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**Brexit: a long march**

Rita Ricketts reflects on the recent British vote in favour of leaving the European Union.

The centenary of the battle of the Somme fell exactly a week after the momentous EU referendum. Now, where tanks once slunk, trucks march nose to tail between England and Europe. On the banks of the Somme is a vast, and unusually tasteful, service station. Nearing Calais, travellers and tradespeople pass by the fields of Flanders, where still ‘the poppies blow’ Between the crosses row on row’.1 If those who lay in these fields were awakened — like characters in Stanley Spenser’s Resurrection paintings — they would recognise their immediate surroundings. Here now are the same flat fields and low-slung, sloping-roofed, buildings, housing landowners with their six or eight cows. One such old farmer, catching anyone with the time to listen to his childhood memories (of the Second World War), recounts how enemy soldiers requisitioned the farm’s only, and much beloved, carthorse. Pointing out the bullet holes in his milking shed, he remembers the faces of enemy soldiers who crossed the farmyard with bayonets fixed.

Has Britain, in voting to leave the European Union, broken faith with the dead? He has some sympathy for those wanting to ditch EU rules: rules that create unfathomable paperwork and prevent him from moving his cows around as his father did, and his unpasteurised milk has few takers. But turning to his copy of *De Standaard*, he takes issue with its 17 June editorial: ‘Ik hou van Europa, ik hou niet van Europa’. What do they mean by Europe, his unpasteurised milk has few takers. But turning to his copy of *De Standaard*, he takes issue with its 17 June editorial: ‘Ik hou van Europa, ik hou niet van Europa’. What do they mean by Europe, he asks? As the philosopher John Gray told BBC4 listeners, the European Union is not Europe. Britain is not leaving Europe. It is leaving the European Union.

Britain’s relationship with the institution that calls itself the European Union has always been a love-you-love-you-not affair. Now, it has come to divorce, a decision reached by a majority of 51.9 per cent. The Brexiteers had won, but judging by the adverse reactions, in Britain, Europe and across the world, it might well turn out to be a pyrrhic victory. Britian awoke to a divided nation. Leaders were challenged or ousted, political parties faced fragmentation, families split, the diaspora were fearful for their future, an angry European Union was out for revenge and the world was stunned. Prime Minister David Cameron resigned, passing the chalice to the Pretenders, who for their own nefarious purposes had planned to unseat him. For some, it turned out, the chalice was poison; they were soon to exit centre (political) stage.

Prime minister still, for a shorter time than he had envisaged, Cameron hastened to Brussels to attend what was to be his last meeting as a member of the European Council. He received no crumbs of comfort from his erstwhile colleagues; they were oblivious to the warnings of elder statesmen, like Henry Kissinger, that ‘punishing the UK would not settle any questions’.2 Back in Blighty, the then foreign secretary, Philip Hammond, described the result as ‘chilling’. Brexit’s cheerleader, Boris Johnson, too, was shocked — he had not envisaged a No vote, and repudiated any suggestion that he was anti-European. Remain supporters were already outside No 10, bearing ‘I’m not leaving’ and ‘We are European not British’ placards.

**Guillotine moment**

The sense of bereavement in university cities was palpable. Students protested while their mentors, fearing for course numbers and research funds, were already meeting to devise ways of holding the government to its promise that they would not lose out.3 Eminent historian Peter Hennessy likened the result to a ‘guillotine moment’.4 Former mandarins, like Robert Armstrong and Robin Butler, professed not to have seen such a disgraceful mess since the 1956 Suez crisis.5 In the City’s towers, young financial analysts milled around, feeling helpless as millions were wiped off quoted company holdings. ‘Who would grab London’s crown, they wondered?’6 They were in fear of their own future as much as the City’s. How had Brexit happened, they asked? How had such an unholy alliance managed to storm to victory, without a manifesto or an exit plan; a question reiterated by former mandarin Lord Butler and historian Hennessy.7

But while Remainers had blinded the electorate with economic ‘science’, Brexiteers had kept it simple. They successfully

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1 Rita Ricketts is the Bodleian Blackwell fellow, University of Oxford, and author of *Scholars, Poets and Radicals* (2015).

2 Guillotine moment

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But while Remainers had blinded the electorate with economic ‘science’, Brexiteers had kept it simple. They successfully
persuaded the, mostly white, working class that they should no longer be governed by remote bureaucrats they had never voted for.6 Like Squealer and Old Major in Orwell’s Animal Farm, the Brexiteers sung of the ‘beasts’, not of ‘England’, but of the ‘EU’. Their immigration policy was the cause of unemployment, the housing crisis, educational disadvantage and powerlessness. They claimed the votes of the well-to-do in England’s shires, promising them that, once out of the European Union, the glory days of Pax Britannica would come again. Demob happy Nigel Farage declared 24 June, the day of the referendum, ‘independence day’.

Philosopher Onora O’Neill dismissed the Brexiteers’ rhetoric as ‘pure fantasy’. But like Peter Hennessy, she also blamed the Remain supporters after casting his vote.

Dangerous malaise
As recriminations flew, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, under attack for his lack-lustre Remain campaign, explained that people had voted for Brexit because they were angry and felt marginalised — it was not about the European Union. Incensed EU leaders and European media buffs failed to heed this nicety. If they had only stopped to look around, they would have seen the same malaise drifting around them. Instead, their angst was directed at the deserter: Britain was ‘adrift, insular, without a plan’ and ‘set to become a loose alliance of mini-states’.10 Even so, messages of sympathy came, to the losers, from across the world, as though after a death in the family.

This is the end of our lives as we have known them. We still have only stopped to look around, they would have seen the same malaise drifting around them. Instead, their angst was directed at the deserter: Britain was ‘adrift, insular, without a plan’ and ‘set to become a loose alliance of mini-states’.10 Even so, messages of sympathy came, to the losers, from across the world, as though after a death in the family.

Members of Remain fully intended to ‘hang onto that’.

The search was on for legal loopholes. Lord Lester, a distinguished Queen’s counsel and EU law specialist, dashed off a letter to The Times, published on 28 June. The decision to leave the European Union, he explained, is governed by Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which is subject to the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. ‘Those arrangements in this case do not envisage ministers acting under the prerogative without parliamentary authority.’ The Brexiteers, he added, had made much ado of restoring parliamentary sovereignty, and it was therefore his view that Article 50 could only be triggered in accordance with the will of parliament expressed in an act of parliament. If the government disagreed, the constitutional issue would need to be resolved by the courts.

Clerk of the House of Commons Sir Malcolm Jack endorsed the idea that Parliament would have to vote on invoking Article 50. The referendum, he explained, has no legal force: parliamentary sovereignty is the key principle.11 Grassroots activists, of similar mind, fired off emails to their MPs and members of the European Parliament. David Aaronovitch, writing in the Guardian (30 Jun 2016), suggested Remainers should ‘join forces with Leavers suffering from buyer’s remorse, to overturn the referendum’. Within days, over three million people signed a petition calling for a second referendum, on the grounds that the Leave vote had far from represented the majority. North of the border, Nicola Sturgeon was considering a second independence vote if Scotland was to be ousted from the European Union along with England. If the United Kingdom is to remain intact, a Der Spiegel correspondent suggested, a second referendum may be essential.12

Second vote
The tabloids dismissed the call for a second EU referendum: the people had spoken and should be respected, a sentiment echoed by Teresa May as she waited in the wings. The philosopher Roger Scruton argued that a second go would only exacerbate mistrust.13 But why, many asked — they had been muttering it all along — had a referendum been called in the first place when the issue was so complex and had so many unknown consequences? When Harold Wilson called the 1975 ‘Common Market’ referendum, one Oxford sage quipped ‘why keep a dog and bark?’

We keep upwards of five hundred dogs in Parliament at a comfortable salary, and now are we expected to bark ourselves? Can more than one in ten, people in the street, give an intelligent and valid answer to the question — in or out?14 For political philosopher Edmund Burke, as for John Stuart Mill, it was the politicians’ job, not the electorate’s, to decide major issues. Burke told his Bristol electors: ‘Your representative owes you not his industry alone but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving, you if he sacrifices it to your opinion’.15 If in Britain we had let the people decide, would we have outlawed hanging or be wearing life-saving safety belts? Would we have voted for the 90-day detention rule, ignoring the concerns raised by leading figures in the executive, legislature and judiciary?

On the other hand, if we had let the people bark, by holding a referendum in Britain on whether or not to go to war in Iraq, it is possible that the then government’s decision-making may have been less cavalier. Writing in the aftermath of the 1688 Glorious Revolution, John Locke saw the referendum as a way of settling a
dispute: ‘If a Controversie arise betwixt a Prince and some of the People, in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great Consequence, I think the proper Umpire in such a case should be the Body of the People.’ A.C. Dickey, one of the great constitutionalists, saw the referendum as the people’s veto: irreversible constitutional change ‘ought not to be made by a body of men who do not clearly represent the final will of the nation’.

Both Dickey and Locke would have been onside with David Cameron: a controversy existed between government and people, the law was silent at worst and doubtful at best, the issue (whether or not to remain in the European Union) was thought to be of great consequence and the guardians of EU law were not seen to represent the will of the (British) people. Yet with the benefit of hindsight, perhaps Burke and Mill were right? EU membership may have been too important to be left to the ‘opinion’ of the people? Margaret Thatcher, signing up to the Single European Act may have been too important to be left to the ‘opinion’ of the people. Hence the referendum as the people’s veto: irreversible constitutional change ‘ought not to be made by a body of men who do not clearly represent the final will of the nation’.

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**Thatcher opposition**

Ironically, Margaret Thatcher may never have been Britain’s first woman prime minister if it had not been for the 1979 devolution referendum called by Labour’s Prime Minister James Callaghan; the present referendum has also unseated a male prime minister and replaced him with a woman. Despite signing the Single European Act, Margaret Thatcher was no EU convert. Her relentless carping gave Cabinet colleagues the chance to topple her. In his resignation speech, which set the process in motion, Geoffrey Howe (deputy prime minister at the time) invoked Sir Winston Churchill’s case for European integration:

> It is also possible and not less agreeable to regard… [the] merger of national sovereignty as the gradual assumption by all the nations concerned of that larger sovereignty which can alone protect their diverse and distinctive customs and… national traditions.

Howe found Churchill’s perception a good deal more convincing, and encouraging for the interests of our nation, than the nightmare image sometimes conjured up [by Prime Minister Thatcher]… people, scheming… to extinguish democracy, to dissolve our national identities and to lead us through the back-door into a federal Europe.… What kind of vision is that for our business people, who trade there each day, for our financiers, who seek to make London the money capital of Europe or for all the young people of today? This word for word is how the estranged 48 per cent of Remain voters, and many who regret their decision, now feel. Prime Minister May, mindful of Thatcher’s fate, is watching her back and accommodating both Brexiteers and Remainers in her Cabinet.

Despite her support for Remain, May has stated that she is determined to go ahead with exit negotiations; she will sit on the Brexit Cabinet Committee. Thus far, she will not countenance a second EU referendum; the same holds for any suggestion of a second shot in Scotland. Yet there are precedents for a second try. In 1992 the Danes voted by 50.7 per cent, with a turnout of 83 per cent, to reject the Treaty of European Union signed in Maastricht. With much diplomacy on the part of John Major (Britain held the EU presidency at the time), more favorable terms were offered and a second referendum (1993) reversed the vote. Ireland’s initial rejection of the Treaty of Nice (2001) was also overturned. But there was no turning around the decision to reject a European Constitution (2005). Many governments felt compelled to ask for the direct support of the people before ratifying such an all-embracing document. Britain’s Labour government, although painfully aware of the very real risk of getting a ‘no’ vote, reluctantly agreed to a referendum. The French and Dutch saved it from this ignominy. Their resounding ‘non’ and ‘neen’ killed the idea of a European (Federal) Constitution. The resonance with Britain’s No vote is striking. The French and Dutch people had vetoed the decision of an unrepresentative (EU) elite. La Liberation, on 30 May 2005, saw this as a triumph for extremism: Right and Left. In London, on the same day, The Times declared it a victory for ‘the eccentric coalition of Left and Right’. The Left, speaking for the workers, the unemployed, the socially excluded and the ‘victims of globalisation’, used the referendum as a means to signal their utter rejection of the ‘Angle-Saxon’ market model. The Right was arch in its rejection of agricultural reform, further enlargement and immigration, which would endanger the ‘French way of life’.

**New wine**

Commenting on Brexit, Russia’s ambassador to Britain seized on the issue of nationalism. He attributed the break-up of the Soviet Union, post-1989, to the neglect of its (then) people’s wish for distinctiveness. Philosopher Roger Scruton, too, contended that EU elites had no recognition of identity. Henry Kissinger argues that EU leaders’ inability to address people’s concerns, especially in the wake of recent terrorist attacks, is fueling the Far Right. Since the United Kingdom’s No vote, Dutch right-winger Geert Wilders has called for a referen-
dum on EU membership, and on 2 October Hungarians are to hold a referendum on the European Union’s refugee quotas.

If Marine Le Pen succeeds in her bid for the presidency, the French may follow suit; recent horrific terrorist attacks will strengthen her arm. Terror and Islamophobia go hand in hand, warns a Belgian newspaper, as Belgium knows first-hand after the attacks in Brussels.33 The MP Jo Cox was an innocent victim of the extremism that sprang up during the referendum campaign. Since the Leave vote, there has been a 400 per cent increase in hate crime in Britain.29 The Chilcot report, coming just twelve days after Brexit, pointed back to the unintended, and continuing, consequences of the 2003 Iraq War. Subsequent upheaval in the Middle East, not EU policies, has brought terrorist attacks to European capitals and a cry to close the borders. As Britain prepares to go-it-alone, and others dare to tread, how can EU leaders prevent what the historian Arnold Toynbee described as ‘the new wine of nationality’ from making ‘sour ferment in the bottles of tribalism’?

That the desperate plight of refugees needs a joint European initiative is a view held by Britain’s new foreign secretary. For domestic consumption, immigration is being presented as an opportunity. Far from being a threat, it will bring the skills and wide pool of talent needed for Britain to compete in the high tech world, especially with the United States, India and China.25 Whatever the shape of any eventual deal between the European Union and the United Kingdom, Britain will need to be open to immigration. Selling this idea to the Brexit-inclined public will not be a task for the faint-hearted. But even if some agreement is reached on freedom of movement of people, it should not be a license to exploit cheap labour, Jeremy Corbyn advised.26 He is to discuss his concerns with socialist compatriots in Paris. ‘Theirs’ is an internationalist, rather than a nationalist agenda.

European Parliament President Martin Schulz has inferred that Theresa May is too preoccupied with healing the rifts in her party to look beyond her own backyard. It is too early to judge, but her appointment of arch Eurosceptics Boris Johnson (foreign secretary), David Davis (secretary of state for exiting the EU) and Liam Fox (secretary of state for trade) is seen as evidence for Schulz’s insinuation. Yet, it is hard to view the appointment of Johnson as evidence of isolationism. He will be itching to fly around the world selling Britain, as he did London. For all the criticism of him in the world press, Johnson is credited with enough cunning to counter any attempts to force Britain out on a limb in Europe, where it will be much less useful to the United States.

**Difficult challenge**

The challenge facing Johnson is how to talk Brexit at home, while talking European integration in the European Union. He will have to get used to this Janus mask if he is to mitigate the danger of EU disintegration. As Kissinger warned, the European Union could ‘subside into an impotent passivity that will shrivel the Atlantic partnership’. He must have observed Russian commentators who could hardly contain their schadenfreude at Brexit. Fyodor Lukanov sees it as a popular rejection of Europe’s political establishment.27 Dimitry Olsangsky, summarising Moscow’s TV coverage, argues that the United States has lost a strong advocate in the courts of Europe.28 Part of the case against remaining was that Britain would have more clout outside of the union. The distinguished historian A.J.P. Taylor argued that Europe had long since lost its hegemony.29 Trying to grab it back, to balance America’s power and counteract Russian expansionism, as John Grey told BBC listeners, was part of the motivation for European integration, as keenly felt in post-imperial Britain as by its European allies. The UK government sees this as best accomplished within NATO; the United States is asking member states to increase their contributions. Remain supporter Michael Falon, staying at Defence, upholds David Cameron’s commitment to a Baltic Force (United Kingdom, Canada, United States). An increased deployment of troops, announced at the July NATO Summit in Warsaw, will reinforce NATO’s borders; the decision to renew the Trident nuclear deterrent was carried in Parliament by 472 to 117: a vote of confidence for Teresa May’s and censure of Jeremy Corbyn.

One of Chilcot’s recommendations was that Britain should co-operate more closely with its European allies. Courting Russian co-operation, rather than letting resentment simmer, has been on Chancellor Merkel’s mind. She has urged the European Union, and the British in particular, to work with Russia to find a way through the ever-worsening situation in the Middle East. In its own, trading, interest, Britain may also have to find a way to settle its differences with Russia.30 Trade is the one bright star in the Brexiteers’ constellation. Despite gloomy economic forecasts, coming from the City, the Bank of England and even the new chancellor of the exchequer, they argue that Britain is now free to strengthen its (trading) relationships with America, China and India, and there is grand talk of a Commonwealth trading pact. For those who have delved into New Zealand foreign policy-making, this will ring a bell. In the 1950s, when New Zealand faced declining markets in Europe and prohibitive trade barriers in the United States, it looked elsewhere, to Asia and the Pacific. Britain’s trade ministers are already out on the milk run. The forthcoming G10 Summit will provide further opportunities. The *China Daily*, in an article by Xing Houyan (Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation) argues that, frustrated by the European Union, China will seek more bilat-

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*Leave supporters wave flags and cheer as the Brexit referendum results come in.*

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eral deals with the United Kingdom; the online giant JD.com is already responding. But the problem, ‘stupid’, is the (British) economy: given the fall in the value of the pound, higher prices will fuel inflation and/or cut demand. Britain’s mobile young may seek jobs overseas and alternative passports — a German job website was flooded by UK users in the 25–35 age range.\textsuperscript{31}

**Bigger issues**

Yet, George Monbiot, writing in the *Guardian* (29 June 2016), is hopeful: ‘is it not the best chance we have had in decades to contain corporate power — of insisting that companies that operate here must offer proper contracts, share their profits, cut their emissions and pay their taxes?’\textsuperscript{32} But there are bigger issues at stake. The peace secured by two world wars is fragile and cannot be taken for granted, Kissinger wrote in *The Times* on 1 July. The United Kingdom and the European Union must, at the very least, treat each other as compatriots and negotiate a deal that restores confidence and the prospect of unity. The European Union’s founders, Adenauer, de Gaulle, Spinelli, Spaak and Monet and the like, wanted to unite. It was the way to secure a lasting peace. Historian Felix Klos has drawn attention to a secret note written by Churchill in 1942: ‘I look out for a United States of Europe where the borders between the nations will have almost lost their significance and everyone can travel unimpeded… and the economy of Europe will be looked at as a whole.’\textsuperscript{33} Britain, so long in its courtship of these ideas, has now rejected them. Will this mean a resurgence of nationalism, where, as Toynbee feared, each country claims to be a universe in itself?

Robert Fisk, writing in the *Guardian* on 28 June 2016, remembered that his father had joined up (in the Second World War) to ‘fight for little Catholic Belgium and for France… he would have said “Britain right or wrong”… but he knew what was “wrong”…’. He would have voted Remain. Siegfried Sassoon, on 1 July 1916, when 57,000 British soldiers were left dead, wounded or missing, wrote that all hell was let loose. Perhaps the centenary commemorations on the Somme have been a timely reminder of a truly terrible, and divided, past. Before Theresa May steps into the breach, she would do well to watch the wonderful Visconti film, *The Leopard*. Will Boris Johnson be as scheming as Sedara and David Davis as delighted by his advancement as Tancredi? May, like *The Leopard*, Fabrizio, the Prince of Salino, contemplating the future of Sicily in the 1860s, may have to accept that Britain must (in its own interests) be part of the mainland? She will have a long march.

**NOTES**

3. Sheffield Hallam University’s vice chancellor told the BBC’s Morning Report on 6 July that EU colleagues’ uncertainty about the future jeopardises collaborative research.
4. BBC4, Point of View, 14 Jul 2016.
5. BBC4, 6 Jul 2016.
7. BBC4, Morning Report, 4 Jun, 6 Jul 2016.
8. BBC4, Point of View: Roger Scruton, 13 Jul 2016.
11. Ibid., 28 Jun 2016, p.32, letters to the editor.
18. In the 1979 referendum the Welsh rejected devolution while the Scots opted for their own assembly. Thanks to a wrecking amendment by the Labour MP George Cunningham, the Scottish referendum was declared abortive: fewer than 40 per cent of those eligible had voted ‘Yes’. The SNP immediately tabled a motion of no confidence. After a dramatic debate on 28 March 1979, the motion was carried by just one vote: 311 to 310!
19. Immigration was, and still is, an explosive issue in Holland. In 2002 the anti-Islam politician Pim Fortuyn was assassinated. Attacks on mosques, following the murder of Theo van Gogh, 2004, a critic of Islamic extremism, left Dutch society polarised and resentful of its million-strong Muslim minority. Murder and mayhem also resulted from the No vote in the 2003 Swedish referendum. (Ostensibly about accepting the euro, it was hijacked by those deeply disturbed by the idea of a European army). Many of the ten newer EU members, still bruised by their own ‘membership’ referendum, are out to veto the EU’s immigration policy.
20. See Will Hutton, ‘Europe is hanging by a thread’, *Observer*, 23 Oct 2005, p.28. The French referendum also presented a heaven-sent opportunity to express a long-pent-up frustration with the president, who was safely ensconced for another two years. All President Chirac’s hopes of using the referendum to gain support and salve the bitter divisions among his foes were shattered.
Europe after the British exit: demise or reinvention?

Stephen Hoadley analyses the implication of Brexit for Europe and concludes that the European Union will survive intact, but will have to adjust, if not reinvent itself.

Not only Brexit but also the rise of anti-EU sentiment throughout Europe have given new life to pessimistic conclusions in books with titles such as Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe by George Friedman; Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide by Bruce Thornton; and After the Fall: The End of the European Dream by Walter Laqueur. The magazine Time has added to the gloom with features such as ‘The Incredible Shrinking Europe’ (8 March 2010); ‘Why Europe Can’t Get Off the Ground’ (12 July 2010); ‘The Decline and Fall of Europe (and Maybe the West)’ (22 August 2011); and ‘Europe or Bust’ (22 August 2015).

However, with Mark Twain I believe rumours of demise are exaggerated. The European Union can adjust and carry on regardless of when and how Britain ceases to be a member. The economic, legal and security foundations of the union are strong. The political foundations are less so, but are not failing yet, and their cracks can be repaired. But Brexit and the rise of anti-EU parties may oblige the European Union, and also Britain, to ‘reinvent itself’.1

Dire predictions

Let us start with economics, about which dire predictions have been proffered. The exit could reduce the collective GDP, and Britain’s contribution to the EU budget and to the European Central Bank, by more than 10 per cent. However, even after Britain’s departure, the remaining European Union of 27 members, added to the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein) and the special arrangements with Switzerland, will still be the world’s largest economic entity.2 It is true that many European countries’ trade and investment ties with the United Kingdom will no longer apply to Britain, but they will continue in force through the transition period and Britain will continue to be a global actor to the breakup of the union altogether. The first scenario seems the most likely, with Mark T wain I believe rumours of demise are exaggerated. The European Union can adjust and carry on regardless of when and how Britain ceases to be a member. The economic, legal and security foundations of the union are strong. The political foundations are less so, but are not failing yet, and their cracks can be repaired. But Brexit and the rise of anti-EU parties may oblige the European Union, and also Britain, to ‘reinvent itself’.1

However, with Mark Twain I believe rumours of demise are exaggerated. The European Union can adjust and carry on regardless of when and how Britain ceases to be a member. The economic, legal and security foundations of the union are strong. The political foundations are less so, but are not failing yet, and their cracks can be repaired. But Brexit and the rise of anti-EU parties may oblige the European Union, and also Britain, to ‘reinvent itself’.1

Possible scenarios range from business-as-usual through the decline of Europe as a global actor to the breakup of the union altogether. The first scenario seems the most likely, despite pessimistic media headlines. This prediction is based on an assessment of the strength of the economic, legal, security and political foundations of European stability even in the absence of its erstwhile second largest member. There will, however, be a period of economic and political uncertainty lasting two to three years.

From a European perspective the impact of Britain’s exit from the European Union will be significant. Possible scenarios range from business-as-usual through the decline of Europe as a global actor to the breakup of the union altogether. The first scenario seems the most likely, despite pessimistic media headlines. This prediction is based on an assessment of the strength of the economic, legal, security and political foundations of European stability even in the absence of its erstwhile second largest member. There will, however, be a period of economic and political uncertainty lasting two to three years.

Legal foundations

The legal foundations of the European Union will remain unchanged by Brexit, with some exceptions. The treaties of Rome, Brussels, Amsterdam, Maastricht and Lisbon will remain in force throughout the transition period and Britain will continue to be guided by them. On the date the divorce becomes final, the treaties will no longer apply to Britain, but they will continue in force with the remaining 27 members.

However, agreements with third countries that were negotiated with the concurrence of all EU members, in contrast to those negotiated by the European Council representing the European Union as a single entity, such as association agreements mandating free access to the EU market, will now have to be re-negotiated.3 These include matters related to aviation, fisheries, energy, visas, human rights and military co-operation. Third-country governments, and also all of the 27 EU member governments, would need to assent to each element of this collection of almost one thousand agreements. The negotiation and ratification processes of each will be unique and without precedent, and consequently will be convoluted and lengthy. But in the meantime, existing agreements would remain valid.

Is European security threatened by the departure of its most militarily potent member?4 Pessimists will assert that Brexit and consequent European distraction and disunity will:
- weaken both Britain and Europe militarily;
- embolden Russia to encroach further into Eastern Europe;
- make detection and prevention of terrorist attacks more difficult; and
- prevent the orderly management of mass migration from Af-

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Common policy
The European Union does have its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under the umbrella of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The CSDP obliges EU member states to earmark military assets for a rapid reaction force and smaller, more agile battle groups. When it exits from the European Union, Britain will cease to work under the CSDP planning obligations and will terminate its financial contributions to the European Defence Agency and related institutions.

But the CSDP is largely a political exercise, its assets are paper commitments rather than standing EU forces and the European Union has never mandated deployment of forces under its flag except for occasional small-scale peacekeeping, training and counter-piracy patrols in Africa and the Balkans. Britain's departure should make little difference to this modest defence posture.

Furthermore, Britain's exit does not spell the end of British defence co-operation with European states. In 2010 Britain negotiated a bilateral arrangement with France, the Lancaster House Agreements, and in 2012 established a joint UKNL Amphibious Force with Holland. Individual European governments can initiate future bilateral co-operation arrangements with London at any time, by mutual agreement, outside the EU envelope.

NATO underpinning
Moreover, and despite the efforts of France to champion a European-led defence alternative, the EU defence institutions are ultimately underpinned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO has been the world's premier alliance since 1949, linking Europe with the United States and Canada. It has grown steadily to its current membership of 28, with Georgia and Ukraine and others applying to join. New Zealand and Australia, and many other states, are associate members.

It was NATO that succeeded in containing the Soviet Union till it collapsed in 1991. It was NATO that took command of liberating Kosovo in 1999, oversaw European troop contingents in Afghanistan after 9/11 and co-ordinated the Libyan intervention in 2011. It is NATO that is currently deploying member forces for exercises in Eastern European states to deter further Russian encroachments.

Britain is the staunchest member of NATO besides the United States. Over the years London has resisted the growth of EU military institutions partially on the grounds that they would duplicate NATO roles, draw resources away from NATO and undermine the US political will to defend Europe. Brexit will free London from EU and CSDP constraints to work more closely with NATO and the United States in military and security policies.

Paradoxically, Brexit will also free the Europeans to strengthen continental defence co-operation and institutions. It should be noted that Europe collectively has nearly one million men and women in uniform and has the potential to deploy a formidable array of modern platforms and armaments systems, including nuclear weapons. Bringing the forces of the member states together, under the umbrella of NATO in accordance with the Berlin Plus Agreement, will be high on Brussels' agenda, led by France and Germany.

Counter-terrorism efforts
European and trans-Atlantic counter-terrorism co-operation has improved markedly since 9/11. But it is incomplete, as illustrated by intelligence-sharing breakdowns between France and Belgium recently, and American complaints about alleged European human rights fastidiousness regarding terrorist data-sharing and prosecution. Counter-terrorism policies and institutions remain fragmented and under the jurisdiction of member states.

Nevertheless the European Council has appointed a counter-terrorism coordinator, and his team liaises with the US State Department's Bureau of Counter-Terrorism and the secretary of homeland security who in turn work with Interpol, Europol and national agencies to share intelligence and harmonise policies. Britain will presumably move out of the European Union's formal counter-terrorism institutions but MI6 will doubtless maintain informal links with both European and US counterparts for mutual advantage, minimising disruption. Britain's major role in the Five Eyes intelligence network led by the United States will con-
Even before Brexit Europe’s migration management initiatives were fragmented, notably by Britain’s opt-outs, Hungarian and Serbian fence-building and German vacillation between welcome and restraint of the latest surge of migrants. The departure of Britain, which took only 3 per cent of Europe’s asylum-seekers in 2015, compared to Germany’s 36 per cent, will not worsen this disunity or disproportionately small Shouldering of the load, only make it more visible.

Ironically, though, the exit and migration surge shocks could goad European governments to achieve greater coherence in their collective immigration policies. Europe may also need to cope with a renewed surge of migrants from Turkey if President Erdogan’s authoritarianism intensifies in the wake of the July coup attempt and the European Union calls off its pledge to accelerate membership negotiations in return for sequestering Syrian migrants.

**Political sphere**

It is in the political sphere that Britain’s exit may alter parameters. The aspiration of ‘an ever-closer Union’ is now less persuasive… if it ever was. Leaders of several EU members, notably Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, have called for a pause in negotiations to deepen the union; others have called for altered policies to address the popular disillusionment with elites that has fuelled the growth of nationalistic political parties. Analysts speculate that Brexit will encourage voters in popular referenda, now scheduled or mooted in Austria, Hungary and Sweden, and opportunistic political party leaders such as Marine Le Pen at the head of France’s National Front, to follow the British example. Extrapolating, pessimists predict the breakup of the union.

I believe these fears (or hopes, if one is a nationalist) are exaggerated. While publics may be sceptical, responsible government leaders are realists, and even those in Greece, once a candidate for Grexit, are focused not on leaving but on negotiating concessions and loans from the European Union, to their advantage.

Furthermore, the institutions of the European Union will remain intact. The membership of the European Council and Councils of Ministers, and the number of EU commissioners and members of the European Parliament, will be reduced, and the influence through the Qualified Majority Vote processes of those remaining will be increased, proportionately. The functioning and jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Auditors will continue during the transition and after. European members’ and Britain’s roles in the Council of Europe and its offshoot the European Court of Human Rights will be unchanged because neither is an EU institution.

**What now?**

‘Brexit is Brexit’, asserted Jean-Paul Juncker, president of the European Commission, implying that Europe would permit no re-entry by the United Kingdom and no special privileges. Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, asserted that Britain cannot have market access ‘à la carte’ but must accept all four of the fundamental freedoms of Europe — free movement of goods, services, capital, and people — hinting that UK attempts to keep its current level of free access would be conditional and probably meet EU resistance. Germany’s Angela Merkel offered more soothing sentiments, reminding her counterparts that it would be in Europe’s interest to avoid ostracising Britain; however, her foreign minister, Walter Steinmeier, her finance minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, and German party leaders and public were less charitable.

The leaders of the 27 EU members, meeting without Britain on 29 June, agreed that Article 50 of the Treaty of European Union and associated Article 216.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union must be triggered without delay to avoid prolonging economic uncertainty. Secretary of State John Kerry, while reaffirming the ‘special relationship’ of the United States with the United Kingdom and Washington’s willingness to negotiate new economic agreements with London, has also advocated a prompt separation.

Britain’s new prime minister, Theresa May, wishes to negotiate new access agreements before exiting, but European leaders reject this approach. Absent a change of policy by either Europe or Britain, a period of economic and political uncertainty lasting two to three years is likely to ensue. While neither entity is likely to ‘reinvent itself’, there is scope for compromise and adjustment. Europe’s and Britain’s partner governments, including New Zealand’s, will be hoping that pragmatism will prevail over nationalism.

**NOTES**


NATO’s summit of unity

Zbigniew Gniatkowski reviews the recent NATO deliberations in Warsaw.

The Warsaw NATO Summit was a clear success. It showed that NATO can be stronger in defence and deterrence, and can do more to project stability beyond the Alliance's borders. Held on 8–9 July, with more than 2200 delegates, including nineteen heads of state and twenty heads of government, it was the largest high-level event ever organised in Poland. The summit’s host was Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg chairing the meeting.

The most important decisions, in the spirit of the 360 degrees principle, strengthen the military security of the Alliance's eastern and southern flanks. We are particularly satisfied with the establishment of an enhanced forward NATO presence in Poland and the three Baltic states.

The summit was also an opportunity to strengthen NATO–European Union co-operation. The NATO allies stressed its importance for security-building both inside and outside Europe. To this end a joint declaration was adopted that aims to stimulate closer co-operation and make us discuss concrete options at the end of this year. For Poland, the most important message was that of NATO and the European Union co-operating in the areas of hybrid and cyber threats as well as in missions and operations, including maritime ones.

The summit decisions also serve as a clear signal to Russia that the Alliance is determined to defend all allied territory. Poland is open to focused dialogue with Russia, but dealing with that country in our opinion requires a proper order of action: deterrence first, then dialogue.

Projecting stability beyond our borders in co-operation with partners is another important dimension of NATO’s efforts in securing the Euro-Atlantic area. What was decided at the summit is an important stage of NATO strengthening and a starting point for further adaptation of NATO, resulting from the evaluation of the current and projected security environment. Full implementation is a precondition of our credibility and security.

We have reasons to be satisfied not only with the political decisions that were made at the symbolic NATO Summit in Warsaw but also with the fact that we managed to create a unique atmosphere of hospitality around the event.

New challenge

Since the end of the Cold War, we have come a long way, and secured peace and stability within our trans-Atlantic community. We have been successful because we firmly believe that every nation has the right to enjoy the benefits of democracy, liberty and economic growth, based on international law and mutual respect. Today, those values are yet again being undermined by threats and challenges, some of which Europe has not seen for decades.

We are witnessing policies of aggression and notorious lack of respect for international law, internal sovereignty and territorial integrity. Military conflicts generate regional instability, as well as new waves of threats, such as terrorism and hybrid warfare. These challenges affect the citizens of every single member state. That is why the summit needed to bring stability in a time of uncertainty, demonstrate our unity in a time of division and ensure security in a time of threat. We have to stay united and demonstrate solidarity, while adapting to long-term changes in the security environment.

In order to meet those expectations, the Alliance gathered in

The Warsaw NATO Summit has shown that the Alliance can be stronger in defence and deterrence. Its outcome strengthens the security of the eastern and southern flanks and serves as a clear signal that NATO is determined to defend its territory. We stand firmly by our values and remain determined to uphold the principles of international law. The summit helped to reinforce NATO–EU co-operation and ties with other partners. With 2200 delegates and 1500 journalists, it was the largest high-level event ever organised in Poland. It was also very successful, both in terms of decisions made and the unique atmosphere of Polish hospitality.
Warsaw had to focus on its core task, which is collective defence. We were successful in making the first step in that regard two years ago in Wales by putting in place the Readiness Action Plan designed to improve our response capabilities. But in the current situation NATO had to find a proper answer built on the conviction that providing security to the allies is not a single act. It is an on-going process.

**Important decisions**

In Warsaw the allies stressed that collective defence remains NATO’s fundamental responsibility. They accepted or noted more than 25 documents relating to different aspects of NATO activity or interest. It is a lot of content that will bear on further NATO actions and posture. However two key documents, defining the current security challenges and comprising important decisions, should be seen as the main references: the Warsaw Summit Communiqué and the Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security. Some comments on chosen details follow.

- **Enhanced presence of NATO forces on the eastern flank:** The 28-nation Western defence alliance reaffirmed its decision to strengthen its eastern flank through the deployment of four multinational battalions to Poland and the Baltic states. Equally, we welcome decisions on a tailored forward presence in Romania and Bulgaria.

  NATO’s actions and posture are defensive in nature. However, they have to be tailored to the current unpredictable security environment. The main purpose of forward force deployment is balancing the disparities in Allied infrastructure. At the same time, they constitute a real capability to implement the core task of collective defence, should a need arise.

  The units of enhanced forward presence are going to be multinational, combat ready and able to assist home defence in a crisis. Four battalion-sized battle groups will be formed with the following countries offering to participate as framework nations: Canada in Latvia, Germany in Lithuania, the United Kingdom in Estonia and the United States in Poland. Along with the enhanced NATO Response Force and the ‘spearhead’ force, they will constitute a rapid and comprehensive response to any conventional or hybrid threat in the region.

- **Adaptation to southern challenges:** In the south, NATO’s defence posture will also change much in upcoming years. NATO will multiply its efforts to project stability in the neighbourhood through developing capacity- and resilience-building programmes. Co-operation with the European Union will be strengthened to assure a more effective approach towards challenges in the south.

  Regarding maritime operations, NATO decided to transform Operation Active Endeavour, under which NATO ships have been patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity, into Operation Sea Guardian. This new, non-Article 5 approach will, according to Jens Stoltenberg, have ‘a broad scope, including situation awareness, counter terrorism and capacity building’ and will ‘work closely with the European Union’s Operation Sophia [a response to the migration crisis] in the central Mediterranean’.

  Poland’s decisions to participate militarily in the global coalition against ISIS (Daesh) and to send one of our frigates to the Aegean Sea are an expression of its solidarity with those allies who feel threatened by developments in the south.

- **Defence against cyber-attacks, hybrid threats and missile attacks:** The allies decided to enhance their cyber-defence capabilities, as outlined in the Cyber Defence Pledge — a document adopted during the summit. We also included countering hybrid warfare among NATO’s longer-term adaptation measures.

  The summit was an opportunity to declare the achievement of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Initial Operational Capability. As a fully adaptable means, we believe it will help us better defend our citizens, territory and forces all across NATO. It was noted that Poland contributes to this effort, hosting the Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo military base.

- **NATO’s open door and co-operation with partners:** The invitation to join issued to Montenegro confirms that NATO still perceives an open door policy as a means to enlarge the area of stability and predictability. Poland is also interested in further progress in this area, in particular the future membership of Macedonia (FYROM), Bosnia–Herzegovina and last — but not least — Georgia.

  We are glad that in Warsaw so many partners found proposals for further co-operation tailored to their needs. For example, during the summit, Ukraine and Georgia found tuned-up
co-operation packages prepared specially for them. The summit was an opportunity to send a strong political signal of support to Ukraine. We were happy to host a NATO–Ukraine Commission meeting to that effect. Regarding the NATO–Georgia Commission, we agreed to further develop special co-operation within the framework of the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative.

Finland and Sweden, as well as Jordan, participated in the summit debates on the highest level, sharing their thoughts on the security situation with the North Atlantic Council. An Afghan delegation was reassured that NATO will not leave their country alone in the face of its still paramount internal problems. Together with Afghanistan, we issued a separate declaration on further co-operation. Among others we decided to sustain the Resolute Support Mission after 2016 as well as to strengthen and enhance the enduring partnership between NATO and Afghanistan.

During the Warsaw Summit there was only one North Atlantic Council session when the NATO members debated on their own. The rest of the meetings were shared with partner countries, including New Zealand, and organisations. It is the best illustration of the Alliance’s serious approach towards co-operation with others for peace and security.

NATO, the allies decided, will continue to enhance its role in projecting stability, including through a more effective approach to partnerships. We will invest in capacity-building and training efforts enabling partner countries to enhance their resilience, to provide for their own security and to increase their interoperability with NATO forces.

Dual-track policy of strong defence and dialogue with Russia: NATO poses no threat to any country. In that spirit, we remain ready for a meaningful dialogue with Russia, to communicate clearly our positions and, as a first priority, to minimise the risk of military incidents, including through reciprocal measures of transparency. The allies decided in Warsaw that the NATO–Russia relationship will be developed basing upon objective evaluation of the implications of Russia’s activity for the security of Allied nations. Our objective is to discourage Russia from employing military means to achieve political goals. We hope a mixture of deterrence and readiness for limited dialogue will drive the message through. We continue to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia, when Russia’s actions make that possible.

As Poland’s President Andrzej Duda pointed out:

We are not surrounded by enemies. We are surrounded by challenges. We need to tackle them not only through defence and deterrence but also through dialogue. At the same time, we stand firmly by our values in a belief that the dialogue cannot compromise either peace, or principles of the international law. Today, as the leaders of democratic nations, we bear special responsibility before our people. The responsibility to make sure that they can feel safe, that they can prosper, that they can live in peace. The results of the summit constitute a milestone in ensuring more security inside and outside the Alliance through effective deterrence and defence and well-arranged co-operation with partners and organisations sharing our principles and values. There is a lot of work ahead of us.

The Polish frigate Kazimierz Pulaski

The summit in session

Jens Stoltenberg, President Obama and President Andrzej Duda

The Polish frigate Kazimierz Pulaski

The summit in session
Putting our refuge hand up

Molly Kennedy discusses New Zealand’s approach to the pressing problem of refugee resettlement in the global context.

Yousef Mazreah has worked next door to me for the past eight months. Every Wednesday at 4 pm, he brings me cardamom tea. It comes on a little platter, with a china tea-cup with roses, a pitcher of milk and a bowl of sugar. The cardamom is precious because it is a particular kind that you get overseas, which I am told is not at all like New Zealand cardamom. He does not work for me, so there is no reason for him to do this other than kindness.

Yousef is also a former refugee. I did not actually know his story until I came across it online, as told to Amnesty International, when I was researching some statistics for a recent presentation. Yousef is from Iran. He is an ethnic Ahwazi Arab. For years his people and culture have been persecuted by the Iranian authorities. Yousef grew up hearing stories of his Ahwazi culture from his parents — a culture that he was not allowed to celebrate and a language he was not allowed to speak. Typical of so many oppressed people, Yousef took action. He formed a ‘civil association’, a group of young people dedicated to preserving their Arabic culture through peaceful activism; dressing in traditional clothing, celebrating traditional dates — all illegal in the eyes of the Iranian authorities. Their group was watched, scrutinised, followed, threatened. Fearing for their safety the group broke up and ‘ran away’. Yousef found himself hiding out at a friend’s house in the capital, Tehran. But he was never safe.

Yousef was arrested in Tehran in 1987, aged just 21. He was charged with committing crimes against the country and ‘waging war against God’. At his trial there was no jury and no lawyer to defend him. For his peaceful activism he was sentenced to 21 years in prison.

For 29 months Yousef was held in solitary confinement in a cell measuring just two metres square. His family had no idea where he was, whether he was dead or alive. Sometimes he would be moved into a cell measuring just a metre by 50 centimetres to try to force him to sign a paper saying he would not participate in human rights or political activity. He was beaten and threatened with death. Once his family knew where he was they would try to visit him, but they would not always be allowed in. The prison guard told him that if he signed the paper, he would see his family.

Finally, suffering from ill health and depression, Yousef signed the paper. He agreed that he would not participate in human rights or political activity. In 1995 he was released from prison, seven years after he entered. For the next fifteen years Yousef had no passport. He was trapped in a country where he could no longer be himself. Security services kept an eye on him. He was free from prison but he was not free. Eventually, in 2010 Yousef was granted a passport. He made the decision to leave Iran. He took his family and fled to Indonesia.

Family reunification

Today Yousef and his family live in New Zealand. He came here in 2012 under the family reunification stream, as his brother was already living here. His four children are growing up here, and one was born in New Zealand. He is studying tourism because he believes that everyone should visit and experience the beauty and friendliness of New Zealand. He also works for the New Zealand Red Cross, helping newer arrivals. And he dreams of one day bringing his parents here. Yousef’s story is just one of many.

The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who:

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country….

The important thing to take away from this is that being a refugee requires a very certain set of circumstances. You are not a refugee if you leave because you are poor, or because you are displaced by a natural disaster. You also must have crossed an international border.

Molly Kennedy is the general manager of Multicultural Learning and Support Services. This article is adapted from a speech she gave to the NZIIA’s Wellington branch on 17 May 2016.

The United Nations high commissioner for refugees is currently seeing larger displacements than at any other time on record. The latest figures show 65.3 million displaced persons, 21.3 million of whom are refugees. New Zealand has a proud and successful history of refugee resettlement, including resettling Polish children fleeing the Second World War, Cambodian refugees fleeing the Killing Fields and more recently families fleeing conflict in Syria. However, New Zealand has the capacity to do more, both within our borders and as a potential regional and global leader in refugee protection.
border in your flight. You have to meet a very high and specific threshold of persecution.

The United Nations high commissioner for refugees, or UNHCR, is currently seeing larger displacements than at any other time on record. The most comprehensive statistics we have are from the end of 2015; at that stage, of the 65.3 million displaced, around 21.3 million were outside of their countries of origin and therefore were categorised as refugees. And in 2015 more than 50 per cent of the world’s refugees were children.

No guarantee
Making it out of a war-torn country alive is no guarantee of safety or resolution. Around 41 per cent of refugees under the UNCHR mandate are in protracted refugee situations, meaning that the refugee population in that area has been in exile for more than five years. However, the average duration for protracted situations is actually much longer — around 26 years. We have seen people who grew up in refugee camps, and whose parents were born in refugee camps.

The figures have increased dramatically, particularly with the Syrian crisis. The UNCHR announced a new record of 42.5 million forcibly displaced people globally in 2011. Since then, these numbers have risen sharply each year: from 45.2 million in 2012 to 51.2 million in 2013 and 59.5 million in 2014. This is an increase of more than 50 per cent in five years.

As at 2014, more than 1.1 million refugees were considered by the UNHCR as in urgent need of resettlement, but only some 80,000 places were available annually. Even counting recent one-off pledges by countries in response to the Syrian crisis, the need for resettlement has vastly outstripped the number of places that have been made available so far. New Zealand often feels very far away from these statistics. Yet for people like Yousef, the link between the global refugee crisis and New Zealand is very close indeed.

New Zealand has a proud history of refugee resettlement. In 1944, New Zealand welcomed 733 Polish children and their 102 carers, who were fleeing their war-torn home and Russian gulags. They came at the invitation of the then-Prime Minister Peter Fraser, and in particular his wife, Janet Fraser, who heard about the children and convinced her husband that New Zealand could help. The stay was initially meant to be temporary, but when the war ended and Poland became a Soviet satellite, the prime minister offered a permanent home.

These refugees, who came to be known as the Pahiatua children, went on to become successful and sometimes prominent Kiwis. For example, John Roy-Wojciechowski was a founder of construction company Mainzeal and meat exporting company Mair Astley. Stefan Lepionka, whose parents were both Pahiatua refugees, set up Stefan’s Orange Juice company at age seventeen, and went on to help friends Marc Ellis and Simon Neal set up Charlie’s juice company, which sold for $130 million in 2011.

Thirty thousand
In the 70 years since the arrival of the Pahiatua children, more than 30,000 refugees have been resettled in New Zealand. Some other prominent examples include — here I borrow the most common names used in the media for each of these groups — the ‘boat people’ from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘Tampa boys’ from Afghanistan in 2001 and the Syrian refugees who have just started English classes a few months ago with us at Multicultural Learning and Support Services. In each of these cases, New Zealand put its hand up to be part of the solution and has gained extremely hardworking and dedicated Kiwis in return.

There are three ways that refugees can come to New Zealand. The first is through what is called the New Zealand quota system, where refugees are put forward by the UNHCR and accepted and brought here by the New Zealand government. The quota is now 1000 per year, a recent, small increase from 750 per year.

The second category is asylum-seekers, or people who arrive in New Zealand and then claim refugee status. There are currently around 300 applications every year, and around half are eventually granted status as a convention refugee — in other words Immigration New Zealand or the courts find that they meet the UN convention definition — and they are allowed to stay permanently in New Zealand. Despite the occasional scaremongering, New Zealand has never had a mass arrival by boat, nor is it at all likely that this will become a common method of arrival in the future. New Zealand is simply too far away. Someone once told

Peter Fraser with arriving Polish refugee children in 1944

Polish child refugees in New Zealand in 1944

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The refugee resettlement camp in Mangere

...that if asylum-seekers managed to navigate a leaky boat along the entire length of Australia and across the Tasman, they should be welcomed with open arms and put on the next America’s Cup team.

New Zealand also has a third category, called the Refugee Family Support Category, through which people who have come to New Zealand as refugees can sponsor their family members to come as well. There are up to 300 places available each year under that category. In total, this makes the number of refugees accepted annually around 1450.

**Different paths**

These three paths are very different. Quota refugees receive wrap-around support and access to New Zealand services. Both of the other pathways are fully paid for by refugees and their families, and they receive no formal settlement support, other than what is given to skilled migrants. Quota refugees are met at the airport, and in some areas this includes a powhiri or musicians playing songs from their home country. In Wellington, so many volunteers attend that Wellington Airport no longer allows them to wait directly outside the gate as it is a health and safety risk. In contrast, asylum-seekers receive none of this. In a recent report by ChangeMakers Refugee Forum, one asylum-seeker recalled that when he showed up at Auckland Airport and expressed his wish to claim refugee status, he was told to go outside to the taxi stand and ‘look at all the taxi drivers until I found one that looked like they were from my country’. I will return to this below. For now, I will focus on the process for quota refugees.

After flight from their country of origin, refugees often spend a significant time in a country of temporary refuge before they can either go back to their home country or be resettled. Most people have no choice whether they go or where they go.

After arrival, our newest Kiwis, who are now referred to as former refugees, go to a camp in Mangere, South Auckland, for their first six weeks. Here they learn about New Zealand culture, get health checks and immunisations, have counselling support and begin English classes. They are then settled in one of six locations, the newest being Dunedin, which was just opened for resettlement this year. Local agencies, such as the Red Cross and Multicultural Learning and Social Services, then provide practical and social support for the initial period of settlement, through social work, volunteer support, English classes and other programmes.

We are all working towards the goal of independence. If a former refugee says to us that they no longer need our help, that is a great success. Our work is aimed at integration, not assimilation. As can be seen from Yousef’s story above, the desire to practice his culture was the very reason he was targeted in Iran. The best settlement takes place when former refugees can be proud of maintaining their culture, while also integrating well into their new culture. We also work by looking at people’s strengths rather than their weaknesses. Making it through war or persecution and across a border and to be one of those few who are resettled in a new country, already shows that you have great internal strength.

**Re-settlement difficulties**

Many Kiwis will understand the common difficulties of settling in a new country, as so many have lived and worked overseas. Learning a new language, missing home and family and culture shock are very common challenges. However, there are also important differences between refugees and migrants. The most important factor is choice. Migrants choose to make New Zealand their home. Refugees are pushed from their home and do not choose whether they will end up learning English, Dutch or Norwegian.

There is the inevitable grief for the loss of family, friends and country. There is often the challenge of having no money or possessions. There is prejudice, as much as we would like to believe it does not exist. And finally, there are high expectations that are difficult to meet. Everyone loves the narrative of the grateful and successful refugee. But we are also talking about humans, like you and me. For those who struggle more with what they have been through, or who are not feeling grateful because of the loss they have experienced or who try to get a job but are turned away, the burden of expectations is yet another hurdle.

So what can New Zealand do? What are some solutions that we can offer? In April, I met with some visiting international colleagues. They told me that everyone they met with in New Zealand, in government, in non-profit organisations and in the community, were interested in helping. The largest barrier was New Zealand believing that it was not big enough to play a role. However, many abroad view us as the ‘Swiss of the South’, able to play a role that is much larger than our size. We have seen this in action in the anti-nuclear movement and in the recent cluster munitions convention, to name a few. In the refugee sector, we are ideally positioned, precisely because of our very proud history.

So first, what can we do locally? It will not come as a surprise that the first thing would be to increase the annual refugee quota. The recent increase announced of 250 per year was very welcome. However, it was not enough. Immigration New Zealand officials have already publicly stated that they could accept 1500 people annually without significant infrastructure changes. Among the groups who have stated that we can and should do more are the New Zealand Red Cross, Amnesty International, the Anglican Church, the Catholic Church and the Human Rights Commission. Editorial headlines have included ‘Shame on us’ from the...
Zealand. It needs to allow UNHCR the flexibility to use resettlement places. As an example, New Zealand was the first country in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child detention

A good start would be to look at ending child detention in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the Convention on the Rights of the

Burmese refugees settled in Nelson and Porirua at the Myanmar versus New Zealand match in the FIFA under-20 tournament in 2015

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Children, to which most countries in the world are signatories, detention clearly violates a number of the stated rights. However, if this was not clear enough, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) clarified in 2012 that:

Children should not be criminalised or subject to punitive measures because of their or their parents' migration status. The detention of a child because of their or their parent's migration status constitutes a children's rights violation and always contravenes the principle of the best interests of the child. This is crystal clear. Detention of children for immigration status should not just be a 'matter of last resort'. It should never happen. And yet in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and (until last month) Australia, it is happening. Moreover, many of these detention centres are overcrowded, with no access to basic health services, sanitation problems and incidents of violence and abuse.

There have been a few ideas proposed recently regarding what New Zealand could do to influence this. First, it could accept unaccompanied minors through its refugee quota programme. This is a standard part of resettlement in other countries but does not currently feature in New Zealand's programme. Many of these countries have actually agreed in principle that they do not want to detain minors, but spaces in supportive community shelters are limited, so detention is used.

If, for example, New Zealand can take twenty unaccompanied minors with refugee status from non-governmental organisation shelters each year, this would free up twenty beds for children to come out of detention. Where the population in some countries is only 300 or so, this could be a legitimate solution over time. By taking these children, New Zealand would also be showing these countries that it is willing to ‘walk the talk’.

By entering into this type of programme, New Zealand would then be well positioned to carry out diplomacy through bilateral country talks, in encouraging countries to end child detention. However, this is more likely to happen if there is public pressure within New Zealand for the government to do so. On an international level, New Zealand should publicly support the End Child Detention campaign. There is a working group of United Nations agencies discussing this issue, and Switzerland has proposed a global initiative that states can support. If New Zealand became a member of this group, or involved in its formation, it would be a way to publicly show our human rights stance.

Possible contribution

So finally, that brings me to what New Zealanders can do as individuals. One action they can take is to be an advocate and friend of refugees. Decisions on the quota are being made as I write, and New Zealand should publicly support the End Child Detention campaign. There is a working group of United Nations agencies discussing this issue, and Switzerland has proposed a global initiative that states can support. If New Zealand became a member of this group, or involved in its formation, it would be a way to publicly show our human rights stance.

1. Yousef’s story here is as told to Mo Farrell. The full story is at bit.ly/1Ukfgk6, reproduced here with permission from both Yousef and Amnesty International.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
9. Ann Beaglehole, Refugee New Zealand: A nation’s response to refugees and asylum seekers (Dunedin, 2013). The first year when refugees were distinguished from other migrants in official statistics was 1944. However, there are many people not represented in this figure, including those who arrived prior to the Second World War, and those who fled their countries but arrived through other migrant categories.
10. This includes a temporary increase of 100 Syrian refugees on top of the quota in early 2016, and temporary increases of 250 per year over the next two financial years (2016/17 and 2017/18), made permanent in 2018.
11. On appeal, through the Immigration and Protection Tribunal. Many statistics quoted show only around 30–40 per cent are accepted, but these only take into account the initial determination, not acceptance through the tribunal.
Choosing the secretary-general was top of the agenda as the first United Nations General Assembly commenced business in London in late January 1946, with Norway’s Trygve Lie eventually emerging as the first secretary-general. It is little known that Peter Fraser was also a possible candidate. Lie records his conversation with Fraser in his 1954 memoir, *In the Cause of Peace*, reporting that Fraser judged himself ‘Too old’, and adding that Fraser ‘grinned, sadly’.2 Fraser being under consideration to be the United Nations’ first secretary general is new to what we know of him. That it has been public since 1954 yet has remained seemingly unnoticed by New Zealanders exemplifies why, fifty years after McIntosh urged that ‘someone, someday will, I hope, make a proper evaluation of Peter Fraser’s world contribution’, we are still waiting.1

Fraser’s post-war United Nations and Commonwealth accomplishments and his succouring the trans-Tasman/Anzac connection have not been collectively canvassed in any masterly scholarly foray. This contrasts with the high-quality writing on Fraser’s contribution to the Allies’ war-time leadership — well covered in F.L.W. Wood’s *The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs* (1958) and Gerald Hensley’s *Beyond the Battlefield: New Zealand and its Allies* (2009), which rehearses the same ground, validating Wood superbly and adding to the story-telling. Fraser’s post-war accomplishments were beyond their respective writs. But they show clearly that none of our fifteen prime ministers since 1945 has moved in the stratospheric premier league that Fraser occupied during the war years.

Fred Wood’s coverage of the international scene in the late 1940s provides the best succinct New Zealand-focused perspective of Fraser grappling with the tough reality that the San Francisco vision was gone, far too soon.4 Wood is reinforced by Bruce Brown’s ‘New Zealand foreign policy, 1947–1954: an Essay into History’.5 Ian McGibbon, with his ‘Peter Fraser and the Onset of the Cold War’, brings to life how the prime minister transformed.6 Keith Sinclair quips of Fraser that he had ‘become a cold war warrior before the hot war ended; psychologically he was ready for an anti-communist crusade’.7 McGibbon pin-points events in Czechoslovakia in 1948 when Fraser’s Cold War preoccupations evolved sharply; in November 1948 Fraser was in Berlin for two days during the Soviet Union’s blockade.

Fraser as the post-war prime minister is caught best by Sinclair in his *Walter Nash* (1976).8 Martyn Finlay, a first-term Labour MP from 1946 to 1949, much later observed of Fraser during that parliamentary term that he ‘unlike Kirk a decade or so later, was not a general to move among the troops’.9 Fraser had been there, done that with General Freyberg in the war years. After the war he had become a ‘general’ who mixed with other ‘generals’, whether military, diplomatic, political or, fascinatingly, from the entertainment and cultural worlds.

It is this element of Fraser which McIntosh appears to rue is so little comprehended — the Fraser who mixed with the other ‘generals’ shouldering the creation of the United Nations (and its specialised agencies) and the new Commonwealth. He was astute enough to bring his favourite general, Freyberg, home to be the governor-general from June 1946 (to beyond Fraser’s death on 12 December 1950). Fraser’s official diaries show that the prime minister spent many evenings at Government House. On

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**Peter Fraser’s post-war diplomacy**

Ken Ross examines the international activities of New Zealand’s wartime prime minister.

‘Certainly no other New Zealand leader ever attained such stature and reputation overseas. This is something that his fellow countrymen have never fully appreciated.’

(Sir Alister McIntosh, 1973)1

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**Peter Fraser**

Ken Ross was an analyst with the External Assessments Bureau, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet from 1976 until 2012. He has been a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra. He is writing a book evaluating New Zealand and Australian prime ministers’ engagement in global diplomacy since 1945.

1 It is little known that Peter Fraser was under consideration to be the United Nations’ first secretary-general. In contrast to the high quality writing on Fraser’s contribution to the Allies’ war-time leadership, Fraser’s post-war United Nations and Commonwealth accomplishments and his succouring the trans-Tasman/Anzac connection have not been collectively canvassed in any masterly scholarly foray. After the war Fraser was restless, lured by the duty of care he felt for global affairs. His engagement with world leaders in the post-war years is now more publicly accessible.
occasion, there were other ‘generals’ in residence, such as Lord Montgomery and Sir Anthony Eden, who called in to see their old war mates.

Global rambling

Fraser was restless, lured by the duty of care he felt for global affairs. His engagement with world leaders in his post-war travels is now more accessible. Fraser’s post-war years live on at Archives New Zealand — in his appointments diaries, and associated files. Some key ones are newly accessible. Their detail gives us a fascinating insight into his final four years as prime minister — his numerous stays at Chequers, his keeping in touch when in London with Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden. After the change of government in London in mid-1945, Fraser had numerous encounters with the new prime minister, Clement Attlee, and his senior ministers — Ernest Bevin, Aneurin Bevan, Hugh Dalton, Stafford Cripps and Herbert Morrison. Most he had worked with in the wartime Cabinets in London. He also engaged with Attlee’s smartest ‘younger bloods’ — Hugh Gaitskell, Douglas Jay and Harold Wilson. Showtime for Fraser was to be at the theatre and movies, including meals with J. Arthur Rank, Dame Sybil Thorndike and David Low. He also was in the crowd for the early 1946 All Black tests in Cardiff and Edinburgh. Fraser went home to Scotland. He visited his sister and brother. It all was fitting for the war-time leader now savouring a little of the new peace.

Sir Alister McIntosh’s papers at the Alexander Turnbull Library are the single richest resource on Fraser. They complement Ian McGibbon’s Undiplomatic Dialogue: letters between Carl Berendsen and Alister McIntosh (1993) and Unofficial Channels: letters between Alister McIntosh and Foss Shanahan, George Laking and Frank Corner (1999), which provide McIntosh’s contemporary reflections on Fraser, and McIntosh’s two public presentations when he spoke of Fraser — on being awarded his honorary degree in 1965 and to the New Zealand Historical Society in 1973. Michael King’s 1978 interviews with McIntosh are in King’s papers at the Turnbull.

Separately housed at Archives New Zealand in Series 18654 — Prime Minister’s Diaries — are Fraser’s annual appointments diaries for his prime ministership: the only absence is the special diary that covered his 14 April to 8 May 1949 visit to London. They are a valuable lode for a new more in-depth appreciation of Fraser’s encounters when overseas.

Post-war, Fraser made just three trips out of New Zealand that took him beyond Australia. From 19 December 1945 to 4 March 1946 he was mostly in London for the first-ever session of the UN General Assembly. (En route he had his first meeting with President Truman at the White House.) Highlights of the London meeting for Fraser were New Zealand going on the board of UNESCO, and helping Australia secure a two-year term (1946–47) as one of the six non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Initially Fraser lobbied for Lester Pearson to be the first secretary-general, then, when he was vetoed, he supported Lie, as well as deflecting the suggestion of himself being considered for the role. Another effort of his was getting Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium’s foreign minister) elected as the first president of the General Assembly.

Fraser stayed home for the next two and a half years, apart from two visits to Australia. The first, in April 1946, was four days in Sydney with Walter Nash, who was going on to London to stand-in for Fraser at the Commonwealth leaders’ meeting. They had consultations with Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley and his deputy, Herb Evatt. (Chifley and Evatt went to the London conference.) Fraser’s second visit to Australia was for twelve days in late August/early September 1947.

Fraser’s four months on the road from 30 September 1948 to 25 January 1949 was the big journey. His first engagement was in London at the Commonwealth Leaders’ Meeting, which lasted from 11 to 22 October. Then it was to Paris for the UN General Assembly’s third session, which Fraser attended from 27 October until 11 December. (While there, he had several meals separately with John Foster Dulles and Eleanor Roosevelt.) He then visited Ireland and Scotland, passing through London several times, which had him at Chequers on each stop-over to talk with Attlee. He went to Canada, seeing his brother, before moving on to New York, where he and
General Eisenhower (now, president of Columbia University) had a catch-up. He was in Washington on 14 January for his second encounter with President Truman.

Fraser’s final travel was to London for another Commonwealth Leaders’ Meeting; he was away from 14 April to 8 May 1949. That was to be the last leaders’ meeting held at 10 Downing Street: it set the framework for the new multi-racial Commonwealth. Fraser was in the thick of that meeting’s history-making decisions on India and Ireland, as well as the shaping of events that led to South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth twelve years later.

**Secretary prospect**

By late January 1946 Fraser was seriously wearied from his war effort. He was 61. His wife’s death ten months before had knocked him. Even so, Fraser had to have been alive to the prospect when in London that, as one of the handful of central figures in the founding of the United Nations at San Francisco six months earlier, he might be tasked with becoming the organisation’s first secretary-general.

Trygve Lie knew Fraser well. Both had figured in the establishment of the United Nations at San Francisco. Earlier in the war, when Lie was London-based as foreign minister in Norway’s government-in-exile, they had mixed. In January 1946 Lie was the foreign minister in Norway’s first post-war government. Like Fraser, he was a social democrat. In his memoirs Lie gives homage to Fraser’s wartime performance, describing him as his ‘father figure’. Lie and Fraser were two of the prominent voices from the smaller Western-inclined countries in the United Nations’ first 51 member states (‘the originals’ from the San Francisco Conference). Other such voices were Canada’s Lester Pearson, Belgium’s Paul-Henri Spaak, Norway’s Edvard Hambro and the Australian Herb Evatt.

Evatt and Fraser worked closely at San Francisco, as they had since Evatt became Australia’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister in 1941. It stayed like that until each lost office in December 1949. Among the bouquets for their outstanding performance at San Francisco was Harold Laski’s observation that the pair ‘did not get all they wanted, but the result of their pressure is that the trustee clauses of the San Francisco charter are much better than they might have been’. Another shrewd character reference comes from the American diplomat and academic Eugene P. Chase, who at San Francisco worked closely with Fraser for two months as his administrative assistant on the trusteeship committee. He has given two accounts, which constitute one of the most substantial appreciations by a non-New Zealander. Lester Pearson is less generous, noting of Fraser that ‘he talked as much as Dr Evatt, but with less effect though I think the Big Three often found his needling harder to take than Evatt’s hammer blows.

Evatt said of Fraser at San Francisco he ‘made a notable contribution to the work of the conference as a whole’. Evatt also noted that Australia ‘could scarcely have been elected [in early 1946] to the Security Council without Mr Fraser’s vigorous advocacy’. Peter Edwards, an Australian war historian, tells us that Fraser’s ‘influence on joint Australian–New Zealand policy in 1944–45 has too often been underestimated by Australian writers’.

**Commonwealth affairs**

Fraser’s engagement in Commonwealth affairs in the post-war years has been well-covered by David McIntyre. Lester Pearson, then Canada’s foreign minister, does Fraser justice on his performance at the 1949 Commonwealth Leaders’ Meeting, when the prime ministers set in place the framework for the new multi-racial Commonwealth. McIntosh contributes his retrospective reflections on the late 1940s gatherings, including Fraser’s performances, in ‘The changing and continuing Commonwealth, 1947–1963’.

Frank Corner, much later, told us that Fraser (and his departmental officials, who included Corner) regarded the San Francisco Conference as ‘their supreme creative endeavour’. One arena where Fraser, with McIntosh, made a critical impact was securing trusteeship status for Western Samoa in 1946 and then unleashing two skilled intellects (and operators), Jim Davidson and Guy Powles, who became, with Corner, the key players for carrying through Fraser’s vision for New Zealand as a pace-setter on decolonisation. Davidson has left us a fine account of his being engaged by Fraser.

**Important legacy**

Of Fraser’s Labour successors Norman Kirk probably got most from observing Fraser during the post-war years. He was then in his mid-twenties with a young family struggling in Auckland and then the Bay of Plenty. Kirk already was a voracious reader and was engaged in the Labour Party. He followed Fraser’s travels and, while undoubtedly comprehending he was observing the last breath of his own powerful leader, he must have absorbed the dynamics of the new British Labour government. Kirk likely
began his life-long deep interest in British Labour politics from this period that had him become friends with his own generation of British Labour personalities, most particularly Harold Wilson and also Roy Jenkins.

Helen Clark has paid deference to Fraser, when giving the 2010 Nordmeyer Lecture; her topic was ‘The UN and New Zealand — Peter Fraser’s legacy.’ David Lange covered Fraser in one of his many post-prime ministership newspaper columns. Otherwise the records are skimpy for any graciousness from his old party.

Fraser’s advocacy of the reintroduction of conscription in the 1949 referendum, it seems, is the last and most legendary legacy. Norman Kirk much later caught Fraser’s conscription predicament when he explained to Peter Franks in 1972 that the referendum ‘was “a tactical disaster politically”, although he argued that Fraser had no choice because war with the Soviet Union seemed inevitable’. Kirk told Franks ‘I was against it. I voted against it, I worked against, very nearly left the Party over it, to be honest… but I think in fairness [Fraser] had the invidious task of having to tell the people well I don’t like it either but I think we have got to do it.’

Kirk’s appreciation of Fraser fits McIntosh’s understandings that he has shared publicly. But that Fraser does not shine through in either of his biographies — Michael Bassett with King does deliver a fine encapsulation of Fraser’s lifetime and the Origins of the New Commonwealth in the 1940s, New Zealand in World Affairs, vol 1 (Wellington, 1977), pp.37–88.

Bassett with King does deliver a fine encapsulation of Fraser’s global diplomacy that he ‘alone determined Labour’s foreign policy, rarely consulting his colleagues. He often failed to inform the cabinet of major decisions he had made’. This was the forerunner for the global diplomacy undertaken by his best successors as Labour prime ministers — when they performed most impressively, such as Norman Kirk’s handling of the 1973 Springbok Tour; much of David Lange’s dealing with the nuclear issue and his head-to-heads with French President Francois Mitterrand; and Helen Clark’s ‘No’ to joining ‘the coalition of the willing’ that George W. Bush and Tony Blair led into Iraq in March 2003.

NOTES

1. Sir Alister McIntosh, ‘Working with Peter Fraser in War-time’, in Margaret Clark (ed), Peter Fraser (Palmerston North, 1997), p.167. The chapter is an abridged version of an address McIntosh gave in June 1973 to the New Zealand Historical Society. The full address is reprinted in the New Zealand Jour-

8. Ibid., pp.70, 203–4, 246, 261, 264, 281.
10. The five diaries are R20834064 to R20834068 at Archives New Zealand.
15. Ibid., p.162.
21. J.W. Davidson, Samoa Mo Samoa: The emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa (Melbourne, 1967), pp.167–79, covers Davidson first visit to Samoa and his reporting to Fraser on 21 June 1947, when the prime minister thanked him, saying ‘You have opened the door to the future for me in Samoa’.
22. Helen Clark, ‘The UN and New Zealand — Peter Fraser’s legacy’, in her At the UN: addresses from Helen Clark’s first term leading the United Nations Development Programme (Wellington, 2013), pp.36–42.
I am honoured to serve as President Obama's personal representative to New Zealand and Samoa, and proud to count him as a friend. Eleven years ago my wife Nancy and I were invited to dinner with the then junior senator from Illinois, Barack Obama. He discussed his view of the world, and we were so impressed with his nuanced approach, as well as his depth and breadth of knowledge. I knew that he would be the right person at the right time to lead our country. I witnessed his calm temperament, his measured judgment and his deep intelligence. Few predicted the enormous challenges he would have to overcome (and I am not referring to Congress), but I knew his personal traits would serve him and our country well. I think a look back at his challenges and accomplishments show I was right. In March, while back in Washington for our annual ambassadorial meetings, the president invited a few of us over to the White House, where I mentioned to him that he had accomplished most of the things we talked about before and during his run for the White House.

President Obama took office in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. We had our worst economic performance in 60 years, with GDP contracting 9.8 per cent. Four million Americans lost their jobs before the president’s inauguration; another four million joined their ranks before his policies could begin to take effect. That is nearly twice the population of New Zealand out of work within a few months.

One of the president’s major achievements has to be saving the United States and the global economy from a major depression — and building the foundation for a more fair, flexible and sustainable economy. He knew that he would not be able to work on the rest of his agenda without getting the economy back on track. Since he took office, the United States has had the longest streak of private sector job growth in its history — 75 consecutive months. More than 14 million new jobs have been created. The unemployment rate is 4.7 per cent — down from a high of 10 per cent — and April had the lowest unemployment claims in 43 years. All of this was done while cutting our deficit by almost 75 per cent.

You occasionally hear talk that America’s economy is in decline. Anyone claiming this is simply not looking at the numbers, which unequivocally show that America’s economy is the largest, strongest and most stable but sustainable in the world. Since the global financial crisis, the United States has put more people to work than Europe, Japan and every other advanced economy combined. So how did we get here from the edge of a total economic collapse?

In early 2009 every American was feeling the impact of the massive recession; the floor was falling out from under our feet. The president and his advisors knew that immediate, bold action was needed to stem the crisis. Within a month of taking office, he signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act into law. This was more than a short-term fix. The president addressed the root causes of the global financial crisis to help put the economy on the path of a durable and equitable recovery. The Recovery Act injected billions of dollars into a frozen financial system and brought about long-term reforms promoting economic growth and stability.

At the height of the crisis, the American auto industry was shedding jobs by the hundreds-of-thousands. We faced the real possibility that General Motors and Chrysler — iconic car companies — would close down and lay off at least a million people. President Obama took the unprecedented step of providing massive loans. Not everyone was in agreement, and many said, ‘let them go bankrupt’. As history shows the president was right: the companies were saved — and the loans were paid back before they were due. GM and Chrysler have become stronger than ever.

As a condition for support the president demanded they retool and build more fuel-efficient cars, setting the highest fuel economy standards in history. In a decade our cars will go twice as far on a tank of gas, and light trucks as well. The president, through the Department of Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency, raised the United States’ CAFE standards — corporate average fuel economy — from 27.5 MPG to 35.5 MPG in 2016 and 54.5 MPG by 2025. Many thought the president was going to kill the industry that he saved. But the American auto industry just recorded its best year in history, and the United States is once again a source of automotive innovation and excellence.

By every measure our economy is stronger today than ever before. In the midst of the worst economic collapse of our generation, the president made clear-eyed, sound decisions, many of which were controversial, that averted disaster and set us on a path for long-term consistent growth. This is important not only for America but also for the world. A healthy American economy means greater growth and opportunities globally and more American contributions to meeting international challenges.

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Barack Obama’s nuanced approach to the world, as well as his depth and breadth of knowledge, were evident before he was sworn in as the 44th president of the United States. In the last seven years he has met many challenges and accomplished much, confirming this assessment. One of his major achievements was saving the United States and the global economy from a major depression. His recovery plan included an aggressive pursuit of energy independence. On foreign policy he has acted on the premise that American leadership must be based on respect for the universal values the United States stands for and on international co-operation.
Energy policy

In order to fuel economic growth the United States needed more sustainable sources of energy. This is why dramatically increasing our investments in domestic energy to reduce our dependence on foreign oil was an important part of the president’s economic recovery plan. So President Obama set out an aggressive ‘All of the above’ energy strategy for our energy independence. Today the United States is producing more oil and natural gas while consuming less. The administration has advanced the growth of energy sources with low or no carbon emissions. We are generating more electricity from renewables such as wind and solar, and we are promoting energy efficiency.

These developments have had substantial economic and energy security benefits and they are helping us reduce carbon emissions and laying the foundation for a clean energy future — one that has already created tens-of-thousands of new economy jobs. And I believe it happened because of how the president went about it. And, most importantly, it has made our energy future resilient. It has greatly reduced our risk to global energy shocks and crises. We are now the world’s largest energy producer.

Climate change

This leads me to the next major threat we all face — climate change. As the president has said, ‘no challenge poses a greater threat to our future than climate change’. Under his leadership the United States has done more to combat climate change than ever before at home and abroad. He has said ‘we cannot condemn our children — and their children — to a future that is beyond their capacity to repair.’ For the first time there is hope on the horizon.

President Obama launched an ambitious and comprehensive Climate Action Plan targeting domestic steps and international collaboration to fight climate change. He then committed massive United States government resources to make that a reality. Over the past eight years the United States has reduced our total carbon pollution by more than any other nation. Our greenhouse gas pollution fell to the lowest levels in twenty years. We are contributing $3 billion to the international Green Climate Fund to help small island states adapt to effects of climate change and help developing countries reduce emissions. At home, we have seen a twenty-fold increase in solar power, and a tripling of wind power, since the president took office. Texas, the heart of our oil and gas production, now gets 19 per cent of their electric power from renewable energy, including solar, wind, biomass and geothermal, on Army, Navy and Air Force installations by 2025. The Federal government has set a goal to deploy 3 gigawatts of renewable energy, mostly solar, wind. And the government is doing its part. Our Defense Department has set a goal to deploy 3 gigawatts of renewable energy, including solar, wind, biomass and geothermal, on Army, Navy and Air Force installations by 2025. The Federal government has committed to sourcing 20 per cent renewable energy for Federal installations by 2020.

Last year the president took the biggest step to reduce our carbon emissions, setting standards to cut power plants’ carbon pollution by 32 per cent. This means there will be 870 million fewer tons of carbon dioxide pollution in our atmosphere — equal to taking 166 million cars off the road.

President Obama knew that a lasting solution to climate change must be global in scope. When he and China’s President Xi came out of the APEC meetings in November 2014 and made a joint declaration on climate change, you knew it was important, not only because of the significant impact on our environment but also because it highlighted the importance of international diplomacy and co-operation. On Earth Day this year more nations came together to sign the Paris Agreement than any other agreement before. It took enormous behind-the-scenes diplomatic work and leadership. History was made when 177 nations, including New Zealand, China, India and the United States, signed the most ambitious international agreement to combat climate change ever, establishing a long-term, durable framework to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. Many credit the success of the Paris Agreement to the leadership of America and China, the world’s two largest emitters. With the two largest economies leading the way, the world followed.

Foreign policy

In the summer of 2007 I was with candidate Obama as he addressed a group interested in the Middle East. I was amazed at his understanding of centuries-long conflicts and individual countries’ histories. He talked about reaching out to Iran, and why diplomacy should be given a chance. Then one of the 25 attendees said: ‘with all due respect senator — are you stupid?’

President Obama assumed office inheriting two wars and a generational struggle against violent extremism. He set the tone of his foreign policy in his first State of the Union address in 2010 and has followed it since: American leadership must be based on respect for the universal values we stand for and on international co-operation.

In my opinion, if successful, the Iran nuclear deal will be considered the president’s greatest achievement. First, he had to build a coalition that no one before had been able to build. China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany all agreed to levy and, more importantly, enforce the most biting sanctions ever imposed. Then, he secured a deal to verifiably prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The implications of a nuclear-armed Iran for regional and world stability were staggering, and we are all more secure because of this deal.

After 55 years, the president re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba, normalising travel, commercial and people-to-people ties. His visit was the first by a US president in 80 years and this new course reflects the belief that it is better to encourage and support democratic reform than to impose policies that could create a failed state.

Recognising that development is not only a moral imperative but also a strategic and economic one, the president implemented the US Global Development Policy — the first of its kind by an American administration. We doubled our aid for development, education, equal rights for women, entrepreneurship and food security. And, what many do not remember, some of our largest aid recipients in the past are now among our top trading partners.

We led international efforts to end the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, shoring up public health systems both at home and abroad. We are looking comprehensively at treating preventable diseases, corruption, instability and violent extremism.

Combatting terrorism

Today Osama bin Laden and most of his top lieutenants are dead or have been captured. Al-Qaeda’s network has largely been dismantled. Fewer of our troops are in harm’s way, as we have responsibly ended the US combat missions in Iraq and Afghani-
signatories ratify it, as I believe they will, it may well be considered for consumer and labour standards across the Pacific. Once all mark environmental and human rights deal and a turning pointency. And the TPP is not just a trade agreement. It is also a land-forward for the values of equality, fairness, openness and transpar-will create jobs in each of our economies and be an important step to the world’s fastest growing regions. It will turn a confusing, closed presi-dent’s legacy. This twelve-nation agreement, representing 40 world. New Zealand is a valued partner in achieving the presi-stand, bringing home more than 95 per cent of the troops deployed when President Obama took office.

The fight against terrorism continues. It will take time, and a sustained effort and co-operation. The president established a comprehensive government-wide strategy to address the ISIS problem and with a 65-member coalition is working to degrade and ultimately destroy it. He understands the importance for all nations to stand up to ISIS together.

The president has long wanted to completely close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. It serves as a recruitment tool for terrorists and an argument for those who oppose America. He has made considerable progress. Eighty-five per cent of prisoners have been transferred, and the president has asked Congress to enact his plan to transfer the remaining 91 prisoners and close the prison for good.

Pacific rebalance
President Obama firmly believes that the Pacific is our future, and realigned our diplomatic, economic and military resources accordingly. As the world’s fastest-growing region and home to more than half the global economy, the Asia–Pacific region is critical to achieving his highest priority: creating peace through prosperity. With most of the world’s nuclear powers and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century ahead is marked by conflict or co-operation, needless suffering or human progress.

The president’s Pacific Rebalance recognises that we are and will always be a Pacific nation, and positions American diplomatic, military and commercial resources to build closer relations throughout this important region. Under the Rebalance, American officials have worked with others around the region to modernise treaty alliances and strengthen partnerships, including with New Zealand through the Wellington and Washington declarations. We worked with you and so many others to strengthen regional institutional architecture.

New Zealand is an important partner diplomatically, economically and militarily. Our military co-operation with New Zealand and other partnerships in the Asia–Pacific region have deterred aggression, prevented conflict and provided a more stable environment. This has led to the flourishing of peace, prosperity and unprecedented freedom of navigation and export access to the world’s largest economies through the world’s busiest shipping lanes. This international economic, legal and security system has helped bring millions of people out of poverty and hunger and led to unparalleled exchanges of ideas, people and cultures.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership will lock in and expand this peace and prosperity to create the largest middle class in the world. New Zealand is a valued partner in achieving the president’s objective of sustainable economic growth in the Pacific. The TPP, signed in New Zealand, will be a cornerstone of the president’s legacy. This twelve-nation agreement, representing 40 per cent of global GDP, will provide all of us with access to one of the world’s fastest growing regions. It will turn a confusing, closed network of markets into an open and more level playing field. It will create jobs in each of our economies and be an important step forward for the values of equality, fairness, openness and transparency. And the TPP is not just a trade agreement. It is also a landmark environmental and human rights deal and a turning point for consumer and labour standards across the Pacific. Once all signatories ratify it, as I believe they will, it may well be considered the defining moment in the Pacific century.

If you ask historians and political scientists today what President Obama’s signature achievement is, many will say Obamacare. For more than 100 years our Congress has debated comprehensive health care reform. Democratic presidents from Truman to Clinton all tried to reform our health care system and failed. Even Republican President Richard Nixon tried twice and failed to pass comprehensive healthcare. President Obama got it done. By covering millions of the uninsured while reining in the soaring costs of healthcare, Obamacare’s enduring impact on the well-being of the average American is an achievement on the order of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Social Security and President Johnson’s Medicare plans. The reason why so many presidents wanted to fix our healthcare system is that it was expensive and uneven. Today 20 million more people have health insurance and for the first time more than nine in ten Americans are covered. And the percentage change in total healthcare costs has slowed to the smallest increase since the Second World War, saving us a projected $200 billion.

Quick tour
So that is a quick tour of how I think President Obama has met some of the major challenges of our generation and has set our economy and our foreign policy on a sustainable course. There is much I left out for consideration of time that is also important, from marriage equality and LGBT rights to advocating for equal pay for women. His very first act in office was to sign legislation banning pay discrimination. And there are issues that have disappoint-pointed the president that will take the work of several administrations to address, such as gun violence, civil rights, campaign finance reform and the need for even more inclusive economic growth.

You add it all up and it is no surprise that for the first time in more than a decade business leaders from around the world have said the world’s most attractive place to invest is not India or China — it is the United States of America. When the world’s largest economy is healthy, innovative and open, it creates opportu-nities for everyone.

In his final State of the Union address earlier this year, President Obama said that American leadership must be based on respect for the universal values we stand for and on international co-operation. He believes that today, more than at any point in human history, the interests of nations and peoples are aligned. His foreign policy has been guided by an understanding that our values are our greatest strength, that we must avoid the extremes of isolation and unbridled nation-building and that the future is something we can shape for the better through concerted and collective effort. The president believes that our standing in the world is grounded in our reputation for resilience, innovation and unlimited opportunities. Our future will not be served by building walls around ourselves or banning people of faith from our shores.

I will leave it to historians to play the ranking game and rate President Obama’s tenure. But I know that, given the scope of the problems we faced, I am grateful we had a thoughtful and caring president, measured but decisive when it mattered. When I look at the list of agenda items that the president and I discussed ten years ago, he has accomplished almost all in difficult partisan times. Under President Obama we have made progress we can be proud of. I believe history will judge him kindly.

New Zealand International Review
BOOK LAUNCH

New Zealand and the United Nations 70 years on

Murray McCully launches a new volume that highlights New Zealand’s role in the world body.

In 1945, New Zealand joined with 49 other nations in the post-Second World War era to establish the United Nations. We played an active role in the negotiation of the UN Charter, setting the rules and principles to govern global relations. Our positions in 1945 included opposing the veto for the five permanent members of the proposed Security Council, advocating for the principles of collective security and self-determination and pushing for economic and social issues to be at the heart of the agenda. We did not win all those battles, and we are still fighting some of them.

In this article I want to reflect on just two points about our engagement in the United Nations: the changing nature of New Zealand’s constituency in it since 1945, and the role of the Security Council. New Zealand’s international relationships are fundamentally different today from 1945. Around the time the United Nations was formed, our place in the world was defined by our relationship with, if not dependence on, Britain and our membership of ANZUS.

In the period following the Second World War, it probably made sense to include New Zealand in the UN grouping of nations described as ‘Western Europe and Others’. Today, although we share many of the same values, it is very hard to see how we now slot in logically alongside these states in the UN context.

We will always strongly value our ties to our traditional friends, but the way we engage on the diplomatic stage has to adapt to evolving realities. Since 1945, our position as the ‘Britain of the South Pacific’ has been replaced by deep and genuine ties to the Asia–Pacific region and a strongly independent voice that we raise more often on behalf of smaller states than established interests of our traditional allies. The Asia–Pacific region now accounts for more than 70 per cent of our two-way trade and China and Australia are our largest trading partners.

Changing composition

This shift is also reflected in the makeup of New Zealand society. Around 12 per cent of our population is now of Asian origin — and in our largest city, Auckland, that proportion is 24 per cent. Seventy-five per cent of all international visitors to New Zealand last year were from the Asia–Pacific region. This trend will only accelerate as Asia’s emerging middle class (expected to reach 1.75 billion by 2020) creates new trade opportunities for New Zealand.

and developed a new security partnership with the United States.

As New Zealand’s economic prospects become increasingly tied to our partners in the Asia–Pacific region, we are also more focused on the political and security challenges facing the region. The key vehicle for engagement on these issues is the suite of regional discussions hosted by ASEAN, especially the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The changing nature of our engagement in the Asia–Pacific region has meant we have had to adapt how we operate on the wider UN stage. The United Nations is a vastly more complex organisation than anyone would have imagined 71 years ago. The conflicts we face are increasingly global and complex and, in recent times, the international community’s expectations have evolved as to when and how the UN engages in a conflict. In response, New Zealand has had to shape new alliances and new approaches to the way we work in the United Nations.

Despite our UN categorisation in the Western Europe and Others category, we operate naturally as an Asia–Pacific nation. The area where we have developed our greatest comparative advantage in the international diplomatic space is our close relationship with the Pacific and with small states. Fortunately, much of the United Nations’ membership is made up of such states and, because they feature across all regional groups, they are increasingly influential.

Similar issues

Many small islands states face similar issues on their path to self-sufficiency — issues around scale, the need to manage ocean resources and the need to develop renewable energy generation and reduce dependence on imported fuel. These are all areas where New Zealand has world-leading expertise and experience supporting development initiatives in the Pacific. These capabilities are equally important in the Caribbean and amongst the small states of the Indian Ocean and the African coast.

Through our development work with small islands states, we are building New Zealand’s role as an expert in high-value, low-cost co-operation activities that makes a rapid and tangible difference on the ground. We have renewable energy partnerships in eight of the Caribbean nations. In the Comoros Islands, off the coast of Africa, dependence on fossil fuels for electricity costs around $40 million per annum on imported fuel. Yet they have a geothermal resource that could make them fully self-sufficient.

Hon Murray McCully is the minister of foreign affairs. This article is the edited text of the address given by him at the launch of the publication New Zealand and the United Nations: 70th Anniversary on 2 May.
New Zealand geothermal technology, costing our aid budget a few hundred thousand dollars, has proven the resource. We are now working with Comoros to secure the US$45 million in funding required for exploratory drilling and the $50 million or so that a geothermal power plant will cost.

It might be asked why New Zealand is doing this? It is because these sorts of activities are game changing. They are a hugely effective spend of the aid dollar and it is these sorts of activities for which we want New Zealand to be known. We are taking this sense of practicality with us into the United Nations, across the development agenda.

While it is too soon to start talking about the ‘legacy’ of our current term on the Security Council, it is my firm view that we will be judged not just on the basis of what we have achieved on the council itself but on the way we served the states that supported us. One of our greatest assets when we come off the council at the end of this year will be the new relationships we have forged with a range of states, and the greater depth our term has brought to our existing relationships. Our advocacy for small state positions on the council and the new networks we have developed will position New Zealand internationally and drive our diplomacy in years to come.

**Unchanged priorities**

We remain as convinced today as we were 70 years ago of the need to have a strong Security Council. Whilst our operating environment has changed since 1945, New Zealand’s priorities in the United Nations, in particular in the council, have essentially stayed the same. We are using our term on the council to voice concerns about the divisions in the council, which severely limit its decision-making. At the same time, we are working to improve its day-to-day functioning — to get the council back to what we sought in 1945 — as a place to solve global problems, not exacerbate them.

Half-way through our term on the council, we are sober in our assessment of its effectiveness. The council is getting on with its core work, including overseeing sixteen current peacekeeping operations, but it is fair to say that on the big issues it often seems to be paralysed. Syria looms large as an example. For five years the council failed to make any meaningful progress in responding to one of the most brutal conflicts of modern times. The recent surge of political will to reach a solution has changed the game decisively. And we hope, like others, that the current diplomatic effort will result in a lasting ceasefire and a political settlement to the conflict.

What we are seeing in the international response to Syria is that for many of today’s conflicts, a single diplomatic mechanism, whether that is the council or a group such as the International Syria Support Group, on its own is not sufficient to really tackle a complex crisis. In resolving the Syria crisis, the council, the ISSG, the UN special envoy and key bilateral players are all working towards the same end and, at the moment, all are essential to move the parties towards a peace deal. So the council is not the ‘one-stop shop’ that some might have hoped in 1945 it would become. However, that is not necessarily a weakness. It reflects the diversity of interests at stake in conflicts today and the composition of the council, which has barely changed since 1945.

On this latter point, when we look ahead to the United Nations of the future, and in particular the Security Council, we cannot escape the impact of the veto, its membership and working methods. The Iran nuclear deal and the Minsk Accords are two further examples where, for various reasons, we saw greater traction in negotiations outside the council than inside. In both cases, however, the council’s endorsement was an essential part of the process. This step is more than a seal of approval — it is an essential sign of legitimacy on behalf of the international community and reflects the fact that the council is the pre-eminent body for international peace and security. And for the time being, this is an operating model we will probably continue to see in the council for the really complex issues on the global agenda.

**Huge detriment**

At the heart of it, we can see that the veto’s impact today far exceeds what was envisaged in the UN Charter, to the huge detriment of the council’s effectiveness and credibility. Reform is a slow game. We need to be adept and prepared to stick it out. In the meantime, we will keep using our term to improve the day-to-day working methods of the council. We will keep working to make it a more transparent and inclusive body. And we will keep supporting initiatives calling for restraint in the exercise of the veto and for more effort to be applied within the council to avoid its use.

The UN Charter is as important today as it was in 1945. But our challenge is to find ways to ensure the United Nations can in the future be the effective organisation that it was intended to be when it was formed 71 years ago. For New Zealand, that means being smart about our place in the United Nations, and it means being prepared to stand up for what we think is right and persist in our efforts to improve the way the world body operates. That is not always going to be straightforward, but it is an essential role for states such as New Zealand. It is a further testament to New Zealand’s commitment to the United Nations that we are fielding a candidate for the position of secretary-general, and we are pleased to be campaigning actively for Helen Clark to compete for the top UN job.

Brian Lynch and all those who contributed to the seminar and publication of *New Zealand and the United Nations: 70th Anniversary* are to be commended. This compendium of essays provides a useful stocktake of what we have achieved over the past 70 years, and importantly, sets out the challenges we have to overcome to ensure the United Nations is the most effective body it can be.
The cover of David Kilcullen’s *Out of the Mountains* includes a quote from Mike Davis that calls Kilcullen ‘the most unfettered and analytically acute mind in the military intelligentsia’. The book itself does indeed demonstrate Kilcullen’s sharp intelligence and analytical capacities, but I was left less convinced by the suggestion that his work is somehow ‘unfettered’ by the demands and expectations of his long career in the military, as a high-level advisor in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, and his current role as a non-executive director of a strategic consultancy firm in Washington. In fact, as I will argue below, much of the analysis in the book is resolutely tied to a Western military perspective that at times appears to be unconscious of its own partial and political point of view, preferring instead to provide highly neutralised, universal and ahistorical accounts of contemporary conflict.

*Out of the Mountains* begins in the context of Afghanistan, with Kilcullen providing a compelling account of a battle he witnessed in a remote part of Afghanistan in 2009. The questions that arise out of this battle then lead into broader reflections on the problems and limitations of counter-insurgency theory and practice in the contemporary environment. We have reached a point, Kilcullen argues, where we must move our thinking and planning ‘out of the mountains’ and focus instead on the rapidly growing coastal cities that hold the vast majority of the world’s population and are home to many of the world’s most intractable violent conflicts. This leads to the identification of four key elements that feed into Kilcullen’s diagnoses of future threats: Population growth (the continuing rise of the planet’s total population), urbanization (the tendency for people to live in larger and larger cities), litonlization (the propensity for these cities to cluster on coastlines) and connectedness (increasing connectivity among people, wherever they live).

In Chapters 2 to 4, Kilcullen continues to show his mastery of the example, detailing cases as diverse as the gang conflicts in the mountains’ and focus instead on the rapidly growing coastal cities that hold the vast majority of the world’s population and are home to many of the world’s most intractable violent conflicts. This leads to the identification of four key elements that feed into Kilcullen’s diagnoses of future threats: Population growth (the continuing rise of the planet’s total population), urbanization (the tendency for people to live in larger and larger cities), litonlization (the propensity for these cities to cluster on coastlines) and connectedness (increasing connectivity among people, wherever they live).

This insistence on the utility of force in creating a better future is connected to Kilcullen’s ‘theory of competitive control’, which reads like a re-statement of some basic claims of Hobbesian sovereignty theory in contemporary economic language. The basic premise of this theory is that local support will follow whichever group is able to establish ‘a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control’, regardless of the ideological preferences of the local population. Physical security, from this point of view, becomes the foundation for everything, superseding ideological and political preferences of the people. While in many ways I agree with this basic starting point for thinking about conflict and community, I found that Kilcullen was a little inconsistent in application of this principle throughout the book, a problem that is perhaps linked to his reluctance to clearly identify the main target audience for it.

It is somewhat odd — and in my view quite telling — that the conclusion is followed by an appendix in which Kilcullen presents his recommendations for military forces trying to adapt to ‘crowded, coastal and complex’ conflicts. Despite the insistence in the conclusion that the repeated use of the pronoun ‘we’ in the book does not refer to any specific group, it seems clear to me that it is primarily written from the perspective of and for Western military, governments and diplomatic agencies that have the capacity to act on a global scale. The discussion in the appendix, despite being structurally severed from the remainder of the text, is the ultimate point to which Kilcullen’s theorising leads.

This is not just an objective account of a changing world, it is an account designed to point toward certain (militarised) responses to the coming dangers. From the affirmations of the non-violent movements discussed in the conclusion, we arrive at the acknowledgment in the appendix that ‘we need to be thinking hard and unsentimentally about what to do when we find ourselves in an urban, networked, littoral environment’. Yet who is the ‘we’ that needs to be thinking ‘hard and unsentimentally’ in this context?
This question is important, because the description of the need for a ‘triple bubble’ of force protection in the appendix does not sit easily with the co-designed partnerships for resilience described in the conclusion.

This leads back to my biggest concern with this book: the apologetic, neutralising, universal, scientific language that is used to buttress Kilcullen’s vision of future war. There is no room for consideration of (for example) the legacies of colonialism or the radicalisation of Western and Islamic politics as drivers of conflict. Everything is presented in terms of an unavoidable, natural, biological or ecological manifestation of human life in coastal cities, rather than as a product of political passions or economic inequalities.

It is here that Kilcullen’s ‘fetters’ are most clearly revealed. His concern is with the ways in which the great mass of human life can be managed and controlled. It is a perspective that can only come from long association with well-financed and well-organised military force that has grown accustomed to the management of global affairs. There is nothing wrong per se with such a perspective, and Kilcullen delivers it in a convincing and very readable manner, yet identifying that perspective as something other than that of a disinterested, objective observer of global developments sheds quite a different light on both Kilcullen’s analysis and his recommendations.  

Jeremy Moses

UNited Nations PeacEKEEPING CHALLENGE: The Importance of the Integrated Approach

Editors: Anna Powles, Negar Partow and Nick Nelson
Published by: Ashgate, Farnham, 2015, 279pp, £65.

Near the start of this book, then UN Under-Secretary-General Ameerah Haq notes that for UN peacekeeping operations ‘the age of innocence has passed’. The central message from Haq is that we need to accept that peacekeeping has become a far more dangerous activity. This is a trend that Haq dates from 2003, the year that UN envoy Sergio de Mello in Iraq was deliberately killed. Essentially a number of peacekeeping missions now find themselves in environments where anti-state actors view blue helmets as the enemy and seek to target them. Furthermore, some missions are explicitly about the protection of civilians, which can then bring peacekeepers into direct conflict with insurgent groups. This is the case for peacekeeping operations like MINUSMA in Mali or MONUSCO in Congo. (Although it lies outside the scope of this book, the African Union’s Mission in Somalia, which is not a UN mission but is UN mandated, has cost the lives of more than 1000 peacekeepers since it started in 2007.)

Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies has pulled together a valuable collection of chapters on the contemporary complexities surrounding peacekeeping. This volume is the record of the presentations made to the Pacific Army Chiefs’ conference in Auckland in 2013. The book is able to draw together the views of generals who have led missions, UN officials and independent academic observers. These contributions are very thought provoking, and some will stay with the reader for a long time.

Martin Dransfield offers some insights into how the New Zealand Defence Force approaches peacekeeping, drawing on his experiences in East Timor and Afghanistan. First, he notes the difficulty of addressing a wide set of governance needs — he had to ask his clergyman to mentor Banyan’s Ministry of Education, and his physician to do the same with the Ministry of Health. Moreover, the Provincial Reconstruction Team needed a combination of peacekeeping troops, police and civilian experts to function effectively. Second, Dransfield recognises that cultural awareness is a ‘force multiplier’. He outlines his efforts to establish who held local power and authority — often not those with formal political titles — and set about bringing them on board. In Banyan this involved reaching out to former Taliban commanders in an effort to undercut their preconception that the Provincial Reconstruction Team was there to destroy them and their communities. These efforts were critical to obtaining local support. Anna Powles’s contribution builds nicely on this theme, and calls for the deliberate standing up of local empowerment and local institutions during the initial critical phase of peacekeeping operations.

The theme of meshing a ‘unity of effort’ — or what the editors usefully term ‘hybrid peacekeeping’ — pervades this contribution. Rwandan General Patrick Nyamvumba notes that soldiers do not always have all the necessary skills for peace support operations (that is, those missions in collapsed states), but in the event of a crisis there are no other alternatives to assembling the troops. But soldiers are not the complete answer either, and there is a need for governance and development experts, including those from non-governmental organisations. Alex Bellamy raises the difficulties for such organisations that want to work in communities without being associated with unpopular governance structures or the military (local or UN); while General Nyamvumba laments that non-governmental organisations following their own priorities have been an unwelcome aspect of his mission in Darfur. Nonetheless, contributors agree that achieving a common purpose amongst troop contributing nations and civilian development efforts is a major element in arriving at a successful outcome. It will strike the reader that this sort of thing is easy to agree to in principle!

Various estimates of numbers of peacekeepers worldwide appear in the book, but, depending on what is counted, there are around 100,000. Bellamy (who counts 120,000) notes that obtaining troop numbers from contributing nations has not proved difficult. There are many reasons why countries want to offer troops, including a desire to stabilise a neighbouring country or region, to secure the income generated (for developing nations) and to obtain field experience. Getting combat boots on the ground is the easy bit. What is in far shorter supply are more expensive ‘enablers’, which include air and ground transport, medical provision, supply chains and the provision of intelligence.

A large section of this book is devoted to the ‘duty of care’ for
soldiers who witness horrifying events and are at risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Australian General John Cantwell writes a very personal chapter about how this impacted on his life, starting with the industrial scale slaughter of Iraqi soldiers he witnessed in the 1991 Gulf War. Modern militaries have deployed a range of partial solutions to help mitigate PTSD, but the need for after-care for returnees is an obvious issue for peacekeepers who have been through situations that often involve chronic and intense feelings of vulnerability and helplessness in particularly insoluble humanitarian crises.

One quibble with this book is that it can lose its reader. Contributors refer to the array of UN missions by their acronyms alone, and very few readers will be able to make sense of this without constantly going to Google. The UN website resolves this problem by listing the name of the country beside the acronym, for example, ‘UNMISS, South Sudan’. It would also be useful to have explained some of the conceptual framework (and associated jargon) around modern peacekeeping — such as terms of art like ‘peace support operation’ — before running into it in the substantive chapters.

Leaving that aside, however, this volume does an excellent job of drawing together academics and practitioners in a way that will allow the reader to become more familiar with the most important contemporary trends in UN peacekeeping missions.

**EXTRASTATECRAFT: The Power of Infrastructure Space**

*Author: Keller Easterling

In this book Easterling, a professor of architecture at Yale University and a writer on urbanism and globalisation, explores the operations of what she calls ‘extrastatecraft’ — ‘often undisclosed activities outside of, in addition to, and sometimes even in partnership with, statecraft’ — in three ‘infrastructure spaces’. The spaces are the free economic zones which operate ‘under authorities independent from the domestic laws of [the] host country’; the global networks of broadband computing and mobile telephony; and the setting of international standards through the ISO, ‘an extra-state parliament of… global standard-making activity’.

In three chapters Easterling explores problematic forms of extrastatecraft in these spaces, including unregulated labour in export processing zones; price gouging by broadband providers in developing countries; and the asymmetry in international standards, which means that ‘there is a meaningful legal mechanism to hold a company accountable for pirating a Madonna video, but not for contaminating the environment or using forced labour’ (citing Judith Kimerling). In another two chapters Easterling examines both ‘disposition’, in particular the ‘misalignment between the activity of an organisation and its stated intent’, and ‘stories’ — the contrast between the upbeat stories that are told about infrastructure (nation-building, universal exchange) and the other stories that are not (a software programme or a planned city put to a different-to-expected use).

The last chapter explores and celebrates challenges to extrastatecraft. The Dutch non-governmental organisation Women on Water uses Dutch-registered ships to offer abortions in international waters to women in countries where abortion is illegal. ‘Whether deploying cunning, banality or absurdity, infrastructure space is a tool of some of the most powerful forces in the world’, Easterling concludes. ‘But two can play at this game’, she adds, ‘in an art of extrastatecraft’.

Easterling’s work is stimulating but has limitations. First, even putting to one side subversive approaches like that of Women on Water, none of the three infrastructure spaces lack positive facets, yet the analysis does not have a place for them. The island state of Mauritius, having turned the whole country into an export processing zone, became one of the most prosperous countries in Africa. While broadband pricing in East Africa remained exploitative even as prices fell, subscriber numbers increased dramatically — one provider, Safaricom, had an estimated three million subscribers by 2020; by 2013 it had over 20 million, with 31 million overall in Kenya. The global activist non-governmental organisation Social Accountability International launched SA8000, a standard for labour, environment and human rights issues, with ISO ‘camouflage’.

Second, while Easterling does acknowledge the partnership between extrastatecraft and statecraft, the state’s vigour, in respect of economic zones in particular, is such as to put a question mark over her neologism. Easterling cites Kenichi Ohmae’s 1995 *End of the Nation State: the rise of regional economies,* but twenty years on the prophecy seems idiosyncratic rather than prescient, and patently so with respect to China, where arguably state power has been strengthened not weakened by the development of export processing zones such as Shenzhen, on the Hong Kong border. The vitality of the state is also evident in many of Easterling’s other case studies, such as Cyberjaya in Malaysia and analogues in the Gulf states — not to mention those states themselves.

Third, Easterling’s overall approach parallels that deployed in the works of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri and other critics of capitalist globalisation and it is not clear whether beyond the specifics of the case studies — of which that on the ISO is the most original — the book has anything novel to say. And if it does, it is in danger of being buried in jargon — ‘an auxiliary activism is enacted. The declarative and the enacted approaches to activism both map onto an ethical Mobius’ may not stop the revolution in its tracks, but it is unlikely to win new converts either.

MALCOLM McKINNEN

**CORRECTION**

The article ‘Policing terrorism in a void’ by John Batterby in the last issue, vol 41 no 4. p.3, states that the Rainbow Warrior was sunk on 10 July 1987. This event in fact occurred on 10 July 1985.
Sir,

In your last issue (vol 41, no 4), you published a letter from Peter Nichols written in response to an article in which I made the case for a U-turn in New Zealand’s current defence strategy. While spit-ting out the odd fruit that he found not to his liking, Peter seems to have chosen to ignore the overview of the whole orchard.

My basic premise was that, in a time of fast increasing international instability, a nation such as New Zealand should seek to increase its self-sufficiency both in terms of its economy, its military strategy and the self-confidence and survivability of its population.

Given existing global governance structures, it is becoming increasingly obvious that rapid climate change is unlikely to be countered in time to prevent an epic calamity to the Earth’s rapidly increasing human population. NATO is actively promoting a return to the Cold War and destabilising the nuclear balance with upgraded nuclear weaponry and anti-missile screens apparently designed to jeopardise Russia’s and China’s ability to offer a riposte to an American first strike. No significant structural changes have been made to the global monetary system following the last global financial crisis. It is improbable that there will not be an even more damaging repeat and consequent disruptions to the trade on which current New Zealand policy makes the welfare of its population dependent.

In light of the multiple and increasing threats to global stability I advocated a two-pronged strategy for the defence of New Zealand. Firstly, New Zealand should optimise its ability to look after its own defence, rather than making its defence ever more dependent on goodwill obtained by ingratiating itself with distant allies, who will inevitably prioritise their national interest above ours. Secondly, I advocated New Zealand increasing the vigour with which it relies on goodwill obtained by ingratiating itself with distant allies, with which it advocates the international rule of law on which, ultimately, its security depends.

The recent publication of the Chilcot report clearly illustrates the contradiction in New Zealand’s current defence strategy. The present policy forces New Zealand to accept the confrontational and aggressive foreign policies of what our defence minister refers to as our ‘our natural allies’. By being complicit in their activities, New Zealand undermines its ability to defend and promote the international rule of law on which, ultimately, its security depends.

My personal take on the Chilcot report is that it represents an attempt to redeem the British government with undeservedly faint blame. To any actively curious observer who had been following events in Iraq, it was evident that Saddam Hussein had dispensed with his weapons of mass destruction capability well before the invasion. Despite Chilcot’s claims, there is no way that Western intelligence agencies were not aware of this fact or that they failed to pass it on to their governments.

Were impartial reports to be published on similar investigations made into Western interventions in countries such as Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan and Syria, the findings would be every bit as condemnatory. How can New Zealand ‘go-along’ with such massive illegality and at the same time play a leadership role in up-holding and developing international law?

Instead of suggesting that graduates of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, should be expected to conform to the received wisdom of current doctrine, I would ask Mr Nichols to find fault with the overall strategy I proposed or, perhaps, convincingly explain how the current defence policy serves to increase the nation’s overall security.

HUGH STEADMAN
Blenheim

HS.
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INSTITUTE NOTES

The National Council meeting

On 7 June the NZIIA held its Annual Dinner. As in the previous year, it took place at the Wellington Club with NZIIA president Sir Douglas Kidd presiding and 121 present. The guest of honour was HE Mark Gilbert, the US ambassador to New Zealand and Samoa. The edited text of his address, which focused on the challenges and accomplishments of Barack Obama’s presidency, is to be found elsewhere in this issue.

Next morning the National Council held its annual meeting, also at the Wellington Club. Sir Douglas Kidd reported ‘a year of some change and more than a little innovation’. He noted the successful Antarctic seminar, the appointment of a new executive director and several groundbreaking events late in the year. He acknowledged the support of Victoria University, MFAT and the Delegation of the European Union and noted an emerging problem of suitable meeting venues.

In presenting her report, Maty Nikkhou-O’Brien paid tribute to the contribution of her predecessor, Peter Kennedy, and noted the three-pronged approach that had subsequently been adopted to excite and engage New Zealanders, from all walks of life, in international affairs. By the end of the year this approach had begun to bear fruit, with several events attracting big audiences. The smooth running of the National Office owed much to increasing use of technology. The efforts of the executive secretary, Synonne Rajanayagam, were commended.

Sir Douglas was re-elected as president, and the other officeholders were all also re-elected — Prof Rob Rabel as vice president, Prof Athol Mann as treasurer and Dr Anthony Smith as chair of the Research Committee. With Neil Walter, John Ballingall and Dr Jon Tanner having stood down from the Standing Committee, the National Council selected Don McKay, Hon Wayne Mapp, Sarah Dennis and Rt Hon Sir Anand Satyanand to replace them. Hon Russell Marshall was elected as an honorary vice president — remedying an oversight by the National Council when he stood down from the presidency some years ago.

In his report Athol Mann pointed to the healthy state of the NZIIA’s finances. A small profit had been achieved in 2015, and a similar result was budgeted for in 2016. The importance of seminars for the NZIIA’s financial health was noted, with the Antarctic seminar having proved very successful and profitable. Other factors in the good result were an increase in the MFAT grant and the reduction in the New Zealand International Review deficit. The council adopted the draft 2016 budget and agreed that corporate and institutional fees be increased by 15 per cent from 2017.

Dr Ian McGibbon, in his report on the NZ International Review, noted the big drop in the deficit in 2015, compared with the worrying result in 2014. He explained that this had been achieved in large part by reduction in printing costs, and praised Synonne Rajanayagam’s contribution to this outcome. He also noted the special issue on New Zealand–ASEAN relations, which had also been financially advantageous because of MFAT’s purchase of additional copies.

Dr Smith’s report on the Research Committee’s activities focused on plans for a further volume in the New Zealand in World Affairs series, covering the period 2005–15.
ety of speakers and topics. There had been an encouraging rise in branch membership. Ties with the university were strengthened.

Hugo Judd noted that the Nelson branch was in excellent shape. With 120 members, it was now facing problems in finding a suitable venue for larger attendances. Thirteen meetings had been held in 2015.

Brian Foley reported that the Timaru branch was in the doldrums, having only managed two meetings in 2015.

Scott Thomson spoke on behalf of the Wairarapa branch, which had had a successful year with eleven meetings in all. With just under 100 members the branch was in good shape.

Wellington branch had a ‘bumper’ year, according to branch chair Brian Lynch. Twenty-two functions had been held, with attendances ranging from 45 to 100. They included two major conferences. At 172, membership fell substantially (though figures received after the National Council indicate an encouraging upsurge this year). The branch’s finances remained very favourable.

The Hawke’s Bay, Waikato, Tauranga or Palmerston North branches were not represented at the council, but reports from all of them were noted.

There was some discussion of the problems faced by branches in smaller centres in particular both in attracting speakers and in seeking to increase local interest.
The full list of officers elected at the National Council meeting:

**Patron**
Lieutenant-General Rt Hon Sir Jerry Mateparae GNZM, QSO

**Life Members**
Mr K. Aldred OBE, Dr R.M. Alley, Prof D. Bing, Mr B.M. Brown QSO, Mr G.M. Davidson CNZM, OBE, JP, Mr B.R Foley, Dr J.S. Hoadley, Rt Hon Justice Sir Kenneth Keith ONZ, KBE, QC, Mr B.J. Lynch ONZM, Prof AW. Mann CMG, Prof W.D. McIntyre OBE, Mr S.W. McMillan, Mr J.S. Thomson, Prof A. A. Trotter ONZM

**President**
Hon Sir Douglas Kidd KNZM

**Vice President**
Prof R.G. Rabel

**Hon Vice President**
Rt Hon Sir Michael Hardie Boys GNZM, GCMG, Prof G.R. Hawke QSO, Prof L.C. Holborow QSO, Hon C.R. Marshall CNZM, Mr G.R. McGhie QSO, Dr I.C. McGibbon ONZM, Dr M.A. McKinnon, Mr S.R.W. Murdoch CNZM, Mr R.F. Nottage CNZM, Dr R.E.B. Peren, Dame Laurie Salas DBE, QSO, Ms A.V. Stokes QSO, Hon H.C. Templeton QSO, Prof D.G. Trow, Mr N.D. Walter CNZM, Mr A.F. Wierzbicki

**Treasurer**
Prof Mann

**Chair, Research Committee**
Dr A.L. Smith

**Managing Editor NZIR**
Dr McGibbon

**Research Committee**
Dr Alley, Dr McGibbon, Dr McKinnon, Prof Rabel, Director

**Standing Committee**
President, Vice President, Treasurer, Executive Director, Managing Editor NZIR, Chairman Research Committee, Director Centre for Strategic Studies (VUW), Dr D.H. Capie (VUW), Ms S. Dennis, Mr N. Keating, Mr Lynch, Hon Dr W.D. Mapp QSO, Mr D.McKay, Mr McMillan, Mr Murdoch, Dr N. Partow, Mr C.S. Pleydell, Ms S. Reynolds, Rt Hon Sir A. Satyanand GNZM, QSO, Ms A. Smith (MFAT), Ms R.R. Walbridge, Mr Wierzbicki

The staff of the National Office comprises:

**Executive Director**
Mrs M. Nikkhou-O’Brien

**Executive Secretary**
Mrs S.T. Rajanayagam
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