Celebrating a 50-year link

While many of the political and security imperatives identified in the 1970s for New Zealand to develop a strong relationship with Vietnam resonate today, it has taken time to adjust to the realities of the rapid economic rise of the world’s sixteenth most populous nation. On the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations, Vietnam is now New Zealand’s fourteenth largest trading partner and an acknowledged key partner in regional security. There have been challenges along the way, but various assessments from earlier decades that New Zealand should stay alert to the potential opportunities in this relationship are as valid now as when first made.

‘Vietnam has become the most important country in Indo-China with the capacity to exert a major influence on the future course of events in South-east Asia’ (Bill Rowling, 1975)
‘Viet Nam is a rising star of Southeast Asia with one of the fastest growing economies in the region’ (Christopher Luxon, 2025)

Two prime ministerial statements bookend five decades of diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Vietnam. Perhaps not surprisingly the first, by Prime Minister Bill Rowling,on 26 June 1975, in announcing the establishment of relations with the then Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), took account of the political change in South-east Asia and the need for New Zealand to ‘be in a position to speak directly to the authorities in Hanoi’.1 Indeed, only a few days earlier, Rowling had spoken at the NZIIA’s annual conference about the need to work with the countries of Indo-China ‘for the wider framework of political and economic consultation which lies at the heart of this Government’s regional foreign policy’.²

The second, with a clear economic focus, was from Prime Minister Christopher Luxon on the eve of his February 2025 visit to Vietnam and just ahead of the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh in Hanoi.³ That development made New Zealand only the tenth country with which Vietnam had signed such an arrangement. It brought to mind a remark made during the author’s farewell call on then President Nguyen Minh Triet in August 2009, two years after his own visit to New Zealand. The president remarked that Vietnam was a country with ‘friends and good friends’ — and for him New Zealand was firmly in the latter camp.⁴

The path from one to the other has not been straightforward. Although New Zealand had recognised the DRV in September 1973, its unwillingness to follow DRV prompts to recognise its partner provisional government (PRG) in South Vietnam delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations until the overthrow in 1975 of the Republic of Vietnam government based in Saigon.

But in those intervening years, there were a series of contacts between the New Zealand and DRV ambassadors in Beijing. On one occasion, Ambassador Bryce Harland reminded his counterpart Nguyen Trong Vinh that one of the first actions of the Labour government, elected at the end of 1972, had been to withdraw its remaining troops in South Vietnam and increase aid in Indo-China. It was ready to extend that assistance to the DRV if desired. Indeed, as Harland commented, some assistance had been provided in the north via international channels and the only assistance in the south was in the humanitarian field.⁵ (The civilian surgical unit in the southern province of Binh Dinh, established in 1963, continued operating until 1975.)

Clear rationale

With the fall of Saigon in April 1975, New Zealand formally recognised the PRG in Saigon (later re-named as Ho Chi Minh City). In June of that year, following advice from Prime Minister Rowling (who was also foreign minister), the Cabinet agreed to open formal diplomatic relations with the DRV in Hanoi, and took note of the emergence of two new governments in Saigon and Cambodia. The rationale was clear: reconciliation in Indo-China and the need for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries to live with one another made the case compelling; and relations with Hanoi would ‘also help ensure that an identifiable New Zealand contribution is made to the longerterm reconstruction of Indo-China’.6 In announcing the move on 26 June, the prime minister repeated some of the points about the importance of North Vietnam to the region and added that a communiqué to such effect had been signed by the two countries’ ambassadors in Beijing. Rowling said that at a later date it could prove desirable to open a diplomatic mission in Hanoi but for the moment the relationship would be managed through accreditation of the New Zealand’s ambassador in Beijing, Harland.7

Harland presented his credentials to the vice-president of the DRV, Nguyen Luong Bang, on 14 October. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review reported that the two had had a brief conversation in which they agreed the past was over and the two countries now had to focus on developing good relations for the future. In separate discussions with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, possible assistance in the agricultural sector was canvassed, two-thirds of the country’s work force then being employed in agriculture and related light industries.8

Official Release, 26 June 1975

Establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam

The Prime Minister, Mr Rowling, announced today that the Ambassador in Peking [Beijing], Mr W.B. Harland, and the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)* there, had signed a joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Mr Rowling recalled that when New Zealand had recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1973, the Government had indicated that it would in due course wish to consider the possibility of accrediting a representative to Hanoi.

“North Vietnam has become the most important country in Indo-China,” Mr Rowling said, “with the capacity to exert a major influence on the future course of events in South-east Asia. It is essential, therefore, that the Government should be in a position to speak directly to the authorities in Hanoi, so that we can be in touch with their thinking and be able to express New Zealand’s own viewpoint on matters of common interest.”

The Prime Minister noted that the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam would also enable New Zealand to contribute more effectively to the task of reconstruction and development in the region.

Mr Rowling said that at a later date it could well prove desirable for New Zealand to open a diplomatic mission in Hanoi, but as a first step the Government proposed to accredit to Hanoi the New Zealand Ambassador resident in Peking.

The joint communiqué: Desirous of developing friendly relations between their two countries, the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level as from 26 June 1975.

[*On 2 July 1976 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was replaced by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the formal unification of North and South Vietnam.]

In marked contradistinction to how a proposal might be made in more recent years for the opening of a new embassy around trade opportunities, the case for Hanoi was purely the profound power shifts in Indo-China and the fact that the consequences would surely be felt beyond the immediate region. Brian Lynch, then head of the Asian Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drew attention to a forcible and rapid re-casting of geography and the transformed balance of power. Indo-China, unlike the (then) five countries of ASEAN, he said, had not been an area of uppermost concern, even with the past military involvement. A lengthy period of conciliation and adjustment lay ahead and New Zealand had to be able to speak directly with governments, and to assess their views and policies.⁹

The following year, with the reunification of Vietnam and formation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the two governments confirmed that the arrangements entered into the previous year (under a different New Zealand administration and while there were governments in both Hanoi and Saigon) remained in force.10 In mid-1978, with the opening of a Vietnamese embassy in Canberra, the first resident ambassador was accredited to New Zealand.

Early policy

As noted by Lynch, the policy of the early years was aimed at encouraging Vietnam’s participation in regional and international affairs, thereby reducing distrust and regional tensions, and in part helping constrain the involvement of the Soviet Union. Even if the early years of the relationship were not substantial, New Zealand did back Vietnam’s membership of the Asian Development Bank and, more importantly, its membership of the United Nations on 20 September 1977. While it also joined the World Health Organisation in 1976 and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1981, Vietnam’s participation in major regional and international organisations remained relatively limited even throughout the 1980s.11

During this period, there were a couple of visits to New Zealand by deputy ministers (foreign affairs and agriculture), but none by New Zealand ministers to Vietnam. Ministers occasionally met in the margins of meetings of the UN General Assembly. There were a few visits by members of Parliament, following in the steps of then first-term MP (and later foreign minister) Russell Marshall, who visited both Hanoi and Saigon in 1975 shortly before the fall of South Vietnam; after witnessing a shooting in the latter, he described it as ‘a frightening place’.12

Even ten years after relations were established, the formal connections were limited. This was due in large measure to Vietnam’s 1978 occupation of Cambodia, which ended only in 1990. At one point, in 1986, Trade Minister Mike Moore considered visiting, only to be told that there were no substantial trade opportunities and that, moreover, a visit would not be seen positively by others. Indeed, in 1988, New Zealand’s exports to Vietnam had fallen to a paltry $150,000.13 Vietnam’s lack of hard currency was a major constraint. An aid programme was an early starter, seen as an investment in the future of New Zealand’s trade prospects. In addition to commodity aid and technical assistance to the dairy industry, training awards were made for students to study English at Victoria University of Wellington. Project assistance was cut following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, although the small training programme continued for a while.

This somewhat desultory state of affairs saw its end with Vietnam’s decision, foreshadowed earlier but announced in 1989, that it would withdraw its troops from Cambodia by 1990.

Anticipating this, some new approaches were developed and included in a paper approved by Foreign Minister Marshall in July 1988. Noting the potential for Vietnam to become a leading political and economic force in the region, the paper drew attention to the fact that New Zealand’s policy of limited contacts was actually quite severe compared with those of some of the ASEAN countries and of Australia. It referred to an earlier review process having been mooted but abandoned in 1984, to avoid exacerbating New Zealand’s own difficulties with the United States over ANZUS.

Limited prospects

The policy paper did caution against expecting too much from a change in posture, given limited trade prospects and the parlous state of Vietnam’s financial position. It recommended a return to a small humanitarian programme, more diplomatic engagement (that had been switched from Beijing to Bangkok in 1979) and some invitations for an inward trade mission and ministerial visit.14 The trade mission came in mid-1989, and Marshall made an official visit to Hanoi later in the year. It was the beginning of a welcome expansion in two-way trade. From less than $500,000 in 1975, it reached $40 million ($36 million of which were New Zealand exports) by the time of the twentieth anniversary of diplomatic relations in 1995. Significantly, 1995 was also the year in which Vietnam became the seventh full member of ASEAN, established formal relations with the United
States and concluded a framework agreement with the European Union.

The pace quickened markedly in the 1990s. The New Zealand visit of Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet in 1993 and one the following year by Foreign Minister Don McKinnon to Hanoi marked the beginning of regular exchanges, increased New Zealand assistance and encouraged more substantial trade. When he announced the formation of the Asia 2000 Foundation (now Asia New Zealand Foundation) in January 1994, McKinnon spoke of the ‘drive into Asia’, monitoring the growth of markets such as Vietnam, and foreshadowed the establishment of a resident embassy in Hanoi.15 A Vietnam–New Zealand Business Council had been established in 1993 and held its inaugural meeting in Hanoi in March 1994. A bilateral trade agreement was signed during the McKinnon visit to Hanoi, and a small number of New Zealand companies opened representative offices.

With this growth in mind, some thought was given in Wellington to appointing an honorary consul in Ho Chi Minh City.16 However, in recognition of the potential for more substantial exchange, a full official trade office was established from 1996. A New Zealand embassy had already opened in Hanoi in 1995, David Kersey presenting credentials as the first resident ambassador on 23 August that year. (Vietnam appointed its first resident ambassador to New Zealand in 2003). The high-level visits continued, with Prime Minister Helen Clark in Vietnam in 2003 (and also for APEC in 2006), and Governor-General Dame Silvia Cartright in late 2005. Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited New Zealand that same year. President Nguyen Minh Triet followed in 2007 and Party Secretary Nong Duc Manh in 2009.17

Growing trade

By the time of the 30th anniversary in 2005, New Zealand exports were in the order of $155 million (of which two-thirds were dairy products). Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade Simon Murdoch commented in a letter in mid-2006 that Vietnam more than ever required New Zealand attention and was likely to be the next ‘Asian tiger’. It was essential, he added, for New Zealand to be alert to increasing competition from other countries for the attention of the Vietnamese government — and that in turn required hard work on New Zealand’s part. He made the additional observation that the English Language Training for Officials programme continued to deliver significant longterm benefits to New Zealand as those former students gained seniority in the government system.18

Vietnam joined the World Trade Organisation in early 2007, a signal of its full participation in the global trading environment. Bilaterally, two-way trade continued to flourish, doubling from 2015 to 2020 and reaching $2 billion. By 2024, that figure had extended to $2.7 billion, and Vietnam became New Zealand’s fourteenth largest trading partner.19 A far cry from some of the prognostications of earlier decades.

While trade is a critical factor in the deepening of bilateral relations, which have enjoyed names such as Comprehensive Partnership (2009), Strategic Partnership (2020) and now Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2025), it can be argued that they are all part of a continuum of building the best and strongest links with a country long identified as a heavyweight regional player. New Zealand clearly identifies its future security and prosperity being linked to the success of ASEAN and its members.20

Trade and education have long been at the heart of the relationship. With Vietnam’s young population, global connectivity and rapid economic growth that would have it as one of the top twenty economies within the next 25 years, those earlier views from the beginning of the relationship are eerily prescient.

Educational focus

Education was very much the focus of the remarks made to a NZIIA meeting on 4 February this year by Deputy Foreign Minister Do Hung Viet. Fortuitously, it took place on the premises of Victoria University of Wellington, one of the institutions with a longstanding engagement with Vietnam. In outlining his country’s foreign policy priorities, the pivotal role of ASEAN and the role of the Asia–Pacific region as the principal engine of growth, Viet drew attention to the shared interests and warmth of personal engagement that underpinned the bilateral relationship. Acknowledging the value his country had obtained from having students in New Zealand over the course of many years,21 as well as the involvement of several New Zealand institutions with degree programmes in Vietnam, the deputy minister offered some thoughts on how this might now be taken to a higher level.

In a bow to his country’s own rapid economic development, Viet suggested that educational exchanges might be enhanced through developing an ASEAN Centre of Excellence, that could focus on fields such as high-tech. He also advocated for the establishment of permanent institutional linkages and training programmes and more work on an emerging leadership programme with the venue alternating between the two countries. Without in any way dismissing the value of programmes currently — and previously — followed by Vietnamese students, Viet was gently pointing to the importance of the educational focus moving in step with his country’s own more sophisticated economy.

Vietnam has also paid considerable attention to regional security and its obligations as an international citizen. Through two recent terms on the UN Security Council, participation in UN peacekeeping missions and work on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, it has demonstrated its commitment to regional and global security.22 New Zealand has been a longstanding partner in defence co-operation, through training, regular ship visits and two-way visits of personnel. Vietnam’s location makes it a critical partner in a region facing geopolitical tension. During their exchanges earlier this year in Hanoi, both prime ministers drew attention to the priority of commitment to regional security in response to military expansion.23

Thriving linkages

Important as all the official connections are, and will continue to be, there is now a thriving world of non-governmental, educational, cultural and informal linkages. In part this is due to the impact of tourism in both directions, and the growing number of New Zealanders and Vietnamese living and working in each other’s country. The involvement of non-government organisations in Vietnam is also of long standing. As the Vietnamese economy grows, the nature of assistance will change. But the foundations laid over decades will surely be beneficial as Vietnam, the world’s sixteenth most populous country, due to reach upper middle-income country status in the next few years, takes its place as the economic and strategic partner that was part of the vision 50 years ago.

NOTES
1. NZ Foreign Affairs Review, Jun 1975.
2. Dunedin, 17 May 1975.
3. www.beehive.govt.nz/release/economic-growth-focus-pm’s-visitviet-nam.
4. Noted in author’s valedictory report to Foreign Minister Winston Peters, 24 Aug 2009.
5. Record of meeting, 30 Dec 1974, attached to memo from Bryce Harland, 31 Dec 1974, External Affairs Records, PM58/521/1, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), R22476592.
6. Memorandum for Cabinet 13 Jun 1975, PM58/521/1, ANZ, R22476592. Rowling noted he had cleared the proposal orally and the ministry should proceed.
7. Press statement, 26 Jun 1975.
8. NZ Foreign Affairs Review, Oct 1975.
9. Ibid., Jul 1975.
10. Minister of State and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Sir Keith Holyoake to Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, 5 Aug 1976, PM 58/521/1, ANZ, R22476593.
11. James Kember, ‘Vietnam — New Zealand Cooperation in Multilateral Institutions’, in International Studies (Nghien cu’u Quoc Te), no 2 (73), Jun 2008. Viet Nam joined APEC in 1998 and hosted it for the first time in 2006, and again in 2017.
12. Ian McGibbon, ‘Hon Cedric Russell Marshall CNZM’, obituary, NZ International Review, vol 50, no 2 (2025).
13. Roberto Rabel in Anthony Smith (ed), Southeast Asia and New Zealand (Singapore, 2005), pp.369, 385.
14. ‘Vietnam Policy’, Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Jun 1988, PM 58/521/1, MFAT. The switch of responsibility for Vietnam to the New Zealand embassy in Bangkok was for practical reasons, relating to the increased workload in Beijing. It also followed in the wake of the brief Sino-Vietnamese War in February–March 1979.
15. Speech to Rotary Club of Auckland, 24 Jan 1994, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Bulletin, Dec 1993/Jan 1994.
16. Report from New Zealand Ambassador in Bangkok, 11 Feb 1994, PM58/521/1, MFAT.
17. Among subsequent visits have been those of the two prime ministers John Key and Nguyen Tan Dung in 2015 and most recently Pham Minh Chinh’s visit in 2025. President Triet’s visit was memorable not only for the business transacted but also for a boat ride up the Waimakariri River in which his offer to take the wheel was politely declined by this author and accompanying staff on health and safety grounds.
18. Letter to author, Jul 2006. Vietnam’s first resident ambassador, Tran Hai Hau, had himself been one of those students.
19. Viet Nam & New Zealand at 50: The Next Chapter, Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2025.
20. Press release by Prime Minister Luxon, 20 Feb 2025 (see above note 3).
21. Students, especially in English language, have been part of the relationship from the outset: the first five came in 1977. In 2023, there were over 1700 students here, making Vietnam the ninth largest source market for international students. Viet Nam & New Zealand at 50 (see above note 19).
22. Vietnam Ministry of National Defence, 2019 Viet Nam National Defence (Hanoi, 2019).
23. www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/543114/new-zealand-and-vietnamsign-comprehensive-strategic-partnership.

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