Jacinda Ardern continues to forge a more US-friendly foreign policy
First published by the Democracy Project. https://democracyproject.nz/. This article can be republished under a Creative Commons CC BY-ND 4.0 license.
Ardern mentioned China only once by name when she spoke to the US business summit in Auckland on Monday, but Beijing was clearly on her mind throughout the 3000-word address.
Some of the hardest-hitting passages came early in the speech and appeared deliberately indirect and oblique, leaving it up to listeners to make up their own minds on the intended likely target of the PM’s words.
For example, Ardern said that New Zealand had ‘held firmly to our independent foreign policy but also to our values. When we see a threat to the rules-based order we rely on, we act.’
While most people would immediately think of New Zealand’s recent moves against Russia – which Ardern discussed in subsequent parts of the speech – the lack of specificity of these initial remarks also allowed for more liberal interpretations involving China.
Joe Biden employed similar ‘double duty’ tactics in his landmark address in Warsaw in late March, although he was less subtle than Ardern. Biden told his audience in Poland that ‘the forces of autocracy have revived all across the globe. Its hallmarks are familiar ones — contempt for the rule of law, contempt for democratic freedom, contempt for the truth itself.’
Jacinda Ardern’s heavy focus throughout her speech on the importance of rules and agreements was another way to signal that New Zealand is currently on the same page as the rest of the West. The Prime Minister gave her audience something of a history lesson, reminding them of the role New Zealand played in the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 and in the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the forerunner of today’s World Trade Organization (WTO).
Given that some of the West’s biggest complaints about China relate to the country’s trade practices – such as supposedly unfair subsidies and the imposition of tariffs to punish countries for unrelated matters, as Australia found out in 2020 – the purpose of Ardern’s history lesson on the origins of the WTO was obvious.
Of course, all of Ardern’s indirectness and obliqueness was not without good reason and the Prime Minister would be fully aware of the sensitivities. With a third of New Zealand’s exports heading to China every year, Wellington can ill afford to get offside with Beijing.
Indeed, until last year, Wellington thought that it had found a way to thread the needle and balance the competing interests of both China and the US. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February has forced New Zealand to align itself more closely with the West.
This new position understandably carries a degree of unfamiliarity and awkwardness for New Zealand policymakers who had been quite happy with the status quo.
But to be fair, a repositioning process of sorts had been underway for some time – and perhaps really began in earnest almost exactly a year ago, when Ardern addressed a similar business summit on New Zealand’s relationship with China.
In that May 2021 speech, the Prime Minister said differences with China were ‘becoming harder to reconcile’ and cited several sensitive issues, such as human rights in Xinjiang and the backsliding of democracy in Hong Kong. Ardern also pointedly noted that New Zealand was a ‘strong supporter of the rules, norms and international frameworks that govern global affairs’.
At the time, Ardern’s critique of China – still modest in scope and tempered by ample praise –seemed like a recalibration following questions about New Zealand’s commitment to the Western cause. In April 2021, foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta signalled that she was unwilling to sign up to Five Eyes joint statements criticising China.
One year later, and with Joe Biden’s calls for ‘unity’ amongst the West very much being the order of the day, Ardern’s speech was never going to include any major criticism of US positions.
This week, the closest Ardern came to criticism was with her comments on American reluctance to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or CPTPP), which she very gently summed up as ‘it would be our preference to see the United States enter the CPTTP.’
Of course, this was not really criticism at all, given that it would very much be the US leadership’s preferred option as well. However, current opinions in Congress make US entry into the CPTPP a non-starter. This explains why Ardern talked up an alternative and much weaker US proposal called the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) that concentrates mainly on trade rules and standards, rather than on market access itself.
For those not interested in reading the tea leaves on Ardern’s speech, a top White House official addressing the same conference was refreshingly open – at least by diplomatic standards – about American expectations of New Zealand and the nature of the perceived threat from China.
Kurt Campbell, who helped to thaw New Zealand’s once-icy relations with the US during the Obama administration and now serves as Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific co-ordinator, told this week’s summit that there had been times in the past when New Zealand had not been strong on ‘hard security’. He added that ‘there is a beginning of a discussion and debate about why New Zealand has to do more’.
Making clear that the debate was not just about Ukraine, Campbell described the future of the Indo-Pacific as the ‘the long game for us’. He also drew a straight line between Beijing and Moscow, describing relations between Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin as a ‘no-holds barred partnership’.
Campbell’s description appeared to be slightly provocative spin on the ‘friendship between the two states has no limits’ line that Xi and Putin included in their joint statement when they met at the Winter Olympics in Beijing in early February.
As usual, Jacinda Ardern’s latest foreign policy address was an exercise in reading between the lines.
But the lines are certainly becoming clearer.
Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Project’s international analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian.
This article can be republished under a Creative Commons CC BY-ND 4.0 https://democracyproject.nz/
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