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Volunteer Service Abroad (Inc)
2 Keeping balance in a two-step dance
Brook Barrington outlines New Zealand’s aspirations for its two-year role on the Security Council.

6 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at 45
Rose Gottemoeller reviews the cornerstone of international arms control and non-proliferation efforts.

9 Standing up for values?
Robert Ayson discusses why New Zealand commits to conflict.

13 Global citizens in a world of disorder
Colin James reflects on New Zealand’s place in an increasingly troubled international environment.

18 Norman Kirk’s ‘OE’
Ken Ross reflects on the prime minister’s visits to South-east Asia, London and Washington.

22 Wider and still wider
Brian Easton looks at the prospects for further expansion of the European Union.

24 Together in struggle
Yosef Livne looks at wartime links between New Zealand and Jewish Palestinian soldiers.

26 BOOKS

JEREMY HARWOOD: World War Two From Above: An Aerial View of the Global Conflict (Stephen Harris).

30 INSTITUTE NOTES

The National Council meeting.
My focus is on New Zealand’s current experience on the United Nations Security Council, and what we are seeking to achieve over the two years of our tenure. Let me begin, however, by positioning this topic in the context of New Zealand’s broader international interests, and the role that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade plays in advancing these.

At its most fundamental, the ministry acts in the world to make New Zealanders safer and more prosperous. This is done directly — for example, through our consular work supporting distressed New Zealanders overseas or by the negotiation of trade and security arrangements. It is also done indirectly — for example, by upholding rules-based institutions and by our development assistance efforts.

In an age characterised by Skype or Face Time and the commodification of international travel, it might be questioned why making New Zealanders safer and more prosperous requires a foreign service with a global presence.

A basic answer is that formal relations between states, in times of ease but especially in times of tension, benefit from having mutually recognised and respected transmission mechanisms (embassies), rules (the Vienna Convention), norms (governments do not lie to governments) and representatives who can authoritatively represent the state, negotiate on its behalf and commit the state to formal undertakings (ambassadors and high commissioners).

A more textured answer is that our national interests are best advanced if our negotiating partners trust us, and trust is found- ed in relationships, and relationships require familiarity (if not always mutual understanding), and familiarity requires a continuity of presence and a constancy of behaviour. I should add that having people who understand the culture of the receiving state, who can identify even the smallest fragment of shared interest and who can leverage such fragments into something bigger is also useful — and these are not things easily or enduringly achieved by sporadic contact from a distance.

Taking these two answers together, it might be said that diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments (as said by Satow). Or you might prefer Napoleon, who said that diplomacy is the police in grand costume. Either way it is a personal art as much as it is a professional science, and as such best conducted face to face.

If you talk to any foreign service officer, from any jurisdiction, it will not take long before they start talking about the importance of relationships. Indeed, I have just done so myself. But I do want to be clear: relationships are a means to an end, they are not ends in themselves. The quality of a collegial diplomatic relationship, or a relationship between states (as if states can be anthropomorphised in this way), might be personally gratifying but they will only be professionally meaningful if they help us to advance the direct and indirect interests of New Zealand.

Active role
And those interests are wide-ranging, and have been wide-ranging for most of our modern history. Migration, empire, war, peace, trade, values, anxiety, technology — all of these things and more have seen New Zealand play an active role in regional and international affairs which belies our small population and our relative isolation.

As a small country with global interests and a beneficiary of international peace and security, we benefit from a rules-based system, which (by and large) extends to every sovereign state, re-
Regardless of size or strength, the same rights.

As an Asia–Pacific country, we benefit directly from the security, stability and prosperity of the region. As a global trading nation, we benefit from a robust international rules-based trading system. As a member of the international community, we benefit from good stewardship of the global commons, including on issues such as climate change, oceans, Antarctica, resource stewardship, counter-terrorism and radicalisation and the challenges facing small island developing states. As a country light on critical mass, we benefit from meaningful connections with others in our region and globally, whether through people-to-people connections or the sharing of ideas or trade.

It is to advance interests such as these, and to leverage our national reputation for objectivity, fair-mindedness, professionalism and constructive engagement in the resolution of difficult problems, that New Zealand campaigned for (and secured) a seat on the Security Council.

**Getting elected**

Security Council seats have, over the two decades since we last served, become more difficult and complicated to secure. That a small country not physically located close to most of the members in its electoral group (with Australia, Canada and the United States, we are the ‘others’ in the Western European and Others Group) managed to secure 75 per cent of the UN vote against diplomatic heavyweights such as Spain and Turkey is a result worth pondering.

New Zealand’s electoral success speaks to the priority which the government placed on our candidacy, the fact that we ran a well-organised campaign and the reputation which New Zealand has long-enjoyed as an engaged and constructive and creative participant in international affairs. We stood on our record, and were successful.

Through our election New Zealand challenged the narrative that to get elected you need a lot of money and a large diplomatic network. Instead, the value proposition underlying our campaign was simple: the crucial thing New Zealand could guarantee any UN member state was that if an issue of importance to them was to come to the UN Security Council, we would give them a fair hearing.

So what is it like? Having worked hard to get on the council, and recognising it could be another twenty years before we attempt to get on again, ministers have made clear that they want our council membership to mean something. They have no interest in New Zealand being a passenger on the council. Nor should we be.

In terms of what New Zealand wants to achieve, I would respond first and foremost that ‘we want to make a positive difference to the work of the Security Council, both in what it does and how it does it’. Additionally, and as a consequence, New Zealand wants to leave the council with our own international standing enhanced.

**Greater range**

We are nearly a quarter of the way through our two-year term, and there is no doubt that the range, complexity and tempo of the international issues requiring the attention of the government and the ministry is greater than at any point in my experience. It is a remarkable time to be a New Zealand foreign service officer, and for an organisation that today has a relatively large number of newish staff the benefits of our time on the council extend to building and reinforcing habits of professionalism, trade craft and collegiality.

Nor is there any doubt that in New York, and across New Zealand’s diplomatic network, doors are open to us that are normally difficult for a New Zealand diplomat to get through. Countries want to hear our views on issues before the council. Equally usefully, they want to tell us their views. We have become more relevant and more interesting to a dizzying range of others. Thus it was that on his recent trip to the Middle East the minister of foreign affairs secured calls on the president of Egypt, the prime minister of Israel and the president of the Palestinian Authority.

The months since taking up our seat have, therefore, not been quiet. Since returning to MFAT in March, I have joined my colleagues in scaling the learning curve which has required us better to understand the interests and policy complexities involved in issues as diverse as the Middle East Peace Process, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali, South Sudan and Burundi. There has also been our deeper engagement in horizontal themes such as combating terrorism, ensuring the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and examining what the United Nations can do in situations where there is no peace to keep.

Delivering impact and influence as one of ten elected members on the council is not without its challenges. Since 1945 the council has evolved modes of operating that result in control of
the substantive agenda being concentrated in the hands of a small number of countries. And there is the paradox that when the five permanent members do agree something between themselves it can be hard to shift them, and when the permanent five do not agree something between themselves then it can be hard to shift them. To have an impact as a non-permanent member, therefore, requires a clear sense of where to invest our effort, deft diplomacy, an ability to build and leverage coalitions of interest and a well-calibrated degree of ambition.

**Council presidency**

So where is New Zealand focusing its effort? In July in New York New Zealand was president of the Security Council — this put us at the centre of events, such as follow-up to the outcomes of the secretary-general’s Peace Operations Review, the Cyprus and Iraq mandate renewals, the twelve-month anniversary of the MH17 downing, the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, the next Middle East Peace Process open debate and the Iran P5+1 negotiations. It also gave New Zealand the opportunity to put topics of importance to us on the council’s agenda.

In line with our campaign undertakings, New Zealand promoted an open debate on the peace and security challenges to small island developing states. The many small island developing states in the Pacific, Caribbean and in the Indian and Atlantic oceans deserve the opportunity to put before the council the various challenges that they face, ranging from the theft of natural resources, to climate change, to transnational crime and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

These are not the usual issues considered by the council, and that is partly the point. They reflect the reality of the threats posed to small and isolated communities. We believe it is timely and appropriate that their concerns are heard at the top table of the United Nations.

**Needed reform**

We also sought to advance an issue that is already being discussed in the General Assembly in the wider context of Security Council reform, and which New Zealand has been active in pressing since Peter Fraser at the San Francisco conference in 1945, namely the working methods of the Security Council and, in particular, the use of the veto and how it affects council practice.

This is a subject which benefits little from public grandstanding. We sought, therefore, to facilitate a constructive engagement with permanent members, to discuss a set of issues that continue to be of interest to the wider membership of the United Nations and which go to the reputation and effectiveness of the international community’s central multilateral institution.

I should add that it is not possible to be a member of the Security Council without also exploring ways to make a constructive contribution to easing the multiple tensions and hardships in the Middle East. New Zealand with Jordan and Spain is joint lead on Security Council consideration of humanitarian issues in Syria, building on work undertaken last year by Australia and Luxembourg, in partnership as well with Jordan.

Syria remains one of the most tragic issues on the council agenda. Minister McCully has described it as a ‘weeping sore’ and a stain on the United Nations’ name because of the council’s inability to deal with the conflict. New Zealand’s efforts on the humanitarian front are focused on trying to alleviate the suffering of those innocent people caught up in this brutal conflict. How can we access besieged areas to ascertain the severity of the situation and ensure there is an appropriate humanitarian response? How can we ensure the principles of medical neutrality are abided by? How can the council make the lives of the people living this tragedy more bearable? These are questions we are pushing the council to address despite the stalemate on the political front.

**Peace process**

The government is also giving some thought as to how New Zealand might most helpfully contribute to energising the Middle East Peace Process. Resolving the Israeli–Palestinian dispute is one of the most longstanding and intractable issues on the council’s agenda. You might wonder why New Zealand has taken it up. There are a number of reasons. First, resolving that issue is a key — though no longer the only key — to peace in the Middle East.

Secondly, it is an issue that has been dealt with largely away...
from the council, even though its resolution is of importance to the entire UN membership, and even though the convening power of the UN Security Council and the good offices of the secretary-general can provide support to the kind of bilateral negotiations that are ultimately required to resolve this problem.

Thirdly, it would not be conscionable for a country like New Zealand to spend two years on the council without giving serious thought as to how we might best contribute to the cause of peace in the Middle East.

Minister McCully is, therefore, conducting quiet but determined diplomacy in this space, supported by New Zealand’s diplomatic network. New Zealand is not seeking necessarily to play a leading role on this issue. We will put our weight behind any initiative that stands a chance of success. But we are also putting thought into how we can best give life to our campaign promise to be an engaged and constructive and creative member of the Security Council, including on the difficult issues.

**Lasting benefits**

I am enough of a mercantilist to hope that at the end of our two years on the Security Council we will have secured for New Zealand some lasting diplomatic benefits. One of these has already been mentioned: the testing and strengthening of our diplomatic skills within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Another has been hinted at: the working in partnership between a highly experienced foreign minister and a diplomatic network that is active, well-connected, well-respected and driving for results.

In addition, at the end of our term we want to ensure that the council as a whole has a much more complete understanding of the challenges facing small island developing states and the issues of importance to them. New Zealand has deep experience with island states in the Pacific, and we want to see what commonalities, and differences, exist between them and the broader collection of small island developing states in the Caribbean, Atlantic and Indian oceans.

I am also deeply struck by how much the Security Council campaign, and our subsequent membership, has led us increasingly to understand the interests, concerns and potential of the 54 countries of Africa. Five of the ten fastest growing economies in the world are African. In calendar year 2014, New Zealand exported NZ$2.1 billion of merchandise to Africa. To put this in context, we exported NZ$2.9 billion of goods to Japan in 2014 and NZ$1.7 billion to South Korea (our fourth and fifth largest country export markets respectively). And I am told that there are more diplomats in Addis Ababa, where we have recently opened a high performing and invaluable embassy, than in Brussels.

Being on the council has, therefore, given us an unparalleled opportunity to better understand and engage with a number of countries whose affluence and influence are likely only to grow. I daresay that we sooner or later would have extended our diplomatic frontier into Africa in a more determined way, but our membership of the Security Council has been a powerful catalyst, giving us access and insights into the concerns of the countries of Africa that we would not have enjoyed otherwise. I anticipate that this will be of enduring benefit to New Zealand, driven by, and in support of, interests that go well beyond our Security Council tenure.

Perhaps most important of all, we want to end our two years on the council having enhanced our reputation for being an engaged and constructive and creative participant in international affairs. Being on the Security Council is serious diplomacy. It is a responsibility, and one not to be taken lightly. We must, and will, discharge our duty well.

**Enduring relevance**

The San Francisco Conference of 1945, at which the UN Charter was created, was formally entitled the United Nations Conference on International Organisation. The relevance of international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all members, who shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in international law, is more obvious today than ever before. For as Henry Kissinger wrote in 1994, international systems live precariously. Every ‘world order’ expresses an aspiration to permanence…. Yet the elements which comprise it are in constant flux…. Never before have the components of world order, their capacity to interact, and their goals changed quite so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally. And much more has changed in the twenty years since he penned those words.

But I do not want to trip lightly over the first step of what the UN Charter makes clear is a two-step dance. Any notion of an international system, or of world order, is rooted in the Westphalian concept of the state, independent and sovereign.

Michael Howard, formerly regius professor of modern history at Oxford, wrote in 1989 that the fundamental problems of the twenty-first century will not be those of traditional power confrontations. They are more likely to arise out of the integration, or disintegration, of states themselves…. Our long-term challenge is that of maintaining cohesion in increasingly heterogeneous societies where traditional national loyalties are widely regarded as anachronistic or irrelevant.

Taking Kissinger and Howard together — an unlikely pairing — there is national and supra-national benefit to be had (and comfort to be taken) from institutions which have a clear purpose, which are based on enduring values, which are robust and respected and which are focused on upholding safety and prosperity ‘in larger freedom’. New Zealand’s tenure on the Security Council, and the work of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade over that period and thereafter, are at their most essential directed at reaffirming that central truth.
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at 45

Rose Gottemoeller reviews the cornerstone of international arms control and non-proliferation efforts.

New Zealand is a powerful voice for progress on arms control and non-proliferation issues. The United States joins it in that call for progress and I will focus here on the cornerstone of international arms control and non-proliferation efforts: the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which came into force 45 years ago.

The ‘grand bargain’ of the NPT set an enduring standard that is as relevant today as it was at the treaty’s inception. That bargain comprises three reinforcing aspects wherein nuclear weapons states pursue disarmament, non-nuclear weapons states abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons and all countries are able to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. For 45 years, the regime has thrived. When faced with challenges, NPT parties have worked together to make the entire non-proliferation regime stronger. Beginning with 62 signatories, the treaty is now nearly universal — and universality remains our ultimate goal.

The treaty has stemmed the tide of proliferation; it has facilitated co-operation among its states party; and it has institutionalised the norms of non-proliferation and disarmament. The three pillars of the treaty provide its stability, and its endurance. Each pillar is as important as the others. Each pillar reinforces the others, and each state party can and must help strengthen all three.

Looking at the success of the NPT, it is easy to forget that the world once faced the unpredictable and harrowing prospect of dozens of nuclear weapons states. It is easy to forget that nuclear war was once a daily fear for people around the world. Most people on this planet do not remember how close we came to ultimate destruction. They do not remember that for thirteen long, tense days in October 1962, Soviet missile placements in Cuba brought us to the edge of the nuclear abyss.

In some ways, that should not be too surprising. It has now been over 50 years since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Faced with the prospect of nuclear war, leaders in Washington and Moscow stepped back from the brink all those years ago and set about the task of reducing both the tension in our relationship and the threats posed by our respective nuclear arsenals. Together, these leaders created the first ‘Hotline’ between the Kremlin and the White House, allowing for direct, immediate communications between our leaders. Within a year, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated, signed and ratified the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which went into force just four months later. The LTBT outlawed nuclear explosive tests on land, in the sea, in the atmosphere and in space. This was a tremendous step in the right direction and one that helped create the political conditions to conclude the NPT.

At the United States signing of the NPT in 1968 President Lyndon Johnson proclaimed that ‘after nearly a quarter century of danger and fear — reason and sanity have prevailed’. The NPT, he said, was ‘evidence that amid the tensions, the strife, the struggle, and the sorrow of [those] years, men of many nations [had] not lost the way — or… the will — toward peace’.

Indeed, if the LTBT was the turning point away from the unthinkable, the NPT was proof that the world was committed to creating a safer, more secure world. Now 45 years after the treaty’s entry into force, we find ourselves in a completely different security paradigm. The threat of nuclear war has been eclipsed by threat of nuclear terrorism — an amorphous, ever-changing threat that has no home address. As the world works to further reduce and prevent the spread of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to provide the best nuclear security, the NPT remains an essential tool.

Since 1969 the Non-proliferation Treaty has been a key instrument in stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation. It has facilitated co-operation among its signatories, and has institutionalised the norms of non-proliferation and disarmament. The three pillars of the treaty, which provide its stability and are responsible for its endurance, are the commitment by nuclear weapons states to pursue disarmament and by non-nuclear weapons states to abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons and the right of all countries to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. The United States and New Zealand have always been strong supporters of this regime.

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Rose Gottemoeller is under secretary for arms control and international security in the State Department. This article is the edited text of the NZIIA’s Foreign Policy Lecture, which she delivered at Victoria University of Wellington on 9 March 2015.
In late April, the 190 parties to the treaty met in New York to discuss progress on advancing the commitments laid out in this essential agreement, as well as the challenges to its viability. For its part, the United States is fulfilling its commitments in all three pillars of the NPT.

**Largest supporter**

No nation has provided as much time and as many resources to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons as the United States. We are the single largest supporter of the IAEA and we put an extremely high priority on promoting and facilitating nuclear safety and security programmes around the world. We have worked to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system for verifying peaceful nuclear programmes, and championed the Additional Protocol as the accepted standard for verifying the absence of clandestine nuclear programmes. Our support for the IAEA also includes leading a global effort to secure nuclear material in order to prevent nuclear terrorism. The United States knows that nuclear security and non-proliferation efforts are never 'finished'. As long as nuclear and radioactive materials exist, they require our utmost commitment to their protection, control, accounting and disposition.

The United States also has been hard at work implementing a comprehensive system of export controls for material, equipment and technology that could be used for nuclear explosive purposes and we will continue to expand on other co-operative threat reduction activities. At the same time, we are helping to strengthen multilateral non-proliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and encouraging their growth. On the regional level, we are also working to provide security assurances for regional nuclear weapons free zones across the world, including importantly for this region the South-east Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. And we support the proposed conference to discuss a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Finally, the United States is working with our P5+1 partners to seek concrete, verifiable steps to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. We are also working with partners in the Six-Party Talks to seek the denuclearisation of North Korea and its return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

**Unassailable commitment**

In Prague in 2009, President Obama made clear the US commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The US commitment to disarmament is clear. It is unassailable. Since the entry into force of the NPT, the United States has reduced its nuclear stockpile by more than 80 per cent. The New START Treaty just celebrated its fourth birthday, and it is being well implemented by both the United States and Russia. Current tensions with the Russian Federation highlight the importance of the security, stability and predictability provided by verifiable mutual limits on strategic weapons.

President Obama stated US willingness to negotiate reductions in both non-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons with Russia. In June 2013, in Berlin, the president proposed a reduction of up to one-third of our deployed strategic warheads from the level established in the New START Treaty. That offer, which was a good one, is still on the table. Progress requires a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment.

To pave the way to lower numbers in the future, the United States is putting its best and brightest to work on creating new verification and monitoring techniques. As part of this effort, the United States has created, in partnership with the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. Starting at our first meeting, we will work with both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, as well as non-governmental organisations, to discuss technical issues associated with verifying nuclear disarmament and to consider possible solutions to those problems.

The third pillar of the treaty — the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — is perhaps less heralded, but it is no less important. This pillar aids in addressing modern challenges such as climate change, food, water and energy security and sustainable development. The United States is a stalwart supporter of the astonishingly varied peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, and we are helping to advance projects that are making a real difference in countries throughout the world. These include projects to advance human health, combat cancer and infectious diseases such as Ebola, support water resource management, ensure food security, protect the environment, promote nuclear safety and security, develop nuclear power infrastructure and develop uranium resources.

**Vital requirement**

International co-operation is vital to the success of these efforts. We will continue to work with the other four nuclear weapons states as defined by the NPT — China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom — to advance our common goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The P5 Process, as it has come to be known, is a multilateral discussion forum among the P5 covering a broad range of international security and stability topics, including our progress in implementing the Action Plan from the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It has been heartening to see countries like China adding to the discussion in a constructive and creative manner. The regular interaction, co-operation and trust-building activities are providing the foundation on which future P5 multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament will stand.

As a strong and determined advocate for both disarmament and non-proliferation, New Zealand is a key player in the NPT review process. On non-proliferation, New Zealand leads by example, serving as a vice-chair of the 1540 Committee, a UN effort to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction and facilitating co-operation and collaboration at the International Atomic Energy Committee in Vienna. New Zealand has also provided over $150,000 in monetary contributions to the Peaceful Uses Initiative, as well as in-kind contributions to the Ocean Acidification International Coordination Center in Monaco by co-ordinating such research in the Australasian region.

With its membership in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, along with other nuclear security efforts, New Zealand is helping to curb the threat of one of the most unpredictable dangers of our time. It is a danger that should serve to move all nations to work harder and faster to reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism ever becoming a reality.

**Increased focus**

At last year's Preparatory Meeting for the NPT Review Conference, New Zealand called for an increased focus on the nuclear disarmament pillar of the NPT. Such focus can take many
shapes. As I mentioned, the United States is particularly interested in expanding our collective work on developing the technologies that will help us verify further nuclear reductions.

Further, there are initiatives and agreements that are essential to progress in this pillar. The United States and New Zealand have both provided strong support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). As the United States works to complete its ratification process for the CTBT, we look to partner with Wellington on further development of the treaty’s international monitoring system and efforts to move towards the treaty’s entry into force. We and the New Zealanders are equally committed to finally spurring the negotiations of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.

CTBT and FMCT share a long pedigree. Both are needed to support more ambitious disarmament steps and, more immediately, to end the nuclear arms build-up in Asia. These treaties remain an important part of our dialogue within the P5 and discussions with India and Pakistan. There is no doubt that New Zealand is fulfilling its NPT commitments in both word and deed.

Challenges ahead
As I stated, the NPT is facing challenges. There are those that think the United States is not moving fast enough to fulfill our disarmament commitments. The record, as evidenced by a more than 80 per cent reduction in stockpile numbers since the entry into force of the NPT, refutes that notion. In hard numbers, the United States had 26,008 nuclear weapons in our active stockpile in 1970. In 2013, the active stockpile consisted of 4804 warheads. That is still too many and we know it. We continue to drive downwards, but occasionally we will find ourselves on a plateau. That is not a failure; that is the reality of how any process works.

The United States and the Russian Federation continue to possess over 90 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, so further bilateral reductions between our nations is the next logical move. That is why President Obama proposed a next round of strategic reduction talks between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Unfortunately, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have made it difficult to engage with Russia on the full range of issues affecting strategic stability. This is unfortunate, as there are real and meaningful steps we should be taking that can contribute to a more predictable, safer security environment.

Addressing current Russian actions is an on-going process. For example, we will keep pushing the Russian government to return to verifiable compliance with its Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) obligations, as the treaty is in our mutual security interest and that of the globe. We have been clear with Russia that our preference is to resolve this issue diplomatically and not risk a return to the action/reaction dangers of the past. The United States appreciates the support of New Zealand and its ratification process for the CTBT, we look to partner with Wellington on further development of the treaty’s international monitoring system and efforts to move towards the treaty’s entry into force. We and the New Zealanders are equally committed to finally spurring the negotiations of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.

CTBT and FMCT share a long pedigree. Both are needed to support more ambitious disarmament steps and, more immediately, to end the nuclear arms build-up in Asia. These treaties remain an important part of our dialogue within the P5 and discussions with India and Pakistan. There is no doubt that New Zealand is fulfilling its NPT commitments in both word and deed.

Shared goal
For the advocates of moving ahead to a ban on nuclear weapons or programmes than have acquired them. The Non-proliferation Treaty is the foundation that allowed for all of these things to happen.

Road ahead
We face challenges to progress in this arena, no doubt. President Johnson rightly said to expect challenges and setbacks when he signed the NPT in 1968, but he ‘solemnly pledge[d] the resources, the resolve, and the unrelenting efforts of the people of the United States and their Government’ in the pursuit of the treaty’s ultimate goal. President Obama and the United States continue to honour this pledge today. We still face challenges, of course.

When he chaired the UN Security Council in September 2009, President Obama said that ‘we harbor no illusions about the difficulty of bringing about a world without nuclear weapons’. ‘We know,’ he said, that ‘there are plenty of cynics, and that there will be setbacks to prove their point. But there will also be days… that push us forward.’

I have seen those days. I have seen Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus take the wise, brave and bold step to send nuclear weapons out of their countries for dismantlement or disposition. I have seen the United States and Russia reduce their respective arsenals again and again. I have also seen the United States and Russia work together to turn the equivalent of 20,000 Soviet nuclear warheads into energy that is lighting up homes and offices across America. Most importantly, I have seen more countries give up nuclear weapons or programmes than have acquired them. The Non-proliferation Treaty is the foundation that allowed for all of these things to happen.
Standing up for values?

Robert Ayson discusses why New Zealand commits to conflict.

‘Mr Speaker, New Zealand is a country that stands up for its values. We stand up for what’s right.’ So said Prime Minister John Key in announcing New Zealand’s deployment to Iraq on 24 February.

But what are we to make of such a claim? Is this really the reason for New Zealand to commit its forces overseas? What does it mean to invoke values in this way? How do these relate to other motivations? Is there a clash or a condominium between New Zealand’s values and interests here? And do values lead New Zealand into hazardous territory? Or are they a shallow and cheap attempt to justify decision-making that occurs for other purposes? And whose values are we talking about? These are the types of questions that I hope to explore in this article.

Exploring values

To do at least some of this, the first task is to offer an explanation of what we mean by values. This is not easy. No watertight definition is available. Toby Estall, a masters student who worked with me as a Victoria University summer scholar, came up with one reference to a German publication, which suggested no less than 1400 variations on what is meant by values. So rather than seeking to offer a definition, let me make some sweeping generalisations.

To me values belong in the general category purposes: things that we think it is worth striving for. This is not easy. No watertight definition is available. Toby Estall, a masters student who worked with me as a Victoria University summer scholar, came up with one reference to a German publication, which suggested no less than 1400 variations on what is meant by values. So rather than seeking to offer a definition, let me make some sweeping generalisations.

To me values belong in the general category purposes: things that we think it is worth striving for. And they are some of the deeper purposes that we can have. They may be, or perhaps they ought to be, our fundamental motivations. Values are the guiding aims we think will make for a good society, a life worth living. They can often be connected to what we regard as moral or ethical conduct. They are closely related to the standards that we want our society to embody in its behaviour. That is not to deny the existence of what we now see as bad values or very harmful value systems, including, for example, a world organised around racist or social Darwinist beliefs. But when we invoke values in foreign policy decision-making, or more specifically when our governments do this, we expect those values to be good ones, especially if it means putting our armed forces in harm’s way.

In this connection, one often finds that a distinction is made between values and interests. This distinction is often drawn too starkly. At the very least there is significant overlap between these two categories of purposes. But sharp distinctions can often be helpful analytically even if they are too stark for practical purposes. While I was on research leave two years ago at the Australian National University, I came across a book from the mid-1960s by a sociologist Sister Augusta Marie Neal, who argued as follows: Values refer to widely shared conceptions of the good; societal values refer to conceptions of the good society. Interests refer to desires for special advantages for the self or for groups with which one is identified.

The idea that interests involve special advantages seems to resonate when we talk of self-interests or when we think about interest groups that focus on a single issue of great interest to them, or when we believe that claims about the national interest are in fact claims about benefits that accrue to the particular country concerned. Why might New Zealand act a certain way? It does so because it is in the national interest of New Zealand to do so — not, by the way, the national interest of Australia or the United States. I think this is what the Key government now means when it invokes the old notion of New Zealand having an independent foreign policy. We may decide to join with others in a certain action, including action against ISIS. And we may be joining traditional partners as we do that. But this, argues the Key government, is not a denial of our independent foreign policy, because we have made up our own mind that this decision works for us. It is in keeping with our interests. Hence, according to this logic, you can work as an increasingly close security partner with the Americans and still be independent.
Important interests

In comparison to values, interests are often depicted in more material and concrete terms. To cite the most obvious example, there may be economic interests at stake — that is, measurable material benefits. A lot of New Zealanders, rightly or wrongly, believe that our foreign policy decision-making has a lot to do with these economic interests. But we can also think of security interests, and all or at least most governments have national security interests that they feel it is their primary duty to promote. And these can involve material, concrete considerations — the security of national borders, our sovereign interests, the security of resources within our territorial waters and so on.

Now quite where New Zealand’s interests stop and our values begin is an almost impossible question to answer. Normally we have them mixed up in our minds. Is greater prosperity for the country, for example, an interest or a value, or both? Is peace an interest — because the avoidance of war is the avoidance of something costly in a material and human sense? Or is it a value — because it is something inherently good and proper to work towards? Is the preservation of a strong system of international law a value — invoked when we refer to New Zealand as a good international citizen? Or is it an interest because small states like New Zealand know that strong international laws offer them some protection against the predations of the big powers? As can be seen, my argument is that in many cases the answer is yes.

If we consider the prime minister’s statement to Parliament in a slightly fuller extract, you may see what I mean:

Mr Speaker, New Zealand is a country that stands up for its text of values or a context of interests? Well, it seems to be both. Is that context, at least as depicted by the prime minister, a con-

Several objections

Now there are any number of objections to this invocation of values and interests in the government’s explanation of why it was committing New Zealand forces abroad. Let me deal with at least a few of these in a way that I hope further illuminates some of the problems and challenges of our subject.

One objection is that New Zealand is not deploying forces because it is standing up for its values. In other words, this is a direct refutation of the prime minister’s claim. There are several varieties of this argument. We might say that the deployment has nothing at all to do with the values that are claimed. Instead, values are simply the public gloss on a private decision made for different reasons. That reason, we are sometimes told, has all to do with New Zealand’s membership in an English-speaking group of countries led by the United States. More specifically, some argue, it is about the Five Eyes intelligence network. And in the Snowden era, this takes us to a view of the world where the spies are omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. No such intelligence world, of course, exists.

A fairly extreme form of this alliance logic is to suggest that because of these connections, the notion that New Zealand makes decisions because of its own interests or values is in fact nonsensical. It is instead the interests of our leading partners that set the terms of our involvement. I for one do not accept this line of reasoning, which has the faint whiff of conspiracy about it.

Even in the case of our involvement in the controversial war in Vietnam, at a time when our alliance links with Washington were very strong, and when we received a very rare visit from the American president of the day, the record shows we were perfectly capable of making our own mind up. And that is what we did, and have generally done since, and before. Just because you decide to work with close partners does not mean you surrender your sense of what is good for you. And just because you make a decision that some citizens find contrary to their weighing of New Zealand’s interests and values does not mean you yourself have not weighed those factors. It is too easy to fall into the trap of thinking that because you disagree with the government’s calculation, New Zealand must have been dancing to someone else’s tune. That is the foreign policy equivalent of the dangerous conclusion that because your favourite political party loses an election, the system is not democratic. It is too easy to ascribe complex political phenomena, caused by multiple factors, to hidden military–industrial complexes or a Washington lobby. But if our world was that simple, there would be no need for scholarship on foreign policy and all our debates would be specious. In fact if that is our world, we may as well stop now.

Easier decision

But it must be admitted that the opportunity to work with close partners is one of the factors that has made it easier and possible for the government to decide to commit New Zealand to an Iraq deployment. This is partly because the government sees advantages in these relationships: that they indeed offer something to New Zealand. What then are we to make of the prime minister’s memorable comment that New Zealand’s commitment to the anti-ISIS coalition would be the price of the club? This was grist to the mill not just of those who had already incorrectly concluded that New Zealand would be deploying for alliance reasons alone and that the decision was made in Washington, not Wellington.

John Key’s words also bypassed a point made in a good deal of the literature on alliances that it is junior powers which tend to get more than they give from the relationship. Accordingly, I think we can argue that New Zealand gets more out of these associations than we put in. And if a number of Australian analysts own up that their country has been free riding, then what does it mean for us? Even so, we have to be wary of slipping into the logic where alliances become ends in themselves.

Another objection is that it is very dangerous to invoke or resort to or be driven by one’s values in making potentially life and death decisions about the deployment of personnel. If we think that values are more about passion, and that interests are more about reason, for example, we might be inclined to take this line. We cannot divorce decisions to go to war from the passionate and emotional sides of our political environments. Clausewitz knew this when he saw how Napoleon could benefit in war from the energy unleashed by the French Revolution. And while it may be difficult to mobilise those energies by referring to momentary or even long-term commercial advantage, or some other sense of material interest, it may be easier to do so by playing into, ma-
nipulating or perhaps even constructing deeper beliefs. National-ism does this — sometimes too well. Would some of the carnage of the First World War have been avoided if reason had prevailed over passion? Did New Zealanders see the defence of the Empire as a question of interests (a strong Britain is good for New Zealand’s security)? Or were they also swayed by the 1914 version of the values discussions we have today.

**Doubtful immunity**

You might say that New Zealanders are immune to some of these wilder fits of passion when it comes to overseas deployments, at least today, but I am not so sure. I remember clearly how strong the sense of outrage was in wider public opinion over the hu-man rights violations that occurred after the 1999 East Timor referendum result in favour of independence. And I remember at least one prominent politician arguing that New Zealand should intervene before Indonesia had been persuaded to seek interna-tional assistance. Fortunately this was not an opinion that was widely shared. But if we think that as New Zealanders we are pretty good and decent people, we are especially vulnerable to the error of assuming that as we go after the things we see as good we will make wise decisions.

A further objection is that while governments often refer to values as purposes that are shared, they are shared in such selec-tive company as to make an emphasis on them internationally divisive. Indeed, we hear quite a bit today about shared interests and values as ways of explaining these close partnerships. While we should not focus entirely on what governments say at the ex-pense of seeing what they do, here is a statement from former Secretary of State Chuck Hagel at the time New Zealand and the United States were signing the Washington Declaration:

> Having fought together in every major conflict of the last century, including Afghanistan, our bonds are rooted not only in our common interests as Pacific nations, but also in the history and the values we share.

Now the first clause of that statement actually — the fighting together in every major conflict of the last century — probably works better as a depiction of the US–Australia alliance than the US–New Zealand closer partnership. But beyond this question of interpretation, this reference to the sharing of history and values is unlikely to be mentioned, to use the most obvious exam-ple, when the United States is talking about its relationship with China. There the focus, when there is language of co-operation, is squarely on common interests. And when John Key said last year, in a question and answer session after a talk on foreign pol-icy, that New Zealand has one type of relationship with China and one type of relationship with the United States and that both understood this to be the case, we get a similar picture.

**General depiction**

New Zealand’s relationship with China, generally, although not always or completely, so often gets depicted by the government in terms of our shared economic interests. And what is different then about our relationship with the United States? Trade Min-ister Phil Goff conveyed part of that difference when in 2006 he highlighted New Zealand’s involvement in Afghanistan to an audience in Washington:

> we both have an overriding commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and freedoms. We are both old democracies, and members of a relatively small group of countries that over the last century have been consistent in the advocacy and practice of these principles.

Not dissimilar language might be cited today in explaining New Zealand’s commitment to what is a US-led coalition against ISIS. Now this is not to suggest, in comparison, that China is objecting to New Zealand’s commitment of forces to Iraq, nor that China is unworried about ISIS. And it can be argued that if one of the threats that ISIS poses is to values, then it may well be threatening some of China’s values too. Elsewhere in Asia, there are signs of that sense too. Having ISIS sympathisers in Indonesia is a direct challenge to the social contract that allows for generally moderate and stable government in the world’s largest Muslim country.

And yet an emphasis on standing up for our values, because it is coincidental to similar logic used by our traditional Western partners in justifying their overseas military commitments, who are standing up for theirs, can still generate a sense of a select group with a similar value system. The question then for us is whether we are comfortable with this or whether we are not. Or to put it in a more direct sense, what happens on the day when the United States announces that, because of its concerns that China is violating the values that undergird security in Asia, it has called on its allies and partners to take steps against Beijing? Does New Zealand suddenly go quiet at that point?

Indeed, this raises a further objection. If we wish to argue that we stand up for our values in sending troops overseas, would we not want these values to be applied consistently? Surely a se-lectively applied value loses a certain amount of its moral high ground. If we are standing up for our values, and these include, for example, ‘democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and free-doms’, why are we not standing up for our values with significant deployments to one or more of the UN peacekeeping missions currently underway in Africa? An obvious answer here is that this is not where so many of our interests are concentrated. Another, perhaps, is that this is not a priority for our allies and partners with whom we prefer to work. Another, less charitable, explana-tion is that we simply do not care that much. Another is that the government sees little in the way of public sentiment pushing for such a move.

**Government preference**

Or to put it another way, what price are we really willing to pay for those values? On Iraq the government clearly had preference for training missions behind the wire, eschewed a special forces mission and it agonised for months over even this decision. Of course, what happens as that deployment unfolds could work in a range of directions. But how much standing up are we really doing? And seeing the repercussions that are now looming for some of Sweden’s commercial interests, are we willing to stand up for our values in the way that Stockholm has by calling out Saudi Arabia as a dictatorship? How much does our government stand up for our values when talking about China, where the space for civil liberties is shrinking as new leader Xi Jinping consolidates his power?

This relates to a further objection where international politics is regarded as an amoral or immoral playground and where pow-er politics driven by self-interest dominate. Moral Man and Im-moral Society, the title of a book written by Reinhold Niebuhr in the 1930s, implies that the values we may hold — and apply — in our lives as individuals may be rendered powerless in a social
world, where the interests of strong political actors dominate. It is still not uncommon to find people arguing that in international politics in particular, where there is no overarching sovereign authority and no justice system with credible enforcement powers, the room for a values-based approach is very slim indeed.

In other words standing up for ones values in the making of foreign policy decisions is either delusional or dangerous or both. Instead, you stand up for vital interests. This is a world, of course, in which New Zealand, which lacks material power, is at the mercy of those who have it, and where our only real protection is either through the security that those actors choose to provide for themselves — which coincidentally helps us — or from the accident of our relatively benign geography.

I do not personally think this sums up the world of international affairs. And I think New Zealand has options. But especially in a world where people find that values are stood up for inconsistently, and where they doubt whether values claims are what they first appear, it is not hard to have some sympathy for this objection.

**One objection**

Indeed one objection is simply to argue that in the end values matter little. Show me a value, some may suggest, and I will reveal the interest that lies underneath it. Values, and especially the notion of shared let alone universal values, become a convenient cloak to cover more pragmatic and selfish reasoning. And this is even worse because the cloak is meant to have moral significance because of the surface nature of those values claims.

And yet when we look back at a number of New Zealand’s deployments over the last two decades, it is difficult to conclude that the values aspect has been nothing more than an illusionist act. This does not mean that only values were involved. Other factors were certainly at stake. Did New Zealand’s reputation among traditional partners benefit, for example, from the deployment of our forces to Bosnia–Herzegovina? Well yes, it did. But does that mean humanitarian concerns were not a significant part of the picture? I think they were. Indeed, an interests-based argument might have concluded that we had no business making this commitment.

When we deployed forces (many of whom were unarmed) to Bougainville, were we partly thinking about our interests in the South Pacific, our neighbourhood, where our influence is strongest? Quite probably we were. But was our sense that a relatively just outcome needed our involvement involved? Well yes, it was too. And what was our long commitment in Afghanistan about? Did New Zealand gain considerably from that long commitment in terms of its now closer relationship with the United States? The record is clear that this is the case. But were we, like many other countries, appalled at what had been wrought from the 9/11 attacks — did we see this as an attack on some of the shared principles of conduct that are about values as well as interests? Well yes, we were.

**Iraq deployment**

What then does this mean for New Zealand’s deployment of forces in Iraq? First of all, we are right to want to question all the explanations that governments offer. Not to do so, and to take all values and interests claims at face value, is not good for our democracy.

Second, it is unlikely that the claim that we are standing up for our values provides a fulsome explanation of why New Zealand is sending forces overseas. Most of these decisions have multiple factors behind them, and that is partly why (although it is not the only reason why) the public justification for deployments can move around a little. Those factors also can change as a campaign evolves. What initially motivated a deployment may not be the same group of factors in their same respective weightings that keep the deployment going. New Zealand’s involvement in Afghanistan over several years is a case in point.

Third, when calculations of interests are involved in a decision to deploy forces, and they invariably are, it is not clear that their existence necessarily cheapens the values claims that are made. This is not least because interests and values are hard to separate. It is also because if the measuring of both interests and values point towards the same deployment decision, presumably it has a better chance of standing up to the challenges that come in any deployment as the mission progresses. I personally think that there are at least some New Zealand interests and values which support the deployment of forces to Iraq. But I also think that values can compete with each other: can you maximise liberty and order at the same time? Quite possibly you cannot. Should you seek to maximise any single value at the expense of all others? I agree with Isaiah Berlin that this is a bad and dangerous idea. And do we agree with even our closest partners on the rank order of these values? Again, I think not. Even with them there will be differences. Some shared values perhaps, but not the same weight given to each of them. And perhaps these differences show up in some of our respective deployment decisions.

Fourth, the international system is not a morally barren universe where there is no room for the application of values. But neither is it free of power politics. It is a mixture. This means that there will be occasions when we are able to stand up for our values in some way, including through the deployment of military forces. And it means sometimes there will be less room to do so. Of course, for some people the deployment of military forces is a betrayal of the values they hold. But if we agree that the international system is something of a mixed bag, where there is room on some occasions for values to be stood up for, and where there is little such room on others, we should not be surprised if values are not stood up for all of the time or that when they are stood up for it happens imperfectly and inconsistently. That is the mixed world in which New Zealand makes its foreign policy decisions. I would rather have a bit of the values ingredient applied, even if it sometimes does not work, than to retreat to cynicism.
Global citizens in a world of disorder

Colin James reflects on New Zealand’s place in an increasingly troubled international environment.

The world order has given way to a world in disorder. Where does New Zealand fit? Where do New Zealanders fit? Those questions have poignancy as, 100 years from getting entangled in a bungled intervention in the Middle East amid the disorder of the First World War, our troops are there again amid disorder contributing to another stumbling ‘Western’ intervention. A difference is that in 1915 there was public enthusiasm and now there is not.

For four decades after 1950 geo-politics were regulated by a standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, two nuclear-armed super-powers with a reciprocal interest in not starting ‘mutually assured destruction’. With the United States were European and Anglo offshoot allies and assorted client autocracies. With the Soviet Union were its subject territories, communist allies and autocracies, though over time China’s communism acquired a divergent quasi-Confucianist dimension. This was in essence a bipolar world.

There was one near-flashpoint, in 1962 over Russian missiles on Cuba, which recent analysis suggests the United States overplayed to the point of heightening the risk of conflict, but it passed. However, there was much skirmishing on the peripheries of the two spheres as both sides sought to draw into or keep in their orbits other countries, including those newly independent of colonial rule. There were conflicts where the two sides or their proxies butted against each other on the ground. One was the Korean War of 1950–53. Another was the eventually successful two-decade-long bid for national self-determination in Vietnam led by nationalist communists, first against the French colonial administration and then against the United States’ attempt to preserve a Korea-style north–south divide.

People, countries and governments knew where they stood. The super-powers knew where they stood. When New Zealand opted out of the mutually assured destruction framework with a nuclear-free policy in 1984, super-power United States treated us as an outcast. That, too, was an over-reaction, with eerie overtones of the Cuba missile episode.

Unipolar world

When the Soviet empire collapsed, the United States was left as the only true superpower. This was a unipolar world. Some, notably Francis Fukuyama, mused that this might portend the ‘end of history’, that is, the triumph of liberal democracy and market capitalism.

Within fifteen years the unipolar super-power was mired in unwinnable wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Just being very big and armed with high-technology weapons and unlimited funds was no longer enough. A British army officer, Emile Simpson, wrote that in Afghanistan war was not as Clausewitz had stated it, an inter-state activity that is polarised, decisive and finite. It was, he wrote, near-impossible to distinguish between enemies and friends: one local commander

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who was notionally on the side of the Afghan government in Kabul ‘rented’ out some of his forces to the local Taliban because they had agreed to pay for them. There were not two sides. Everyone was on his/her own side.2

Meanwhile, China had concentrated from 1978 on building its economy. Economic power usually delivers political power. China unsurprisingly has been asserting its claim to what it regards as its national territory, including islands and marine areas on its east coast and stretching far to its south between Vietnam and the Philippines. In May it reaffirmed that offshore claim in a defence white paper.3 The United States has been harrumphing about that and has been reforging its alliances with South Korea and Japan. Expert commentary on China’s assertiveness — or is it aggressiveness? — ranges from the reassuring to the scarifying.4

But China’s rise, which also includes expanding investment abroad to secure raw materials, building and strengthening transport, political and trade links with countries to its west and building infrastructure projects in South America and Africa to cement good relations, has not resulted — at least not yet — in the construction of a new bipolar standoff between the incumbent super-power and a rising power on the way to becoming a super-power (if it is not one already). There does not appear (yet?) to be the tight parallel some, such as Robert Kagan, see between China–United States in the 2010s and Germany–Britain in the 1900s decade which led to the First World War.5

Other players
Why not? First, there are some big players who do not fit on either side.

India, big and slowly improving economically, has also been harrumphing a bit about China and joined the United States in January in some strong words about China’s island building in the South China Sea and bullying of the Philippines and Vietnam. India is wooing Japan as a mutual counterweight to China. But India is also trying to understand and deal with China, and China has shown interest in investing in India. Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping are still early in their expected decade-long rule. How they get on will have implications for world order. New MFAT chief executive Brook Barrington could usefully do some work on this and then tell us his conclusions.

To India’s north, Russia has also set out to regain territory by backing rebels in Ukraine and annexing Crimea and by exerting pressure on and offering inducements to other neighbouring countries to join its economic sphere of influence. It has sought to rebuild relations with China. It has explicitly tried to invest in and one the European Union was extending to the former Russian Empire countries to the union’s east. The tsars were not tsars of Russia: they were tsars of all the Russias.

Turn south from Russia to the Middle East sectarian cauldron. Excitable ‘end-of-history’ types called the 2011 uprisings the ‘Arab Spring’, presaging a golden summer of democracy and market-economics. For myself, I thought it much more like 1848 in Europe, when regimes were toppled in the name of freedom and justice, only to be restored within a short period in much the same condition, mostly with different figureheads. That might be what is going on right now under the surface in Egypt, where

President Sisi has imposed a vicious autocracy, and elsewhere, including in the Saudi Arabian and Gulf states monarchies. But if so, it will likely be a generation or two before we know. History does not run along tight parallel tracks.

Prolonged war
For now, the Middle East is fighting a loose equivalent of Europe’s Thirty Years War in the early 17th century, sect versus sect, tribe versus tribe. Wahhabist Sunni Saudi Arabia has spawned al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, which now threatens stability at home. Sunni Saudi Arabia is backing Sisi’s crackdown on the Qatar-backed Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia are sort-of-fighting each other in a sort-of-but-not-quite proxy war in Yemen, where the Shia Houthi, known as Zaidis, are in some respects, for example, jurisprudence, close to Sunni. Different Sunni insurgents, including the Wahhabi-descended Islamic State, are contesting what used to be Syria. The United States is backing Shiite Iraq — or, rather, what used to be Iraq — against the Sunni Islamic State (and Sunni Iraqi allies who do not like the Shias in power in Baghdad) and is doing that awkwardly alongside troops and commanders from Shiite Iran, which the United States used to label as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and with which it has, after difficult negotiations, sort-of made a sort of deal not to develop nuclear weapons.

We have sent troops into this cauldron. If our troops can work out who are enemies and who are friends, they will deserve honorary doctorates.

Nobody can fix a sectarian contest but the sectarians. Only Muslims can fix Islam. When extracts out of context from a holy writ are used as god-given instructions to kill children, there is no place for liberal-democratic rationality — and this cannot be corrected by an outside of force of the sort only the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, with its millions of available ‘boots on the ground’, could deliver. It needs Muslim leaders to lead, to accept that the killers and rapists are Muslims who justify their actions on scripture, to step back from their own particular tight readings of scripture that set them apart from each other and seek common, humanitarian, readings as the basis for collaboration.

New Zealand troops in one corner of this chaos to aid one player in it will not make a jot of difference to the region’s security. The only plausible reason for our involvement is to please the United States, Britain and Australia, to pay our dues to the ‘club’ or be part
of the ‘family’. John Key is an Americanophile and a royalist. The risk is a dent in our reputation for disinterested concern and help where help can be useful. Murray McCully’s grandiose offer to fix Palestine may be tarnished by familial Key’s clubbing.

**European disorder**

Go west: Europe is also not the orderly place it was in 2007. Greece still hovers on the edge of ejection or rejection. Britain is to vote — yet again — on whether to stay in the European Union and that comes after Scotland came close to voting to leave Britain. In most countries there are populist parties of various colours from far left to far right to autonomy-seeking or secessionist. These parties are challenging the past six decades of dominance by core parties — those of the centre-left and centre-right. The latest to disrupt the core-party order is Pandemos in Spain. Some voters believe the message of those upstart parties; most who swell their vote do so not in support of the ideology but because they see the upstart parties as standing against the established elites who have caused, or at least not fixed, what they, the voters, believe caused their stress. We had a localised dose of that in Northland in March.

Go farther west: the United States political system is not in good order. The Tea Party is pure — and half-mad — populism, yet exerts influence on the Republicans. The Democrats have no compass. The Congress is a place of discord and standoff and the administration’s agencies are constrained from functioning effectively and efficiently. Fukuyama describes the United States as a ‘vetocracy’.6

Roam afield. Brazil? South Africa? Thailand? Work your way through a long list of barely stable or distorted political systems. This is not the basis for solidity, stability and order, where everyone knows their place.

In short, the world is in disorder. According to Richard Haass’s reading of Hedley Bull, there is a ‘perennial tension in the world between forces of order and forces of disorder, with the details of the balance between them defining each era’s particular character.’7 Robert Ayson of Victoria University, Bull’s biographer, cautions against seeing this as a sort of seesaw, swinging up into order and down into disorder and back again.8

**Disruptive change**

So it should be assumed that this period of disorder is an interregnum until some power or powers re-establish order. There is another powerful disorderly force at work: disruptive technological change.

Digital connectedness facilitated the early Arab uprisings and the many post-2008 ‘Occupy’ movements. The Islamic State has used new media to shock and recruit. A company can find itself suddenly shamed, at significant cost, as Fonterra knows. Obscure nobodies can acquire sudden fame. Most of this is transitory. Some of it sticks.

Add in big data, advertisers’ ability to feed off your internet searches to target ads at you for Wanganiu or Napier hotels even when you are reading the *New York Times*. That is more insidious and intrusive than the hoover-everything spying many voted for last year.

Add in everyday folks’ ability to buy things without tax. Why pay GST on a book or a dress to Bill English for Steven Joyce to shovel it out to the sublimely rich like Peter Jackson?

Why pay a telecoms company to talk to someone in Delhi or Cape Town when Skype gets you there without paying. Why pay a full taxi fare when Uber will customise your ride for a customised price? Why go to a movie theatre when you can download the movie in a minute or two and play it on your own wide screen with a glass of your best wine, or Speights, in your hand. Why go to the TAB when you can get better, and tax-free, odds on a site domiciled in the ether? Why settle for your lecturer’s limited knowledge or pedestrian communication when you can get the world’s best?

If you are a customer of some public service, will you not have the same expectations of that service fitting your need, not some bureaucratic frame? And if you are on the supply side, you can find funders and customers around the world for your niche item. You can set up in production with a 3D printer with a fraction of the capital standard manufacturing needs.

Add all that together and pile it on top of the globalisation of finance, capital, production and people of the past three decades, all of which are, if anything, intensifying.

**Fragmented power**

That all adds up to the fragmentation and dispersal of power. That fragmentation and dispersal is not just of states’ power over their territories and citizens. It is also of monolithic companies that used to rule markets. It is of unions and churches. And armies: Emile Simpson charts the tendency in his redenomination of war.

Moises Naim has brought this together in a breathless book. He overstates his case, but he is recording a tendency others have been writing about in various ways for the past ten years and particularly the past five.9

What this amounts to is the early stages of the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state, the product of the Treaty of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Years War, which affirmed the sovereignty of national governments, particularly in religious matters.

The nation-state has a lot of life in it yet, as climate change negotiations tell us. But we are seeing the early stages of a transition from people being citizens of a country to being global citizens.10

When Jane Austen talked in her books in the early 19th century of ‘the country’, she meant the immediate surrounding area. There was a ‘nation’, which raised taxes and fought wars. An elite resided there. But for most the country was where they lived plus some nearby places. They lived in that neighbourly ‘country’, which happened to be in the nation.
By the time of the First World War ‘the country’ had come to mean ‘the nation’. People lived in the nation and happened to live in a particular place in that nation. So there were New Zealanders who happened to live in Gore. They were eastern Southlanders, to be sure, and fully conscious of it, but, bigger than that, they were New Zealanders.

**Economic transformation**

This transition paralleled, or was driven by, the economic transformation the industrial revolution brought about. Large factories produced goods that were transported across the nation by revolutionised transport. Local economies were absorbed into a national economy. There was still much that was local — retail stores, doctors, mechanics and the like. But they were in a system that was national. National governments expanded their authority to regulate it.

This century’s hyper-globalisation, as Dani Rodrik called it in 2011, coming on top of the globalisation of the last two decades of the 20th century, has been driving a similar transformation, this time from national economies to a global economy. There are many facets to this, including long and complex supply or value chains, world markets for makers of niche services and products, ‘work’ spread around the globe, additive manufacturing, doctors’ access to global symptoms databanks to provide you with an accurate diagnosis after the robot has done a first run through with you. And much, much more.

The real international economic issues now are behind the borders, as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations demonstrate. Such deals breach and puncture national borders — and national sovereignty. For some decades the International Civil Aviation Organisation has set the rules for air transport: if you do not conform, your planes do not fly to other countries. The World Trade Organisation has binding mechanisms to settle trade disputes among signatories. A widening range of bilateral treaties includes mechanisms to settle firms’ disputes with other states. A web of rules is being woven as treaties are signed. Sovereign nations are being required to give up slices of sovereignty if they want to be part of the hyper-global game.

**Climate change**

Then there is climate change. That is an inescapably global matter to which there is only a global solution. Climate change renders everyday people global.

Moreover, digital technology enables everyday people increasingly to go global. No longer is the preserve of the rich and intellectual elites. We older-fogeys watch and worry and sometimes partake. If you are twenty you are likely to assume you roam the digital world for work, purchases and entertainment, games, friends and much more. Customer choice and customisation are taking on new meanings. Public servants, watch out; banks, too, and doctors and lawyers. And as everyday people go global, they resent interference with their digital travel.

We are beginning to head down the path to being global dwellers, people who live in the world and happen to live in New Zealand and, within New Zealand, happen to live in Gore.

There is also a physical dimension: the much greater movement of people. Some 300 million live outside the country they were born in. The stream of humanitarian refugees is turning into a torrent. These migrants bring into nation-states a transnational dimension, diversifying once homogeneous societies and disturbing settled national narratives.

Then note that big cities (which Auckland might one day be) are becoming distinct elements of national cultures and economies — in a sense, extra-national.

**Global dwellers**

So in 2065 we might be global dwellers who happen to live in New Zealand or, if we are Aucklanders, happen to live in Auckland. Of course, we will be very much New Zealanders or Aucklanders in that global sphere, but we will likely have a wider view of ourselves and our identities.

There will likely be many, often erratic, blowbacks from national governments asserting what sovereignty they still have or think they have. But I do think we are on the way towards being global dwellers and from that to eventually being global citizens a generation or two on. If I am right, it will have profound global and national consequences.

Where can New Zealand fit? Where will it fit? First, these are early days. In Austen’s day, local could still believe local would endure as the reference point for identity. In our day we can believe national will endure. And it will for a long while yet.

But that does not mean we can comfortably secure ourselves behind our borders. If there is a global economy and if people increasingly operate globally, there will be an increasing need and demand for global regulation. Meantime, there is disorder.

And for at least some, maybe many decades, there is no prospect of global government to do in this transition what national governments did as economies and societies transited from local to national. The European Union’s travails are instructive. Tiny New Zealand may have to navigate some choppy waters, perhaps in changing alliances with bigger nation-states.

**New framework**

But go back to Hedley Bull. He argued that informal arrangements could work to manage the tensions between the two superpowers of the 1960s. And they did. So it is possible informal or semi-formal ‘global governance’ arrangements could develop, as they have for some interactions, such as sport, and for some activities, such as aviation, and as has been argued since the Ebola episode for pandemics.

If they do not, I think global dwellers over the next two to five generations will increasingly expect them, in order to have some form of oversight or dispute resolution as they become increasingly active globally, both in the digital sphere and as they roam physically. It is far too early to guess the forms these might take, but the bottom-up-top-down approach now applied to climate change negotiations is perhaps one clue as to how sovereign states may begin to edge towards meeting their globalising citizens’ growing global interests.

New Zealand is a small, non-threatening nation safely parked at the bottom of the world, no threat. We could argue for informal and semi-formal supra-state arrangements, think up prototypes and propose them, starting with our time on the UN Security Council. We could test drive them with our South Pacific islands neighbours.

That would give a different, new meaning to New Zealand being a good global country-citizen, as we often promote ourselves (some would argue unjustifiably).
And it might help facilitate a tiny bit of order in a disordered world, which a small country needs more than a big country.

NOTES
10. The word citizen can be taken to mean a full member of a state, recognised by the government of that state. On that reading there could not be global citizens until there is a global government. But there is a less formal reading, as presented by Kennedy Graham in ‘Global Citizenship’, a draft chapter for a forthcoming book: ‘A person could, however, be a member of a society without being a citizen of that society’s non-existent polity. Thus a person could be a member of an existing “global society” without necessarily being a citizen of a “global polity”. So the contemporary definition of a citizen needs to be relaxed if the concept “global citizenship” is to have meaning.’
Ken Ross reflects on the prime minister’s visits to South-east Asia, London and Washington.

While Leader of the Opposition, Mr Kirk had to pay out of his own pocket for overseas trips, which was largely in the interests of the country. If he was lucky an airline might perhaps offer him a seat on an inaugural flight, or a foreign government offer him a grant. (Margaret Hayward, 1981)

The domination of world headlines by the war in Vietnam has given South East Asia an exaggerated reputation for violence and instability. (Norman Kirk, 1970)

Norman Kirk’s arrival at the prime minister’s office match-fit to engage the world was exceptional. Most often, New Zealand prime ministers have been ill prepared to do global diplomacy. Global diplomacy is what prime ministers do to advance their government’s foreign policy. Global diplomacy was Kirk’s forte. Kirk was so outstanding that he has branded New Zealand his way — as a progressive small state, with a deep internationalism central to our national identity. His ‘OE’ (Overseas Experience) became important in impressing the world scene when prime minister.

Kirk’s preparation for his prime ministership is an extraordinary story — he has yet to have the biography that does him justice. The astutest template I have found for understanding Kirk is Alan Bullock’s three-volume study of Ernest Bevin, Britain’s foreign secretary (1945–51). Bullock concentrates on the public Bevin, who really mattered. The result is a wonderfully fresh and authentic picture of one of the most creative men of his time, engaged in the business of creation — pushing, bullying, cajoling, dominating, persuading, horse-trading through the endless, dreary committees and occasional angry meetings were his raw material.

Richard Long and Spiro Zavos were canny observers of Kirk. Their (and other contemporaries’) coverage deepens my sense that Ernest Bevin is Kirk’s smartest template. In November 1973 Long wrote ‘Mr Kirk has an uncanny ability to sniff the wind, to judge feeling to control his party and caucus, and to move ahead without trampling on too many feet’.

Long was writing subsequent to the outstanding illustration of Kirk’s Bevin-style attributes when prime minister — his ensuring that the Springboks did not visit New Zealand. Kirk was a talented problem solver, rather than an ideologically minded leader.

Kirk’s fascination with South-east Asia saw him become a pivotal player for
enabling New Zealand (and his good friend Michael Somare’s Papua New Guinea) to draw close to ASEAN soon after his death. Gerald Hensley informs us in his 2006 memoir, *Final Approaches*, how Kirk steered New Zealand to a close association with ASEAN and in a non-contentious manner by not endeavouring to force our way into becoming a member state.6

**Important gateway**

The principal avenue for Kirk developing his foreign friendships was the Socialist International. In the late 1960s the organisation was the prime spot for global progressives. It also became the school of choice for Kirk to read up on world affairs: the organisation prepared much such material, which Kirk read closely (evident from his annotated markings on such documents newly accessible at Archives New Zealand). Kirk also contributed articles.7 While initially Eurocentric, as Kirk became engaged the Socialist International was spreading its structures. Kirk was given the leadership, with Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party becoming his secretariat, for the organisation’s Asia-Pacific initiative.

Consequently, this ‘band of brothers’ — his international brigade — was among the most vital components of the Norman Kirk who became prime minister on 8 December 1972. Ahead of that day I can place Kirk in the company of Lee Kuan Yew, Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, Indira Gandhi, Connor Cruise O’Brien, Golda Meir, Salvador Allende and British Labourites, such as Harold Wilson, Roy Jenkins, Denis Healey and Jim Callaghan. None of our other fourteen post-1945 prime ministers had such a galaxy of pals barracking for them from afar when they moved into the prime minister’s office.

All regarded him as a fully fledged member of their group of progressives. Some invited him home. Kirk twice went to Sweden at Olof Palme’s invitation. He was twice in Israel at Golda Meir’s invitation. Kirk regularly chatted with Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore before becoming prime minister.

Gilda Meir was special for Kirk — ‘for years, she had been the Socialist International’s biggest star.’ Meir’s ‘aura of folksy motherliness and cold political skills’ would have appealed to him. When Kirk visited Israel in 1968 and 1971 it was ‘a raucous and argumentative country that could make a New Yorker feel mellow’ — a foreign country to present-day Israel.8

Of the foreign leaders who feature in Kirk’s prime ministership, just Julius Nyerere, Pierre Trudeau and, most surprising, Gough Whitlam first met Kirk only after he became prime minister.

**New material**

I am re-constructing Kirk’s pre-prime ministerial international travel largely from the Kirk Papers at Archives New Zealand, including 47 newly accessible files. This material has enabled new vistas for observing how Kirk was so ready to be prime minister. His correspondence is sometimes breath-taking as he analyses contemporary international crises.

The United States, Britain and South-east Asia were Kirk’s most favoured destinations. Ahead of becoming prime minister he visited each at least four times. He twice (1962 and 1971) received United States Foreign Leader Program grants that had him there for three months with time in Washington and then acquainting himself with the American hinterlands.

Kirk was in Britain in 1962, 1968, 1971 and 1972. Harold Wilson secured Kirk two trips to Britain, one while prime minister and another when he was back in opposition (with the British Labour Party hosting Kirk). Kirk’s prime focus with the British was his cajoling on New Zealand’s behalf as they entangled themselves with joining the European Economic Community, which had major implications for New Zealand’s traditional trade access in the British market. While New Zealand’s concern at British entry was the prime issue of their discussions, Wilson’s endeavours not to commit Britain militarily to the Vietnam conflict were followed intently by Kirk. Ben Pimlott, Wilson’s biographer, concludes that Wilson ‘courageously, persistently and despite the strongest inducements, declined to provide’ a British contribution.9 Kirk was well-versed in the minutiae of Wilson’s Vietnam performance.

**South-east Asia**

Kirk had lengthy trips through South-east Asia in 1960, 1962 and 1970. He had briefer visits in 1968 and twice in 1972. Singapore, which he as often as possible went through on his longer-haul travel from London, had the attraction that Lee Kuan Yew was always keen to have him call in — in Kirk’s time round-the-world tickets were the smart way to fly. The pair’s special rapport was evident at the 1973 Commonwealth leaders’ meeting in Ottawa and when Kirk visited Singapore in December 1973.

Kirk’s South-east Asia interest seriously shone from mid-1970 when, following his 28-day trip to Singapore, Malaysia, Thai-
land, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Indonesia, he wrote an 84-page ‘trip report’ that he circulated
to his MPs and several selected others, including the governorgeneral (Sir Arthur Porritt). The *New Zealand Herald* gave Kirk
space to air his insights.10 On 11 August 1970 he addressed the
Wellington branch of the New Zealand Institute of International
Affairs on his assessments of South-east Asia. The experienced
Asia observer, Nicholas Turner, reported that Kirk revealed a grasp of the realities and complexities of Asian
affairs which left a deep impression on his listeners, who included Foreign Affairs and Defence officials as well as a
large number of others with a close interest in international
affairs…. He answered questions from the floor with a fluency
and competence which very few politicians can match.11
Ten months later Kirk addressed the NZIIA’s Auckland branch:
that speech became an NZIIA pamphlet, *New Zealand and its
Neighbors*, and remained a rare international affairs statement
by Kirk ahead of his becoming prime minister — then it was
quickly much picked over by foreign ministry officials and Wel-
lington-based foreign diplomats.

Even as far back as 1962 Kirk weaved his South-east Asia into
his Washington conversations and it was his most usual topic for
his talks to public meetings elsewhere in the United States. After
they met in Washington in February 1971, when Marshall Green
was President Nixon’s assistant secretary of state for East Asia and
the Pacific, Kirk and Green exchanged letters that showed each
recognised the other’s high wisdom — Green was Nixon’s top Asia adviser then. A year later Green was in Nixon’s small entou-
rage on his ground-breaking China visit: Green came to Wel-
lington to debrief the government and Kirk. (Green’s soft touch
for New Zealand was that Wellington was his first diplomatic
posting in the late 1940s and he had enjoyed the time here.) Af-
ter Nixon’s re-election in 1972 Kissinger, who strongly resented
Green, had him posted to Canberra to sort out Gough Whitlam.
(Green was Kissinger’s prime rival for Nixon’s attention on Asian
affairs.) Whitlam was delighted to be delivered Green — they
were already chatter-box companions. Kirk was given no such
present by Nixon. While Kirk was prime minister there was no
United States ambassador in Wellington, until his last ten weeks.

The Vietnam War was a consuming issue throughout Kirk’s
parliamentary years. It had soured his first general election per-
formance as Labour’s leader in 1966. Afterwards, Kirk was ag-
rieved that he had been scalded by voters for his forthright
opposition to the war. Jim Anderton and Keith Sinclair have
separately related their initial encounters with Kirk at that time
and recorded how impressive his critical assessment of Wash-
ington’s Vietnam tragedy was. Kirk went once to South Vietnam, in
June 1970. New Zealand’s then ambassador in Saigon, Paul Ed-
monds, impressed him with his Asian expertise (Edmonds had
already pulled up with Marshall Green from their time together
in Indonesia in 1965, when they observed the overthrow of the
Sukarno regime by the generals headed by Suharto).

**Extraordinary gap**
The most extraordinary gap in Kirk’s ‘OE’ has to be Australia.
So far, I cannot find any instance of Kirk travelling there for a
visit before he went as prime minister. I still have no confirmed
account of Kirk and Whitlam ever meeting anywhere prior to
the first of their five encounters when prime ministers. This is so
notwithstanding Whitlam’s reference in New Zealand in Janu-
ary 1973 that he had taken Kirk to lunch previously but that this
was their first meeting in New Zealand.12 (Whitlam had visited
New Zealand at least five times previously.) As yet, I have not
discovered any correspondence with Whitlam or other Australi-
an Labor Party leaders — a sharp contrast to the wealth of cor-
respondence with leaders elsewhere.

Kirk was well informed on contemporary Australian political
developments. The Kirk Papers in Archives New Zealand have
a substantial collection of files full of clippings from Australian
newspapers covering the years from 1960 to Kirk’s death. In her
*Diary of the Kirk Years*, Margaret Hayward reports Kirk ‘takes a
book from his shelf, *The Power Struggle* by Alan Reid, about the
struggle for leadership in Australian politics’.

Once they were both prime ministers Kirk and Whitlam
did not warm to each other. Kirk is known not to have been
impressed with Whitlam’s two senior colleagues that he had
encountered ahead of his prime ministership. Lance Barnard,
Whitlam’s deputy, had stood in for Whitlam at several Socialist
International meetings that Kirk attended. Jim Cairns, another
senior Whitlam minister and previously a prominent voice in
Australia’s anti-Vietnam protest movement, had come to New
Zealand several times, beginning at Queen’s Birthday weekend
1964 in Nelson, when he and Kirk were together on a panel on
world affairs. Cairns returned to New Zealand at least twice to
join Vietnam protest events before joining Whitlam’s govern-
ment in December 1972.

**UN interest**
Kirk’s interest in the United Nations began with his observing
Dag Hammarskjöld, the secretary-general (1952–62). On 19
June 1962 Kirk attended the General Assembly’s 16th session in
New York. Kirk early comprehended the importance of the Unit-
ed Nations for the ‘small state rampant’ mantra tagged to Peter
Fraser. When Kirk was first an MP his prime minister, Walter
Nash, was a miserable failure on United Nations’ developments.
Kirk seemingly drew his own line in the sand, which was widely
acknowledged internationally with his commitment to the Unit-

As Kirk began his climb to the top he followed Fraser and Nash who had seen the Commonwealth as a progressive force. Arnold Smith’s *Stitches in Time: The Commonwealth in World Politics* (1981) has given us a good account of his time as the Commonwealth’s first secretary-general from 1966 to 1975, essentially the same period that Kirk was on top as Labour’s leader. Developments such as the Nigeria/Biafra conflict, Singapore’s withdrawal from Malaysia, and Bangladesh’s emergence as an independent state happened in these years. Kirk likely viewed South Africa’s troubles through the Commonwealth prism.

Kirk’s interest in the Commonwealth had to have been boosted by Gerald Hensley — the son-in-law of Kirk’s close friend and personal lawyer Austen Young — who was working as Arnold Smith’s special assistant in the Commonwealth Secretariat from 1965 to 1969. Kirk later made valuable use of Hensley’s successor in that role, David McDowell, for one of the most sensitive diplomatic encounters during his prime ministership — meeting Abraham Ordia.

Although Kirk never got to Ireland or Canada ahead of his prime ministership, the two countries’ independent foreign policies were integral to his maturing one for New Zealand. In particular, Connor Cruise O’Brien and Lester (’Mike’) Pearson were the individuals who inspired him, with their writings and their accomplishments for their own governments and when on service with the United Nations.

Kirk did not ever visit the Soviet Union or China. Nor did he make it to North Asia, including Japan and South Korea. Africa, the then Eastern Europe, Central and South America never saw Kirk. Canada once hosted him, but when prime minister in August 1973.

Ruth Kirk seldom accompanied her husband on his international travel. Kirk was able to intently focus on developing his intellectual capital when travelling abroad. His staff did not go with him. His travelling companions were weekly news magazines, such as *The Economist*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *The Bulletin* (Sydney).

**Match-fit leader**

Margaret Hayward’s recall of the afternoon of Monday, 11 December 1972, the first day that Kirk had access to his new prime ministerial office, is a valuable clue. She unpacked Mr K’s books from many cartons, removed the statute books from his office and replaced them with the biographies of such people as Harold Wilson, Lee Kuan Yew, Menzies, Beaverbrook, Seddon, Nehru, Macmillan and Nasser. Then I sorted his volumes on current affairs into regional groupings. Mr K cherishes his books and doesn’t feel comfortable until he has them around him.19

Wilson and Macmillan opened up Kirk’s thinking on how he would do his prime ministership. They had turned in creditable premierships, wrote readable memoirs, and were ‘problem solver’ prime ministers, as Kirk aspired to be.

Wilson’s first prime ministership, from October 1964 to June 1970, is likely the foremost single mentoring Kirk had for his own preparedness. Wilson’s *The Labour Government 1964–1970: A Personal Record* (1971) may well have been Kirk’s prime ‘training manual’. When Kirk became prime minister he knew Wilson personally — they had already met at least five times, corresponded (exceptionally, in those times, signing off in familial ‘Norm’ and ‘Harold’), and phoned each other (quite unusual in the late 1960s/early 1970s).

Kirk observed Macmillan’s prime ministership — at least from when he started his own parliamentary career. When Macmillan visited New Zealand in January 1958, he may have been the first foreign VIP Kirk encountered following his becoming an MP two months previously. Macmillan, for whom Kirk had much regard, had already published five of the six volumes of his memoirs when Kirk became prime minister.

Hensley confirms Kirk’s intense interest in US developments. Muldoon, Hensley says, ‘never seemed especially interested in American affairs, in contrast, say, with Norman Kirk’.24 In *Final Approaches* Hensley mentions Kirk’s interest when he had an evening with the Hensleys in Washington in 1971. Roberto Rabel has a gem that ‘Kirk took his lead from American liberal Democrats’25 (the capital D relating to the Democrat Party). Among such Democrats were William Fulbright, Averill Harriman, Vance Hartke and Hubert Humphrey — each of whom he had met before becoming prime minister.

**NOTES**

12. In the course of responding to Kirk’s welcome at the parliamentary luncheon Whitlam said ‘I have on earlier occasions in Australia taken Mr Kirk to lunch’.
13. Hayward, p.106.
Wider and still wider

Brian Easton looks at the prospects for further expansion of the European Union.

There is a plinth at the city centre of Warsaw that shows the distances to other European capitals. It began as a wooden signpost put up just after the Berlin Wall fell, pointing 1122 kilometres east to Moscow and 1122 kilometres west to Brussels. It signalled that while the Poles may be Slavs and were a part of the Soviet Empire, they are also Roman Catholics and attached to Western Europe; indeed Warsaw has the ambience of Paris (although cheaper for the tourist), even if some of the Polish villages seem more out in the steppes. Their ‘Western’ status has been reinforced by the appointment of Donald Tusk (pronounced Toosk), a previous Polish prime minister, as president of the European Council, which comprises the heads of the EU member states.

To the rest of the world, the plinth and Poland pose the questions of where is Europe and what is Europe? The geographic centre of the European continent is probably in Lithuania, to the north-east of Poland — there is an awful lot of land to the north and east of Moscow. Its population centre is between Frankfurt and Prague, for population densities are higher to the west. The centre of economic activity will be further north, in Germany.

What is Europe is an even more difficult question. One answer is geography; a second might be some notion of the idea of Europe. Another is the membership of the European Union, which requires, according to its Copenhagen Declaration, a stable democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law, a functioning market economy and the acceptance of the obligations of membership, including EU law.

Currently there are 28 members in the European Union — the most recent to join was Croatia in 2013. Undoubtedly affluent Norway and Switzerland would be welcome, although they have chosen to stay out, while six countries (Albania, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) are candidates and another two (Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo) are officially recognised as potential candidates. There are also four microstates too small to join that are largely a part of the European Union’s single market as are Norway and Switzerland. Additionally there are territories outside Europe, including New Caledonia and French Polynesia, which are treated as parts of France. (Now you know the answer to the question: which part of the European Union is closest to New Zealand?)

More complicated

It gets even more complicated with the European Neighbourhood Policy, which covers countries in North Africa, the Mediterranean border of the Middle East (including Israel and the Palestinian Authority) and the other European states of the former Soviet Empire, excluding Russia.

The neighbourhood policy is about protecting the European Union’s borderlands, although if some of the countries get their economic act together some European businesses may eventually move there. That is likely to be some time off. Most are very poor, few would be mistaken for democracies and many are politically unstable. An immediate concern is their refugees crossing the Mediterranean — sometimes in vessels as unstable as the countries they are leaving.

Any examination of Europe poses difficult questions. Even if its geographical bounds can be determined — its geographic centre is probably in Poland — it remains difficult to explain what it represents. Membership of the European Union is one defining characteristic, at least for part of the continent. There are currently 28 members. According to the union’s Copenhagen Declaration, this membership requires a stable democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law, a functioning market economy and the acceptance of the obligations of membership, including EU law. These requirements represent a barrier to any closer relationship between Russia and the union.
As difficult as relations with some of the littoral states are, they pale into insignificance compared to those with Russia. The eastern margins of the European Union are insulated by Belarus and Ukraine. However, the Russian-backed rebels in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of the latter and the seizure of Crimea suggest the buffer may not be robust. In addition, Russia directly borders Finland, Estonia and Latvia.¹ (The latter two are about one-quarter Russian people; Ukraine has about a sixth — not all may want to rejoin the authoritarian Russian homeland.)

Almost every boundary of Europe is ambiguous — the exception may be the English Channel. Perhaps what the European Union is really about is how to make such boundaries irrelevant. It may be increasingly successful for the internal boundaries, while some of the external boundaries may become more fluid too. But its eastern boundary will remain problematic for some time. Russia wants to play a non-EU game. On the two general principles of the Copenhagen criteria it gets a zero score.

Different economy
Russia is a different sort of economy from most of Europe. It is unashamedly crony capitalist and is dependent on extractive industries. In the classification of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s Why Nations Fail, it has an extractive politics in which money is made by rents from natural resources and state-licensed monopolies that inhibit the development of a modern industrial economy because entrepreneurial initiative is thwarted.

Russia normally runs a current account surplus but still has to borrow to offset the capital outflow, most of which is funds moved offshore by the rich beneficiaries of the extractive policies, and who — given the arbitrary nature of Russian political life — have usually moved with them. So the economy is not benefiting from the surpluses even were there opportunities to invest.

While Russia sees itself as endowed with hydrocarbon resources the world needs, the fracking revolution is likely to hold the long run price of oil below that on which Russia currently depends — say US$70 a barrel; the Russian budget is predicated on $110. The energy resources may be vast, but they are difficult to extract and Russia does not have a reputation for efficiency of extraction. There appears to be no Plan B.

From a world, or even European, perspective what is curious about Russia is that despite its belligerence, it is a puny nation compared to the European Union. Its population is about 28 per cent of that of the union (but still larger than any member state). Its economy ranks behind Germany, France, Britain and Italy by GDP and is about a fifth of the EU total. True, it has nuclear weapons (as have Britain and France) and a leader much less constrained by popular democracy or by pressures from other leaders. As Hitler showed, a bloody-minded authoritarian leader can, in the short term, make some inroads into democracies, but the democratically elected German chancellors who have followed him have had a more lasting legacy.

Long delay
My expertise is economics not politics, but even I can hazard that were the current Russian regime to fall, it would be many decades before the country might be able to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Yet in the long run Russia has to make some accommodation with the European Union. No doubt, as occurred in Ukraine, there are people who already wish that, although they are powerless in the current regime.

Possibly Putin is playing a very short game without much long run strategy. As the West diversifies out of Russian gas, he is looking east to China and Japan. China also has non-energy interests in Russian Asia. To China, with 20 per cent of the world’s population and only 7 per cent of its water, the Siberian rivers must look attractive.

Russia is also puny relative to China, whose economy is about the same in size as the European Union’s and whose population is twice as large. Shying away from a more positive relationship with the European Union may precipitate Russia into becoming a client state of China. Perhaps there is a role for Russia as a mediator between China and Europe.

When I tried to discuss these issues with young Brussels bureaucrats from the east of the European Union, I got manifest hostility. They and their families had been too brutalised under the Soviet Empire to take a charitable approach. Those I spoke to further to the east were too worried about Russian aggression towards Ukraine (and potential aggression towards the Baltic states) to look too far ahead.

Yet the current situation is unstable and Putin’s vision of Russia is unsustainable. Ultimately there has to be some accommodation, especially given the major contributions Russia has made to the idea of Europe — in literature, mathematics, music, science and the visual and performing arts. In the interim the European Union has to reaffirm that it sees a country that in the long run will be a welcome partner, without flinching from the first two principles in the Copenhagen declaration.

NOTE
¹ In fact Poland and Lithuania also have borders with Russia, by virtue of the Kaliningrad enclave.
Together in struggle

Yosef Livne looks at wartime links between New Zealand and Jewish Palestinian soldiers.

Early in October 2012, I was appointed to be Israel’s new ambassador to New Zealand. A few weeks later, while on a study tour of sites associated with the Shoah (Jewish Holocaust) in Poland, I visited the Commonwealth plot in the Rakowicki cemetery in Krakow. Our guide took us there to pay tribute to thirteen Jewish soldiers from Palestine, then a British mandate, who had enlisted in the British Army fighting the Germans. All of them were taken prisoner of war by the Germans and died while in captivity. As I stood with my head bowed I saw also the tombs of New Zealand soldiers, buried alongside. I knew how the former found final rest there. All of them had been taken prisoner of war early on in the Second World War and were either killed or died while in captivity — but Kiwis? Most were not flyers. So who were they and how come they ended alongside the Jewish soldiers from Palestine? Were they also prisoners of war? How did they die? Did they share the degradation at the same camp? In short, many questions that needed answers.

As I began to search for answers, I discovered new information. True, I found little evidence that our prisoners had the chance to mingle. I did, however, realise that there were points of contact prior to captivity. I decided to pursue the matter further.

The answer is fairly simple. The link between New Zealand men in uniform and my country goes back a long way. Our march began in the First World War, many years before Israel became a state. It passed through Gallipoli, where Zionist volunteers were present alongside ANZAC troops. It then moved to the dunes of the Holy Land, where Kiwi soldiers fought against Turkish soldiers near Nes Ziona and Rishon LeZion in the Judean plain and around Beersheba, liberating what today is Israel from the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, there are several monuments around the country honouring their sacrifice. Should not we ask ourselves whether our paths crossed in the Second World War? As the newly designated ambassador to New Zealand, I felt it was my duty to take up the task. So, now, 70 years after VE Day, I humbly present this essay.

The link between New Zealand men in uniform and Israel goes back a long way. The first contacts took place during the First World War, many years before Israel became a state. At Gallipoli, Zionist volunteers served alongside Anzac troops. New Zealand mounted riflemen fought the Ottomans in the dunes of the Holy Land near Nes Ziona and Rishon LeZion in the Judean plain and around Beersheba, liberating what today is Israel from the Ottoman Empire. New Zealand and Jewish soldiers fought alongside each other in Greece, North Africa and Italy, and were held in the same prison of war camps in German-occupied territory.

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Jewish volunteers

Our journey starts at the beginning of the war. The struggle to defeat Hitler motivated many among the Jewish population in the British mandate of Palestine to enlist in the British Army. It is beyond the scope of this essay, but the task was not so easy. Yet in 1940 hundreds joined what became known as the Royal Auxiliary Pioneers. Those who joined this unit were basically meant to be employed in such tasks as building fortifications and working on docks and wharfs and had no military training. In fact, many of those who joined this branch came from the ranks of the labour movement and were either workers themselves or members of collective settlements (kibbutzim).

The first encounter between Kiwi and Hebrew troops that I found took place in 1940 in Mersa Matruh, Egypt. In BeKavlei Shevi, his memoirs in Hebrew (In Shackles of Captivity), Shlomo Soldash, a soldier in the Royal Auxiliary Pioneers, tells of his encounters with Kiwis. His 605th Company built bunkers side by side with New Zealand soldiers. Later, the pioneers were transferred to Greece. Near Larissa, pioneers and New Zealanders worked together at a weapons depot. The battle of Greece saw both Hebrew and New Zealand troops facing off against the German Army. Although the pioneers had very little (if any) military training, they took part in the fighting. According to Soldash, the Kiwis were amazed by the speed with which their Palestinian comrades mastered the different weapons given to them. Similar testimony to that of Soldash is offered by Josef Almog, who was a sergeant in the pioneers and later rose to become secretary-general of the Histadrut Trade Union movement and minister of labour in Israel. In his book BeRosh Muram (With Head Held High, Jewish Soldiers in Nazi Captivity) he also tells of opposition to the Germans. A group of Hebrew soldiers joined other soldiers under the command of New Zealand and Australian officers and together went on a counter-attack against the German advance units at the entrance to the Kalamata port, taking half of them prisoners.

Unfortunately, this act of bravery did not change the outcome. Greece fell to the Germans and many soldiers, among whom were both Kiwis and Jewish Palestinians, were taken prisoner of war.

Fortunate escape

Among the soldiers in Greece was Yitzhak Persky. Persky was a volunteer, though at 42 he was well beyond enlistment age.
One of his sons would become one of Israel’s most important statesmen — Shimon Peres. The story of Persky varies, depending on the source, and yet it is relevant. Following the defeat in Greece, Persky found refuge in a monastery called Hassia. At one point he joined other soldiers near the village of Lamia and boarded a motor launch hoping to reach nearby Turkey. While on their way, the Germans attacked the boat and a New Zealand soldier who stood next to him was killed. The boat’s commander, fearing for the life of the Jewish Persky, ordered him to place the dead Kiwi soldier’s ‘dog tags’ round his neck, and the dead soldier was given a burial at sea. To this moment, I have not been able to identify the identity of the dead soldier, nor the exact date of the event. Nevertheless, the story appears in different forms — the latest in the 27 January 2013 edition of the Israeli daily Yediot Achronot.

Later, while on a military train to a POW camp in Germany, Persky and a New Zealand soldier tried to escape. The German officer in charge ordered the two to be shot. Intervention by a brave Australian Methodist clergyman, Rex Dakers, saved their lives.

In a way, this story brings us to Lamdorf and Stalag VIII-B, where so many soldiers from different parts of the British Empire had been taken. The soldiers were housed according to their origin. The question that comes to my mind is if any point did the prisoners have a chance to meet?

Turning our attention to the Middle East and North Africa, there are several meeting points between New Zealander and Jewish Palestinian. Kfar Vitkin, a co-operative village located about 35 kilometres north of Tel Aviv, became a convalescence place for New Zealand soldiers. It was also the site of a dental care unit. Our country saw New Zealand troops worked on the railway lines connecting Haifa and Transjordan. 

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while some of them had the chance of visiting kibbutzim, such as Degania, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. In September 1941, thousands of soldiers marched through Tel Aviv in a parade designed to promote enlistment. A New Zealand military band headed the parade. Later, a Hebrew transport company, 462th, took part in moving the New Zealand Division from Syria to Egypt to face the Afrika Korps.

**Moving story**

One of the most moving stories is that of a friendship struck up between a Jewish soldier, a member of Kibbutz Na’an, and a young soldier from New Zealand — as told in a series of letters the Jewish soldier wrote to his family back home. Although I am still engaged in an effort to identify this New Zealand soldier, the tale of the friendship, which stretches over a year, is very moving indeed. Hopefully, this essay will help in discovering the family of the soldier, of whom all we know is that his last name was ‘Tate’ and that his mother’s name was Elinora or Leonora. Their friendship came to an end when the author is told of his friend’s death. We also know he went out to look for his burial site — to no avail. Whether that young man is one of the missing in action with no known grave is a mystery that still needs to be clarified.

In 1944, the British government authorised the formation of the Jewish Brigade. Their contact with New Zealand troops began en route from Egypt to Italy aboard HMS Alcantara, when they joined for an evening sing-a-long.

As the Jewish Brigade deployed in Italy, its officers were seconded to other Allied units to further their experience. The first battalion was posted along the Senio River. Its intelligence officer, Captain Arie Simon, was attached to the 28th (Maori) Battalion. In his memoirs, he relates that the very day he arrived he took part in an operation designed to capture a German courier. Simon’s fluent German — he was born in Germany — became very useful, since he was the only one who could pronounce the password and hence capture the enemy soldier or could question him.

Is this the end of the trip? I doubt it very much. I still hope to be able to track down the Tate family whose son became a friend of a Hebrew soldier. Who knows, I may even be able to identify the soldier whose dog tags saved Persky’s life. However, even if I do not, the story is still there. It is a story of camaraderie in the face of supreme adversity. In the film The Maltese Falcon, Humphrey Bogart defines the statuette as the stuff that dreams are made of. I believe that the story of the encounters between Kiwi and Hebrew soldiers in Gallipoli and Palestine and later during the Second World War are the stuff that should help in building lasting friendship.

**NOTES**

5. Picture collection of Norman Leaf.
This book is timely inasmuch as it promises to shed light on Putin’s motives for his recent aggressiveness towards Ukraine and other neighbouring countries and, more broadly, the West.

The author traces the evolution of Russia’s security policies during the period of Putin’s dominance of the Kremlin. Her focus is on how Russia responded to the uprising in Chechnya and clashes in the North Caucasus, and also to the challenges of globalisation, the financial crisis and the initiatives of Western powers. She finds that during the period 2000–14 Russia evolved from an acknowledged weak state into a self-proclaimed strong state, one now attempting to play the role of a major power.

When Russia was internally divided and weak its leaders were conciliatory towards the Western powers, accommodating to China and partners such as Ukraine, Cuba and Venezuela, and co-operative in international organisations. But as Russia strengthened with oil and gas revenue windfalls and consolidation of the Kremlin’s authority throughout Russia, especially in Chechnya, the leaders became more assertive of Russia’s unique interests and status, and less amenable to Western norms.

However, developments in the past year seem to be anomalous. As Russia has weakened economically under pressure from the global financial crisis, falling energy export revenues, capital flight and sanctions by the European Union and the United States, Putin has not become more conciliatory, as past Russian behaviour might suggest, but more defiant. Putin’s rhetoric is described by the author as increasingly nationalistic, patriotic and anti-Western. The anomaly is explained by the author’s key theme, that external security policies are a function of the leader’s perceptions of domestic security needs. Now that Putin has seized control of the oligarchs, the energy establishment, the leader’s perceptions of domestic security needs. Now that Putin has seized control of the oligarchs, the energy establishment, the political and financial structures and the media, he perceives Russia to be a ‘strong state’ domestically, despite an absence of objective confirmation, and projects that perception through his muscular security policies. Unexamined by the author is the hypothesis that Putin’s bluster is a compensation for regime weakness, a ploy to rally a disgruntled population behind a leader to protect the country from threats that the leader has deliberately contrived.

Infusing the book’s narrative are concepts of the post-modernist ‘critical security analysis’ approach as championed by the Copenhagen School and applied by Buzan and Waever in their 1998 treatise Security: A New Framework for Analysis. The author’s method was to apply discourse analysis to the communications of Russia’s leaders to discern the leaders’ beliefs and aspirations and consequent security policies. This academic approach offers another dimension to an understanding of Russia’s policies, and post-modern scholars may find value in Snetkov’s methodology. But this reviewer believes that an orthodox analysis would have been more useful to the general reader.

Nevertheless, the reader can skip the academic passages and still take away a useful insight: that states’ external security policies are profoundly shaped by the regime’s domestic security need (and vice versa) and both should be analysed together. Thus Putin’s domestic authoritarianism and his foreign policy aggressiveness operate in tandem, each reinforcing the other.

But those hoping for a prognosis of Russia’s future security policy trajectory, or for policy guidance as to how Western governments should respond to Putin’s increasingly erratic steerage of Russia’s relations with Europe and the United States, will have to look elsewhere.

STEPHEN HOADLEY

IS THE AMERICAN CENTURY OVER?

Author: Joseph S. Nye, Jr

Assuming his guise as a conservative pundit, comedian Stephen Colbert once quipped that ‘our greatest days are ahead of us, and we have the greatest history in the history of history, but this instant right now is completely screwed up, and we’ve got to save America from disaster’ (interview with NPR, 4 October 2012). In amongst discussions of a possible US decline comes the sober analysis of Joseph Nye; one of the most astute observers of global politics and the commentator that has done most to popularise the importance of ‘soft power’.

To Nye, there are specific types of power, and how they are
combined has a resulting impact on global reach and influence. These are factors of hard power (forces of coercion and economic might) and soft power (the attractiveness of a given society). How does the United States track on these measures?

Nye notes, as a starting point, that it is a myth that the United States was ever hegemonic, and prefers to talk about ‘primacy’ or ‘half hegemony’ instead. He notes that fears of American decline have been around since about the end of the Second World War, about the time that the United States accepted a consistent global role, and the public became seized of the notion of potentially falling behind (to the Soviet Union in that era). He also rejects comparisons to the empires of the past, noting that that of the American Century can only be described as an ‘empire by invitation’. If networks, rather than hierarchies, are significant in the modern world, the United States still has a substantive set of treaty allies (Nye calculates 60), and a larger number that ‘lean towards’ (100) the United States. Only 21 ‘lean against’. Nye notes that the European Union, which enhances Western hard and soft power, is in fact the world’s largest economy if taken in aggregate.

The two core discussion points that emerge about American power in contemporary times are internal weaknesses (absolute decline) and/or the rise of China (relative decline). On the first of these questions, Nye is not blind to America’s myriad social problems. He also notes Washington’s growing polarisation, and worries if the slow-by-design American political system is fit for purpose in the modern age. Nonetheless, there is no particular sense in the United States that democracy itself is illegitimate. Furthermore, the US economy is well underway to recovery, while, arguably, the country has continued to make significant social advantages even while some issues remain entrenched. On the second proposition of relative decline, namely the rise of China, again Nye sees a mixed story. Nye is wary of flat line projections that have China overtaking the United States in economic terms. The US economy is still twice the size of China’s, and, perhaps more importantly, Chinese per capita incomes are only at 20 per cent of US rates. It remains to be seen if China can yet make the transition from a middle-income country to an advanced economy. Nye notes that it is entirely possible that China never makes that transition. At the same time, the United States and China have become economically entwined, in part a deliberate policy choice of the Clinton administration to integrate China into global trade and the World Trade Organisation. Nye acknowledges that China has closed the military gap in some significant ways, but the United States retains a 10:1 advantage. But where Nye finds Beijing particularly wanting is on soft power. Nye concludes that China has made the mistake of thinking that soft power can be driven by government, when in fact soft power is largely driven by civil society. ‘The best propaganda is not propaganda.’ While Nye acknowledges that domestic weaknesses in the United States, and foreign policy mistakes (like the invasion of Iraq), have worked against America’s reputation, it remains the case that the United States is still a magnet for global immigration. (In fact Nye adjudges immigration to be a crucial regenerative element to US power over a long period of time.) To Nye, China’s attempts at soft power, such as Confucius institutes, do little or nothing to extend China’s positive influence.

The book goes on to note that discussion of a return to American isolationism is misplaced. Successive US administrations have pursued either maximalist or retrenchment policies in office, but future leaders are unlikely to disregard some permanent interests. There is not a question in Nye’s mind that the United States will abandon a global role. In fact, he sees an inherent danger in any administration that might over-extend the United States, such as occupations in Vietnam and Iraq. Meanwhile, a surprising number of post-war US presidents have pursued some form of retrenchment of the American global role, thereby sometimes enhancing US strength; famously Carter and Obama have done this, but Nye adds Eisenhower and Nixon to the list.

In summary, Nye’s argument is that whatever the American Century represented in the past, it was never one of unbridled control of global affairs, even during its unipolar moment at the point of the breakup of the Soviet Union. But, by the same token, US primacy, but not dominance, looks set to continue in global affairs for decades to come. This is partly a result of continued hard and soft power advantages, but increasingly because international networks are growing in significance in terms of outcomes in global affairs.

ANTHONY SMITH

WORLD WAR TWO FROM ABOVE: An Aerial View of the Global Conflict

Author: Jeremy Harwood
Published by: Exisle Publishing Ltd, Auckland, 208pp, $44.99.

Bletchley Park’s role in decoding German Enigma messages is rightly credited with shortening the Second World War and saving millions of lives. But the work of photo reconnaissance and interpretation contributed at least as much to detecting enemy threats both technical and tactical. Without the eyes in the sky and the forensic expertise to make meaning of what the photos revealed, much firepower and many months would have been wasted, and many more lives lost. Outcomes critical to the Allies’ victory, such as the D-Day landings, could well have turned out very differently. This aspect of World War Two From Above provides a compelling thread through Jeremy Harwood’s wide-ranging account of air power, both soft and hard, during the greatest conflict the world has known.

Harwood begins this 208-page tour d’horizon with the rapid emergence of aerial photography during the First World War, describing how air combat and photo reconnaissance developed in tandem, yet demonstrating the greater significance of the photographic mapping to where the war would be won or lost, namely understanding the vulnerabilities and defensive strengths of the
An American bomber attacks a German target

Opposing armies on the Western Front. By mid-1917 Germany was taking more than 4000 photos a day, and in the last ten months of the war alone, the Western powers amassed more than 10 million photos of the shifting frontlines.

By the global conflict to follow just 21 years later, the balance was shifting in favour of air power as a determinant of victory. Harwood describes this explosive evolution in snappy segments, among them: the ‘Blitzkrieg’ victories over France and low countries; Britain’s desperate monitoring and bombing of the German invasion fleet in the French and Belgian Channel ports and the Battle of Britain in which the Luftwaffe failed to gain the air supremacy to enable the barges to bear the Wehrmacht across to England’s south and eastern coasts. The night-time ‘Blitz’ of British cities over the winter of 1940–41 proved wrong the predictions that targeting civilians would break the spirit of resistance — as the Bomber Command chief, Air Marshal Harris, found with the strategic bombing offensive that produced such conflagrations as the firestorms of Hamburg in 1943 and Dresden in 1945. Harwood paints the gradation as the military initiative and advantage swung in favour of the Allies, through to the firebombing of Japanese cities, culminating in the dropping of the two atomic bombs.

Harwood gives due credit to the various means by which each side improved how they ‘saw’ the enemy, for both attack and defensive purposes: the destruction of Coventry in November 1940 was an horrific triumph of radio-guided navigation, while the development of the ground-scanning H2S radar on RAF bombers not only added new precision to target-finding but also emitted signals that led Luftwaffe nightfighters onto them. In defensive terms, RAF Fighter Command’s blunting of the Luftwaffe armadas during the Battle of Britain was made possible by the precision of radar detection — technology that originated in Germany, yet which the Luftwaffe chief, Hermann Goering, failed to take seriously enough to prioritise its destruction. Germany quickly caught up, erecting a chain of radar detection that stretched from the Swiss border to the Dutch coast, and using these to direct nightfighters onto passing bombers and to zero flak batteries onto them with devastating effect.

Overall, Harwood’s narration sustains a crackling pace, as could be expected from an account of an electronic as well as a weapons arms race in the air with such high stakes and wide repercussions. His writing is as punchy as his subject and full of fascinating details that reward close reading. The photographs are well chosen and captioned, and supported by excellent colour campaign maps and thumbnail profiles of key aircraft in many key European and Pacific theatres of the war. By the book’s end the reader has no doubt the war from above either trumped or decisively supported success on land and sea.

Harwood’s most compelling synthesis is in demonstrating how photo reconnaissance and interpretation developed from a patchwork puzzle into a highly specialised field that became the ‘brains behind many operations’, both detecting and countering new threats with the potential to alter the course of the war. He makes very clear that the factor that gave Britain the critical edge in this aspect of intelligence warfare was human more than technical. Unlike Germany, the RAF realised from the start of the war that maintaining an accurate picture of military developments in German-controlled territory could do much to offset Britain’s serious deficit in military manpower and equipment. Nazi Germany on the other hand — though having photo-mapped much of Britain and the western stretches of the Soviet Union before it attacked both — seemed by Harwood’s account to lapse into complacent group-think once the fighting began in earnest.

Japan also suffered from self-imposed myopia, doing little to develop its aerial reconnaissance despite the role this played in the December 1941 triumphs of Pearl Harbor and the sinking by torpedo bombers of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales. Japan’s defeat at the Battle of Midway in June 1942 was one stunning consequence: Japan’s carrier force commander, Vice-Admiral Nagumo, was totally unaware of the approaching US carrier force that was to prove the nemesis of his own. Midway crippled the Japanese navy as an offensive force — an early turning point in the Pacific War.

Britain meanwhile continued to build its air intelligence capacity in both numbers and sophistication. Its central nervous system, RAF Medmenham — housed in a stately manor west of London — grew from 230 staff to 3000 over the course of the war. It recruited an eclectic workforce, including artists and silversmiths, to convert imagery into scale models — used, for instance, in planning the Dam Busters’ raid against the Ruhr dams in May 1943, and detailed miniatures of the Normandy beaches to aid the amphibious and airborne D-Day assaults in June 1944. Interpretations of photos — often of military build-ups or weaponry not yet unleashed by Germany — proved decisive in blunting their damage. The detection of the testing site of V-1 and V-2 rockets at Peenemunde, on the Baltic Coast, led to another of the most successful precision bombing attacks of the war, just three months after the Dam Busters raid. Continued surveillance of V-1 and V-2 rocket launching sites in the Pas de Calais and Cherbourg allowed the destruction of many and the prevention of even wider carnage in Britain.

Harwood’s account is not complete nor without minor flecks. While his careful fact-checking is strongly in evidence, it is not flawless: he claims the German attack on France through the Ar
dennes in May 1940 was undetected, whereas a Spitfire pilot actually photographed the panzer concentrations on the wooded roads and warned London but was ignored — again, interpretation held the key. Harwood devotes three pages to the Battle for Crete, yet inexplicably buttons into one sentence both the Allies’ September 1944 ‘Operation Market Garden’ to capture the Rhine bridges in occupied Holland — the biggest airborne assault likely ever to be mounted — and Germany’s ‘Battle of the Bulge’ Ardennes offensive in December 1944, in which US airborne troops narrowly held the line, with no relief for weeks because bad weather prevented the Allies bringing their air superiority to bear.

In places, more strategic context would have helped to drive home the significance of air power. One example is the decisive importance of Fighter Command’s south-eastern sector commander, New Zealander Keith Park, eschewing the ‘big wing’ amassing of fighters in the Battle of Britain in favour of small, quickly deployed squadrons. Another was the critical role Malta played in deploying aircraft to attack Axis shipping crossing the Mediterranean to resupply Italian and German Afrika Korps troops. By then, again Air Vice-Marshal Park was in command — a good thing for the New Zealand and other soldiers reversing Rommel’s advance and building up to the victory at El Alamein in November 1942. Bomber Command’s 44 per cent fatality rate is neither mentioned nor the significance of its contribution explained, including allowing Churchill to describe it to Stalin as the ‘second front’ drawing German manpower and resources from the Eastern Front.

Despite these areas where more might have filled out the picture, World War Two From Above is a fine book and one of the best in its genre for letting pictures tell a story that, in no small measure, was about the power of pictures as an instrument of war.

STEVEN HARRIS
The NZIIA’s 25th Annual Dinner was held at the Wellington Club on the evening of 16 June as the usual prelude to the National Council. One hundred and thirty guests were present, with Dr Brook Barrington, the recently appointed chief executive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as guest of honour. He delivered a thoughtful address between courses. (The text can be found elsewhere in this issue.) Auckland branch stalwart Dr Stephen Hoadley’s elevation to life membership was announced during the dinner.

The National Council met in the same venue next morning. Opening proceedings, the president, Sir Douglas Kidd, noted the passing of two NZIIA personalities since the last council — former president Professor Gordon Orr and former Standing Committee member Erima Henare.

The election of officers followed. Sir Douglas, Professor Rob Rabel and Professor Athol Mann were all re-elected by acclamation. Dr Anthony Smith, who has been acting as chair of the Research Committee following the departure of Dr John Subritzky on posting as high commissioner in Malaysia, was elected to the position. Dr Hoadley was formally elected as a life member, and all honorary vice presidents were re-elected. With regard to the Standing Committee, three members — Adele Mason, Anthony Scott and Richard Nottage — stood down, and Nic Keating and Dr Negar Partow were elected as co-opted members.

In accepting re-election Sir Douglas predicted an ‘exciting and troubling year’ ahead internationally. He noted a number of bright spots in the NZIIA’s 2014 programme, including two addresses by Prime Minister John Key. Numerous high profile speakers had been hosted. He especially commended the increased participation of students and younger people, and urged branches to reach out to them.

Executive Director Peter Kennedy, who is shortly to relinquish his position, reported that the National Office is running well. He noted several measures taken in the last two years to improve the performance of the institute, including the new website and the new financial accounting system. He thanked all who had supported him during his tenure, especially Executive Secretary Synonne Rajanayagam. Later in the meeting it was announced that Maty Nikkhou-O’Brien would succeed him in early August.

In reporting on the NZ International Review, Dr Ian McGibbon noted the troubling blow out in the deficit this year, caused mainly by a fall off in membership, which he suggested was a warning sign for the institute. The council noted that plans were in train to change the printer, recently obtained quotes having indicated that a considerable saving can be made in this area.

Athol Mann presented his report. He noted the importance of seminars in ensuring a healthy financial position as instanced by the very successful Arctic/Antarctic seminar earlier this year. The council approved his draft budget. Honorary Vice President Professor Don Trow’s agreement to review the accounts was noted; he will replace Roy Tiffen.

Delegates from seven of the NZIIA’s ten branches were present. Auckland chair Gregory Thwaite noted a uniformly high
quality of speakers but fluctuating audiences. A worrying development was the loosening of ties with the university, which in turn has meant less student interest.

Christchurch chair, Dr Chris Jones, reported a busy year, with fourteen meetings. A steep decline in membership was attributable to changes in the subscription structure but work by the treasurer will hopefully turn this situation around. The branch has clarified arrangements regarding the use of university facilities and aims to expand its current programme of events.

Former branch chair and NZIIA Life Member Ken Aldred represented the Napier branch in the absence of current chair Dr Richard Grant. He noted the problems of attracting young people to meetings and of obtaining speakers. A very successful meeting had been held with Israeli ambassador Yosef Livne.

Hugo Judd, Nelson’s chair, reported a successful year, with an increasing membership. Attendance at meetings, of which there had been eleven, was usually around 80.

Jen Scoular reported on Tauranga, our newest branch, pointing out that low membership had led to a low level of activity. Several successful meetings had been held.

Reporting on Timaru, stalwart Brian Foley indicated that the branch was struggling to survive, with declining membership. Several excellent meetings had been held, and there were hopes for an improvement in the branch fortunes this year.

New chair of the Wellington branch Brian Lynch spoke to the report on Wellington’s year provided by the outgoing chair, Peter Nichols. Thirteen speaking engagements were held, with attendances fluctuating between 30 and 200. There had been a significant drop in branch membership, from 238 to 189. He explained that the branch was in good financial heart.

Written reports were tabled from Palmerston North, Waikato and Wairarapa.

Some members of the National Council listen to discussion, with the re-elected treasurer, Athol Mann, at left.

Hugo Judd

Jen Scoular

Brian Foley

Brian Lynch
Dr Stephen Hoadley

Dr Stephen Hoadley began his service to the NZIIA as Auckland branch secretary, then branch president, in the 1970s and 1980s. He also became one of the first contributors to the newly established NZ International Review, starting in 1976 with articles on the New Zealand aid, East Timor and ASEAN. A tabulation in the 1990s found that he was the Review’s most prolific contributor in the 20 years since its founding. He is still a regular contributor of articles and book reviews. His support of the Review is reflected in his role as a corresponding editor, dating from 1976, and his varied contributions to the NZIIA earned him appointment as an honorary vice president. He has authored a series of books published by the NZIIA, including New Zealand and Taiwan (1993), New Zealand and Australia (1995), The US–New Zealand Kiwifruit Dispute (1997), New Zealand United States Relations (2000), Negotiating Free Trade: The New Zealand Singapore CEP Agreement (2002) and New Zealand and France (2005). He also contributed a chapter to New Zealand in World Affairs, Vol II, 1972–1990. In past years he has served on the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament, on the Aid Advisory Committee and on the review panel of the Intelligence Agencies Bill. In 1986 he was one of a four-person NZIIA delegation that visited China.

Stephen is still active as an associate professor of politics and international relations at Auckland University, where he teaches New Zealand diplomacy, European and American foreign policies and economic statecraft, and directs the degree of master of professional studies in international relations and human rights. He regularly lectures on foreign affairs at the NZDF Command and Staff College, where he is an honorary professor, and at courses for the Royal New Zealand Navy, in which he is an honorary captain. Television and radio commentary and public talks on current international events have been one of Stephen’s enthusiasms, starting in 1973 and continuing to the present.
Maty Nikkhou-O’Brien has been appointed executive director of the NZIIA, replacing Peter Kennedy who has concluded his contract. Maty holds an master of science degree in international relations from the London School of Economics and degrees in languages and political and socio-economic studies from the Sorbonne and in Iranian studies from the French Institute for Oriental Studies. She has been involved in international projects as a language engineer, EU programme manager, negotiator and diplomatic and trade facilitator. Maty has built an extensive business network that includes diplomats, senior company executives, political analysts and international civil servants. She co-founded and directed Diplosphere, a successful and innovative think tank on international affairs, that has held well attended panel discussions, some of which have been broadcast by national media. Diplosphere has tackled topics such as ‘ISIL: Motivations and Implications for New Zealand’, ‘Tensions in Iraq: What Implications for New Zealand, Candidate for UNSC?’, and ‘Perspectives on the Crisis in Ukraine: Should New Zealand Be Worried?’. These discussions open the debate on international issues to New Zealanders from all walks of life. Maty’s main interests are the international relations of the Middle East, conflict resolution, economic diplomacy, Iran and US foreign policy. She is the author of various articles and a French book on Maoritanga and has had wide experience with the media, including Arte French/German TV channel, Radio France Internationale and the BBC. She speaks French, English, German and Persian and has some knowledge of classical Greek and Maori. She took up her position on 4 August.
AN INVITATION

If you are interested in international affairs and you are not already a subscriber to the New Zealand International Review, consider the advantage of receiving this magazine on a regular basis. New Zealand International Review completed its thirty-ninth consecutive year of publication in 2014. It continues to be the only national magazine exclusively devoted to national issues as they affect New Zealand. Issued bimonthly it is circulated throughout New Zealand and internationally. The Review is non-partisan, independent of government and pressure groups and has lively articles from local and international authors, with special emphasis on New Zealand’s international relations. It contains:
- stimulating and up-to-date articles on topical issues,
- reviews of recent book releases,
- details of other NZIIA publications,
- information on national and branch activities.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Price</th>
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<td>NZ$85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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