New Caledonia’s Bougival Accord offers path beyond independence deadlock

A breakthrough in negotiations might finally see progress towards settling the long-running question of New Caledonia’s political status.

The Bougival Accord, signed on 12 July at a meeting convened by French President Emmanuel Macron, falls short of independence for the Pacific territory but does reflect hard-won concessions by all parties. Much work remains to implement the agreement and prevent a recurrence of the violence that has plagued New Caledonia over the past year.

The result of months of discussion, initial failure, and ten days of exhaustive discussion, the Bougival Accord breaks new ground. It creates a new State within France, with unprecedented double nationality, new Caledonian citizenship alongside French citizenship, its own international relations powers (albeit with “respect” for France’s national interests), and processes to allow for the handover of the last remaining sovereign powers over time.

This marks a new beginning, but not an end. The Accord requires ongoing cooperation between deeply divided parties and must be endorsed in a referendum in February 2026.

The Accord expands local voter eligibility, the issue triggering violence in 2024, and increases the number of seats in the local Congress, slightly reducing the representation of Kanak areas relative to urban Noumea. It sets out further agreements to be concluded, on financial backing by France for economic development; developing the nickel industry equitably, including through more local processing, and supplying Europe (when the main market is currently China); and giving “absolute priority” to helping disaffected young people (meaning young Kanaks, many of whom escalated demonstrations into riots last year) to access education, training and employment.

The new referendum will not be on independence. Instead, all New Caledonians eligible to vote in the three independence referendums held since 2018, including the boycotted 2021 referendum, will vote on the Bougival Accord.

Major concessions have been made by France and the two local sides, loyalists and independence parties.

For France, the Accord’s precedents have possible flow-on effects in its other territories, despite French Minister Manuel Valls suggesting it is for New Caledonia alone.

Having independence leaders participate in the talks at all was a success. France had refused to allow their coalition President to participate after he was recently released from French detention. Independence leaders have accepted that for now, a vote on independence is replaced by a vote on the Accord, although the latter specifically stipulates the continued right to self-determination, and that the new State can negotiate the final sovereign responsibilities. They have also accepted significant opening of voter eligibility, weakening the indigenous vote, and reductions in the Congress seats in the two mainly Kanak provinces.

The loyalist parties, who gained their objective of remaining within France, also secured the realignment of Congress seats to their advantage. However, they have accepted only limited opening of voter eligibility, a new referendum, and the new status and double nationality, anathema for them until now.

Achieving the agreement was difficult. Independence leaders consulted lengthily with their politburo in Noumea on the final evening, meeting Valls at 1AM before a final roundtable at 6AM clinched the deal on 12 July. All leaders publicly described the Accord as a compromise, saying that no one was 100% satisfied.

These difficulties foreshadow future challenges as leaders return home to convince their followers to support their compromises, a point acknowledged by Macron. Independence leader Emmanuel Tjibaou foreshadowed that “delegations will be insulted and threatened” by supporters over aspects of the agreement which delivered “neither unqualified remaining with France, nor an immediate solution to attaining full sovereignty” but was “a necessary convergence of interests, saying much about the strong attachment of both sides to the territory”.

The next steps will each demand cooperation between deeply divided parties.

Both houses of the French national parliament must endorse constitutional change given the nature of the proposals, yet the National Assembly is in a precarious state, with no party in a clear majority and a no confidence motion possible at any turn. The right-wing leader Marine Le Pen has criticised the potential precedent for France’s other overseas territories, claiming the agreement undermines national unity and saying she will seek modifications during parliamentary consideration.

The February 2026 referendum in New Caledonia will be a further test, but not the last. Assuming the Accord wins support, a new Congress will pass a Fundamental Law, essentially a constitution. It will determine a name, flag and anthem for the new State, and define a New Caledonian nationality, determining voting and employment criteria. The new Congress will be decided by provincial elections in June 2026, which will be held with the deeply controversial broader voter eligibility (all those currently eligible, plus those with 15 years of residence to the election date). There will also be an increase in the overall provincial seat numbers, and further difficulties may arise from the planned reduction of seats in mainly Kanak areas.

France will also need to pass a new Organic Law to implement the changes, and the various separate financing, economic, nickel and social agreements must be negotiated.

If the agreement holds, it will deliver much to the wider Pacific region. Not only will it guarantee more economic prosperity and political stability in New Caledonia itself, after years of deep divisions, political impasse, and in 2024, violence, but it will create a new Pacific state with a voice in international affairs.

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