casualties mounted.

The six chapters cover a range of aspects, each adorned with a fish-hook kind of title, which may be attractive to some readers and repellent to others. Nevertheless, each chapter is full of detailed analysis, grappling pointedly with the range of issues raised. ‘Being British’ and ‘Being Truly British’ set the context of the arguments presented in the first two chapters. ‘Half a Soldier Before Enrolled’ touches the road to war, setting the New Zealand peculiarities of those going off to war, and the diverse interpretive strands of New Zealand’s military past and present (1914–18). These include the matters of internal colonial rebellions and the Boer War, and the unpleasant evolution from Gallipoli through the years on the Western Front. ‘Shirkers’ is the next chapter, which makes interesting reading as it skirts the wide range of negative stereotypes that increased as the war went on, and the downstream effects, including the issue of spite. ‘The Women’s Part’ considers not only the immediate role of women in the war at home and abroad but also the foreshadowing of what would occur on an even grander scale during the Second World War in terms of the expansion of occupational opportunities, the downstream effects of which continued through the rest of the 20th century. The last chapter looks at the ‘Culture of Sacrifice’ and the impact of more than 18,000 deaths and thousands more wounded and scarred physically or psychologically by war service, along with the societal response to that. The legacy left an indelible long-lasting imprint on New Zealand society, extending through to today’s 21st century world.

The conclusion to the book compares the response in the long run to both world wars, noting the tendency to regard the First World War as basically pointless in contrast to the Second World War, which had to be fought. On the First World War, the author takes a different view and observes that the German aggression in Western Europe at the outset cannot be ignored. While the book grapples with what he sees as the New Zealand societal response in all its shades to harrowing times, and does so with gusto, it perhaps could have drawn the imperial context more clearly. New Zealand, a burgeoning new country coming out of a turbulent relatively recent past (a series of mini-civil wars stretching across more than 60 years of the 19th century), nevertheless found itself confronted by obligations within the Empire that were responded to as very much the natural order of things. The South African (immediate post-Boer War experience and the rise of the Afrikaners), Australian (only a country in the 20th century) and Canadian responses to the war are different and yet also very substantial, while the Indian role deep within the Empire directly ruled as the jewel in the Crown is another contrast. On the other hand, given the extent to which the author has gone deeply into the New Zealand experience of the First World War, there cannot be room in this book for much more. One interesting aspect that is not covered directly would seem to be the question of New Zealand’s remoteness or lack of it from the war. While the smallness of the threat posed by the German navy with von Spee’s squadron in 1914 is hardly a big issue, the reach of German seapower is not really noticed at all, despite a raider showing up in New Zealand waters later in the war. The issue of maritime connectivity (the sea is a highway to ports and trade) and the potential threat posed is something that is revisited by Germany (1940, 1941, 1945) and Japan (1942–44) in the Second World War. The myth of New Zealand’s remoteness that has become politically well cemented-in today is an interesting omission and one that might also be commented on (although the Japanese threat is alluded to as part of a general racial distrust of Asians in 1914–18 New Zealand). As New Zealand is very much the product of the successful application of British seapower, it is interesting to reflect on how geographic distance and a connected world of seaborne trade has also strategic vulnerability embedded within it. Through the First World War, Britannia ruled the waves at least until 1917 and the onslaught of unrestricted submarine warfare. Although this threat was defeated, future threats were highlighted by the advent of the US Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. It is a matter of record that intelligence officers of the US Great White Fleet visiting Auckland before the First World War took the time preparatory to a potential Pacific conflict with the British Empire to scope how to take Auckland by force as a prelude to attacking the Australian ports.

However, these considerations are a long way from this book. The book itself contains a great number of interesting illustrations taken from contemporary publications, and the sources used are very extensive, as one would expect in a social history. Perhaps more official Army Department and Navy Department files might have been perused. Loveridge has certainly covered the ground, which is not surprising as the book is based on his doctoral thesis.

This book is something of a well-argued tour de force, very precisely written, and has much to entertain the reader as it traverses matters that demand quite a bit of sober as well as humorous reflection. Looking holistically at the New Zealand societal commitment to the First World War, the author has done sterling work overall. Call to Arms is an absorbing if at times disquieting read.

JOHN TONKIN-COVELL
Chinese ANZacs
Australians of Chinese Descent in the Defence Forces 1885–1919

Second Edition (Revised to include New Zealand-born Chinese of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force 1914–1919)

Author: Alastair Kennedy
Published by: New Zealand Chinese Association, Wellington, 2015, 173pp, $40 (books can be obtained from james-to@es.co.nz).

The very wordy title of this book reflects the fact that it has something of an after thought quality. When it was first published, in 2012, it had no coverage of Chinese who served in the New Zealand forces, despite including the word ‘Anzac’ in its title. This was not, of course, unusual, for Australians often tend to overlook the ‘NZ’ in the acronym. The author admits in his preface that he was ‘foolish enough’ to overlook the New Zealanders, but he soon acted to remedy the omission with assistance of Chinese in New Zealand. A second edition published digitally in 2013 contained a 24-page additional chapter on New Zealand-born Chinese in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. The New Zealand Chinese Association has now acted to provide a hard-back version.

The experience of Chinese in both Australia and New Zealand was often marked by indifference, discrimination and hostility in the period up to and during the First World War. Although the number of Chinese in New Zealand had been as high as 5000 in the 1870s, there were roughly half that number in 1914. But to enlist in the NZEF men had to be British citizens and not all the Chinese in New Zealand held that status. There were perhaps only about 150 men who were eligible to enlist. Alistair Kennedy’s investigation indicates that perhaps a third of them answered the call.

Kennedy provides biographical information about the men that have so far been identified as Chinese in the NZEF. It will perhaps come as a surprise to readers to find that two Chinese were among the New Zealand troops that landed at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. These were James George Patterson, grandson of one of the first Chinese to arrive in New Zealand, and Norman Kwong Tsu Low. The latter, whose father was another early arrival in New Zealand, was an engineer, who had graduated from Canterbury University College in 1908. Enlisting in the United Kingdom, he was eventually posted to the 1st Company, New Zealand Engineers and went ashore with them in the evening of the landing day. He later served on the Western Front, as did his brother. Most of the Chinese NZEF soldiers served in that theatre. Three were killed during the war, including Patterson at Gallipoli. Several were badly wounded. Three were decorated and one commissioned.

One shortcoming in Kennedy’s coverage derives from the fact that the initial publication of the revised edition in 2013 came before Archives New Zealand completed the digitisation of all personal files of men who served with the NZEF. This target was achieved just before the centenary of the outbreak of the war in August 2014, and the digitised files now constitute an enormous resource for the study of New Zealand society in the early 20th century. The fact that the author was forced on numerous occasions to state that the Chinese soldier in question’s details could not be confirmed because his file was as yet unavailable is a disappointing feature of this book. However, readers can easily access files of the soldiers mentioned on Archives New Zealand’s website (www.archway.archives.govt.nz) and follow up on the information supplied by Kennedy.

Despite this problem, this book is not only a useful reminder of the diversity of composition of the NZEF in the First World War but also a valuable corrective to the idea that Chinese in New Zealand were all an excluded and despised minority at that time.

IAN McGIBBON
National Office and branch activities.

On 1 March a panel discussion on ‘The TPP and New Zealand: Where Do We Stand?’ was held in Parliament’s Grand Hall. Minister of Trade Hon Todd McClay hosted the event, and was also a keynote speaker. Chaired by Hon Sir Douglas Kidd, the NZIIA president, the panelists were Crawford Falconer, the Sir Graeme Harrison professorial chair at Lincoln and formerly OECD trade leader, a deputy secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade responsible for the Trade and Economy Group and ambassador to the World Trade Organisation; Emeritus Prof Gary Hawke, a fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand and member of the Academic Advisory Council of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia; Terence O’Brien, a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and formerly ambassador to the United Nations, European Union and the WTO–GATT; Prof Zhiyue Bo, director of the New Zealand Contemporary China Research Centre; and Colin James, political journalist and analyst and life member of New Zealand Parliament Press Gallery.

On 3 March the NZIIA was associated, along with the European Union Centres Network New Zealand, with the Delegation of the European Union to New Zealand in convening a public seminar on ‘The European Commission’s New Trade for All Strategy and New Zealand’ presented by Helena König (European Commission’s Directorate General Trade).

Former president of East Timor and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Dr José Ramos-Horta spoke at Victoria University on 9 March on the topic ‘Perspectives on Global and Regional Foreign Policy Issues’.

On 14 March the foreign minister of Iran, Javad Zarif, addressed a meeting on ‘What Role now for Iran in the Middle East and the World’.

Hawke’s Bay
On 10 March Dr Richard Grant (branch chair and former diplomat) addressed the branch on ‘What Diplomats Do’.

Waikato
A meeting was held on 16 March to hear Dr Ron Smith (research associate, University of Waikato’s Department of Political Science and Public Policy) speak on ‘Climate Change and the Death of Science’.

Wairarapa
The following meetings were held:
2 Mar Sir Geoffrey Palmer (former prime minister), ‘What Does the Paris Agreement on Climate Change Mean for New Zealand?
13 Apr Dr Richard Grant (former New Zealand ambassador to Germany), ‘German reunification 25 Years On: Then and Now’.

Wellington
The branch AGM was held on 15 March. The following officers were elected:
Chair — Brian Lynch ONZM
Vice Chair — Joe Burton
Events Organiser — Andrew Warden
Treasurer — Mark Holden
Membership Secretary — Kerry Boyle
Minutes Secretary — Lisa Marriner
Student Representatives — Eve Bain, Emma Harman
Committee — Vern Bennett, Karim Dickie, Oliver Harper, Kevin Ratnam, Tricia Wallbridge, Frank Wilson, Tim Wang, Tim Wood

Following the AGM Laurence Kubiak, the chief executive officer of the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, spoke on ‘An Economic Perspective on Global Affairs’.

Other meetings included:
10 Mar Eldad Beck (Berlin–based Israeli journalist) ‘Myths and Realities of the Arab–Israel Conflict’.
13 Apr Prof Rouben Azizian (director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University), ‘Russia’s New Security Strategy: Implications for the Asia–Pacific’.
21 Apr Dr Jon Johansson (Victoria University of Wellington politics lecturer and Fulbright scholar in the United States in 2009), ‘Presidents, Primaries and Political Time: Election “16”’. This meeting was jointly convened with Fulbright New Zealand.

Auckland
The following meetings were held:
3 Mar HE Marina Kaljurand (foreign minister of Estonia), ‘The Role of Cyber Security in Foreign Affairs and Defence’.
22 Mar Peter Kennedy (former NZIIA executive director), ‘The Western Front: Shadows of the Past’.

Christchurch
The following meetings were held:
8 Mar Eldad Beck (the Berlin-based correspondent of the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth since 2002, covering Germany, Central Europe and the European Union), ‘Myths and Realities of the Arab–Israel Conflict’.
15 Mar Prof William Spurlin (Brunel University, London), ‘The Legacy of Nazi Persecutions against Lesbians and Gay Men in Contemporary Society’.

Dr José Ramos-Horta

Brian Lynch

New Zealand International Review
AN INVITATION

If you are interested in international affairs and you are not already a subscriber to the New Zealand International Review, consider the advantage of receiving this magazine on a regular basis. New Zealand International Review completed its fortieth consecutive year of publication in 2015. It continues to be the only national magazine exclusively devoted to national issues as they affect New Zealand. Issued bimonthly it is circulated throughout New Zealand and internationally. The Review is non-partisan, independent of government and pressure groups and has lively articles from local and international authors, with special emphasis on New Zealand’s international relations. It contains
- stimulating and up-to-date articles on topical issues,
- reviews of recent book releases,
- details of other NZIIA publications,
- information on national and branch activities.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION (six issues)

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