Israel-Iran conflict: Moscow positions itself for advantage

The outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Iran is replete with opportunities for Russia. Moscow is navigating a delicate path, balancing a complex mix of interests and relationships, in seeking to leverage the crisis to its advantage.

At one level, Russia’s response has been entirely orthodox and predictable.

Moscow was quick to “strongly condemn” the Israeli strikes on Iran last Friday as “unprovoked” and “categorically unacceptable”, a “clear violation” of international law, while calling also for restraint, warning of the risks that the war could lead to wider regional destabilisation.

Russia has also engaged in high-level diplomacy, with President Vladimir Putin speaking not only with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but also with US President Donald Trump, offering Russia’s services as a mediator. Moscow has also sought to internationalise the issue, calling for an urgent meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss the crisis.

Given Iran’s support for Russia in its war with Ukraine, notably through Tehran’s provision of much-needed drones and missiles, and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement signed by the two countries in January this year, it might have been expected that Moscow would come out with a more sharply one-sided response to Israel’s attack on Iran.

Yet Moscow’s response has, in fact, been more nuanced and cautious, looking to balance Russia’s complex interests and web of relationships in the region, and beyond.

In particular, Russia has been careful not to allow itself to be boxed in to supporting Iran but instead sought to preserve room for manoeuvre. While Moscow’s relations with Tehran have certainly intensified over the past few years, they’ve remained limited, qualified and transactional, notwithstanding the flowery political rhetoric. The underlying suspicion and rivalry that has historically characterised Russia-Iran relations remain strong. This is apparent in Syria, where Moscow’s wish to prevent Damascus falling completely under Iran’s sway was an underlying factor in its 2015 intervention in support of the Assad regime. Similarly, Russia sees Iran as a strategic rival in the South Caucasus and is wary that Tehran has been looking to take advantage there of Moscow’s preoccupation in Ukraine.

Moreover, Moscow may now be less dependent on Tehran’s military assistance, especially with substantial local production of Iranian-designed Shahed drones underway in Russia. And the impressive-sounding Comprehensive Strategic Partnership doesn’t really seem to add up to much in practical military and security terms; it doesn’t oblige Moscow to provide wartime military support for Tehran, but rather merely stipulates that Russia not provide military support for Iran’s adversary – an unlikely contingency anyway in the case of Israel.

It is important to remember that Russia, no less than Israel and the United States, does not want to see Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability, for all the support it has historically provided for development of Iran’s civil nuclear energy facilities. This is why Moscow was a key party in diplomatic negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.

In responding to the Israel–Iran crisis, Russia is trying to stand above the fray and keep all its options open.

Moscow’s primary interest is to demonstrate and reinforce its global relevance. Russia sees a role for itself as a power broker in the Middle East, leveraging its diplomatic expertise, experience and influence with all parties.

While Russia–Israel ties have cooled over the past few years, as Moscow openly sided with Arab states in opposing Israel’s war in Gaza and southern Lebanon, both sides have been careful not to burn their bridges and to keep channels open.

More broadly, Russia attaches priority to developing closer relations, especially economic, with other key regional states in the Middle East – all of whom harbour deep suspicions of Iran. This includes Saudi Arabia (Moscow’s key partner in managing the global oil market) and the United Arab Emirates (an increasingly important commercial partner for Russia in a sanctions-complicated world). Meanwhile, Russia’s relations with Türkiye, a regional rival to Iran, are complex but functional – and increasingly important, not least economically (Türkiye is a major importer of Russian energy while Türkiye values the economic injection provided by large numbers of Russian tourists facing travel restrictions elsewhere).

Another factor weighing on Moscow’s calculations is its relationship with the United States.

In contacts with the Trump administration over recent months, Russia has underlined the scope for Moscow and Washington to work together to deal with global issues where interests align. Russia can portray the outbreak of war between Israel and Iran as one such opportunity, with Moscow as a potential partner in efforts to defuse the crisis, whether as intermediary or in the context of a longer-term agreement – a view evidently shared by Trump. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov has alluded to a possible role for Moscow in reprocessing Iran’s highly enriched uranium, in the context of an eventual settlement of the Iran nuclear issue.

Moscow will also relish the renewed conflict in the Middle East dominating global media bandwidth, distracting political and public attention, in the United States and Europe, away from Ukraine.

The spike in oil prices, and wider market uncertainty, following Israel’s attack on Iran will also be a helpful windfall for Moscow, given the crucial importance of energy revenue in funding Russia’s war economy.

For all the obvious risks that the Israel–Iran conflict poses for wider regional security and stability, Russia will nonetheless seize on the crisis as an opportunity to advance its interests, reinforce key relationships, and enhance its regional and global standing.

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